Editing Rockwell B-1 Lancer (section)

==Development==

===Background===
{{Main|North American XB-70 Valkyrie}}

In 1955, the USAF issued requirements for a new bomber combining the payload and range of the [[Boeing B-52 Stratofortress]] with the Mach&nbsp;2 maximum speed of the [[Convair B-58 Hustler]].<ref name= Jenkins_99_p10>Jenkins 1999, p. 10.</ref> In December 1957, the USAF selected [[North American Aviation]]'s [[North American XB-70 Valkyrie|B-70 Valkyrie]] for this role, a six-engine bomber that could cruise at [[Mach number|Mach]]&nbsp;3 at high altitude ({{convert|70000|ft|m|abbr=on|sigfig=2|disp=or}}).<ref name= Jenkins_p12-13>{{harvnb|Jenkins|1999|pp=12–13.}}</ref><ref name=Jenkins_p15-7>{{harvnb|Jenkins|1999|pp=15–17.}}</ref> [[Soviet Union]] [[interceptor aircraft]], the only effective anti-bomber weapon in the 1950s,<ref name="Schwartz p.118"/> were already unable to intercept the high-flying [[Lockheed U-2]];<ref>Rich, Ben and Leo Janos. ''Skunk Works''. Boston: Little, Brown & Company, 1994. {{ISBN|0-316-74300-3}}.</ref> the Valkyrie would fly at similar altitudes, but much higher speeds, and was expected to fly right by the fighters.<ref name="Schwartz p.118"/>

[[File:North American XB-70 in Flight EC68-2131.jpg|thumb|left|The XB-70 Valkyrie was chosen in 1957 to replace the [[Convair B-58 Hustler|Hustler]] but suffered as a result of a switch in doctrine from a high- to a low-altitude flying profile.]]
By the late 1950s, however, anti-aircraft [[surface-to-air missile]]s (SAMs) could threaten high-altitude aircraft,<ref name=Jenkins_1999_p21>{{harvnb|Jenkins|1999|p=21.}}</ref> as demonstrated by the [[1960 U-2 incident|1960 downing]] of [[Gary Powers]]' U-2.<ref>[http://www.keesings.com/search?kssp_selected_tab=article&kssp_a_id=17425n01sov "May 1960&nbsp;– The U-2 Incident.&nbsp;– Soviet and American Statements."] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110723185702/http://www.keesings.com/search?kssp_selected_tab=article&kssp_a_id=17425n01sov |date=23 July 2011 }} ''Keesing's Record of World Events'', Volume 6, 1960.</ref> The USAF [[Strategic Air Command]] (SAC) was aware of these developments and had begun moving its bombers to low-level penetration even before the U-2 incident. This tactic greatly reduces radar detection distances through the use of [[terrain mask#Terrain masking|terrain masking]]; using features of the terrain like hills and valleys, the line-of-sight from the radar to the bomber can be broken, rendering the radar (and human observers) incapable of seeing it.<ref name=Spick_1986_p6-8/> Additionally, radars of the era were subject to "[[clutter (radar)|clutter]]" from stray returns from the ground and other objects, which meant a minimum angle existed above the horizon where they could detect a target. Bombers flying at low altitudes could remain under these angles simply by keeping their distance from the radar sites. This combination of effects made SAMs of the era ineffective against low-flying aircraft.<ref name=Spick_1986_p6-8>{{harvnb|Spick|1986|pp=6–8.}}</ref><ref name="Schwartz p.119"/> The same effects also meant that low-flying aircraft were difficult to detect by higher-flying interceptors, since their radar systems could not readily pick out aircraft against the clutter from ground reflections (lack of [[look-down/shoot-down]] capability).

The switch from high-altitude to low-altitude flight profiles severely affected the B-70, the design of which was tuned for high-altitude performance. Higher [[aerodynamic drag]] at low level limited the B-70 to subsonic speed while dramatically decreasing its range.<ref name=Jenkins_1999_p21/> The result would be an aircraft with somewhat higher subsonic speed than the B-52, but less range. Because of this, and a growing shift to the [[intercontinental ballistic missile]] (ICBM) force, the B-70 bomber program was cancelled in 1961 by President [[John F. Kennedy]],<ref name="Schwartz p.118">{{harvnb|Schwartz|1998|p=118.}}</ref><ref>[https://ntrs.nasa.gov/api/citations/19950002358/downloads/19950002358.pdf "NASA-CR-115702, B-70 Aircraft Study Final Report, Vol. I, p. I-38."] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210412130342/https://ntrs.nasa.gov/api/citations/19950002358/downloads/19950002358.pdf |date=12 April 2021 }} ''NASA'', 1972.</ref> and the two XB-70 prototypes were used in a supersonic research program.<ref name=Jenkins_p14-6>{{harvnb|Jenkins|1999|pp=14–16.}}</ref>

