Editing Russo-Japanese War (section)

== Historical background ==

=== Modernization of Japan ===
[[File:Kisaburō Ohara, Europe and Asia Octopus Map, 1904 Cornell CUL PJM 1145 01.jpg|thumbnail|upright=1.2|This anti-Russian satirical map was produced by a Japanese student at [[Keio University]] during the Russo-Japanese War. It follows the design used for a similar map first published in 1877.<ref>"[[c:File:Serio-comic war map for 1877.jpg|Serio-comic war map for the year 1877]]" by Frederick W. Rose (publisher not identified).</ref>]]

After the [[Meiji Restoration]] in 1868, the Meiji government endeavoured to assimilate Western ideas, technological advances and ways of warfare. By the late 19th century, Japan had transformed itself into a modernized industrial state. The Japanese wanted to be recognized as equal with the Western powers. The Meiji Restoration had been intended to make Japan a modernized state, not a Westernized one, and Japan was an imperialist power, looking towards overseas expansionism.{{sfn|Storry|1979|pp=15–16}}

====A Japanese sphere of influence====
The United States saw Japan as an ally in the U.S.'s quest to control the Pacific and maintain for the U.S. China's "[[Open Door Policy]]." In Autumn 1872, U.S. minister to Japan [[Charles DeLong]] explained to U.S. General [[Charles LeGendre]] that he had been urging the Government of Japan to occupy Taiwan and "civilize" the [[Taiwanese indigenous people]] just as the U.S. had taken over the land of the [[Native Americans in the United States|Native Americans]] and "civilized" them.<ref>James Bradley, "The Imperial Cruise: A Secret History of Empire and War" (Little, Brown and Company, 2009), p. 186-188</ref> General LeGendre encouraged the Japanese to declare a Japanese "sphere of influence" modeled on the [[Monroe Doctrine]] that the U.S. had declared for the exclusion of other powers from the [[Western Hemisphere]]. Such a Japanese sphere of influence would be the first time a non-White state would adopt such a policy. The stated aim of the sphere of influence would be to civilize the barbarians of Asia. "Pacify and civilize them if possible, and if not...exterminate them or otherwise deal with them as the United States and England have dealt with the barbarians," LeGendre explained to the Japanese.<ref>James Bradley, "The Imperial Cruise: A Secret History of Empire and War" (Little, Brown and Company, 2009), p. 188 citing Robert Eskildsen, ed. "Foreign Adventures and the Aborigines of Southern Taiwan, 1867-1874 (Nankang, Taipei: Institute of Taiwan History, Academic Sinica, 2005), 209.</ref>

In the years 1869–1873, the ''[[Seikanron]]'' ("Conquer Korea Argument") had bitterly divided the Japanese elite: one faction wanted to conquer Korea immediately, another wanted to wait until Japan was further modernized before embarking on a war to conquer Korea; significantly, no one in the Japanese elite ever accepted the idea that the Koreans had the right to be independent, with only the question of timing dividing the two factions.{{sfn|Storry|1979|p=16}} In much the same way that Europeans used the "backwardness" of African and Asian nations as a reason for why they had to conquer them, for the Japanese elite the "backwardness" of China and Korea was proof of the inferiority of those nations, thus giving the Japanese the "right" to conquer them.<ref name="Storry1979_17">{{harvnb|Storry|1979|p=17}}.</ref>

[[Count]] [[Inoue Kaoru]], the foreign minister, gave a speech in 1887 saying "What we must do is to transform our empire and our people, make the empire like the countries of Europe and our people like the peoples of Europe," going on to say that the Chinese and Koreans had essentially forfeited their right to be independent by not modernizing.{{r|Storry1979_17}} Much of the pressure for an aggressive foreign policy in Japan came from below, with the advocates of a [[Freedom and People's Rights Movement|"people's rights" movement]] calling for an elected parliament also favouring an ultra-nationalist line that took it for granted the Japanese had the "right" to annex Korea, as the "people's rights" movement was led by those who favoured invading Korea in the years 1869–1873.{{r|Storry1979_17}}

As part of the modernization process in Japan, [[Social Darwinism|social Darwinist]] ideas about the "[[survival of the fittest]]" were common from the 1880s onward and many ordinary Japanese resented the heavy taxes imposed by the government to modernize Japan, demanding something tangible like an overseas [[colony]] as a reward for their sacrifices.{{sfn|Storry|1979|pp=18–19}}

