Editing Russian Orthodox Church (section)

== History ==
{{Main|History of the Russian Orthodox Church}}

[[File:Cross of the Russian Orthodox Church 01.svg|thumb|The three-barred cross of the Russian Orthodox Church. The slanted bottom bar represents the footrest, while the top is the [[titulus Crucis|titulus]] (often "INRI") affixed by the Roman authorities to Christ's cross during his crucifixion]]

===Apostle Andrew===
One of the foundational narratives associated with the history of [[Eastern Orthodox Church|Orthodoxy]] in Russia is found in the 12th-century ''[[Primary Chronicle]]'', which says that the [[Saint Andrew|Apostle Andrew]] visited [[Scythia]] and [[Greek colonies]] along the northern coast of the [[Black Sea]] before making his way to [[Chersonesus]] in [[Crimea]].{{sfn|Fennell|2014|page=20|loc=Apostle Andrew, while preaching in the Greek colony of Sinope on the south shore of the Black Sea, decided to journey to Rome... via Cherson in the Crimea}}{{sfn|Shevzov|2012|page=16|loc=The history of Orthodoxy in Russia is associated with two foundational narratives. The first relates to its apostolic roots}} According to the legend, Andrew reached the future location of [[Kyiv|Kiev]] and foretold the foundation of a great Christian city with many churches.{{sfn|Fennell|2014|page=20|loc=On the way he stopped first at the site of the future city of Kiev, where, predictably, he prophesied the founding of a great town with many churches}} Then, "he came to the [land of the] [[Novgorod Slavs|Slovenians]] where [[Novgorod]] now [stands]" and observed the locals, before eventually arriving in [[Rome]].{{sfn|Fennell|2014|page=20}} Despite the lack of historical evidence supporting this narrative, modern church historians in Russia have often incorporated this tale into their studies.{{sfn|Shevzov|2012|page=16}}

===Kievan Rus'===
{{see also|Christianization of Kievan Rus'}}

In the 10th century, Christianity began to take root in [[Kievan Rus']].{{sfn|Fennell|2014|page=25}} Towards the end of the reign of [[Igor of Kiev|Igor]], Christians are mentioned among the [[Varangians]].{{sfn|Fennell|2014|page=24}} In the text about the treaty with the [[Byzantine Empire]] in 944–945, the chronicler also records the oath-taking ceremony that took place in [[Constantinople]] for Igor's envoys as well as the equivalent ceremony that took place in Kiev.{{sfn|Fennell|2014|page=25}} Igor's wife [[Olga of Kiev|Olga]] was baptized sometime in the mid-10th century; however, scholars have disputed the exact year and place of her conversion, with dates ranging from 946 to 960.{{sfn|Fennell|2014|page=26|loc=Not that anyone doubts that she was baptized. All are agreed on that. But when, where and under what circumstances? These are the questions that divide the academics}} Most scholars tend to agree that she was baptized in Constantinople, though some argue that her conversion took place in Kiev.{{sfn|Fennell|2014|page=26}} Olga's son [[Sviatoslav I of Kiev|Sviatoslav]] opposed conversion, despite persuasion from his mother,{{sfn|Fennell|2014|page=25}} and there is little information about Christianity in sources in the period between 969 and 988.{{sfn|Fennell|2014|page=31}}

Ten years after seizing power, Grand Prince [[Vladimir the Great|Vladimir]] was baptized in 988 and began [[Christianization of Kievan Rus'|Christianizing his people]] upon his return.{{sfn|Fennell|2014|page=35}} That year was decreed by the Russian Orthodox Church in 1988 as the date of the Christianization of the country.{{sfn|Fennell|2014|page=35}} According to the ''Chronicle'', Vladimir had previously sent envoys to investigate the different faiths.{{sfn|Fennell|2014|page=35}} After receiving glowing reports about Constantinople,{{sfn|Fennell|2014|page=35}} he captured Chersonesus in Crimea and demanded that the sister of [[Basil II]] be sent there.{{sfn|Fennell|2014|page=37}} The marriage took place on the condition that Vladimir would be also baptized there.{{sfn|Fennell|2014|page=37}} Vladimir had lent considerable military support to the Byzantine emperor and may have besieged the city due to it having sided with the rebellious [[Bardas Phokas the Younger|Bardas Phokas]].{{sfn|Fennell|2014|page=37}} By the early 11th century, Christianity was established as the state religion.{{sfn|Kent|2021|p=12}} By the early 13th century, some 40 episcopal sees had been established, all of which ultimately answered to Constantinople.{{sfn|Kent|2021|p=15}}

===Transfer of the see to Moscow; ''de facto'' independence of the Russian Church===
After Kiev lost its significance following the [[Mongol invasion of Kievan Rus'|Mongol invasions]], Metropolitan [[Maximos, Metropolitan of Kiev and All Rus'|Maximus]] moved his seat to [[Vladimir, Russia|Vladimir]] in 1299.{{sfn|Fennell|2014|page=134}} His successor, [[Peter of Moscow|Peter]], found himself caught in the conflict between the principalities of [[Principality of Tver|Tver]] and [[Principality of Moscow|Moscow]] for supremacy in [[northwest Russia]].{{sfn|Fennell|2014|page=134|loc=Petr arrived in Vladimir from Constantinople in 1309 at the height of the conflict between Tver' and Moscow for supremacy in northwest Russia}}{{sfn|Meyendorff|2010|page=149}} Peter moved his residence to [[Moscow]] in 1325 and became a strong ally of the prince of Moscow.{{sfn|Fennell|2014|page=136}} During Peter's tenure in Moscow, the foundation for the [[Dormition Cathedral, Moscow|Dormition Cathedral]] was laid and Peter was buried there.{{sfn|Meyendorff|2010|page=153}} By choosing to reside and be buried in Moscow, Peter had designated Moscow as the future center of the Russian Orthodox Church.{{sfn|Fennell|2014|page=136}}

Peter was succeeded by [[Theognostus of Kiev|Theognostus]], who, like his predecessor, pursued policies that supported the rise of the Moscow principality.{{sfn|Meyendorff|2010|page=156}}{{sfn|Fennell|2023|page=192}} During the first four years of his tenure, the Dormition Cathedral was completed and an additional four stone churches were constructed in Moscow.{{sfn|Meyendorff|2010|page=156}} By the end of 1331, Theognostus was able to restore ecclesiastical control over Lithuania.{{sfn|Fennell|2023|page=134}} Theognostus also proceeded with the canonization of Peter in 1339, which helped to increase Moscow's prestige.{{sfn|Meyendorff|2010|page=156}} His successor [[Alexius, Metropolitan of Kiev|Alexius]] lost ecclesiastical over Lithuania in 1355, but kept the traditional title.{{sfn|Fennell|2014|page=141}}

[[File:Miloradovichdefense.jpg|thumb|Russian Orthodox monks defended the [[Trinity Lavra of St. Sergius|Trinity monastery]] against Polish troops during the [[Time of Troubles]]. Painting by [[Sergey Miloradovich]].]]

On 5 July 1439, at the [[Council of Florence]], the only Russian prelate present at the council signed the union, which, according to his companion, was only under duress.{{sfn|Fennell|2014|page=175}} Metropolitan [[Isidore of Kiev|Isidore]] left [[Florence]] on 6 September 1439 and returned to Moscow on 19 March 1441.{{sfn|Fennell|2014|pages=177–179}} The chronicles say that three days after arriving in Moscow, Grand Prince [[Vasily II of Moscow|Vasily II]] arrested Isidore and placed him under supervision in the [[Chudov Monastery]].{{sfn|Fennell|2014|page=180}} According to the chroniclers of the grand prince, "the princes, the boyars and many others — and especially the Russian bishops — remained silent, slumbered and fell asleep" until "the divinely wise, Christ-loving sovereign, Grand Prince Vasily Vasilyevich shamed Isidor and called him not his pastor and teacher, but a wicked and baneful wolf".{{sfn|Fennell|2014|page=181}} Despite the chronicles calling him a heretical [[apostate]], Isidore was recognized as the lawful metropolitan by Vasily&nbsp;II until he left Moscow on 15 September 1441.{{sfn|Fennell|2014|page=181}}

For the following seven years, the seat of the metropolitan remained vacant.{{sfn|Fennell|2014|page=183}} Vasily&nbsp;II defeated the rebellious [[Dmitry Shemyaka]] and returned to Moscow in February 1447.{{sfn|Fennell|2014|page=185}} On 15 December 1448, a council of Russian bishops elected [[Jonah Metropolitan of Moscow|Jonah]] as metropolitan, without the consent of the patriarch of Constantinople, which marked the beginning of [[autocephaly]] of the Russian Church.{{sfn|Fennell|2014|page=185}} Although not all Russian clergy supported Jonah, the move was subsequently justified in the Russian point of view following the [[fall of Constantinople]] in 1453, which was interpreted as divine punishment.{{sfn|Shevzov|2012|page=19|loc=While not all Russian 
clergymen supported this decision, the move was subsequently justified in Russian eyes by the fall of Constantinople in 1453}} While it is possible that the failure to obtain the blessing from Constantinople was not intentional, nevertheless, this marked the beginning of independence of the Russian Church.{{sfn|Shevzov|2012|page=19}}

=== Autocephaly and schism ===
{{see also|15th–16th century Moscow–Constantinople schism|Schism of the Russian Church}}
[[File:Nikita Pustosviat. Dispute on the Confession of Faith.jpg|thumb|''An [[Old Believers|Old Believer]] Priest, [[Nikita Pustosviat]], Disputing the Matters of Faith with [[Patriarch Joachim of Moscow|Patriarch Joachim]]'', painting by [[Vasily Perov]]]]

Jonah's policy as metropolitan was to recover the areas lost to the Uniate church.{{sfn|Shubin|2004|pp=132–133}} He was able to include Lithuania and Kiev to his title, but not [[Galicia (Eastern Europe)|Galicia]].{{sfn|Shubin|2004|pp=132–133}} Lithuania was separated from his jurisdiction in 1458, and the influence of Catholicism increased in those regions.{{sfn|Shubin|2004|pp=132–133}} As soon as Vasily&nbsp;II heard about the ordination of [[Gregory the Bulgarian|Gregory]] as metropolitan of the newly established [[Metropolis of Kiev, Galicia and all Rus' (1441–1596)|metropolis of Kiev]], he sent a delegation to the king of Poland warning him not to accept Gregory; Jonah also attempted to persuade feudal princes and nobles who resided in Lithuania to continue to side with Orthodoxy, but this attempt failed.{{sfn|Shubin|2004|pp=132–133}}

The fall of Constantinople and the beginning of autocephaly of the Russian Church contributed to political consolidation in Russia and the development of a new identity based on awareness that Moscow was only metropolitanate in the Orthodox ''[[oikoumene]]'' that remained politically independent.{{sfn|Shevzov|2012|page=19}} The formulation of the idea of Moscow as the "[[Moscow, third Rome|third Rome]]" is primarily associated with the monk [[Philotheus of Pskov]], who stated that "Moscow 
alone shines over all the earth more radiantly than the sun" because of its fidelity to the faith.{{sfn|Shevzov|2012|page=19}} The marriage of [[Ivan III of Russia|Ivan&nbsp;III]] to [[Sophia Palaiologina]], the niece of the last Byzantine emperor, and the defeat of the Tatars, helped to solidify this view.{{sfn|Shevzov|2012|page=19}}<ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Strémooukhoff|first1=Dimitri|date=1953|title=Moscow the Third Rome: Sources of the Doctrine|journal=Speculum|volume=28|issue=1|pages=84–101|doi=10.2307/2847182|jstor=2847182|s2cid=161446879}}</ref><ref>{{cite book|title=The Blackwell Dictionary of Eastern Christianity|publisher=Blackwell Publishing|year=1999|isbn=978-0-631-23203-2|editor1-last=Parry|editor1-first=Ken|location=Malden, MA|page=490|editor2-last=Melling|editor2-first=David}}</ref>