Although never intended for the low-level role, the B-52's flexibility allowed it to outlast its intended successor as the nature of the air war environment changed. The B-52's huge fuel load allowed it to operate at lower altitudes for longer times, and the large airframe allowed the addition of improved [[radar jamming and deception]] suites to deal with radars.<ref>{{harvnb|Knaack|1988|pp=279–280.}}</ref> During the [[Vietnam War]], the concept that all future wars would be nuclear was turned on its head, and the "big belly" modifications increased the B-52's total bomb load to {{convert|60000|lb|kg}},<ref>{{harvnb|Knaack|1988|p=256.}}</ref> turning it into a powerful tactical aircraft which could be used against ground troops along with strategic targets from high altitudes.<ref name="Schwartz p.119"/> The much smaller bomb bay of the B-70 would have made it much less useful in this role.

===Design studies and delays===
Although effective, the B-52 was not ideal for the low-level role. This led to a number of aircraft designs known as [[penetrator (aircraft)|penetrators]], which were tuned specifically for long-range low-altitude flight. The first of these designs to see operation was the supersonic [[General Dynamics F-111 Aardvark|F-111]] fighter-bomber, which used variable-sweep wings for tactical missions.<ref>Gunston 1978, pp. 12–13.</ref> A number of studies on a strategic-range counterpart followed.

The first post-B-70 strategic penetrator study was known as the Subsonic Low-Altitude Bomber (SLAB), which was completed in 1961. This produced a design that looked more like an airliner than a bomber, with a large swept wing, [[T-tail]], and large [[turbofan|high-bypass engines]].<ref>Taylor, Gordon. [https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/330289.pdf "Subsonic Low Altitude Bomber"] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210419072226/https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/330289.pdf |date=19 April 2021 }}, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base ASD-TDR-62-426, June 1962.</ref> This was followed by the similar Extended Range Strike Aircraft (ERSA), which added a [[variable-sweep wing]], then en vogue in the aviation industry. ERSA envisioned a relatively small aircraft with a {{convert|10000|lb|kg|adj=on}} payload and a range of {{convert|10070|mi|km|abbr=}} including {{convert|2900|mi|km|abbr=}} flown at low altitudes. In August 1963, the similar Low-Altitude Manned Penetrator design was completed, which called for an aircraft with a {{convert|20000|lb|adj=on}} bomb load and somewhat shorter range of {{convert|8230|mi|km|abbr=}}.<ref>{{harvnb|Pace|1998|pp=11–14.}}</ref><ref name="Knaack pp.575-6">{{harvnb|Knaack|1988|pp=575–576.}}</ref>

These all culminated in the October 1963 Advanced Manned Precision Strike System (AMPSS), which led to industry studies at [[Boeing]], [[General Dynamics]], and [[North American Aviation|North American]] (later [[Rockwell International|North American Rockwell]]).<ref>{{harvnb|Casil|2003|p=8.}}</ref><ref name="Knaack p.576">{{harvnb|Knaack|1988|p=576.}}</ref> In mid-1964, the USAF had revised its requirements and retitled the project as Advanced Manned Strategic Aircraft (AMSA), which differed from AMPSS primarily in that it also demanded a high-speed high-altitude capability, similar to that of the existing Mach&nbsp;2-class F-111.<ref name="Knaack p.575">{{harvnb|Knaack|1988|p=575.}}</ref> Given the lengthy series of design studies, North American Rockwell engineers joked that the new name actually stood for "America's Most Studied Aircraft".<ref name=study>{{cite conference |conference=AIAA 16th Annual Meeting and Technical Display |doi=10.2514/6.1981-919 |first1=R.A |last1=Hibma |first2=E.D |last2=Wegner |title=16th Annual Meeting and Technical Display |chapter=The Evolution of a Strategic Bomber |date=12–14 May 1981 |chapter-url=https://arc.aiaa.org/doi/abs/10.2514/6.1981-919 |location=Long Beach, CA |access-date=7 April 2021 |archive-date=12 March 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220312092153/https://arc.aiaa.org/doi/abs/10.2514/6.1981-919 |url-status=live }}</ref>