Furthermore, the educational system of Meiji Japan was meant to train the schoolboys to be soldiers when they grew up, and as such, Japanese schools indoctrinated their students into ''[[Bushido|Bushidō]]'' ("way of the warrior"), the fierce code of the samurai.{{r|Storry1979_17}} Having indoctrinated the younger generations into ''Bushidō'', the Meiji elite found themselves faced with a people who clamored for war, and regarded diplomacy as a weakness.{{r|Storry1979_17}}

=== Pressure from the people ===
The British Japanologist [[Richard Storry]] wrote that the biggest misconception about Japan in the West was that the Japanese people were the "docile" instruments of the elite, when in fact much of the pressure for Japan's wars from 1894 to 1941 came from the ordinary people, who demanded a "tough" foreign policy, and tended to engage in riots and assassination when foreign policy was perceived to be pusillanimous.{{r|Storry1979_17}}

Though the Meiji [[oligarchy]] refused to allow [[liberal democracy]], they did seek to appropriate some of the demands of the "people's rights" movement by allowing an elected [[Imperial Diet (Japan)|Imperial Diet]] in 1890 (with limited powers and an equally limited franchise) and by pursuing an aggressive foreign policy towards Korea.{{r|Storry1979_17}}

In 1884, Japan had encouraged a coup in the [[Kingdom of Korea]] by a pro-Japanese reformist faction, which led to the conservative government calling upon China for help, leading to a clash between Chinese and Japanese soldiers in Seoul.<ref name="Storry1979_20">{{harvnb|Storry|1979|p=20}}.</ref> At the time, Tokyo did not feel ready to risk a war with China, and the crisis was ended by the [[Convention of Tientsin]], which left Korea more strongly in the Chinese sphere of influence, though it did give the Japanese the right to intervene in Korea.{{r|Storry1979_20}} All through the 1880s and early 1890s, the government in Tokyo was regularly criticized for not being aggressive enough in Korea, leading Japanese historian [[Masao Maruyama (scholar)|Masao Maruyama]] to write: <blockquote>Just as Japan was subject to pressure from the Great Powers, so she would apply pressure to still weaker countries{{snd}}a clear case of the transfer psychology. In this regard it is significant that ever since the Meiji period demands for a tough foreign policy have come from the common people, that is, from those who are at the receiving end of oppression at home.{{r|Storry1979_20}}</blockquote>

=== Russian Eastern expansion ===
Tsarist Russia, as a major imperial power, had ambitions in the East. By the 1890s it had extended its realm across [[Central Asia]] to [[Afghanistan]], absorbing local states in the process. The Russian Empire stretched from Poland in the west to the [[Kamchatka Peninsula]] in the east.<ref>{{cite map |title=The Growth of European and Japanese Dominions in Asia since 1801 |cartography=Velhagen & Klasings |website=University of Texas – Perry–Castañeda Library Map Collection |url=http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/historical/shepherd/japan_euro_growth_1800.jpg |access-date=25 September 2007 |archive-date=9 January 2017 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170109030720/http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/historical/shepherd/japan_euro_growth_1800.jpg |url-status=live }}</ref> With its construction of the [[Trans-Siberian Railway]] to the port of Vladivostok, Russia hoped to further consolidate its influence and presence in the region. In the [[Tsushima incident]] of 1861 Russia had directly assaulted Japanese territory.

=== First Sino-Japanese War (1894–95) ===
[[File:Great Victory of Pyongyang and Capture of Chinese Qing Generals by Migita Toshihide 1894.jpg|thumb|Chinese generals in [[Pyongyang]] surrender to the Japanese, October 1894.]]