By the turn of the 16th century, the consolidation of Orthodoxy in Russia continued as Archbishop [[Gennady of Novgorod]] created the first complete manuscript translation of the Bible into [[Church Slavonic]] in 1499, known as [[Gennady's Bible]].{{sfn|Shevzov|2012|page=20}} At the same time, two movements within the Russian Church had emerged with differing ecclesial visions.{{sfn|Shevzov|2012|page=20}} [[Nilus of Sora]] (1433–1508) led the [[non-possessors]], who opposed monastic landholding except for the purposes of charity in addition to strong involvement of the church in the affairs of the state, while [[Joseph of Volotsk]] (1439–1515) led a movement that supported strong church involvement in the state's affairs.{{sfn|Shevzov|2012|page=20}} By 1551, the [[Stoglav Synod]] addressed the lack of uniformity in existing ecclesial practices.{{sfn|Shevzov|2012|page=20}} Metropolitan [[Macarius, Metropolitan of Moscow|Macarius]] also collected "all holy books... available in the Russian land" and completed the ''Grand Menaion'', which was influential in shaping the narrative tradition of Russian Orthodoxy.{{sfn|Shevzov|2012|page=20}} In 1589, during the reign of [[Feodor I of Russia|Feodor&nbsp;I]] and under the direction of [[Boris Godunov]], the metropolitan of Moscow, [[Patriarch Job of Moscow|Job]], was consecrated as the first Russian patriarch with the blessing of [[Jeremias II of Constantinople]].<ref>{{cite book |last1=McGuckin |first1=John Anthony |title=The Concise Encyclopedia of Orthodox Christianity |date=3 February 2014 |publisher=John Wiley & Sons |isbn=978-1-118-75933-2 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=wqUTAgAAQBAJ |language=en |page=405}}</ref>{{sfn|Shevzov|2012|page=20}} In the decree establishing the [[patriarchate]], the whole Russian tsardom is called a "third Rome".{{sfn|Rock|2006|page=272|loc=...in the decree establishing the Moscow patriarchate in 1589, the whole of the 'great Russian Tsarstvo' is called a third Rome}}

By the mid-17th century, the religious practices of the Russian Orthodox Church were distinct from those of the [[Greek Orthodox Church]].{{sfn|Shevzov|2012|page=22}} Patriarch [[Patriarch Nikon of Moscow|Nikon]] reformed the church in order to bring most of its practices back into accommodation with the contemporary forms of Greek Orthodox worship.{{sfn|Shevzov|2012|page=22}} Nikon's efforts to correct the translations of texts and institute liturgical reforms were not accepted by all.{{sfn|Shevzov|2012|page=22}} Archpriest [[Avvakum]] accused the patriarch of "defiling the faith" and "pouring wrathful fury upon the Russian land".{{sfn|Shevzov|2012|page=22}} The result was [[Schism of the Russian Church|a schism]], with those who resisted the new practices being known as the [[Old Believers]].{{sfn|Shevzov|2012|page=22}}

In the aftermath of the [[Treaty of Pereyaslav]], the [[Ottoman Empire|Ottomans]], supposedly acting on behalf of the Russian regent [[Tsarevna Sophia Alekseyevna of Russia|Sophia Alekseyevna]], pressured the [[Ecumenical Patriarch of Constantinople|patriarch of Constantinople]] into [[Annexation of the Metropolis of Kyiv by the Moscow Patriarchate|transferring the metropolis of Kiev from the jurisdiction of Constantinople]] to that of Moscow. The handover brought millions of faithful and half a dozen dioceses under the ultimate administrative care of the patriarch of Moscow, and later of the Holy Synod of Russia, leading to a significant Ukrainian presence in the Russian Church, which continued well into the 18th century.<ref>[http://magazines.russ.ru/novyi_mi/2006/8/ka10.html Yuri Kagramanov, The war of languages in Ukraine] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20071001001419/http://magazines.russ.ru/novyi_mi/2006/8/ka10.html |date=1 October 2007}}", ''[[Novy Mir]]'', 2006, № 8</ref> The exact terms and conditions of the handover of the metropolis remains a contested issue.<ref>{{Cite news|url=https://tass.ru/obschestvo/5514136|title=РПЦ: вмешательство Константинополя в ситуацию на Украине может породить новые расколы |work=[[TASS|TACC]]|language=RU|access-date=25 December 2022}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web|url=https://orthodoxyindialogue.com/2018/07/02/ecumenical-patriarch-takes-moscow-down-a-peg-over-church-relations-with-ukraine/|title=Ecumenical Patriarch Takes Moscow Down a Peg Over Church Relations With Ukraine|website=orthodoxyindialogue.com|date=2 July 2018|access-date=25 December 2022}}</ref><ref>[https://www.patriarchate.org/news-archives/-/asset_publisher/N2gTPQxXwPlE/content/oikoumenikos-patriarches-einai-logikon-na-epithymomen-os-meter-ekklesia-ten-apokatastasin-tes-enotetos-tou-en-oukrania-dieremenou-ekklesiastikou-somat?_101_INSTANCE_N2gTPQxXwPlE_languageId=en_US Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew: "As the Mother Church, it is reasonable to desire the restoration of unity for the divided ecclesiastical body in Ukraine" (The Homily by Patriarch Bartholomew I of Constantinople after the memorial service for the late Metropolitan of Perge, Evangelos), The official website of the Ecumenical Patriarchate, 2 July 2018.]</ref><ref>{{Cite web|url=https://risu.ua/ru/peredacha-kievskoy-mitropolii-moskovskomu-patriarhatu-v-1686-godu-kanonicheskiy-analiz_n82716|title=«Передача» Киевской митрополии Московскому патриархату в 1686 году: канонический анализ |website=risu.ua|accessdate=25 December 2022}}</ref>

===Synodal period===
{{further|Church reform of Peter the Great}}
[[File:Софийский собор (Тобольск).jpg|right|thumb|St. Sophia-Assumption Cathedral in [[Tobolsk]]]]

Following the death of Patriarch [[Patriarch Adrian of Moscow|Adrian]] in 1700, [[Peter the Great|Peter&nbsp;I of Russia]] ({{reign|1682|1725}}) decided against an election of a new patriarch, and drawing on the clergy that came from Ukraine, he appointed [[Stefan Yavorsky]] as ''[[locum tenens]]''.{{sfn|Shevzov|2012|page=23}} Peter believed that Russia's resources, including the church, could be used to establish a modern European state and he sought to strengthen the authority of the monarch.{{sfn|Shevzov|2012|page=23}} He was also inspired by church–state relations in the West and therefore brought the institutional structure of the church in line with other ministries.{{sfn|Shevzov|2012|page=24}} [[Theophan Prokopovich]] wrote Peter's ''Spiritual Regulation'', which no longer legally recognized the separation of the church and the state.{{sfn|Shevzov|2012|page=24}}

Peter replaced the patriarch with a council known as the [[Most Holy Synod]] in 1721, which consisted of appointed bishops, monks, and priests.{{sfn|Shevzov|2012|page=24}} The church was also overseen by an ober-procurator that would directly report to the emperor.{{sfn|Shevzov|2012|page=24}} Peter's reforms marked the beginning of the Synodal period of the Russian Church, which would last until 1917.{{sfn|Shevzov|2012|page=24}} In order to make monasticism more socially useful, Peter began the processes that would eventually lead to the large-scale secularization of monastic landholdings in 1764 under [[Catherine the Great|Catherine&nbsp;II]].{{sfn|Shevzov|2012|page=24}}<ref>Lindsey Hughes, ''Russia in the Age of Peter the Great'' (1998) pp.&nbsp;332–56.</ref> 822 monasteries were closed between 1701 and 1805, and monastic communities became highly regulated, receiving funds from the state for support.{{sfn|Shevzov|2012|page=24}}

The late 18th century saw the rise of ''[[starets|starchestvo]]'' under [[Paisius Velichkovsky|Paisiy Velichkovsky]] and his disciples at the [[Optina Monastery]]. This marked a beginning of a significant spiritual revival in the Russian Church after a lengthy period of modernization, personified by such figures as [[Dimitry of Rostov|Demetrius of Rostov]] and [[Platon Levshin|Platon of Moscow]]. [[Aleksey Khomyakov]], [[Ivan Kireevsky]] and other lay theologians with [[Slavophile]] leanings elaborated some key concepts of the renovated Orthodox doctrine, including that of ''[[sobornost]]''. The resurgence of Eastern Orthodoxy was reflected in Russian literature, an example is the figure of [[Starets]] [[Father Zosima|Zosima]] in [[Fyodor Dostoyevsky]]'s ''[[The Brothers Karamazov|Brothers Karamazov]]''.

In the Russian Orthodox Church, the [[clergy]], over time, formed a hereditary [[Priestly caste|caste of priests]]. Marrying outside of these priestly families was strictly forbidden; indeed, some [[bishops]] did not even tolerate their [[Clerical marriage|clergy marrying]] outside of the priestly families of their diocese.<ref name="Russian Clergy">{{Cite web|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=dAiwJjtBKk0C&dq=russian+hereditary+clergy&pg=PA18|title=The Russian Clergy. Translated from the French ... By C. Du Gard Makepeace|first=Ivan|last=GAGARIN|authorlink=Ivan Gagarin|date=25 December 1872|accessdate=25 December 2022|via=Google Books}}</ref>

====Fin-de-siècle religious renaissance====
[[File:Russisch Orthodoxe Kirche Dresden.JPG|thumb|[[St. Simeon of the Wonderful Mountain Church|Russian Orthodox church]] in [[Dresden]], built in the 1870s]]

In 1909, a volume of essays appeared under the title ''[[Vekhi]]'' ("Milestones" or "Landmarks"), authored by a group of leading left-wing intellectuals, including [[Sergei Bulgakov]], [[Peter Berngardovich Struve|Peter Struve]] and former [[Marxism|Marxists]].

It is possible to see a similarly renewed vigor and variety in religious life and spirituality among the lower classes, especially after the upheavals of 1905. Among the peasantry, there was widespread interest in spiritual-ethical literature and non-conformist moral-spiritual movements, an upsurge in pilgrimage and other devotions to sacred spaces and objects (especially icons), persistent beliefs in the presence and power of the supernatural (apparitions, possession, walking-dead, demons, spirits, miracles and magic), the renewed vitality of local "ecclesial communities" actively shaping their own ritual and spiritual lives, sometimes in the absence of clergy, and defining their own sacred places and forms of piety. Also apparent was the proliferation of what the Orthodox establishment branded as "sectarianism", including both non-Eastern Orthodox Christian denominations, notably [[Baptists]], and various forms of popular Orthodoxy and mysticism.<ref>A. S. Pankratov, Ishchushchie boga (Moscow, 1911); Vera Shevzov, ''Russian Orthodoxy on the Eve of Revolution'' (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004); Gregory Freeze, 'Subversive Piety: Religion and the Political Crisis in Late Imperial Russia', ''Journal of Modern History'', vol. 68 (June 1996): 308–50; Mark Steinberg and Heather Coleman, eds. ''Sacred Stories: Religion and Spirituality in Modern Russia'' (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2007)</ref>

===Russian Revolution and Civil War===
{{see also|Russian Revolution}}
In 1914, there were 55,173 Russian Orthodox [[church (building)|churches]] and 29,593 [[chapel]]s, 112,629 [[priest]]s and [[deacon]]s, 550 [[monastery|monasteries]] and 475 [[convent]]s with a total of 95,259 monks and nuns in Russia.<ref>{{cite web|title=What role did the Orthodox Church play in the Reformation in the 16th Century?|url=http://www.stgeorgegreenville.org/OrthodoxLife/Chapter1/Chap1-9.html|website=Living the Orthodox Life|access-date=25 August 2015|url-status=dead|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150829172737/http://www.stgeorgegreenville.org/OrthodoxLife/Chapter1/Chap1-9.html|archive-date=29 August 2015}}</ref>

The year 1917 was a major turning point in Russian history, and also the Russian Orthodox Church.<ref>[[Aurelio Palmieri|Palmieri, F. Aurelio]]. [https://archive.org/stream/catholicworld02unkngoog#page/n166/mode/2up ''"The Church and the Russian Revolution,"''] [https://archive.org/stream/catholicworld02unkngoog#page/n594/mode/2up Part II], The Catholic World, Vol. CV, N°. 629, August 1917.</ref> In early March 1917 (O.S.), the Tsar was [[Nicholas II of Russia#Abdication (1917)|forced to abdicate]], the [[Russian Empire|Russian empire]] began to implode, and the government's direct control of the Church was all but over by August 1917. On 15 August (O.S.), in the Moscow [[Dormition Cathedral, Moscow|Dormition Cathedral]] in the Kremlin, the [[1917–18 Local Council of the Russian Orthodox Church|Local (''Pomestniy'') Council]] of the ROC, the first such convention since the late 17th century, opened. The council continued its sessions until September 1918 and adopted a number of important reforms, including the restoration of [[Patriarch of Moscow and all Rus'|Patriarchate]], a decision taken 3 days after the [[Bolshevik]]s [[October Revolution|overthrew the Provisional Government]] in Petrograd on 25 October (O.S.). On 5 November, Metropolitan [[Patriarch Tikhon of Moscow|Tikhon of Moscow]] was selected as the first Russian Patriarch after about 200 years of Synodal rule.