The arguments that led to the cancellation of the B-70 program had led some to question the need for a new strategic bomber of any sort. The USAF was adamant about retaining bombers as part of the [[nuclear triad]] concept that included bombers, ICBMs, and [[submarine-launched ballistic missile]]s (SLBMs) in a combined package that complicated any potential defense. They argued that the bomber was needed to attack hardened military targets and to provide a safe [[counterforce]] option because the bombers could be quickly launched into safe loitering areas where they could not be attacked. However, the introduction of the SLBM made moot the mobility and survivability argument, and a newer generation of ICBMs, such as the [[LGM-30 Minuteman|Minuteman III]], had the accuracy and speed needed to attack point targets. During this time, ICBMs were seen as a less costly option based on their lower unit cost,<ref>{{harvnb|Pace|1998|p=10.}}</ref> but development costs were much higher.<ref name=Jenkins_1999_p21/> [[United States Secretary of Defense|Secretary of Defense]] [[Robert McNamara]] preferred ICBMs over bombers for the Air Force portion of the deterrent force<ref name="Knaack pp.576-7">{{harvnb|Knaack|1988|pp=576–577.}}</ref> and felt a new expensive bomber was not needed.<ref name=fas>[https://fas.org/nuke/guide/usa/bomber/b-1a.htm "B-1A page."] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20151122162355/https://fas.org/nuke/guide/usa/bomber/b-1a.htm |date=22 November 2015 }} Federation of American Scientists. Retrieved 20 March 2008.</ref><ref name="Knaack p.576-8"/> McNamara limited the AMSA program to studies and component development beginning in 1964.<ref name="Knaack p.576-8">{{harvnb|Knaack|1988|pp=576–578.}}</ref>

Program studies continued; [[IBM]] and [[Autonetics]] were awarded AMSA advanced avionics study contracts in 1968.<ref name="Knaack p.576-8"/><ref name=Jenkins_p23-6/> McNamara remained opposed to the program in favor of upgrading the existing B-52 fleet and adding nearly 300 [[FB-111A|FB-111s]] for shorter range roles then being filled by the B-58.<ref name="Schwartz p.119">Schwartz 1998, p. 119.</ref><ref name="Knaack p.576-8"/> He again vetoed funding for AMSA aircraft development in 1968.<ref name=Jenkins_p23-6>{{harvnb|Jenkins|1999|pp=23–26.}}</ref>

===B-1A program===
[[File:RARF Antenna, Reflecting Array Radio Frequency, Raytheon, 1968-1969, Ku-band, over 3500 phase shifting modules, for the AN-APQ-140 radar - National Electronics Museum - DSC00376.JPG|thumb|right|150px|[[AN/APQ-140]] radar for the B-1A<ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.designation-systems.net/usmilav/jetds/an-apq.html |title=AN/APQ – Airborne Multipurpose/Special Radars |author=<!--Staff writer(s); no by-line.--> |date=1 July 2007 |website=Designation-systems.net |access-date=2015-01-27 |archive-date=28 September 2017 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170928230343/http://www.designation-systems.net/usmilav/jetds/an-apq.html |url-status=live }}</ref>]]

President [[Richard Nixon]] reestablished the AMSA program after taking office, keeping with his administration's [[flexible response]] strategy that required a [[Single Integrated Operations Plan#Counterforce migrates to deterrence and warfighting|broad range of options short of general nuclear war]].<ref name="Knaack p.579">{{harvnb|Knaack|1988|p=579.}}</ref> Nixon's Secretary of Defense, [[Melvin Laird]], reviewed the programs and decided to lower the numbers of FB-111s, since they lacked the desired range, and recommended that the AMSA design studies be accelerated.<ref name="Knaack p.579"/> In April 1969, the program officially became the ''B-1A''.<ref name="Schwartz p.119"/><ref name="Knaack p.579"/> This was the first entry in the [[1962 United States Tri-Service aircraft designation system|new bomber designation series]], created in 1962. The Air Force issued a request for proposals in November 1969.<ref name=Pace_p22-3/>