The first major war the Empire of Japan fought following the Meiji Restoration was [[First Sino-Japanese War|against China]], from 1894 to 1895. The war revolved around the issue of control and influence over Korea under the rule of the [[Joseon]] dynasty. From the 1880s onward, there had been vigorous competition for influence in Korea between China and Japan.<ref name="Hwang2010_1323">{{harvnb|Hwang|2010|pp=132–133}}.</ref> The Korean court was prone to factionalism, and at the time was badly divided between a reformist camp that was pro-Japanese and a more conservative faction that was pro-Chinese.{{r|Hwang2010_1323}} In 1884, a pro-Japanese coup attempt was put down by Chinese troops, and a "residency" under General [[Yuan Shikai]] was established in Seoul.{{r|Hwang2010_1323}} A peasant rebellion led by the [[Donghak|Tonghak]] religious movement led to a request by the Korean government for the [[Qing dynasty]] to send in troops to stabilize the country.{{r|Hwang2010_1323}} The Empire of Japan responded by sending their own force to Korea to crush the Tonghak and installed a puppet government in [[Seoul]]. China objected and war ensued. Hostilities proved brief, with Japanese ground troops routing Chinese forces on the [[Liaodong Peninsula]] and nearly destroying the Chinese [[Beiyang Fleet]] in the [[Battle of the Yalu River (1894)|Battle of the Yalu River]]. Japan and China signed the [[Treaty of Shimonoseki]], which ceded the Liaodong Peninsula and the island of Taiwan to Japan. After the peace treaty, Russia, Germany, and France [[Triple Intervention|forced Japan to withdraw from the Liaodong Peninsula]]. The leaders of Japan did not feel that they possessed the strength to resist the combined might of Russia, Germany and France, and so gave in to the ultimatum. At the same time, the Japanese did not abandon their attempts to force Korea into the Japanese sphere of influence. On 8 October 1895, [[Empress Myeongseong|Queen Min]] of Korea, the leader of the anti-Japanese and pro-Chinese faction at the Korean court was murdered by Japanese agents within the halls of the [[Gyeongbokgung]] palace, an act that backfired badly as it turned Korean public opinion against Japan.<ref name="Hwang2010_137">{{harvnb|Hwang|2010|p=137}}.</ref> In early 1896, King [[Gojong of Korea]] [[Korea royal refuge at the Russian legation|fled to the Russian legation]] in Seoul, believing that his life was in danger from Japanese agents, and Russian influence in Korea started to predominate.{{r|Hwang2010_137}} In the aftermath of the flight of the King, a popular uprising overthrew the pro-Japanese government and several cabinet ministers were lynched in the streets.{{r|Hwang2010_137}}

In 1897, Russia occupied the Liaodong Peninsula, built the [[Port Arthur naval base|Port Arthur]] fortress, and based the [[Pacific Fleet (Russia)|Russian Pacific Fleet]] in the port. Russia's acquisition of Port Arthur was primarily an anti-British move to counter the British occupation of [[Weihai|Wei-hai-Wei]], but in Japan this was perceived as an anti-Japanese move.{{sfn|Jukes|2002|p=8}} Germany occupied [[Jiaozhou Bay]], built the [[Siege of Tsingtao|Tsingtao fortress]], and based the German [[East Asia Squadron]] in this port. Between 1897 and 1903, the Russians built the [[Chinese Eastern Railway]] (CER) in Manchuria.<ref name="Jukes2002_9">{{harvnb|Jukes|2002|p=9}}.</ref> The Chinese Eastern Railroad was owned jointly by the Russian and Chinese governments, but the company's management was entirely Russian, the line was built to the Russian gauge and Russian troops were stationed in Manchuria to protect rail traffic on the CER from bandit attacks.{{r|Jukes2002_9}} The headquarters of the CER company was located in the new Russian-built city of [[Harbin]], the "Moscow of the Orient". From 1897 onwards, Manchuria{{snd}}while still nominally part of the "Great Qing Empire"{{snd}}started to resemble more and more a Russian province.{{r|Jukes2002_9}}

=== Russian encroachment ===
In December 1897, a Russian fleet appeared off Port Arthur. After three months, in 1898, China and Russia negotiated a convention by which China leased (to Russia) Port Arthur, [[Talienwan]] and the surrounding waters. The two parties further agreed that the convention could be extended by mutual agreement. The Russians clearly expected such an extension, for they lost no time in occupying the territory and in fortifying Port Arthur, their sole warm-water port on the Pacific coast and of great strategic value. A year later, to consolidate their position, the Russians began to build a new railway from [[Harbin]] through [[Mukden]] to Port Arthur, the [[South Manchuria Railway|South Manchurian Railroad]].{{r|Jukes2002_9}} The development of the railway became a contributory factor to the [[Boxer Rebellion]], when [[Boxers attacks on Chinese Eastern Railway|Boxer forces burned the railway stations]].{{sfn|Connaughton|1988|pp=19–20}}