In early February 1918, the Bolshevik-controlled government of Soviet Russia enacted the [[Decree on separation of church from state and school from church]] that proclaimed [[separation of church and state]] in Russia, freedom to "profess any religion or profess none", deprived religious organisations of the right to own any property and legal status. Legal religious activity in the territories controlled by Bolsheviks was effectively reduced to services and sermons inside church buildings. The Decree and attempts by Bolshevik officials to requisition church property caused sharp resentment on the part of the ROC clergy and provoked violent clashes on some occasions: on 1 February (19 January O.S.), hours after the bloody confrontation in Petrograd's [[Alexander Nevsky Lavra]] between the Bolsheviks trying to take control of the monastery's premises and the believers, [[Tikhon of Moscow|Patriarch Tikhon]] issued a proclamation that [[anathema]]tised the perpetrators of such acts.<ref>{{cite web |url = http://st-elizabet.narod.ru/raznoe/anafema_sovetchikam.htm |title = Анафема св. патриарха Тихона против советской власти и призыв встать на борьбу за веру Христову |access-date = 5 March 2015 }}</ref>

The church was caught in the crossfire of the [[Russian Civil War]] that began later in 1918, and church leadership, despite their attempts to be politically neutral (from the autumn of 1918), as well as the clergy generally were perceived by the Soviet authorities as a "counter-revolutionary" force and thus subject to suppression and eventual liquidation.

In the first five years after the Bolshevik revolution, 28 bishops and 1,200 priests were executed.<ref>{{cite news |last = Ostling |first = Richard |title = Cross meets Kremlin |work = [[TIME Magazine]] |date = 24 June 2001 |url = http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,150718,00.html |archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20070813173443/http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,150718,00.html |url-status = dead |archive-date = 13 August 2007 }}</ref>

===Soviet period===
{{See also|Religion in the Soviet Union|Persecution of Christians in the Soviet Union}}

[[File:Tikhon of Moscow.jpg|thumb|Patriarch [[Tikhon of Moscow]]]]

The Soviet Union, formally created in December 1922, was the first state to have elimination of religion as an ideological objective espoused by the country's ruling political party. Toward that end, the Communist regime confiscated church property, ridiculed religion, harassed believers, and propagated materialism and atheism in schools.<ref>Religious Persecution in the Soviet Union (Part II): Hearings before the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs, 99th Cong. (1986). <nowiki>https://www.csce.gov/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/19862D072D1020hearing20religious20persecution20in20USSR20part202_0.pdf</nowiki> </ref> Actions toward particular religions, however, were determined by State interests, and most organized religions were never outlawed.

Orthodox clergy and active believers were treated by the Soviet law-enforcement apparatus as anti-revolutionary elements and were habitually subjected to formal prosecutions on political charges, arrests, exiles, [[Gulag|imprisonment in camps]], and later could also be incarcerated in [[Punitive psychiatry in the Soviet Union|mental hospitals]].<ref>''Father Arseny 1893–1973 Priest, Prisoner, Spiritual Father.'' Introduction pp. vi–1. St Vladimir's Seminary Press {{ISBN|0-88141-180-9}}</ref><ref>{{cite news|newspaper=The Washington Post|url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/11/25/AR2006112500783.html|title=Anti-Communist Priest Gheorghe Calciu-Dumitreasa|first=Patricia|last=Sullivan|date=26 November 2006|page=C09}}</ref>

However, the Soviet policy vis-a-vis organised religion vacillated over time between, on the one hand, a utopian determination to substitute secular rationalism for what they considered to be an outmoded "superstitious" worldview and, on the other, pragmatic acceptance of the tenaciousness of religious faith and institutions. In any case, religious beliefs and practices did persist, not only in the domestic and private spheres but also in the scattered public spaces allowed by a state that recognized its failure to eradicate religion and the political dangers of an unrelenting culture war.<ref>John Shelton Curtis, ''The Russian Church and the Soviet State'' (Boston: Little Brown, 1953); Jane Ellis, ''The Russian Orthodox Church: A Contemporary History'' (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1986); Dimitry V. Pospielovsky, ''The Russian Church Under the Soviet Regime 1917–1982'' (St. Vladimir's Seminary Press, 1984); idem., ''A History of Marxist–Leninist Atheism and Soviet Anti-Religious Policies'' (New York; St. Martin's Press, 1987); Glennys Young, P''ower and the Sacred in Revolutionary Russia: Religious Activists in the Village'' (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997); Daniel Peris, ''Storming the Heavens: The Soviet League of the Militant Godless'' (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998); William B. Husband, ''"Godless Communists": Atheism and Society in Soviet Russia'' (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 2000; Edward Roslof, ''Red Priests: Renovationism, Russian Orthodoxy, and Revolution, 1905–1946'' (Bloomington, Indiana, 2002)</ref>

[[File:St. Sophia Cathedral, Harbin, China.jpg|thumb|[[Saint Sophia Cathedral in Harbin|St. Sophia Cathedral]] in [[Harbin]], northeast China. In 1921, Harbin was home of at least 100,000 [[White émigré|White]] [[Harbin Russians|Russian]] émigrés.]]
The Russian Orthodox church was drastically weakened in May 1922, when the [[Living Church|Renovated (Living) Church]], a reformist movement backed by the Soviet secret police, broke away from Patriarch Tikhon (also see the [[Josephite Movement|Josephites]] and the [[Catacomb Church|Russian True Orthodox Church]]), a move that caused division among clergy and faithful that persisted until 1946.

Between 1917 and 1935, 130,000 Eastern Orthodox priests were arrested. Of these, 95,000 were put to death.{{citation needed|date=August 2023}} Many thousands of victims of persecution became recognized in a special canon of saints known as the "[[New Martyr|new martyrs]] and confessors of Russia".{{citation needed|date=August 2023}}

When Patriarch Tikhon died in 1925, the Soviet authorities forbade patriarchal election. Patriarchal ''locum tenens'' (acting Patriarch) [[Patriarch Sergius I of Moscow|Metropolitan Sergius]] (Stragorodsky, 1887–1944), going against the opinion of a major part of the church's parishes, in 1927 issued a declaration accepting the Soviet authority over the church as legitimate, pledging the church's cooperation with the government and condemning political dissent within the church. By this declaration, Sergius granted himself authority that he, being a deputy of imprisoned [[Peter of Krutitsy|Metropolitan Peter]] and acting against his will, had no right to assume according to the XXXIV [[Canons of the Apostles|Apostolic canon]], which led to a split with the [[Russian Orthodox Church Outside Russia]] abroad and the [[Catacomb Church|Russian True Orthodox Church]] (Russian Catacomb Church) within the Soviet Union, as they allegedly remained faithful to the Canons of the Apostles, declaring the part of the church led by Metropolitan Sergius [[schism (religion)|schism]], sometimes coined ''Sergianism''. Due to this canonical disagreement it is disputed which church has been the legitimate successor to the Russian Orthodox Church that had existed before 1925.<ref name="14spravka">{{in lang|ru}} Alekseev, Valery. [http://www.ipc.od.ua/14spravka.html Historical and canonical reference for reasons making believers leave the Moscow patriarchate]. Created for the government of [[Moldova]] {{webarchive |url=https://web.archive.org/web/20061129175211/http://www.ipc.od.ua/14spravka.html |date=29 November 2006 }}</ref><ref>Talantov, Boris. 1968. [http://www.orthodoxinfo.com/ecumenism/cat_tal.aspx The Moscow Patriarchate and Sergianism] (English translation).
</ref><ref>[http://www.russianorthodoxchurch.ws/01newstucture/pagesen/news04/meylavrinsa.html Protopriest Yaroslav Belikow. 11 December 2004. The Visit of His Eminence Metropolitan Laurus to the Parishes of Argentina and Venezuela] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070429165319/http://www.russianorthodoxchurch.ws/01newstucture/pagesen/news04/meylavrinsa.html |date=29 April 2007 }}."
</ref><ref>{{Cite web|url=http://catacomb.org.ua/modules.php?name=Pages&go=page&pid=1099|title=Церковные Церковные Ведомости: Духовное наследие Катакомбной Церкви и Русской Православной Церкви Заграницей - Patriarch Tikhon's Catacomb Church. History of the Russian True Orthodox Church] Ведомости: Духовное наследие Катакомбной Церкви и Русской Православной Церкви Заграницей – Patriarch Tikhon's Catacomb Church. History of the Russian True Orthodox Church|website=catacomb.org.ua|access-date=25 December 2022}}</ref>

In 1927, Metropolitan [[Eulogius (Georgiyevsky)|Evlogy]] of Paris broke with the ROCOR (along with Metropolitan [[Platon (Rozhdestvensky)]] of New York, leader of the Russian Metropolia in America). In 1930, after taking part in a prayer service in London in supplication for Christians suffering under the Soviets, Evlogy was removed from office by Sergius and replaced. Most of Evlogy's parishes in Western Europe remained loyal to him; Evlogy then petitioned Ecumenical Patriarch [[Photius II of Constantinople|Photius II]] to be received under his canonical care and was received in 1931, making a number of parishes of Russian Orthodox Christians outside Russia, especially in Western Europe an [[Exarchate]] of the Ecumenical Patriarchate as the [[Archdiocese of Russian Orthodox churches in Western Europe]].

[[File:Christ saviour explosion.jpg|thumb|left|Photograph taken of the 1931 demolition of the [[Cathedral of Christ the Saviour]] in Moscow]]

Moreover, in the [[1929 Soviet Union legislative election|1929 elections]], the Orthodox Church attempted to formulate itself as a full-scale opposition group to the Communist Party, and attempted to run candidates of its own against the Communist candidates. Article 124 of the [[1936 Soviet Constitution]] officially allowed for freedom of religion within the Soviet Union, and along with initial statements of it being a multi-candidate election, the Church again attempted to run its own religious candidates in the [[1937 Soviet Union legislative election|1937 elections]]. However the support of multicandidate elections was retracted several months before the elections were held and in neither 1929 nor 1937 were any candidates of the Orthodox Church elected.<ref>[[Sheila Fitzpatrick|Fitzpatrick, Sheila]]. 1999. ''Everyday Stalinism: Ordinary Life in Extraordinary Times: Soviet Russia in the 1930s''. New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 179-82.</ref>

After [[Operation Barbarossa|Nazi Germany's attack on the Soviet Union]] in 1941, [[Joseph Stalin]] revived the Russian Orthodox Church to intensify patriotic support for the war effort. In the early hours of 5 September 1943, Metropolitans Sergius (Stragorodsky), [[Patriarch Alexy I of Moscow|Alexius (Simansky)]] and [[Nicholas (Yarushevich)]] had a meeting with Stalin and received permission to convene a council on 8 September 1943, which elected Sergius Patriarch of Moscow and all the Rus'. This is considered by some as violation of the [[Canons of the Apostles|Apostolic canon]], as no church hierarch could be consecrated by secular authorities.<ref name="14spravka"/> A new patriarch was elected, theological schools were opened, and thousands of churches began to function. The [[Slavic Greek Latin Academy|Moscow Theological Academy Seminary]], which had been closed since 1918, was re-opened.