[[File:Rockwell B-1A 1.jpg|thumb|left|B-1A prototype]]
Proposals were submitted by Boeing, General Dynamics and North American Rockwell in January 1970.<ref name=Pace_p22-3/><ref>Kocivar, Ben. [https://books.google.com/books?id=9AAAAAAAMBAJ&pg=PA86 "Our New B-1 Bomber&nbsp;– High, Low, Fast, and Slow."] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230202092349/https://books.google.com/books?id=9AAAAAAAMBAJ&pg=PA86 |date=2 February 2023 }} ''Popular Science'', Volume 197, Issue 5, November 1970, p. 86.</ref> In June 1970, North American Rockwell was awarded the development contract.<ref name=Pace_p22-3>{{harvnb|Pace|1998|pp=22–23.}}</ref> The original program called for two test airframes, five flyable aircraft, and 40 engines. This was cut in 1971 to one ground and three flight test aircraft.<ref name="Knaack p.584">{{harvnb|Knaack|1988|p=584.}}</ref> The company changed its name to [[Rockwell International]] and named its aircraft division North American Aircraft Operations in 1973.<ref>[http://www.boeing.com/history/narrative/n086roc.html "Rockwell International history 1970–1986."] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20071011202047/http://www.boeing.com/history/narrative/n086roc.html |date=11 October 2007}} Boeing. Retrieved 8 October 2009.</ref> A fourth prototype, built to production standards, was ordered in the fiscal year 1976 budget. Plans called for 240 B-1As to be built, with [[initial operational capability]] set for 1979.<ref name="Sorrels p.27">{{harvnb|Sorrels|1983|p=27.}}</ref>

Rockwell's design had features common to the F-111 and XB-70. It used a [[escape crew capsule|crew escape capsule]], that ejected as a unit to improve crew survivability if the crew had to abandon the aircraft at high speed. Additionally, the design featured large variable-sweep wings in order to provide both more [[lift (force)|lift]] during takeoff and landing, and lower drag during a high-speed dash phase.<ref name="lee p.13"/> With the wings set to their widest position the aircraft had a much better airfield performance than the B-52, allowing it to operate from a wider variety of bases. Penetration of the Soviet Union's defenses would take place at [[supersonic speed]], crossing them as quickly as possible before entering the more sparsely defended interior of the country where speeds could be reduced again.<ref name="lee p.13"/> The large size and fuel capacity of the design would allow the "dash" portion of the flight to be relatively long.

In order to achieve the required Mach&nbsp;2 performance at high altitudes, the exhaust nozzles and air [[intake ramp]]s were variable.<ref>{{harvnb|Whitford|1987|p=136.}}</ref> Initially, it had been expected that a Mach&nbsp;1.2 performance could be achieved at low altitude, which required that titanium be used in critical areas in the fuselage and wing structure. The low altitude performance requirement was later lowered to Mach&nbsp;0.85, reducing the amount of titanium and therefore cost.<ref name="Knaack p.584"/> A pair of small [[Canard (aeronautics)|vanes]] mounted near the nose are part of an active vibration damping system that smooths out the otherwise bumpy low-altitude ride.<ref>Schefter, Jim. [https://books.google.com/books?id=cwEAAAAAMBAJ&pg=PA110 "The Other Story About The Controversial B-1."] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240208140009/https://books.google.com/books?id=cwEAAAAAMBAJ&pg=PA110#v=onepage&q&f=false |date=8 February 2024 }} ''Popular Science'', Volume 210. Issue 5, May 1977, p. 112.</ref> The first three B-1As featured the escape capsule that ejected the cockpit with all four crew members inside. The fourth B-1A was equipped with a conventional [[ejection seat]] for each crew member.<ref>{{harvnb|Spick|1986|pp=30–32.}}</ref>

The B-1A mockup review occurred in late October 1971; this resulted in 297 requests for alteration to the design due to failures to meet specifications and desired improvements for ease of maintenance and operation.<ref name="Knaack p.586">{{harvnb|Knaack|1988|p=586.}}</ref> The first B-1A prototype (Air Force serial no. 74–0158) flew on 23 December 1974.<ref>Jane's All The World's Aircraft 1975–76, John W.R.Taylor, {{ISBN|0531032507}}, p. 439</ref> As the program continued the per-unit cost continued to rise in part because of high [[inflation]] during that period. In 1970, the estimated unit cost was $40 million, and by 1975, this figure had climbed to $70 million.<ref>{{harvnb|Jenkins|1999|p=44.}}</ref>