The Russians also began to make inroads into Korea. A large point of Russia's growing influence in Korea was [[Gojong's internal exile to the Russian legation]].<ref>{{Cite web |title=한국사데이터베이스 |url=http://db.history.go.kr/item/level.do?itemId=hk&levelId=hk_018_0010_0490&types=o |access-date=2022-06-05 |website=db.history.go.kr}}</ref> A pro-Russian cabinet emerged in the [[Korean Empire]]. In 1901, [[Nicholas II of Russia|Tsar Nicholas II]] told [[Prince Henry of Prussia (1862–1929)|Prince Henry of Prussia]], "I do not want to seize Korea but under no circumstances can I allow Japan to become firmly established there. That will be a ''[[casus belli]]''."<ref>{{Cite book |last=Unoki |first=Ko |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=Hi3uCwAAQBAJ |title=International Relations and the Origins of the Pacific War |date=2016 |publisher=Springer |isbn=978-1-137-57202-8 |page=61 |language=en}}</ref> By 1898 they had acquired mining and forestry concessions near the [[Yalu river|Yalu]] and [[Tumen river|Tumen]] rivers,{{sfn|Paine|2003|p=317}} causing the Japanese much anxiety. Japan decided to attack before the Russians completed the Trans-Siberian Railway.

=== Boxer Rebellion ===
{{See also|Russian invasion of Manchuria}}
[[File:Troops of the Eight nations alliance 1900.jpg|thumb|Troops of the [[Eight-Nation Alliance]] in 1900. Left to right: Britain, United States, Australia, India, Germany, France, Austria-Hungary, Italy, Japan.]]

The Russians and the Japanese both contributed troops to the [[Eight-Nation Alliance]] sent in 1900 to quell the Boxer Rebellion and to relieve the international legations besieged in the Chinese capital, Beijing. Russia had already sent 177,000 soldiers to Manchuria, nominally to protect its railways under construction. Though the Qing imperial army and the Boxer rebels united to fight against the invasion, they were quickly overrun and ejected from Manchuria. After the Boxer Rebellion, 100,000 Russian soldiers were stationed in Manchuria.{{sfn|Jukes|2002|p=11}} The Russian troops settled in{{sfn|Connaughton|1988|pp=7–8}} and despite assurances they would vacate the area after the crisis, by 1903 the Russians had not established a timetable for withdrawal{{sfn|Paine|2003|p=320}} and had actually strengthened their position in Manchuria.

=== Pre-war negotiations ===
The Japanese statesman [[Itō Hirobumi]] started to negotiate with the Russians. He regarded Japan as too weak to evict the Russians militarily, so he proposed giving Russia control over Manchuria in exchange for Japanese control of northern Korea. Of the five ''Genrō'' (elder statesmen) who made up the Meiji oligarchy, Itō Hirobumi and Count [[Inoue Kaoru]] opposed the idea of war against Russia on financial grounds, while [[Katsura Tarō]], [[Komura Jutarō]] and Field Marshal [[Yamagata Aritomo]] favored war.{{sfn|Katō|2007|p= 96}} Meanwhile, Japan and Britain had signed the [[Anglo-Japanese Alliance]] in 1902 – the British seeking to restrict naval competition by keeping the Russian Pacific seaports of Vladivostok and Port Arthur from their full use. Japan's alliance with the British meant, in part, that if any nation allied itself with Russia during any war against Japan, then Britain would enter the war on Japan's side. Russia could no longer count on receiving help from either Germany or France without the danger of British involvement in the war. With such an alliance, Japan felt free to commence hostilities if necessary.{{sfn|Nish|1985|loc=ch. 8}}

The 1890s and 1900s marked the height of the "[[Yellow Peril]]" propaganda by the German government, and the German Emperor [[Wilhelm II, German Emperor|Wilhelm II]] ({{reign | 1888 | 1918}}) often wrote letters to his cousin Emperor Nicholas II of Russia, praising him as the "saviour of the white race" and urging Russia forward in Asia.<ref name="McLean2003_121">{{harvnb|McLean|2003|p=121}}.</ref><ref name="Fiebi-vonHase2003_165">{{harvnb|Fiebi-von Hase|2003|p=165}}.</ref> From November 1894 onward, Wilhelm had been writing letters praising Nicholas as Europe's defender from the "Yellow Peril", assuring the Tsar that God Himself had "chosen" Russia to defend Europe from the alleged Asian threat.{{sfn|Röhl|2014|p=182}} On 1 November 1902 Wilhelm wrote to Nicholas that "certain symptoms in the East seem to show that Japan is becoming a rather restless customer" and "it is evident to every unbiased mind that Korea must and will be Russian".{{r|McLean2003_121}} Wilhelm ended his letter with the warning that Japan and China would soon unite against Europe, writing: <blockquote>Twenty to thirty million Chinese, supported by a half dozen Japanese divisions, led by competent, intrepid Japanese officers, full of hatred for Christianity{{snd}}that is a vision of the future that cannot be contemplated without concern, and it is not impossible. On the contrary, it is the realisation of the yellow peril, which I described a few years ago and I was ridiculed by the majority of people for my graphic depiction of it&nbsp;... Your devoted friend and cousin, Willy, Admiral of the Atlantic.{{sfn|Röhl|2014|p=183}}</blockquote>