In December 2017, the [[Security Service of Ukraine]] lifted classified top secret status of documents revealing that the [[People's Commissariat for State Security|NKVD]] of the USSR and its units were engaged in the selection of candidates for participation in the [[1945 Local Council of the Russian Orthodox Church|1945 Local Council]] from the representatives of the clergy and the laity. NKVD demanded "to outline persons who have religious authority among the clergy and believers, and at the same time checked for civic or patriotic work". In the letter sent in September 1944, it was emphasized: "It is important to ensure that the number of nominated candidates is dominated by the agents of the NKBD, capable of holding the line that we need at the Council".<ref>{{cite web |url = https://espreso.tv/news/2017/12/10/moskovskyy_patriarkhat_stvoryuvaly_agenty_nkvs_svidchat_rozskerecheni_sbu_dokumenty |title = Московський патріархат створювали агенти НКВС, – свідчать розсекречені СБУ документи |website = espreso.tv }}</ref><ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.znak.com/2017-12-10/sbu_rassekretila_arhivy_moskovskogo_patriarha_v_1945_godu_izbirali_agenty_nkgb|title=СБУ рассекретила архивы: московского патриарха в 1945 году избирали агенты НКГБ|website=www.znak.com|access-date=11 December 2017|archive-date=11 December 2017|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20171211003534/https://www.znak.com/2017-12-10/sbu_rassekretila_arhivy_moskovskogo_patriarha_v_1945_godu_izbirali_agenty_nkgb|url-status=dead}}</ref>

====Persecution under Khrushchev====
A new and widespread persecution of the church was subsequently instituted under the leadership of Nikita Khrushchev and Leonid Brezhnev. A second round of repression, harassment and church closures took place between 1959 and 1964 when [[Nikita Khrushchev]] was in office. The number of Orthodox churches fell from around 22,000 in 1959 to around 8,000 in 1965;<ref>{{Cite book|title=Tsarist and Communist Russia 1855–1964|last=Sally|first=Waller|date=30 April 2015|isbn=9780198354673|edition= Second |location=Oxford|oclc=913789474}}</ref> priests, monks and faithful were killed or imprisoned{{citation needed|date=March 2023}} and the number of functioning monasteries was reduced to less than twenty.

Subsequent to Khrushchev's ousting, the Church and the government remained on unfriendly terms{{Vague|reason=What characterised it as unfriendly? Also its unscientific term|date=April 2023}} until 1988. In practice, the most important aspect of this conflict was that openly religious people could not join the [[Communist Party of the Soviet Union]], which meant that they could not hold any political office. However, among the general population, large numbers{{Clarify|reason=Needs statistics|date=April 2023}} remained religious.

Some Orthodox believers and even priests took part in the [[dissident]] movement and became [[prisoner of conscience|prisoners of conscience]]. The Orthodox priests [[Gleb Yakunin]], Sergiy Zheludkov and others spent years in Soviet prisons and exile for their efforts in defending freedom of worship.<ref>"Dissent in the Russian Orthodox Church," ''Russian Review'', Vol. 28, N 4, October 1969, pp. 416–27.</ref> Among the prominent figures of that time were Dmitri Dudko<ref name="Dudko">{{Cite news|url=https://www.independent.co.uk/news/obituaries/fr-dmitry-dudko-550017.html|title=Fr Dmitry Dudko|date=30 June 2004|work=[[The Independent]]|accessdate=25 December 2022}}</ref> and [[Alexander Men|Aleksandr Men]]. Although he tried to keep away from practical work of the dissident movement intending to better fulfil his calling as a priest, there was a spiritual link between Men and many of the dissidents. For some of them he was a friend; for others, a godfather; for many (including [[Yakunin]]), a spiritual father.<ref>''Keston Institute and the Defence of Persecuted Christians in the USSR''</ref>{{Obsolete source|date=April 2023}}{{Unreliable source?|date=April 2023}}

According to [[Vladimir Bogoyavlensky|Metropolitan Vladimir]], by 1988 the number of functioning churches in the [[Soviet Union]] had fallen to 6,893 and the number of functioning convents and monasteries to just 21.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Dunlop |first=John B. |date=December 1990 |title=The Russian Orthodox Church and nationalism after 1988 |url=https://biblicalstudies.gospelstudies.org.uk/pdf/rcl/18-4_292.pdf |journal=Religion in Communist Lands |language=en |volume=18 |issue=4 |pages=292–306 |doi=10.1080/09637499008431483 |issn=0307-5974}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Bell |first1=Helen |last2=Ellis |first2=Jane |date=December 1988 |title=The millennium celebrations of 1988 in the USSR |url=https://biblicalstudies.org.uk/pdf/rcl/16-4_292.pdf |journal=Religion in Communist Lands |language=en |volume=16 |issue=4 |pages=292–328 |doi=10.1080/09637498808431389 |issn=0307-5974}}</ref> In 1987 in the [[Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic|Russian SFSR]], between 40% and 50% of newborn babies (depending on the region) were baptized. Over 60% of all deceased received Christian funeral services.{{citation needed|date=March 2023}}

==== Glasnost and evidence of collaboration with the KGB ====
{{Main|Glasnost}}

Beginning  in the late 1980s, under Mikhail Gorbachev, the new political and social freedoms resulted in the return of many church buildings to the church, so they could be restored by local parishioners. A pivotal point in the history of the Russian Orthodox Church came in 1988, the millennial anniversary of the [[Christianization of Kievan Rus']]. Throughout the summer of that year, major government-supported celebrations took place in Moscow and other cities; many older churches and some monasteries were reopened. An implicit ban on religious propaganda on state TV was finally lifted. For the first time in the [[history of the Soviet Union]], people could watch live transmissions of church services on television.

[[Gleb Yakunin]], a critic of the [[Moscow Patriarchate]] who was one of those who briefly gained access to the [[KGB]]'s archives in the early 1990s, argued that the Moscow Patriarchate was "practically a subsidiary, a sister company of the KGB".<ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB119792074745834591?mod=hpp_us_inside_today |title=Born Again. Putin and Orthodox Church Cement Power in Russia|author= Andrew Higgins|work=[[Wall Street Journal]]|date= 18 December 2007}}</ref> Critics charge that the archives showed the extent of active participation of the top ROC hierarchs in the KGB efforts overseas.<ref name="Vypiski">[http://www.krotov.info/acts/20/1960/1967_loubyanka.html Выписки из отчетов КГБ о работе с лидерами Московской патриархии] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20081208122858/http://www.krotov.info/acts/20/1960/1967_loubyanka.html |date=8 December 2008 }} Excerpts from KGB reports on work with the leaders of the Moscow Patriarchate</ref><ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.theguardian.com/world/1999/feb/12/1 |title=Russian Patriarch 'was KGB spy|work= [[The Guardian]]|date= 12 February 1999}}</ref><ref name="Andrew">[[Christopher Andrew (historian)|Christopher Andrew]] and [[Vasili Mitrokhin]], The [[Mitrokhin Archive]]: The KGB in Europe and the West, Gardners Books (2000), {{ISBN|0-14-028487-7}}</ref><ref name="Albats">[[Yevgenia Albats]] and Catherine A. Fitzpatrick. ''The State Within a State: The KGB and Its Hold on Russia – Past, Present, and Future''. 1994. {{ISBN|0-374-52738-5}}, p. 46.</ref><ref name="PrChurch">[[Konstantin Preobrazhensky|Konstantin Preobrazhenskiy]] – [http://cicentre.com/Documents/putin_espionage_church.html Putin's Espionage Church] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20081209002520/http://cicentre.com/Documents/putin_espionage_church.html |date=9 December 2008 }}, an excerpt from a forthcoming book, "Russian Americans: A New KGB Asset" by [[Konstantin Preobrazhensky|Konstantin Preobrazhenskiy]]</ref><ref name="CWNrep">[http://www.cwnews.com/news/viewstory.cfm?recnum=13868 Confirmed: Russian Patriarch Worked with KGB, Catholic World News. Retrieved 29 December 2007.]</ref> [[George Trofimoff]], the highest-ranking US military officer ever indicted for, and convicted of, [[espionage]] by the [[United States]] and sentenced to [[life imprisonment]] on 27 September 2001, had been "recruited into the service of the KGB"<ref>{{Cite web|url=http://cicentre.com/Documents/DOC_Trofimoff_Affidavit.htm|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080627153846/http://cicentre.com/Documents/DOC_Trofimoff_Affidavit.htm|url-status=dead|title=George Trofimoff Affidavit|archive-date=27 June 2008}}</ref> by Igor Susemihl (a.k.a. Zuzemihl), a bishop in the Russian Orthodox Church (subsequently, a high-ranking hierarch—the ROC Metropolitan Iriney of [[Vienna]], who died in July 1999).<ref>[http://ortho-rus.ru/cgi-bin/ps_file.cgi?2_599 Ириней (Зуземиль)] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20071109133930/http://www.ortho-rus.ru/cgi-bin/ps_file.cgi?2_599 |date=9 November 2007 }} Biography information on the web-site of the ROC</ref>

Konstanin Kharchev, former chairman of the Soviet Council on Religious Affairs, explained: "Not a single candidate for the office of bishop or any other high-ranking office, much less a member of the Holy Synod, went through without confirmation by the Central Committee of the [[Communist Party of the Soviet Union|CPSU]] and the [[KGB]]".<ref name="Albats" /> Professor Nathaniel Davis points out: "If the bishops wished to defend their people and survive in office, they had to collaborate to some degree with the KGB, with the commissioners of the Council for Religious Affairs, and with other party and governmental authorities".<ref>Nathaniel Davis, ''A Long Walk to Church: A Contemporary History of Russian Orthodoxy'', (Oxford: Westview Press, 1995), p. 96 Davis quotes one bishop as saying: "Yes, we—I, at least, and I say this first about myself—I worked together with the KGB. I cooperated, I made signed statements, I had regular meetings, I made reports. I was given a pseudonym—a code name as they say there. ... I knowingly cooperated with them—but in such a way that I undeviatingly tried to maintain the position of my Church, and, yes, also to act as a patriot, insofar as I understood, in collaboration with these organs. I was never a stool pigeon, nor an informer."</ref> Patriarch Alexy II, acknowledged that compromises were made with the Soviet government by bishops of the Moscow Patriarchate, himself included, and he publicly repented for these compromises.<ref>He said: "Defending one thing, it was necessary to give somewhere else. Were there any other organizations, or any other people among those who had to carry responsibility not only for themselves but for thousands of other fates, who in those years in the Soviet Union were not compelled to act likewise? Before those people, however, to whom the compromises, silence, forced passivity or expressions of loyalty permitted by the leaders of the church in those years caused pain, before these people, and not only before God, I ask forgiveness, understanding and prayers." From an interview of Patriarch Alexy II, given to ''Izvestia'' No 137, 10 June 1991, entitled "Patriarch Alexy II: – I Take upon Myself Responsibility for All that Happened", English translation from Nathaniel Davis, ''A Long Walk to Church: A Contemporary History of Russian Orthodoxy'' (Oxford: Westview Press, 1995), p. 89</ref><ref>[http://orthodoxinfo.com/ecumenism/roca_history.aspx History of the Russian Orthodox Church Abroad] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090513181214/http://www.orthodoxinfo.com/ecumenism/roca_history.aspx |date=13 May 2009 }}, by St. John (Maximovich) of Shanghai and San Francisco, 31 December 2007</ref>

===Post-Soviet era===
====Patriarch Aleksey II (1990–2008)====
[[File:Russian Orthodox Episcopal Ordination.jpg|thumb|upright=1.15|Russian Orthodox episcopal consecration by [[Patriarch Alexy II of Moscow|Patriarch Alexius II]] [[Patriarch of Moscow and all the Rus'|of Moscow and All Russia]]]]

Metropolitan [[Patriarch Alexy II of Moscow|Alexy (Ridiger)]] of [[Saint Petersburg|Leningrad]], ascended the patriarchal throne in 1990 and presided over the partial return of Orthodox Christianity to Russian society after 70 years of repression, transforming the ROC to something resembling its pre-communist appearance; some 15,000 churches had been re-opened or built by the end of his tenure, and the process of recovery and rebuilding has continued under his successor [[Patriarch Kirill of Moscow|Patriarch Kirill]]. According to official figures, in 2016 the Church had 174 dioceses, 361 bishops, and 34,764 parishes served by 39,800 clergy. There were 926 monasteries and 30 theological schools.<ref>Русская церковь объединяет свыше 150 млн. верующих в более чем 60 странах – митрополит Иларион Interfax.ru 2 March 2011</ref>

The Russian Church also sought to fill the ideological vacuum left by the [[collapse of Communism]] and even, in the opinion of some analysts, became "a separate branch of power".<ref>{{cite news |url= http://us.ft.com/ftgateway/superpage.ft?news_id=fto120520081735416422&page=1 |title=Russia's church mourns patriarch |access-date=8 December 2008 |author=Charles Clover |date=5 December 2008 |newspaper=Financial Times |location= London |url-status=dead |archive-url= https://web.archive.org/web/20100329045043/http://us.ft.com/ftgateway/superpage.ft?news_id=fto120520081735416422&page=1 |archive-date=29 March 2010 }}</ref>