===New problems and cancellation===
[[File:B-1A underside 1982.jpg|thumb|left|B-1A Prototype 4 showing its [[anti-flash white]] underside in 1981 |alt= A B-1A flying with its wings swept forward, showing its anti-flash white underside]]
[[File:B1A160wingsmuseum.JPG|thumb|left|B-1A nose section with ejection capsule denoted. Three of the four B-1As were fitted with escape capsules. |alt= The nose section of a B-1A on display with outline of the ejection capsule denoted]]

In 1976, Soviet pilot [[Viktor Belenko]] defected to [[Japan]] with his [[Mikoyan-Gurevich MiG-25|MiG-25 "Foxbat"]].<ref>Willis, David K. [https://pqasb.pqarchiver.com/csmonitor_historic/access/261218552.html?dids=261218552:261218552&FMT=ABS&FMTS=ABS:AI&date=Sep+16%2C+1976&author=By+David+K.+Willis+Staff+correspondent+of+The+Christian+Science+Monitor&pub=Christian+Science+Monitor&desc=Japan's+scrutiny+of+Soviet+jet+jars+detente&pqatl=google "Japan's scrutiny of Soviet jet jars détente."] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120616165137/http://pqasb.pqarchiver.com/csmonitor_historic/access/261218552.html?dids=261218552%3A261218552&FMT=ABS&FMTS=ABS%3AAI&date=Sep+16%2C+1976&author=By+David+K.+Willis+Staff+correspondent+of+The+Christian+Science+Monitor&pub=Christian+Science+Monitor&desc=Japan%27s+scrutiny+of+Soviet+jet+jars+detente&pqatl=google |date=16 June 2012 }} ''Christian Science Monitor'', 16 September 1976. Retrieved 23 May 2010.</ref> During debriefing he described a new "super-Foxbat" (almost certainly referring to the [[Mikoyan MiG-31|MiG-31]]) that had look-down/shoot-down [[radar]] in order to attack cruise missiles. This would also make any low-level penetration aircraft "visible" and easy to attack.<ref>Donald 2004, p. 120.</ref> Given that the B-1's armament suite was similar to the B-52, and it then appeared no more likely to survive Soviet airspace than the B-52, the program was increasingly questioned.<ref name="Knaack p.590">{{harvnb|Knaack|1988|p=590.}}</ref> In particular, Senator [[William Proxmire]] continually derided the B-1 in public, arguing it was an outlandishly expensive dinosaur. During the [[1976 United States presidential election|1976 federal election]] campaign, [[Jimmy Carter]] made it one of the Democratic Party's platforms, saying "The B-1 bomber is an example of a proposed system which should not be funded and would be wasteful of taxpayers' dollars."<ref name=time>[https://content.time.com/time/subscriber/article/0,33009,919040-3,00.html "Carter's Big Decision: Down Goes the B-1, Here Comes the Cruise."] ''Time'', 11 July 1977. Retrieved 8 October 2009.</ref>

When Carter took office in 1977 he ordered a review of the entire program. By this point the projected cost of the program had risen to over $100 million per aircraft, although this was lifetime cost over 20 years. He was informed of the relatively new work on [[stealth aircraft]] that had started in 1975, and he decided that this was a better approach than the B-1. [[The Pentagon|Pentagon]] officials also stated that the [[AGM-86 ALCM|AGM-86]] Air-Launched Cruise Missile (ALCM) launched from the existing B-52 fleet would give the USAF equal capability of penetrating Soviet airspace. With a range of {{convert|1500|mi|km}}, the ALCM could be launched well outside the range of any Soviet defenses and penetrate at low altitude like a bomber (with a much lower [[radar cross-section]] (RCS) due to smaller size), and in much greater numbers at a lower cost.<ref name="Withington p.7">{{harvnb|Withington|2006|p=7.}}</ref> A small number of B-52s could launch hundreds of ALCMs, saturating the defense. A program to improve the B-52 and develop and deploy the ALCM would cost at least 20% less than the planned 244 B-1As.<ref name=time/>

On 30 June 1977, Carter announced that the B-1A would be canceled in favor of ICBMs, SLBMs, and a fleet of modernized B-52s armed with ALCMs.<ref name="Sorrels p.27"/> Carter called it "one of the most difficult decisions that I've made since I've been in office." No mention of the stealth work was made public with the program being [[Classified information|top secret]], but it is now known that in early 1978 he authorized the [[Advanced Technology Bomber]] (ATB) project, which eventually led to the [[Northrop Grumman B-2 Spirit|B-2 Spirit]].<ref name="Pace p20-27">{{harvnb|Pace|1999|pp=20–27.}}</ref>