Wilhelm aggressively encouraged Russia's ambitions in Asia because [[Franco-Russian Alliance|France, Russia's closest ally]] since 1894, was less than supportive of Russian expansionism in Asia, and it was believed in Berlin that German support of Russia might break up the Franco-Russian alliance and lead to a new German–Russian alliance.{{r|McLean2003_121}}
The French had made it clear that they disapproved of Nicholas's forward policy in Asia; the French Premier [[Maurice Rouvier]] (in office: May to December 1887) publicly declaring that the Franco-Russian alliance applied only in Europe, not to Asia,<ref>{{cite book
 | last1 = Röhl
 | first1 = John C. G.
 | author-link1 = John C. G. Röhl
 | translator1-last = de Bellaigue
 | translator1-first = Sheila
 | translator2-last = Bridge
 | translator2-first = Roy
 | year = 2008
 | chapter = Uncle and nephew: Edward VII and the 'encirclement' of Germany
 | title = Wilhelm II: Into the Abyss of War and Exile, 1900–1941
 | url = https://books.google.com/books?id=xUxkAgAAQBAJ
 | edition = reprint
 | publisher = Cambridge University Press
 | publication-date = 2014
 | pages = 252–253
 | isbn = 9780521844314
 | access-date = 16 September 2020
 | quote = As war between Russia and Japan drew nearer in the winter of 1903–4, London and Paris intensified their efforts to come to an understanding, both governments being anxious to avoid being dragged into the coming conflict between their respective allies. [...] When the French premier, Maurice Rouvier, declared that his country's alliance with Russia did not extend to East Asia but only to Europe, Wilhelm greeted this announcement jubilantly [...].
 | archive-date = 1 October 2020
 | archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20201001022242/https://books.google.com/books?id=xUxkAgAAQBAJ
 | url-status = live
 }}</ref>
and that France would remain neutral if Japan attacked Russia.{{sfn|Röhl|2014|pp= 252–253}}{{request quotation|date=September 2020}} The American president [[Theodore Roosevelt]] (in office 1901–1909), who was attempting to mediate the Russian–Japanese dispute, complained that Wilhelm's "Yellow Peril" propaganda, which strongly implied that Germany might go to war against Japan in support of Russia, encouraged Russian intransigence.{{sfn|Fiebi-von Hase|2003|p= 163}} On 24 July 1905, in a letter to the British diplomat [[Cecil Spring Rice]], Roosevelt wrote that Wilhelm bore partial responsibility for the war as "he has done all he could to bring it about", charging that Wilhelm's constant warnings about the "Yellow Peril" had made the Russians uninterested in compromise as Nicholas believed that Germany would intervene if Japan attacked.{{sfn|Fiebi-von Hase|2003|pp=163–164}}

The implicit promise of German support suggested by Wilhelm's "Yellow Peril" speeches and letters to Nicholas led many decision-makers in [[Saint Petersburg]] to believe that Russia's military weaknesses in the Far East (like the uncompleted Trans-Siberian railroad line) did not matter{{snd}}they assumed that the ''Reich'' would come to Russia's assistance if war should come. In fact, neither Wilhelm nor his Chancellor Prince [[Bernhard von Bülow]] (in office: 1900–1909) had much interest in East Asia, and Wilhelm's letters to Nicholas praising him as Europe's saviour against the "Yellow Peril" were really meant to provoke change in the [[European balance of power|balance of power in Europe]], as Wilhelm believed that any Russian entanglement with Japan would break up the Franco-Russian alliance and lead to Nicholas signing an alliance with Germany.{{r|Fiebi-vonHase2003_165}} This was especially the case as Germany had embarked upon the "[[Tirpitz Plan]]" and a policy of ''[[Weltpolitik]]'' (from 1897) meant to challenge Britain's position as the world's leading power. Since Britain was allied to Japan, if Germany could manipulate Russia and Japan into going to war with each other, this in turn would allegedly lead to Russia turning towards Germany.{{r|Fiebi-vonHase2003_165}}

Furthermore, Wilhelm believed if a Russian–German alliance emerged, France would be compelled to join it. He also hoped that having Russia pursue an expansionist policy in Asia would distract and keep Russia out of the Balkans, thus removing the main source of tension between Russia and Germany's ally [[Austria-Hungary]].{{r|McLean2003_121}} During the war, Nicholas, who took at face value Wilhelm's "Yellow Peril" speeches, placed much hope in German intervention on his side. More than once Nicholas chose to continue the war out of the belief that the Kaiser would come to his aid.{{sfn|McLean|2003|pp= 127–128}}