In August 2000, the ROC adopted its Basis of the Social Concept<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.mospat.ru/en/documents/social-concepts/|title=The Basis of the Social Concept|access-date=5 March 2015|archive-date=27 March 2015|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150327212920/https://mospat.ru/en/documents/social-concepts/|url-status=dead}}</ref> and in July 2008, its Basic Teaching on Human Dignity, Freedom and Rights.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.mospat.ru/en/documents/dignity-freedom-rights/|title=The Russian Orthodox Church's Basic Teaching on Human Dignity, Freedom and Rights|access-date=5 March 2015|archive-date=27 March 2015|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150327202203/https://mospat.ru/en/documents/dignity-freedom-rights/|url-status=dead}}</ref>

[[File:RIAN archive 749019 Opening of monument to victims of political repressions.jpg|thumb|upright|Opening of monument to the victims of [[Political repression in the Soviet Union|political repressions]], [[Moscow]], 1990]]

Under Patriarch Aleksey, there were difficulties in the relationship between the Russian Orthodox Church and the [[Holy See|Vatican]], especially since 2002, when [[Pope John Paul II]] created a [[Catholic]] diocesan structure for Russian territory. The leaders of the Russian Church saw this action as a throwback to prior attempts by the Vatican to [[proselytism|proselytize]] the Russian Orthodox faithful to become Roman Catholic. This point of view was based upon the stance of the Russian Orthodox Church (and the [[Eastern Orthodox Church]]) that the Church of Rome is in schism, after breaking off from the Orthodox Church. The Roman Catholic Church, on the other hand, while acknowledging the primacy of the Russian Orthodox Church in Russia, believed that the small Roman Catholic minority in Russia, in continuous existence since at least the 18th century, should be served by a fully developed church hierarchy with a presence and status in Russia, just as the Russian Orthodox Church is present in other countries (including constructing a cathedral in Rome, near the [[Vatican City|Vatican]]).

There occurred strident conflicts with the Ecumenical Patriarchate, most notably over the Orthodox Church in [[Estonia]] in the mid-1990s, which resulted in [[1996 Moscow–Constantinople schism|unilateral suspension of eucharistic relationship between the churches by the ROC]].<ref>Телеграмма Патриаха Алексия Патриаху Константинопольскому Варфоломею I от 23 февраля 1996 // [[:ru:Журнал Московской Патриархии|ЖМП]] 1996, № 3 (Официальная часть).</ref> The tension lingered on and could be observed at the meeting in Ravenna in early October 2007 of participants in the Orthodox–Catholic Dialogue: the representative of the Moscow Patriarchate, Bishop [[Hilarion Alfeyev]], walked out of the meeting due to the presence of representatives from the [[Estonian Apostolic Orthodox Church]] which is in the jurisdiction of the Ecumenical Patriarchate. At the meeting, prior to the departure of the Russian delegation, there were also substantive disagreements about the wording of a proposed joint statement among the Orthodox representatives.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://orthodoxeurope.org/page/14/130.aspx#3|title=No 130 (October 21, 2007) » Europaica Bulletin » OrthodoxEurope.org|access-date=5 March 2015}}</ref> After the departure of the Russian delegation, the remaining Orthodox delegates approved the form which had been advocated by the representatives of the Ecumenical Patriarchate.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.interfax-religion.com/?act=news&div=3945|title=Interfax-Religion|access-date=5 March 2015}}</ref> The Ecumenical See's representative in Ravenna said that Hilarion's position "should be seen as an expression of authoritarianism whose goal is to exhibit the influence of the Moscow Church. But like last year in Belgrade, all Moscow achieved was to isolate itself once more since no other Orthodox Church followed its lead, remaining instead faithful to Constantinople."<ref>[http://new.asianews.it/index.php?l=en&art=10597 Progress in dialogue with Catholics, says Ecumenical Patriarchate new.asianews.it 19 October 2007.] {{webarchive |url=https://web.archive.org/web/20081226125657/http://new.asianews.it/index.php?l=en&art=10597 |date=26 December 2008 }}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.cwnews.com/news/viewstory.cfm?recnum=54270 |title=Ecumenical progress, Russian isolation, after Catholic-Orthodox talks|website= [[Catholic World News]]|date= 19 October 2007}}</ref>

[[File:Cross Procession in Novosibirsk 01.jpg|thumb|A cross Procession in [[Novosibirsk]], Siberia.]]

Canon [[Michael Bourdeaux]], former president of the [[Keston Institute]], said in January 2008 that "the Moscow Patriarchate acts as though it heads a state church, while the few Orthodox clergy who oppose the church-state symbiosis face severe criticism, even loss of livelihood."<ref>{{cite news|url=http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/comment/faith/article3172785.ece |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080725095124/http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/comment/faith/article3172785.ece |url-status=dead |archive-date=25 July 2008 |title=President Putin and the patriarchs|author=Michael Bourdeaux|work=[[The Times]]'|date= 11 January 2008}}</ref> Such a view is backed up by other observers of Russian political life.<ref>[http://www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/2008-30-16.cfm Piety's Comeback as a Kremlin Virtue.] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20081211003954/http://www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/2008-30-16.cfm |date=11 December 2008 }}, Alexander Osipovich, ''[[The Moscow Times]]'', 12 February 2008. p. 1.</ref> Clifford J. Levy of ''[[The New York Times]]'' wrote in April 2008: "Just as the government has tightened control over political life, so, too, has it intruded in matters of faith. The Kremlin's surrogates in many areas have turned the Russian Orthodox Church into a de facto official religion, warding off other Christian denominations that seem to offer the most significant competition for worshipers. [...] This close alliance between the government and the Russian Orthodox Church has become a defining characteristic of Mr. Putin's tenure, a mutually reinforcing choreography that is usually described here as working '[[Symphonia (theology)|in symphony]]'."<ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/24/world/europe/24church.html?_r=1&scp=4&sq=russia&st=nyt&oref=slogin |author=Clifford J. Levy|title=At Expense of All Others, Putin Picks a Church|work= [[The New York Times]]|date= 24 April 2008}}</ref>

Throughout Patriarch Alexy's reign, the massive program of costly restoration and reopening of devastated churches and monasteries (as well as the construction of new ones) was criticized for having eclipsed the church's principal mission of evangelizing.<ref>[http://portal-credo.ru/site/?act=news&id=67353&topic=618 Патриарх Алексий Второй: эпоха упущенных возможностей] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090803072116/http://portal-credo.ru/site/?act=news&id=67353&topic=618 |date=3 August 2009 }} RISU 11 December 2008</ref><ref>[http://kommersant.ru/doc.aspx?DocsID=1094071&ThemesID=1011 Ветряные мельницы православия Kommersant, 15 December 2008].</ref>

On 5 December 2008, the day of Patriarch Alexy's death, the ''[[Financial Times]]'' said: "While the church had been a force for liberal reform under the Soviet Union, it soon became a center of strength for conservatives and nationalists in the post-communist era. Alexei's death could well result in an even more conservative church."<ref>{{cite web|url=http://us.ft.com/ftgateway/superpage.ft?news_id=fto120520081735416422&page=2 |title=Russia's church mourns patriarch |access-date=8 December 2008 |first=Charles |last=Clover |date=5 December 2008 |work=The [[Financial Times]] |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20100329050911/http://us.ft.com/ftgateway/superpage.ft?news_id=fto120520081735416422&page=2 |archive-date=29 March 2010 }}</ref>

====Patriarch Kirill (since 2009)====
[[File:Annual procession with the Albazin icon.jpg|thumb|Annual procession with the Albazin icon, [[Jewish Autonomous Region]], Russian Far East.]]

On 27 January 2009, the [[Local Council of the Russian Orthodox Church|ROC Local Council]] elected Metropolitan [[Patriarch Kirill of Moscow|Kirill of Smolensk]] Patriarch of Moscow and All Rus′ by 508 votes out of a total of 700.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://iz.ru/rubric/obshchestvo|archiveurl=https://web.archive.org/web/20090301054312/http://www.izvestia.ru/obshestvo/article3124663/|url-status=dead|title=Общество – свежие и последние новости из жизни общества в мире и России, комментарии, интервью очевидцев|archivedate=1 March 2009|website=iz.ru|language=RU|accessdate=25 December 2022}}</ref> He was enthroned on 1 February 2009.

Patriarch Kirill implemented reforms in the administrative structure of the Moscow Patriarchate: on 27 July 2011 the Holy Synod established the Central Asian Metropolitan District, reorganizing the structure of the Church in Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Turkmenistan.<ref>Решением Священного Синода образован Среднеазиатский митрополичий округ</ref> In addition, on 6 October 2011, at the request of the Patriarch, the Holy Synod introduced the metropoly (Russian: митрополия, mitropoliya), administrative structure bringing together neighboring eparchies.<ref>ЖУРНАЛЫ заседания Священного Синода от 5–6 октября 2011 года</ref>

Under Patriarch Kirill, the ROC continued to maintain close ties with the Kremlin enjoying the patronage of president [[Vladimir Putin]], who has sought to mobilize Russian Orthodoxy both inside and outside Russia.<ref name="defiance" /><ref name="firepower_2016_09_14_nytimes_com">{{cite news|author=Andrew Higgins |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/14/world/europe/russia-orthodox-church.html |title=In Expanding Russian Influence, Faith Combines With Firepower|date= September 13, 2016|work=[[New York Times]]|accessdate= January 26, 2022}}</ref> Patriarch Kirill endorsed Putin's [[2012 Russian presidential election|election in 2012]], referring in February to Putin's tenure in the 2000s as "God's miracle".<ref>{{Cite web|url=http://www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/2005767.html|title=Стенограмма встречи председателя Правительства РФ В.В. Путина со Святейшим Патриархом Кириллом и лидерами традиционных религиозных общин России / Статьи / Патриархия.ru|website=www.patriarchia.ru|accessdate=25 December 2022}}</ref><ref>{{cite book|editor=Julia Gerlach and Jochen Töpfer|title=The Role of Religion in Eastern Europe Today|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=1F6vBQAAQBAJ&pg=PA135|year=2014|publisher=Springer|page=135|isbn=978-3658024413}}</ref> Nevertheless, Russian inside sources were quoted in the autumn 2017 as saying that Putin's relationship with Patriarch Kirill had been deteriorating since 2014 due to the fact that the presidential administration had been misled by the Moscow Patriarchate as to the extent of support for [[2014 pro-Russian unrest in Ukraine|pro-Russian uprising]] in eastern Ukraine; also, due to Kirill's personal unpopularity he had come to be viewed as a political liability.<ref>{{Cite web|url=http://religiopolis.org/publications/11984-novye-starye-simptomy.html|title=НОВЫЕ СТАРЫЕ СИМПТОМЫ – ReligioPolis – Информационный ресурс Центра религиоведческих исследований|website=religiopolis.org|accessdate=25 December 2022|archive-date=27 November 2022|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221127154454/http://religiopolis.org/publications/11984-novye-starye-simptomy.html|url-status=dead}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web|url=https://sobesednik.ru/politika/20171023-borba-bashen-ili-neumerennyj-appetit-pochemu-putin-izbegaet-patriarha|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20171023235538/https://sobesednik.ru/politika/20171023-borba-bashen-ili-neumerennyj-appetit-pochemu-putin-izbegaet-patriarha|url-status=dead|archive-date=23 October 2017|title=Борьба башен или неумеренный аппетит? Почему Путин избегает патриарха|website=sobesednik.ru|accessdate=25 December 2022}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web|url=http://zagolovki.ru/daytheme/rpz/24Oct2017|title=Из-за чего Путин сторонится патриарха: "Собеседник" узнал, за что Кирилл попал в опалу|website=zagolovki.ru|access-date=18 October 2018|archive-date=19 October 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20181019012910/http://zagolovki.ru/daytheme/rpz/24Oct2017|url-status=dead}}</ref>

====Schism with Constantinople====
{{see also|2018 Moscow–Constantinople schism}}