Domestically, the reaction to the cancellation was split along partisan lines. The Department of Defense was surprised by the announcement; it expected that the number of B-1s ordered would be reduced to around 150.<ref name="Sorrels p.23">{{harvnb|Sorrels|1983|p=23.}}</ref> Congressman [[Robert Dornan]] (R-CA) claimed, "They're breaking out the vodka and caviar in Moscow."<ref>Belcher, Jerry. [https://pqasb.pqarchiver.com/latimes/access/653499322.html?dids=653499322:653499322&FMT=ABS&FMTS=ABS:AI&type=historic&date=Jun+11%2C+1977&author=&pub=Los+Angeles+Times&desc=Dropping+B-1+Would+Bring+World+War+III%2C+Dornan+Says&pqatl=google "Dropping B-1 Would Bring World War III, Dornan Says."] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20121102085836/http://pqasb.pqarchiver.com/latimes/access/653499322.html?dids=653499322:653499322&FMT=ABS&FMTS=ABS:AI&type=historic&date=Jun+11,+1977&author=&pub=Los+Angeles+Times&desc=Dropping+B-1+Would+Bring+World+War+III,+Dornan+Says&pqatl=google |date=2 November 2012 }} ''Los Angeles Times'', 11 June 1977.</ref> However, it appears the Soviets were more concerned by large numbers of ALCMs representing a much greater threat than a smaller number of B-1s. Soviet news agency [[Telegraph Agency of the Soviet Union|TASS]] commented that "the implementation of these militaristic plans has seriously complicated efforts for the limitation of the strategic arms race."<ref name=time/> Western military leaders were generally happy with the decision. NATO commander [[Alexander Haig]] described the ALCM as an "attractive alternative" to the B-1. French General Georges Buis stated "The B-1 is a formidable weapon, but not terribly useful. For the price of one bomber, you can have 200 cruise missiles."<ref name=time/>

Flight tests of the four B-1A prototypes for the B-1A program continued through April 1981. The program included 70 flights totaling 378 hours. A top speed of Mach&nbsp;2.22 was reached by the second B-1A. Engine testing also continued during this time with the YF101 engines totaling almost 7,600 hours.<ref name=Jenkins_p46>{{harvnb|Jenkins|1999|p=46.}}</ref>

===Shifting priorities===
[[File:USAF B-1A Lancer.JPEG|thumb|upright=1.4|A Rockwell B-1A in 1984 |alt= A right side view of a B-1A on the ground in 1984]]

It was during this period that the Soviets started to assert themselves in several new theaters of action, in particular through [[Cuban intervention in Angola|Cuban proxies]] during the [[Angolan Civil War]] starting in 1975 and the [[Soviet–Afghan War|Soviet invasion of Afghanistan]] in 1979. U.S. strategy to this point had been focused on [[containment|containing]] [[Communism]] and preparation for war in Europe. The new Soviet actions revealed that the military lacked capability outside these narrow confines.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Gibbs |first=David |date=1987 |title=Does the USSR Have a 'Grand Strategy'? Reinterpreting the Invasion of Afghanistan |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/424428 |journal=Journal of Peace Research |volume=24 |issue=4 |pages=365–379 |doi=10.1177/002234338702400404 |jstor=424428 |issn=0022-3433}}</ref>

The U.S. Department of Defense responded by accelerating its [[United States Rapid Deployment Forces|Rapid Deployment Forces]] concept but suffered from major problems with airlift and sealift capability.<ref>{{cite book|last=Moore|first=John Leo|title=U.S. Defense Policy: Weapons, Strategy, and Commitments|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=qcQdAAAAMAAJ|year=1980|publisher=Congressional Quarterly|isbn=978-0-87187-158-9|pages=65, 79|access-date=22 October 2019|archive-date=8 February 2024|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240208140041/https://books.google.com/books?id=qcQdAAAAMAAJ|url-status=live}}</ref> In order to slow an enemy invasion of other countries, air power was critical; however the key Iran-Afghanistan border was outside the range of the [[United States Navy]]'s carrier-based attack aircraft, leaving this role to the U.S. Air Force.