Despite previous assurances that Russia would completely withdraw from Manchuria the forces it had sent to crush the Boxer Rebellion by 8 April 1903, that day passed with no reduction in Russian forces in that region.{{sfn|Katō|2007|p=102}} In Japan, university students demonstrated both against Russia and against their own government for not taking any action.{{sfn|Katō|2007|p=102}} On 28 July 1903 [[Shinichiro Kurino|Kurino Shin'ichirō]], the Japanese minister in Saint Petersburg, was instructed to present his country's view opposing Russia's consolidation plans in Manchuria. On 3 August 1903 the Japanese minister handed in the following document to serve as the basis for further negotiations:<ref>{{cite book |title= Baron Komura to Mr. Kurino |date= 3 August 1903 }} in {{harvnb|Correspondence Regarding Negotiations|1904|pp= [https://archive.org/stream/correspondencere00japarich#page/7/mode/1up 7–9]}}.</ref>
# Mutual engagement to respect the independence and territorial integrity of the Chinese and Korean empires and to maintain the principle of equal opportunity for the commerce and industry of all nations in those countries.
# Reciprocal recognition of Japan's preponderating interests in Korea and Russia's special interests in railway enterprises in Manchuria, and of the right of Japan to take in Korea and of Russia to take in Manchuria such measures as may be necessary for the protection of their respective interests as above defined, subject, however, to the provisions of article I of this agreement.
# Reciprocal undertaking on the part of Russia and Japan not to impede development of those industrial and commercial activities respectively of Japan in Korea and of Russia in Manchuria, which are not inconsistent with the stipulations of article I of this agreement. Additional engagement on the part of Russia not to impede the eventual extension of the Korean railway into southern Manchuria so as to connect with the East China and Shan-hai-kwan–Newchwang lines.
# Reciprocal engagement that in case it is found necessary to send troops by Japan to Korea, or by Russia to Manchuria, for the purpose either of protecting the interests mentioned in article II of this agreement, or of suppressing insurrection or disorder calculated to create international complications, the troops so sent are in no case to exceed the actual number required and are to be forthwith recalled as soon as their missions are accomplished.
# Recognition on the part of Russia of the exclusive right of Japan to give advice and assistance in the interest of reform and good government in Korea, including necessary military assistance.
# This agreement to supplant all previous arrangements between Japan and Russia respecting Korea.
On 3 October 1903 the Russian minister to Japan, [[Roman Rosen]], presented to the Japanese government the Russian counter proposal as the basis of negotiations, as follows:<ref>{{cite book |title= Baron Komura to Mr. Kurino |date= 5 October 1903 }} in {{harvnb|Correspondence Regarding Negotiations|1904|pp= [https://archive.org/stream/correspondencere00japarich#page/22/mode/1up 22–24]}}.</ref>
# Mutual engagement to respect the independence and territorial integrity of the Korean Empire.
# Recognition by Russia of Japan's preponderating interests in Korea and of the right of Japan to give advice and assistance to Korea tending to improve the civil administration of the empire without infringing the stipulations of article I.
# Engagement on the part of Russia not to impede the commercial and industrial undertakings of Japan in Korea, nor to oppose any measures taken for the purpose of protecting them so long as such measures do not infringe the stipulations of article I.
# Recognition of the right of Japan to send for the same purpose troops to Korea, with the knowledge of Russia, but their number not to exceed that actually required, and with the engagement on the part of Japan to recall such troops as soon as their mission is accomplished.
# Mutual engagement not to use any part of the territory of Korea for strategical purposes nor to undertake on the coasts of Korea any military works capable of menacing the freedom of navigation in the Straits of Korea.
# Mutual engagement to consider that part of the territory of Korea lying to the north of the 39th parallel as a neutral zone into which neither of the contracting parties shall introduce troops.
# Recognition by Japan of Manchuria and its littoral as in all respects outside her sphere of interest.
# This agreement to supplant all previous agreements between Russia and Japan respecting Korea.