In 2018, the Moscow Patriarchate's traditional rivalry with the [[Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople|Patriarchate of Constantinople]], coupled with Moscow's anger over the decision to grant autocephaly to the Ukrainian church by the Ecumenical Patriarch, led the ROC to boycott the [[Pan-Orthodox Council|Holy Great Council]] that had been prepared by all the Orthodox Churches for decades.<ref name="defender_2019_05_19_ecfr_eu" /><ref name="ukrainian_question_2016_06_30_moscow_times">{{Cite news |url= https://themoscowtimes.com/articles/ukrainian-question-divides-orthodox-world-53509 |title=Ukrainian Question Divides Orthodox World |access-date=14 October 2018 |date=30 June 2016 |first=Ola |last=Chichowlas |work=The Moscow Times}}</ref>

The Holy Synod of the ROC, at its session on 15 October 2018, [[Moscow–Constantinople schism (2018)|severed]] [[full communion]] with the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople.<ref>{{Cite web|url=http://www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/5283737.html|title=Священный Синод Русской Православной Церкви признал невозможным дальнейшее пребывание в евхаристическом общении с Константинопольским Патриархатом / Новости / Патриархия.ru|website=www.patriarchia.ru|accessdate=25 December 2022}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web|url=http://www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/5283687.html|title=ЖУРНАЛЫ заседания Священного Синода от 15 октября 2018 года / Официальные документы / Патриархия.ru|website=www.patriarchia.ru|accessdate=25 December 2022}}</ref> The decision was taken in response to the move made by the Patriarchate of Constantinople a few days prior that effectively ended the Moscow Patriarchate's jurisdiction over Ukraine and promised [[autocephaly]] to Ukraine,<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://ec-patr.org/|title=Οικουμενικό Πατριαρχείο|accessdate=25 December 2022}}</ref> the ROC's and the Kremlin's fierce opposition notwithstanding.<ref name="defiance">{{cite news |url = https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/oct/14/ukraine-archbishop-bartholomew-defies-moscow-church |title = Archbishop's defiance threatens Putin's vision of Russian greatness |last=Tisdall |first=Simon |date=14 October 2018 |website=The Guardian |location= London |access-date=14 October 2018}}</ref><ref>{{Cite news|url=https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2018-10-13/putin-is-loser-as-ukraine-s-orthodox-church-seeks-independence|title=Putin Is the Biggest Loser of Orthodox Schism|newspaper=Bloomberg.com |date=13 October 2018|via=www.bloomberg.com}}</ref><ref>{{cite web |url =https://www.rferl.org/a/russian-orthodox-church-to-break-with-patriarchate-of-constantinople/29545003.html |title=Russian Orthodox Church Breaks Ties With Constantinople Patriarchate |publisher=[[RFERL]] |access-date =15 October 2018}}</ref><ref>{{Cite news |url= https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-45870939 |title=Russian Orthodox Church severs links with Constantinople|date=16 October 2018|work=BBC News|access-date=16 October 2018}}</ref>

While the Ecumenical Patriarchate finalised the establishment of the [[Orthodox Church of Ukraine]] on 5 January 2019, the ROC continued to claim that the only legitimate Orthodox jurisdiction in the country, [[Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate)|was its branch]].<ref name="ЖУРНАЛ98">{{Cite web|url=http://www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/5330863.html|title=ЖУРНАЛЫ заседания Священного Синода от 28 декабря 2018 года / Официальные документы / Патриархия.ru|website=www.patriarchia.ru|accessdate=25 December 2022}}</ref> Under a law of Ukraine adopted at the end of 2018, the latter was required to change its official title so as to disclose its affiliation with the Russian Orthodox Church based in an "aggressor state".<ref>{{cite news |title=Ukraine's President Signs Law Forcing Russia-Affiliated Church To Change Name |url= https://www.rferl.org/a/ukraine-s-president-signs-law-forcing-orthodox-church-to-change-its-name/29671193.html |work=Radio Liberty |date=22 December 2018 }}</ref><ref>{{cite news |title=Poroshenko signs law on Ukrainian Orthodox Church renaming |url= http://tass.com/society/1037495 |work=[[TASS]] |date=22 December 2018 }}</ref> On 11 December 2019 the [[Supreme Court of Ukraine]] allowed the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate (UOC-MP) to retain its name.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.unian.info/society/10796912-supreme-court-of-ukraine-rules-in-favor-of-moscow-patriarchate.html|title=Supreme Court of Ukraine rules in favor of Moscow Patriarchate|website=www.unian.info|date=16 December 2019 |accessdate=25 December 2022}}</ref>

In October 2019, the ROC unilaterally severed communion with the [[Church of Greece]] following the latter's recognition of the Ukrainian autocephaly.<ref>{{cite news|url=https://mospat.ru/en/2019/10/17/news178948/|title=Statement of the Holy Synod of the Russian Orthodox Church|date=17 October 2019|work=[[Department of External Church Affairs of the Moscow Patriarchate]]|access-date=13 September 2020}}</ref> On 3 November, Patriarch Kirill failed to commemorate the Primate of the Church of Greece, Archbishop [[Ieronymos II of Athens]], during a liturgy in Moscow.<ref>{{cite news |title=Патриарх Кирилл впервые не помянул главу Элладской церкви в богослужении: Священный синод РПЦ ранее постановил прекратить молитвенное общение с иерархами ЭПЦ |url= https://tass.ru/obschestvo/7075462 |work=[[TASS|TACC]] |language=RU|date=3 November 2018 }}</ref> Additionally, the ROC leadership imposed pilgrimage bans for its faithful in respect of a number of dioceses in Greece, including [[Archbishopric of Athens|that of Athens]].<ref>{{cite news |title=Church of Greece calmly monitors the actions of Moscow |url= https://orthodoxtimes.com/church-of-greece-calmly-monitors-the-actions-of-moscow/ |work=Orthodox Times |date=4 November 2019 }}</ref>

On 8 November 2019, the Russian Orthodox Church announced that Patriarch Kirill would stop commemorating the [[Patriarch Theodore II of Alexandria|Patriarch of Alexandria and all Africa]] after the latter and [[Greek Orthodox Church of Alexandria|his Church]] recognized the OCU that same day.<ref>{{Cite web|url=http://www.interfax-religion.com/?act=news&div=15355|title=Patriarch Kirill to cease liturgical commemoration of Patriarch of Alexandria – Moscow Patriarchate spokesman|date=8 November 2019|website=www.interfax-religion.com|url-status=dead|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20191109210346/http://www.interfax-religion.com/?act=news&div=15355|archive-date=9 November 2019|access-date=8 November 2019}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web|url=http://www.interfax-religion.ru/?act=news&div=73733|title=РПЦ считает невозможным дальнейшее поминовение Александрийского патриарха|date=8 November 2019 |language=ru |website=www.interfax-religion.ru|access-date=8 November 2019}}</ref><ref>{{Cite news |url= https://orthodoxtimes.com/the-patriarchate-of-alexandria-recognizes-the-orthodox-church-of-ukraine/|title=Patriarchate of Alexandria recognizes Autocephalous Church of Ukraine (upd)|date=8 November 2019|website=Orthodox Times |access-date=8 November 2019}}</ref>

On 27 September 2021, the ROC established a religious [[Day of Remembrance of the Victims of Political Repressions|day of remembrance]] for all Eastern Orthodox Christians which were persecuted by the Soviet regime. This day is the 30 October.<ref>{{Cite web|date=27 September 2021|title=Russian Church has established a day of remembrance for the victims of repression|url=http://www.interfax-religion.com/?act=news&div=16289|access-date=2021-11-14|website=www.interfax-religion.com}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web|title=ЖУРНАЛЫ заседания Священного Синода от 23–24 сентября 2021 года / Официальные документы / Патриархия.ru|url=http://www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/5837973.html|access-date=2021-11-14|website=www.patriarchia.ru|language=ru|quote=2. В дополнение к ежегодному поминовению пострадавших в годы гонений за веру Христову благословить на территории России 30 октября совершение заупокойных богослужений о всех православных христианах, безвинно богоборцами убиенных или безвинно пребывавших в заключении.}}</ref>

====Russian invasion of Ukraine====
[[File:Архиепископ Иннокентий (Васильев) в храме апостола и евангелиста Иоанна Богослова СПбДА.jpg|thumb|upright|Russia-born Metropolitan {{Ill|Innocent (Vasilyev)|ru|Иннокентий (Васильев)}} of [[Vilnius]] condemned "Russia's war against Ukraine" and is determined to seek greater independence from Moscow.<ref name="Week-War"/>]]
Metropolitan [[Onufriy (Berezovsky)|Onufriy of Kyiv]], [[Primate (bishop)|primate]] of the [[Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate)]] (UOC-MP) called the war "a disaster" stating that "The Ukrainian and Russian peoples came out of the [[Christianization of Kievan Rus'|Dnieper Baptismal font]], and the war between these peoples is a repetition of the sin of [[Cain]], who [[Cain and Abel|killed his own brother out of envy]]. Such a war has no justification either from God or from people".<ref>{{cite news |title=Moscow and Ukrainian Orthodox leaders call for peace – but define it differently|url=https://religionnews.com/2022/02/24/orthodox-patriarch-of-moscow-kirill-calls-on-all-parties-to-avoid-civilian-casualties-in-ukraine/ |work=Religion News Service |date=24 February 2022}}</ref> He also appealed directly to Putin, asking for an immediate end to the "fratricidal war".<ref>{{cite web |author=NewsRoom |title=Metropolitan Onufriy: Russia has started military actions against Ukraine, pray for the army and the people {{!}} Orthodox Times (en) |url=https://orthodoxtimes.com/metropolitan-onufriy-russia-has-started-military-actions-against-ukraine-pray-for-the-army-and-the-people/ |access-date=28 February 2022 |website=orthodoxtimes.com}}</ref><ref>{{cite web |date=27 February 2022 |title= How is Russia-Ukraine war linked to religion? |url=https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-vladimir-putin-kyiv-europe-nationalism-ff22c6c17784674a5eaad0f0a1ff17ca |website=[[AP News]]}}</ref> In April 2022, after the Russian invasion, many UOC-MP parishes signaled their intention to switch allegiance to the [[Orthodox Church of Ukraine]].<ref>{{cite news |last1=Maqbool |first1=Aleem |title='I'm shocked by my church leaders in Moscow' – priest in Ukraine |url=https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-61109104 |work=BBC News |date=15 April 2022}}</ref> The attitude and stance of [[Patriarch Kirill of Moscow]] to the war is one of the oft quoted reasons.<ref name="Week-War">{{cite news |title=Russian Orthodox Patriarch Kirill's support for Putin's Ukraine war has fractured his church |url=https://theweek.com/russo-ukrainian-war/1012713/russian-orthodox-patriarch-kirills-support-for-putins-ukraine-war-has |work=The Week |date=19 April 2022}}</ref> The head of the [[Russian Orthodox Diocese of Lithuania|Russian Orthodox Church in Lithuania]], Metropolitan {{Ill|Innocent (Vasilyev)|ru|Иннокентий (Васильев)}}, called Patriarch Kirill's "political statements about the war" his "personal opinion".<ref name="Week-War"/> On 7 March 2022, [[Aleksandrs Kudrjašovs]], head of the [[Latvian Orthodox Church]], condemned the Russian invasion of Ukraine.<ref>{{cite news |title=The Latvian Orthodox Church condemns the war in Ukraine |url=https://baltics.news/2022/03/07/the-latvian-orthodox-church-condemns-the-war-in-ukraine/ |work=Baltics News |date=7 March 2022}}</ref>

