Editing Sentience (section)

== Sentience in philosophy ==
"Sentience" was first coined by philosophers in the 1630s for the concept of an ability to feel, derived from Latin ''[[:wikt:sentiens|sentiens]]'' (feeling).<ref>{{cite web |last= |first= |date= |title=Sentient |url=https://www.etymonline.com/word/sentient |access-date=31 January 2021 |website=Etymology Online |publisher=Douglas Harper}}</ref> In philosophy, different authors draw different distinctions between [[consciousness]] and sentience. According to [[Antonio Damasio]], sentience is a minimalistic way of defining consciousness, which otherwise commonly and collectively describes sentience plus further features of the [[mind]] and consciousness, such as [[creativity]], [[intelligence]], [[sapience]], [[self-awareness]], and [[intentionality]] (the ability to have thoughts about something). These further features of consciousness may not be necessary for sentience, which is the capacity to feel sensations and emotions.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Damasio|first=Antonio|date=October 2001|title=Fundamental feelings|journal=Nature|language=en|volume=413|issue=6858|pages=781|doi=10.1038/35101669|pmid=11677584|bibcode=2001Natur.413..781D|s2cid=226085|issn=1476-4687|doi-access=free}}</ref>

===Consciousness===
According to [[Thomas Nagel]] in his paper "[[What Is It Like to Be a Bat?]]", consciousness can refer to the ability of any entity to have subjective perceptual experiences, or as some philosophers refer to them, "[[qualia]]"—in other words, the ability to have states that it ''feels like something'' to be in.<ref name=Nagel1974>{{cite journal | last1 = Nagel | first1 = Thomas | year = 1974 | title = What Is It Like to Be a Bat? | journal = The Philosophical Review | volume = 83 | issue = 4| pages = 435–450 | doi=10.2307/2183914 | jstor=2183914 |url={{google books |plainurl=y |id=fBGPBRX3JsQC|page=165}}}}</ref> Some philosophers, notably [[Colin McGinn]], believe that the physical process causing consciousness to happen will never be understood, a position known as "[[new mysterianism]]". They do not deny that most other aspects of consciousness are subject to scientific investigation but they argue that qualia will never be explained.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Shermer |first=Michael |date=2018-07-01 |title=Will Science Ever Solve the Mysteries of Consciousness, Free Will and God? |url=https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/will-science-ever-solve-the-mysteries-of-consciousness-free-will-and-god/ |access-date=2024-03-10 |website=Scientific American |language=en}}</ref> Other philosophers, such as [[Daniel Dennett]], argue that qualia is not a meaningful concept.<ref name="Ransey">{{cite encyclopedia | title=Eliminative Materialism | encyclopedia=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy | publisher=Stanford University | access-date=19 June 2014 | author=Ramsey, William | editor=Zalta, Edward N. | year=2013 | edition=Summer 2013 | url=http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2013/entries/materialism-eliminative/}}</ref>

Regarding [[animal consciousness]], the [[Animal consciousness#Cambridge Declaration on Consciousness|Cambridge Declaration of Consciousness]], publicly proclaimed on 7 July 2012 at Cambridge University, states that many non-human animals possess the neuroanatomical, neurochemical, and neurophysiological substrates of conscious states, and can exhibit intentional behaviors.{{Ref label|A|a|none}} The declaration notes that all [[Vertebrate|vertebrates]] (including fish and reptiles) have this neurological substrate for consciousness, and that there is strong evidence that many invertebrates also have it.<ref name="CDC2012">{{cite web |last=Low |first=Philip |date=7 July 2012 |title=The Cambridge Declaration on Consciousness |url=http://fcmconference.org/img/CambridgeDeclarationOnConsciousness.pdf |access-date=5 August 2020 |website=FCM Conference |publisher=Cambridge University |quote=it is indisputable that all vertebrates, including fish and reptiles do possess the neurological substrates of [[phenomenal consciousness|consciousness]], and that there is further very strong evidence to support that invertebrates, including but not limited to decapod crustaceans, cephalopod mollusks, and insects, also do}}</ref>

==== Phenomenal vs. affective consciousness====

[[David Chalmers]] argues that sentience is sometimes used as shorthand for ''phenomenal consciousness'', the capacity to have any subjective experience at all, but sometimes refers to the narrower concept of ''affective consciousness'', the capacity to experience subjective states that have affective valence (i.e., a positive or negative character), such as pain and pleasure.<ref name="chalmers">{{cite AV media |people=Massimo Pigliucci, David Chalmers |date=Dec 18, 2020 |title=Philosophy Day 2020: David Chalmers - Consciousness and moral status |medium=YouTube |language=English |url=https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZP3ReZHGn7E | archive-url=https://ghostarchive.org/varchive/youtube/20211031/ZP3ReZHGn7E| archive-date=2021-10-31 | url-status=live|access-date=Sep 12, 2021 |publisher=Figs in Winter }}{{cbignore}}</ref>

===Sentience quotient===
The sentience quotient concept was introduced by [[Robert A. Freitas Jr.]] in the late 1970s.<ref name="Freitas">{{cite journal |author=Freitas, R.A. Jr. |date=April 1984 |title=Xenopsychology |journal=[[Analog Science Fiction/Science Fact]] |volume=104 |pages=41–53}}</ref> It defines sentience as the relationship between the information processing rate of each individual processing unit (neuron), the weight/size of a single unit, and the total number of processing units (expressed as mass). It was proposed as a measure for the sentience of all living beings and computers from a single neuron up to a hypothetical being at the theoretical computational limit of the entire universe. On a [[logarithmic scale]] it runs from −70 up to +50.