During the Russian–Japanese talks, the Japanese historian Hirono Yoshihiko noted, "once negotiations commenced between Japan and Russia, Russia scaled back its demands and claims regarding Korea bit by bit, making a series of concessions that Japan regarded as serious compromises on Russia's part".<ref name="Katō2007_978">{{harvnb|Katō|2007|pp=97–98}}.</ref> The war might not have broken out had not the issues of Korea and Manchuria become linked.<ref name="Katō2007_101">{{harvnb|Katō|2007|p=101}}.</ref> The Korean and Manchurian issues had become linked as the Prime Minister of Japan, [[Katsura Tarō]] (in office 1901–1906), decided if war did come, that Japan was more likely to have the support of the United States and Great Britain if the war could be presented as a struggle for [[free trade]] against the highly protectionist Russian empire, in which case, Manchuria, which was the larger market than Korea, was more likely to engage Anglo-American sympathies.{{r|Katō2007_101}} Throughout the war, Japanese propaganda presented the recurring theme of Japan as a "civilized" power (that supported free trade and would implicitly allow foreign businesses into the resource-rich region of Manchuria) vs. Russia the "uncivilized" power (that was protectionist and wanted to keep the riches of Manchuria all to itself).{{r|Katō2007_101}}

Emperor Gojong of Korea (King from 1864 to 1897, Emperor from 1897 to 1907) came to believe that the issue dividing Japan and Russia was Manchuria, and chose to pursue a policy of neutrality as the best way of preserving Korean independence as the crisis mounted.{{r|Katō2007_978}} In a series of reports to Beijing, Hu Weide, the Chinese ambassador in Saint Petersburg from July 1902 to September 1907, looked closely at whether a Russian or a Japanese victory would be favourable to China, and argued that the latter was preferable, as he maintained a Japanese victory presented the better chance for China to regain sovereignty over Manchuria.{{r|Katō2007_978}} In December 1903 China decided to remain neutral if war came, because though Japan was the only power capable of evicting Russia from Manchuria, the extent of Japanese ambitions in Manchuria was not clear to Beijing.{{r|Katō2007_978}}

Russian–Japanese negotiations then followed, although by early January 1904 the Japanese government had realised that Russia was not interested in settling the [[Manchuria]]n or Korean issues. Instead, Russia's goal was buying time{{snd}}via diplomacy{{snd}}to further build up militarily.<ref name="KodaNWCR2005">{{Cite journal |last= Koda |first= Yoji |title= The Russo-Japanese War: Primary Causes of Japanese Success |journal= [[Naval War College Review]]  |volume= 58 |issue= 2 |date= Spring 2005 |url-access=  |url= https://www.questia.com/read/1P3-840737501 }}{{dead link|date=July 2021}}</ref> In December 1903, Wilhelm wrote in a marginal note on a diplomatic dispatch about his role in inflaming Russo-Japanese relations:<blockquote>Since 97{{snd}}Kiaochow{{snd}}we have never left Russia in any doubt that we would cover her back in Europe, in case she decided to pursue a bigger policy in the Far East that might lead to military complications (with the aim of relieving our eastern border from the fearful pressure and threat of the massive Russian army!). Whereupon, Russia took Port Arthur and ''trusting us'', took her fleet ''out of the Baltic'', thereby making herself ''vulnerable to us'' by sea. In Danzig 01 and Reval 02, the same assurance was given again, with result that entire Russian divisions from Poland and European Russia were and are being sent to the Far East. This would not had happened if our governments had not been in agreement!{{sfn|Röhl|2014|p=164}}</blockquote>
A recurring theme of Wilhelm's letters to Nicholas was that "Holy Russia" had been "chosen" by God to save the "entire white race" from the "Yellow Peril", and that Russia was "entitled" to annex all of Korea, Manchuria, and northern China up to Beijing.{{sfn|Röhl|2014|p=263}} Wilhelm went on to assure Nicholas that once Russia had defeated Japan, this would be a deadly blow to British diplomacy, and that the two emperors, the self-proclaimed "Admiral of the Atlantic" and the "Admiral of the Pacific", would rule Eurasia together, making them able to challenge British [[sea power]] as the resources of Eurasia would make their empires immune to a British blockade, and thus allowing Germany and Russia to "divide up the best" of the British colonies in Asia between them.{{sfn|Röhl|2014|p=263}}