On 27 February 2022, a group of 286 Russian Orthodox priests published an open letter calling for an end to the war and criticised the suppression of non-violent [[2022 anti-war protests in Russia|anti-war protests in Russia]].<ref>{{cite news |title=Russian Orthodox priest arrested for anti-war stance |url=https://cruxnow.com/church-in-europe/2022/03/russian-orthodox-priest-arrested-for-anti-war-stance |work=Crux |date=10 March 2022}}</ref> On 6 March 2022, Russian Orthodox priest of Moscow Patriarchate's [[Diocese of Kostroma|Kostroma Diocese]] was fined by Russian authorities for anti-war sermon and stressing the importance of the commandment "Thou shalt not kill".<ref>{{cite news |title=Russian Priest Defends Calling Ukraine Conflict a 'War' After $330 Fine |url=https://www.newsweek.com/russian-priest-defends-calling-ukraine-conflict-war-after-330-fine-1689762 |work=Newsweek |date=19 March 2022}}</ref> Some priests in the Russian Orthodox Church have publicly [[Protests against the Russian invasion of Ukraine|opposed the invasion]], with some facing arrest under the [[Russian 2022 war censorship laws]].<ref>{{Cite news |date=2022-03-17 |title=Ukraine war: Russians grieve for fallen soldiers|work=BBC News |url=https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-60769509 }}</ref><ref>{{cite news |title='Those who unleashed aggression won't be in heaven' St. Petersburg priest faces criminal charges for condemning Russia's war against Ukraine |url=https://meduza.io/en/feature/2022/06/13/those-who-unleashed-aggression-won-t-be-in-heaven |work=[[Meduza]] |date=13 June 2022}}</ref><ref>{{cite news |title=Russian priest under investigation after criticising military |url=https://cne.news/article/1439-russian-priest-under-investigation-after-criticising-military |work=CNE News |date=13 July 2022}}</ref> In [[Kazakhstan]], Russian Orthodox priest Iakov Vorontsov, who signed an open letter condemning the invasion of Ukraine, was forced to resign.<ref>{{cite news |title=Russian Orthodox Priest In Kazakhstan Forced Out Over Anti-War Stance |url=https://www.rferl.org/a/kazakh-priest-ouster-defrocked-russia-ukraine-war-letter-condemn-orthodox-almaty/32476657.html |work=Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty |date=26 June 2023}}</ref> Former Russian Orthodox priest Father Grigory Michnov-Vaytenko, head of the {{ill|Russian Apostolic Church|ru|Апостольская православная церковь}} — a recognized religious organization founded by other dissident priests such as Father [[Gleb Yakunin]] — said that "The [Russian Orthodox] church now works like the [[Political commissar|commissars]] did in the Soviet Union. And people of course see it. People don't like it. Especially after February [2022], a lot of people have left the church, both priests and people who were there for years."<ref>{{cite news |title='Nothing to be afraid of': How Father Grigory became Russia's most prominent anti-war priest |url=https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2022/10/12/meet-father-grigory-russias-most-prominent-anti-war-priest |work=Euronews |date=14 January 2023}}</ref>

[[File:Kirill2013.jpg|thumb|''"We do not want to fight with anyone. Russia has never attacked anyone. It is surprising that a large and powerful country has never attacked anyone, it has only defended its borders."''<ref>{{cite news|url=https://orthodoxtimes.com/kirills-provocative-statement-russia-has-never-attacked-anyone/|title=Kirill's provocative statement: Russia has never attacked anyone|work=Orthodox Times|date=2022-05-04|access-date=2023-09-14}}</ref>]]
[[File:Dolyna (Kramatorsk Raion) after Russian invasion (2022-12-05) 09.jpg|thumb|St. George's church in the [[Sviatohirsk Lavra]] complex after Russian shelling in May 2022]]
Patriarch Kirill has referred to the [[2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine]] as "current events" and has avoided using terms like ''war'' or ''invasion'',<ref>{{Cite magazine|url=https://www.commonwealmagazine.org/orthodox-response-putin-invasion |title=The Orthodox Response to Putin's Invasion|magazine= [[Commonweal (magazine)|Commonweal]]|date=27 February 2022}}</ref> thereby complying with Russian censorship law.<ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/ukraine/2022/03/08/russia-free-speech-press-criminalization-misinformation/9433112002/|title=Russia increases censorship with new law: 15 years in jail for calling Ukraine invasion a 'war'|first=Celina|last=Tebor|newspaper=[[USA Today]]}}</ref> Kirill approves the invasion, and has blessed the Russian soldiers fighting there. As a consequence, several priests of the [[Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate)|Russian Orthodox Church in Ukraine]] have stopped mentioning Kirill's name during the divine service.<ref>{{Cite news|url=https://www.bbc.com/ukrainian/news-60720034|title=Патріарх Кирило благословив війська РФ на війну проти України. Як це сталось|newspaper=BBC News Україна}}</ref> The Moscow patriarchate views Ukraine as a part of their "[[canonical territory]]". Kirill has said that the Russian army has chosen a very correct way.<ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.ncronline.org/news/world/after-supporting-ukraine-invasion-russias-patriarch-kirill-criticized-worldwide-0|title=After supporting Ukraine invasion, Russia's Patriarch Kirill criticized worldwide|date=15 March 2022|newspaper=[[National Catholic Reporter]]}}</ref>

Kirill sees [[gay pride]] parades as a part of the reason behind Russian warfare against Ukraine.<ref>{{cite news |last1=Sangal |first1=Aditi |last2=Vogt |first2=Adrienne |last3=Wagner |first3=Meg |last4=Yeung |first4=Jessie |last5=George |first5=Steve |last6=Noor Haq |first6=Sana |last7=Ramsay |first7=George |last8=Upright |first8=Ed |last9=Vera |first9=Amir |last10=Chowdhury |first10=Maureen |title=Russian Orthodox Church alleges gay pride parades were part of the reason for Ukraine war |url=https://edition.cnn.com/europe/live-news/ukraine-russia-putin-news-03-08-22#h_de0516e0f59ac2214af21bbb0aaf152e |access-date=3 April 2022 |work=CNN |date=8 March 2022 |language=en}}</ref> He has said that the war is not physically, but rather metaphysically, important.<ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.ncronline.org/news/people/russias-patriarch-kirill-defends-invasion-ukraine-stoking-orthodox-tensions|title=Russia's Patriarch Kirill defends invasion of Ukraine, stoking Orthodox tensions|date=8 March 2022|newspaper=[[National Catholic Reporter]]}}</ref>

In the days after the world learned about the 2022 [[Bucha massacre|Bucha massacre by Russian invaders of Ukraine]], Kirill said that his faithful should be to ready "protect our home" under any circumstance.<ref name="proput">{{cite news |last1=Gedeon |first1=Joseph |last2=Toosi |first2=Nahal |title=The pro-Putin preacher the U.S. won't touch |url=https://www.politico.com/news/2022/06/22/patriarch-kirill-putin-russia-ukraine-00041388 |publisher=Politico |date=22 June 2022}}</ref>

On 6 March 2022 ([[Forgiveness Sunday]] holiday), during the liturgy in the Church of Christ the Savior, he justified Russia's attack on Ukraine, stating that it was necessary to side with "[[Donbas]]" (i.e. [[Donetsk People's Republic|Donetsk]] and [[Luhansk People's Republic]]), where he said there is an ongoing 8-year "genocide" by Ukraine and where, Kirill said, Ukraine wants to enforce [[gay pride]] events upon local population. Despite the holiday being dedicated to the concept of forgiveness, Kirill said there can't be forgiveness without delivering "justice" first, otherwise it's a capitulation and weakness.<ref>{{Cite web|url=http://www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/5906442.html|title = Патриаршая проповедь в Неделю сыропустную после Литургии в Храме Христа Спасителя / Патриарх / Патриархия.ru}}</ref> The speech came under international scrutiny, as Kirill parroted President Putin's claim that Russia was fighting "fascism" in Ukraine.<ref name="religdisp">{{cite news |last1=Kelaidis |first1=Katherine |title=The Russian Patriarch Just Gave His Most Dangerous Speech Yet — And Almost No One In the West Has Noticed |url=https://religiondispatches.org/the-russian-patriarch-just-gave-his-most-dangerous-speech-yet-and-almost-no-one-in-the-west-has-noticed/ |access-date=23 May 2022 |publisher=[[Religion Dispatches]] |date=4 April 2022}}</ref> Throughout the speech, Kirill did not use the term "Ukrainian", but rather referred to both Russians and Ukrainians simply as "Holy Russians", also claiming Russian soldiers in Ukraine were "laying down their lives for a friend", [[John 15:13|referencing]] the [[Gospel of John]].<ref name="religdisp"/>

On 9 March 2022, after the liturgy, he declared that Russia has the right to use force against Ukraine to ensure Russia's security, that Ukrainians and Russians are one people, that Russia and Ukraine are one country, that the West incites Ukrainians to kill Russians to sow discord between Russians and Ukrainians and gives weapons to Ukrainians for this specific purpose, and therefore the West is an enemy of Russia and God.<ref>{{Cite web |url=http://www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/5907484.html |script-title=ru:Патриаршая проповедь в среду первой седмицы Великого поста после Литургии Преждеосвященных Даров в Храме Христа Спасителя |language=ru |trans-title=Patriarchal Sermon on Wednesday of the First Week of Great Lent after the Liturgy of the Presanctified Gifts at the Cathedral of Christ the Savior |website=Патриарх / Патриархия.ru |trans-website=Patriarch / Patriarchy.ru |date=9 March 2022 |last1=Kirill |first1=Patriarch of Moscow}}</ref>

In a letter to the [[World Council of Churches]] (WCC) sent in March 2022, Kirill justified the attack on Ukraine by NATO enlargement, the protection of Russian language, and the establishment of the [[Orthodox Church of Ukraine]]. In this letter, he did not express condolences over deaths among Ukrainians.<ref>{{Cite web |author=H.H. Patriarch Kirill of Moscow and all Russia |url=https://www.oikoumene.org/sites/default/files/2022-03/Scan%20of%20the%20official%20letter.pdf |title=Исполняющему обязанности Генерального секретаря Всемирного совета церквей протоиерею Иоанн Саука |trans-title=To Acting Secretary of the World Council of Churches Archpriest John Sauca |language=ru |date=10 March 2022 |via=[[World Council of Churches]]}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.oikoumene.org/resources/documents/response-by-hh-patriarch-kirill-of-moscow-to-rev-prof-dr-ioan-sauca|title = Response by H.H. Patriarch Kirill of Moscow to Rev. Prof. Dr Ioan Sauca}}</ref>

Kirill participated in a [[Zoom (software)|Zoom]] video call with [[Pope Francis]] on 16 March 2022, of which Francis stated in an interview<ref>{{Cite web |last=Fontana |first=Luciano |date=5 March 2022 |title=Exclusive {{!}} Pope Francis: "I am ready to meet Putin in Moscow" |url=https://www.corriere.it/cronache/22_maggio_03/pope-francis-putin-e713a1de-cad0-11ec-84d1-341c28840c78.shtml |access-date=22 May 2022 |website=Corriere della Sera |language=it-IT}}</ref> that Kirill "read from a piece of paper he was holding in his hand all the reasons that justify the Russian invasion."<ref name=":8">{{Cite web |last=CNA |title=Report: EU commission proposes sanctions against Patriarch Kirill |url=https://www.catholicnewsagency.com/news/251135/report-eu-commission-proposes-sanctions-against-patriarch-kirill |access-date=22 May 2022 |website=Catholic News Agency |language=en}}</ref>

Representatives of the [[Vatican City|Vatican]] have criticized Kirill for his lack of willingness to seek peace in Ukraine.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://religionnews.com/2022/03/10/with-war-in-ukraine-pope-francis-years-long-outreach-to-kirill-appears-to-be-in-ruins/|title=With war in Ukraine, Pope Francis' years long outreach to Kirill appears to be in ruins|date=10 March 2022}}</ref> On 3 April, the former [[Archbishop of Canterbury]] [[Rowan Williams]] said there was a strong case for expelling the Russian Orthodox Church from the WCC, saying, "When a Church is actively supporting a war of aggression, failing to condemn nakedly obvious breaches of any kind of ethical conduct in wartime, then other Churches do have the right to raise the question ... I am still waiting for any senior member of the Orthodox hierarchy to say that the slaughter of the innocent is condemned unequivocally by all forms of Christianity."<ref>{{Cite web |url=https://www.thetablet.co.uk/news/15226/expel-russian-orthodox-from-wcc-says-rowan-williams |title=Expel Russian Orthodox from WCC says Rowan Williams |first=Patrick |last=Hudson |website=The Tablet |date=4 April 2022 |access-date=5 April 2022 |archive-date=12 July 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220712062803/https://www.thetablet.co.uk/news/15226/expel-russian-orthodox-from-wcc-says-rowan-williams |url-status=dead }}</ref>