During the 1980 presidential campaign, [[Ronald Reagan]] campaigned heavily on the platform that Carter was weak on defense, citing the cancellation of the B-1 program as an example, a theme he continued using into the 1980s.<ref>Reagan, President Ronald. {{usurped|1=[https://web.archive.org/web/20070317181440/http://www.presidentreagan.info/speeches/address_to_nation/1984_10_20.cfm "Reagan's Radio Address to the Nation on Foreign Policy."]}} ''presidentreagan.info''. 20 October 1984.</ref> During this time Carter's defense secretary, [[Harold Brown (Secretary of Defense)|Harold Brown]], announced the stealth bomber project, apparently implying that this was the reason for the B-1 cancellation.<ref name="Schwartz p.120">{{harvnb|Schwartz|1998|p=120.}}</ref>{{verify source|date=January 2021}}

===B-1B program===
[[File:B-1 Bomber debut (1984).jpg|thumb|left|The B-1B debuted outside a hangar in [[Palmdale, California]], 1984.|alt= The first B-1B at its roll-out ceremony outside a hangar in Palmdale, California in 1984]]

On taking office, Reagan was faced with the same decision as Carter before: whether to continue with the B-1 for the short term, or to wait for the development of the ATB, a much more advanced aircraft. Studies suggested that the existing B-52 fleet with ALCM would remain a credible threat until 1985. It was predicted that 75% of the B-52 force would survive to attack its targets.<ref name=post-b-52>Mitchell, Douglas D. [https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metacrs8615/ "IB81107, "Bomber Options for Replacing B-52s."] ''Library of Congress Congressional Research Service, via Digital Library, UNT,'' 3 May 1982. Retrieved 16 July 2011.</ref> After 1985, the introduction of the [[SA-10]] missile, the MiG-31 interceptor and the first effective Soviet [[Airborne Early Warning and Control]] (AWACS) systems would make the B-52 increasingly vulnerable.<ref>Jumper, John P. [http://oai.dtic.mil/oai/oai?verb=getRecord&metadataPrefix=html&identifier=ADA518979 "Global Strike Task Force: A Transforming Concept, Forged by Experience."] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120312075538/http://oai.dtic.mil/oai/oai?verb=getRecord&metadataPrefix=html&identifier=ADA518979 |date=12 March 2012}} ''Aerospace Power Journal'' 15, no. 1, Spring 2001, pp. 30–31. Originally published by ''Air University'', Maxwell Air Force Base, 2001.</ref> During 1981, funds were allocated to a new study for a bomber for the 1990s time-frame which led to developing the ''Long-Range Combat Aircraft'' (LRCA) project. The LRCA evaluated the B-1, F-111, and ATB as possible solutions; an emphasis was placed on multi-role capabilities, as opposed to purely strategic operations.<ref name=post-b-52/>

In 1981, it was believed the B-1 could be in operation before the ATB, covering the transitional period between the B-52's increasing vulnerability and the ATB's introduction. Reagan decided the best solution was to procure both the B-1 and ATB, and on 2 October 1981 he announced that 100 B-1s were to be ordered to fill the LRCA role.<ref name="lee p.13"/><ref name="Reagan approves">Coates, James. [https://pqasb.pqarchiver.com/chicagotribune/access/635722892.html?dids=635722892:635722892&FMT=ABS&FMTS=ABS:AI&type=historic&date=Oct+03%2C+1981&author=&pub=Chicago+Tribune&desc=Reagan+approves+B-1%2C+alters+basing+for+MX&pqatl=google "Reagan approves B-1, alters basing for MX."] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20121103092403/http://pqasb.pqarchiver.com/chicagotribune/access/635722892.html?dids=635722892:635722892&FMT=ABS&FMTS=ABS:AI&type=historic&date=Oct+03,+1981&author=&pub=Chicago+Tribune&desc=Reagan+approves+B-1,+alters+basing+for+MX&pqatl=google |date=3 November 2012 }} ''Chicago Tribune'', 3 October 1981. Retrieved 28 July 2010.</ref>

In January 1982, the U.S. Air Force awarded two contracts to Rockwell worth a combined $2.2 billion for the development and production of 100 new B-1 bombers.<ref name=Jenkins_p62>{{harvnb|Jenkins|1999|p=62.}}</ref> Numerous changes were made to the design to make it better suited to the now expected missions, resulting in the ''B-1B''.<ref name="Withington p.7"/> These changes included a reduction in maximum speed,<ref name="Schwartz p.120"/> which allowed the variable-aspect intake ramps to be replaced by simpler fixed geometry intake ramps. This reduced the B-1B's radar cross-section which was seen as a good trade off for the speed decrease.<ref name="lee p.13">{{harvnb|Lee|2008|p=13.}}</ref> High subsonic speeds at low altitude became a focus area for the revised design,<ref name="Schwartz p.120"/> and low-level speeds were increased from about Mach&nbsp;0.85 to 0.92. The B-1B has a maximum speed of Mach&nbsp;1.25 at higher altitudes.<ref name="lee p.13"/><ref name=BNA_B-1B_specs/>