Nicholas had been prepared to compromise with Japan, but after receiving a letter from Wilhelm attacking him as a coward for his willingness to compromise with the Japanese (who, Wilhelm never ceasing reminding Nicholas, represented the "Yellow Peril") for the sake of peace, became more obstinate.<ref name="Röhl2014_269">{{harvnb|Röhl|2014|p= 269}}.</ref> Wilhelm had written to Nicholas stating that the question of Russian interests in Manchuria and Korea was beside the point, saying instead it was a matter of Russia:<blockquote>...undertaking the protection and defence of the White Race, and with it, Christian civilization, against the Yellow Race. And whatever the Japs are determined to ensure the domination of the Yellow Race in East Asia, to put themselves at its head and organise and lead it into battle against the White Race. That is the kernel of the situation, and therefore there can be very little doubt about where the sympathies of all half-way intelligent Europeans should lie. England betrayed Europe's interests to America in a cowardly and shameful way over the Panama Canal question, so as to be left in 'peace' by the Yankees. Will the 'Tsar' likewise betray the interests of the White Race to the Yellow as to be 'left in peace' and not embarrass the Hague tribunal too much?.{{r|Röhl2014_269}}</blockquote>
When Nicholas replied that he still wanted peace, Wilhelm wrote back in a telegram "You innocent angel!", telling his advisors "This is the language of an innocent angel. But not that of a White Tsar!"{{r|Röhl2014_269}} Nevertheless, Tokyo believed that Russia was not serious about seeking a peaceful solution to the dispute. On 13 January 1904, Japan proposed a formula by which Manchuria would remain outside Japan's sphere of influence and, reciprocally, Korea outside Russia's. On 21 December 1903, the Katsura cabinet voted to go to war against Russia.{{r|Katō2007_101}}

[[File:Shinichiro Kurino.jpg|thumb|Kurino Shin'ichirō]]

By 4 February 1904, no formal reply had been received from Saint Petersburg. On 6 February the Japanese minister to Russia, [[Shin'ichirō Kurino|Kurino Shin'ichirō]], was recalled, and Japan severed diplomatic relations with Russia.{{r|KodaNWCR2005}}

Potential diplomatic resolution of territorial concerns between Japan and Russia failed; historians have argued that this directly resulted from the actions of Emperor [[Nicholas II]]. Crucially, Nicholas mismanaged his government. Although certain scholars contend that the situation arose from the determination of Nicholas II to use the war against Japan to spark a revival in Russian patriotism, no historical evidence supports this claim.{{sfn|Esthus|1981|p= 411}} The Tsar's advisors did not support the war, foreseeing problems in transporting troops and supplies from European Russia to the East.<ref>{{Cite book |last= Tolf |first= Robert W. |year= 1976 |title= The Russian Rockfellers |publisher= Hoover Press |isbn= 0-8179-6583-1 |page= 156 |url= https://books.google.com/books?id=3DmsQLtWq1wC |access-date= 20 September 2020 |archive-date= 1 November 2020 |archive-url= https://web.archive.org/web/20201101200552/https://books.google.com/books?id=3DmsQLtWq1wC |url-status= live }}</ref> The Tsar himself repeatedly delayed negotiations with the Japanese government as he believed that he was protected by God and the autocracy.{{sfn|Esthus|1981|p= 397}} The Japanese understanding of this can be seen in a telegram from Japanese minister of foreign affairs, Komura, to the minister to Russia, in which he stated:
<blockquote>
...the Japanese government have at all times during the progress of the negotiations made it a special point to give prompt answers to all propositions of the Russian government. The negotiations have now been pending for no less than four months, and they have not yet reached a stage where the final issue can with certainty be predicted. In these circumstances the Japanese government cannot but regard with grave concern the situation for which the delays in negotiations are largely responsible.<ref>
{{cite book |title= Baron Komura to Mr. Kurino |date=  1903 }} In {{harvnb|Correspondence Regarding Negotiations|1904|p=[https://archive.org/stream/correspondencere00japarich#page/38/mode/1up 38]}}.
</ref>
</blockquote>
Some scholars have suggested that Nicholas II dragged Japan into war intentionally, in hopes of reviving Russian nationalism. This notion conflicts with a comment made by Nicholas to Kaiser Wilhelm of Germany, saying there would be no war because he "did not wish it".{{sfn|Schimmelpenninck van der Oye|2005|p=42}}
This does not reject the claim that Russia played an aggressive role in the East, which it did; rather, it means that Russia unwisely calculated and supposed that Japan would not go to war against Russia's far larger and seemingly superior navy and army. Nicholas held the Japanese in contempt as "yellow monkeys", and he took for granted that the Japanese would simply yield in the face of Russia's superior power, which thus explains his unwillingness to compromise.{{sfn|Jukes|2002|pp= 16–20}} Evidence of Russia's false sense of security and superiority to Japan is seen by Russian reference to Japan's choosing war as a big mistake.{{sfn|Jukes|2002|p=21}}{{request quotation|date=September 2020}}