The Russian Orthodox St Nicholas church in [[Amsterdam]], Netherlands, has declared that it is no longer possible to function within the Moscow patriarchate because of the attitude that Kirill has taken to the Russian invasion, and instead requested to join the [[Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople]].<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/mar/13/russian-orthodox-church-in-amsterdam-announces-split-with-moscow|title=Russian Orthodox church in Amsterdam announces split with Moscow|date=13 March 2022|website=the Guardian}}</ref> The [[Religion in Lithuania#Eastern Orthodoxy|Russian Orthodox Church in Lithuania]] has declared that they do not share the political views and perception of Kirill and therefore are seeking independence from Moscow.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://orthodoxtimes.com/orthodox-church-of-lithuania-to-seek-independence-from-moscow/|title=Orthodox Church of Lithuania to seek independence from Moscow|website=orthodoxtimes.com}}</ref>

On 10 April 2022, 200 priests from the [[Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate)]] released an open request to the [[Primate (bishop)|primates]] of the other [[Organization of the Eastern Orthodox Church#Autocephalous Eastern Orthodox churches|autocephalous Eastern Orthodox Churches]], asking them to convene a Council of Primates of the Ancient Eastern Churches at the Pan-Orthodox level and try Kirill for the heresy of preaching the "Doctrine of the [[Russian world]]" and the moral crimes of "blessing the war against Ukraine and fully supporting the aggressive nature of Russian troops on the territory of Ukraine." They noted that they "can't continue to remain in any form of [[Canonical territory|canonical subordination]] to the Moscow Patriarch," and requested that the Council of Primates "bring Patriarch Kirill to justice and deprive him of the right to hold the patriarchal throne."<ref>{{Cite web |title=About 200 priests of the UOC-MP demand International Ecclesiastical Tribunal for Kiril |url=https://risu.ua/en/international-ecclesiastical-tribunal-for-cyril---almost-200-priests-of-the-uoc-mp-demand_n128244 |access-date=12 April 2022 |website=Religious Information Service of Ukraine |language=en}}</ref><ref>[https://orthodoxtimes.com/pressure-on-kirill-intensifies-400-priests-call-for-condemnation-by-world-orthodoxy/ "Pressure on Kirill intensifies – 400 priests call for condemnation by world Orthodoxy"], Orthodox Times, 14 April 2022</ref>

When the [[Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate)]] removed itself from the Moscow Patriarchate on 27 May 2022, Kirill claimed that the "spirits of malice" wanted to separate the Russian and Ukrainian peoples but they will not succeed.<ref>{{cite web | url=https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2022/05/29/patriarch-kirill-understands-ukraine-church-schism-a77830 | title=Patriarch Kirill 'Understands' Ukraine Church Schism|work=The Moscow Times | date=29 May 2022 }}</ref> The Ukrainian church released a declaration in which it stated "it had adopted relevant additions and changes to the Statute on the Administration of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, which testify to the complete autonomy and independence of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church."<ref name=":1travnya-2022-roku">{{Cite web |date=2022-05-27 |title=Resolution of the Council of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of May 27, 2022 |url=https://news.church.ua/2022/05/27/postanova-soboru-ukrajinskoji-pravoslavnoji-cerkvi-vid-27-travnya-2022-roku/ |access-date=2022-05-28 |website=Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patrirachate) |language=Ukrainian}}</ref> The church did not publish its new constitution.<ref name="yevtushenkoUOCMPKir">{{Cite web|url=https://www.politico.eu/article/ukraine-hunts-collaborators-ukrainian-orthodox-church-moscow-patriarchate-mykola-yevtushenko/|title=Ukraine hunts collaborators in its divided church|website=[[Politico]]|date=9 December 2022|accessdate=29 March 2023}}</ref> Although in this Ukrainian Orthodox Church clergymen now claims that 'any provisions that at least somehow hinted at or indicated the connection with Moscow were excluded' the Russian Orthodox Church ignores this and continues to include UOC-MP clerics in its various commissions or working groups despite these individuals not agreeing to this nor even wanting to be included.<ref name="ROC32207628">
* {{Cite news |website=[[Radio Free Europe]] |date=4 January 2023 |url=https://www.radiosvoboda.org/a/rpts-kyrylo-putin-ukrayina-uptsmp-vyibr/32207628.html|language=Ukrainian|author=Dmytro Horevo |title=The Russian Orthodox Church does not recognize the independence of Ukraine or the independence of the UOC|access-date=6 January 2023}}
* {{Cite news |website=Official website of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate)|date=31 December 2022 |url=https://news.church.ua/2022/12/31/the-charter-of-the-uoc-does-not-contain-any-provisions-that-would-even-hint-at-the-connection-with-moscow-the-head-of-the-legal-department/?lang=en|language=en |author= |title=The Charter of the UOC does not contain any provisions that could even hint at the connection with Moscow — the Head of the Legal Department|access-date=6 January 2023}}
* {{Cite news |website=Official website of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate)|date=31 December 2022 |title=The UOC priest protested his inclusion in the ROC Publishing Council|language=Ukrainian|author= |url=https://news.church.ua/2022/12/31/svyashhennik-upc-visloviv-protest-cherez-jogo-vklyuchennya-vidavnichoji-radi-rpc/|access-date=6 January 2023}}</ref>
[[File:Vladimir Putin's 2023 Address to the Federal Assembly (1).jpg|thumb|Kirill with Volodin, Medvedev, Lavrov, Shoigu and other prominent figures of the [[Russia under Vladimir Putin|Putin regime]] during Putin's [[2023 Presidential Address to the Federal Assembly|Presidential Address to the Federal Assembly]] on 21 February 2023]]
Cardinal [[Kurt Koch]], president of the [[Dicastery for Promoting Christian Unity|Pontifical Council for Promoting Christian Unity]], said that the patriarch's legitimization of the "brutal and absurd war" is "a heresy."<ref>{{cite web | url=https://cruxnow.com/church-in-europe/2022/06/top-vatican-prelate-calls-russian-patriarchs-defense-of-ukraine-war-heresy|title=Top Vatican prelate calls Russian patriarch's defense of Ukraine war 'heresy' |date=30 June 2022 }}</ref>

Kirill supported [[2022 Russian mobilization|the mobilization of citizens to go to the front in Ukraine]], he urged citizens to fulfill their military duty and that if they gave their lives for their country they will be with God in his kingdom.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Brugen |first=Isabel van |date=23 September 2022 |title=Putin's top priest tells Russians not to fear death amid mobilization |url=https://www.newsweek.com/russia-priest-patriarch-kirill-mobilization-putin-death-ukraine-1745616 |access-date=24 September 2022 |website=Newsweek |language=en}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.asianews.it/news-en/The-%C3%BRussia-Last-Crusade-56728.html|title=Russia's Last Crusade|access-date=24 September 2022|surname=AsiaNews.it|website=www.asianews.it|language=en}}{{Dead link|date=October 2023 |bot=InternetArchiveBot |fix-attempted=yes }}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.eldebate.com/religion/20220926/kirill-moscu-sigue-llamando-guerra-santa-este-sacrificio-lava-todos-pecados-persona-cometido_62288.html|trans-title=Kirill of Moscow continues to call for holy war: "This sacrifice washes away all sins"|title=Kirill de Moscú sigue llamando a la guerra santa: "Este sacrificio lava todos los pecados"| access-date=24 September 2022|author=<!-- none -->|date=23 September 2022|website=El Debate| language=es}}</ref>

North Macedonia and Bulgaria expelled senior members of the Russian Orthodox Church for acts contravening their national security in 2023, raising questions about the church using their position to spy and to spread Russian political propaganda.<ref>{{cite web |title=Praying for Putin: Spies in Cassocks Threaten the West |url=https://cepa.org/article/praying-for-putin-spies-in-cassocks-threaten-the-west/ |date=31 October 2023}}</ref> In 2023 [[Patriarch Bartholomew]] criticised the Russian church, which he says is teaching a "theology of war". "This is the theology that the sister Church of Russia began to teach, trying to justify an unjust, unholy, unprovoked, diabolical war against a sovereign and independent country – Ukraine."<ref>{{cite web |title=Patriarch Bartholomew firmly denied the possibility of "reconsidering" the granting of autocephaly to the Church of Ukraine |url=https://risu.ua/en/patriarch-bartholomew-firmly-denied-the-possibility-of-reconsidering-the-granting-of-autocephaly-to-the-church-of-ukraine_n142200 |date=3 September 2023}}</ref> In January 2024, the senior priest of the Church of the Life-Giving Trinity in [[Ostankinsky District|Ostankino]], Moscow, was removed from his post for calling for peace.<ref>{{cite news |title=Russian Orthodox priest faces expulsion for refusing to pray for victory over Ukraine |url=https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/jan/14/russian-orthodox-priest-faces-expulsion-for-refusing-to-pray-for-victory-over-ukraine |work=The Guardian |date=14 January 2024}}</ref>

During the [[World Russian People's Council]] headed and led by Kirill of late March 2024 a document was approved that stated that the Russian invasion of Ukraine was a "[[Holy War]]".<ref name="newsweek1884577">{{cite web |author=Brendan Cole|title=Ukraine Is Now 'Holy War,' Russian Church Declares|url=https://www.newsweek.com/russia-ukraine-war-holy-1884577|date=28 March 2024 |access-date=29 March 2024|website=[[Newsweek]]}}<br/>{{cite web |author=Tetyana Oliynyk|title=Russian Orthodox Church calls invasion of Ukraine "holy war", Ukrainian church reacts|url=https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2024/03/28/7448650/|date=28 March 2024 |access-date=29 March 2024|website=[[Ukrainska Pravda]]}}</ref> The document stated that the war had the goal of "protecting the world from the onslaught of [[globalism]] and the victory of [[Western world|the West]], which has fallen into [[Satanism]]".<ref name="newsweek1884577"/> The document also stated that following the war "the entire territory of modern Ukraine should enter the zone of Russia's exclusive influence".<ref name="newsweek1884577"/> This was to be done so "the possibility of the existence of a [[Russophobic]] political regime hostile to Russia and its people on this territory, as well as a political regime controlled from an external center hostile to Russia, should be completely excluded".<ref name="newsweek1884577"/> The document also made reference to the "[[All-Russian nation|triunity of the Russian people]]" and it claimed that [[Belarusians]] and [[Ukrainians]] "should be recognised only as [[sub-ethnic group]]s of the [[Russians]]".<ref name="newsweek1884577"/>

On August 20, 2024, the [[Verkhovna Rada|Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine]] banned the Russian Orthodox Church in Ukraine by adopting the {{Ill|Law of Ukraine "On the Protection of the Constitutional Order in the Sphere of Activities of Religious Organizations"|uk|Закон України «Про захист конституційного ладу у сфері діяльності релігійних організацій»}}.<ref>{{Cite news |last=Service |first=RFE/RL's Ukrainian |title=Ukrainian Lawmakers Approve Law Banning Religious Groups Tied To Russian Orthodox Church |url=https://www.rferl.org/a/ukrainian-orthodox-church-moscvow-patriarchate-legislation/33085600.html |access-date=2024-08-20 |work=RadioFreeEurope/RadioLiberty |language=en}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |date=2024-08-20 |title=Ukraine's parliament passes law banning Russian Orthodox Church |url=https://news.liga.net/en/politics/news/ukraines-parliament-passes-law-banning-russian-orthodox-church-in-ukraine |access-date=2024-08-20 |website=LIGA |language=en}}</ref> Ukrainian religious organizations affiliated with the Russian Orthodox Church will be banned 9 months from the moment the {{Ill|State Service of Ukraine for Ethnopolicy and Freedom of Conscience|uk|Державна служба України з етнополітики та свободи совісті}} issues the order, if this religious organization does not sever relations with the Russian Orthodox Church in accordance with [[Canon law of the Eastern Orthodox Church|Orthodox canon law]].<ref>{{Cite web |title=Ukrainian Parliament bans Russian-linked religious organizations, targets UOC-MP |url=https://english.nv.ua/nation/verkovna-rada-adopts-a-draft-bill-and-therefore-bans-all-moscow-ruled-religious-organizations-50444399.html |access-date=2024-08-20 |website=english.nv.ua |language=en}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |title=Parliament passes law banning religious organisations linked to Russia |url=https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2024/08/20/7471107/ |access-date=2024-08-20 |website=Ukrainska Pravda |language=en}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |date=2024-08-20 |title=The Ukrainian Parliament supported the draft law on banning the UOC MP |url=https://babel.ua/en/news/110038-the-ukrainian-parliament-supported-the-draft-law-on-banning-the-uoc-mp |access-date=2024-08-20 |website=babel.ua |language=en}}</ref>