The B-1B's maximum takeoff weight was increased to {{convert|477000|lb|kg}} from the B-1A's {{convert|395000|lb|kg}}.<ref name="lee p.13"/><ref name=Spick_1986_p28/> The weight increase was to allow for takeoff with a full internal fuel load and for external weapons to be carried. Rockwell engineers were able to reinforce critical areas and lighten non-critical areas of the airframe, so the increase in [[Basic aircraft empty weight|empty weight]] was minimal.<ref name=Spick_1986_p28>{{harvnb|Spick|1986|p=28.}}</ref> To deal with the introduction of the [[MiG-31]] equipped with the new [[Zaslon]] radar system, and other aircraft with look-down capability, the B-1B's [[electronic warfare]] suite was significantly upgraded.<ref name="lee p.13"/>

[[File:A B-1 Lancer performs a fly-by during a firepower demonstration.jpg|thumb|A B-1B banking during a demonstration in 2004 |alt= B-1B with its wings swept back doing a banked turn during a demonstration]]
Opposition to the plan was widespread within Congress. Critics pointed out that many of the original problems remained in both areas of performance and expense.<ref>{{harvnb|Casil|2003|p=7.}}</ref> In particular it seemed the B-52 fitted with electronics similar to the B-1B would be equally able to avoid interception, as the speed advantage of the B-1 was now minimal. It also appeared that the "interim" time frame served by the B-1B would be less than a decade, being rendered obsolete shortly after the introduction of a much more capable ATB design.<ref>Germani, Clara, ed. [http://www.csmonitor.com/1981/0921/092119.html "Former defense chief raps B-1 bomber plan."] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120616165104/http://www.csmonitor.com/1981/0921/092119.html |date=16 June 2012 }} ''Christian Science Monitor'', 21 September 1981. Retrieved 28 July 2010.</ref> The primary argument in favor of the B-1 was its large [[conventional weapon]] payload, and that its takeoff performance allowed it to operate with a credible bomb load from a much wider variety of airfields. Production subcontracts were spread across many congressional districts, making the aircraft more popular on [[Capitol Hill]].<ref>{{Cite web |title=B-1 Lancer {{!}} PDF {{!}} Aerospace Engineering {{!}} Aircraft |url=https://www.scribd.com/document/512722/B-1-Lancer |access-date=2024-04-24 |via=Scribd}}</ref>

B-1A No. 1 was disassembled and used for radar testing at the [[Rome Laboratory|Rome Air Development Center]] in the former [[Griffiss Air Force Base]], [[New York (state)|New York]].<ref name=Jenkins_p70>{{harvnb|Jenkins|1999|pp=70–74.}}</ref> B-1As No. 2 and No. 4 were then modified to include B-1B systems. The first B-1B was completed and began flight testing in March 1983. The first production B-1B was rolled out on 4 September 1984 and first flew on 18 October 1984.<ref name=Jenkins_p63-4>{{harvnb|Jenkins|1999|pp=63–64.}}</ref> The 100th and final B-1B was delivered on 2 May 1988;<ref name="B-1B_backgrounder">[http://www.boeing.com/defense-space/military/b1-lancer/docs/B-1B_overview.pdf "B-1B Background Information."] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20061026163809/http://www.boeing.com/defense-space/military/b1-lancer/docs/B-1B_overview.pdf|date=26 October 2006}} Boeing. Retrieved 8 October 2009.</ref> before the last B-1B was delivered, the USAF had determined that the aircraft was vulnerable to Soviet air defenses.<ref name="dao 1">Dao 2001, p. 1</ref>

In 1996, Rockwell International sold most of its space and defense operations to Boeing,<ref>{{cite news |last1=Peltz |first1=James |title=Rockwell to Sell Off Space, Defense Divisions to Boeing |url=https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1996-08-02-mn-30527-story.html |newspaper=Los Angeles Times |date=2 August 1996 |access-date=13 February 2024}}</ref> which continues as the primary contractor for the B{{nbh}}1 as of 2024.<ref name="USAF B-1" />