Editing Resolution-class submarine (section)

==Background==
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During the 1950s and early 1960s, the [[United Kingdom]]'s nuclear deterrent was based on the RAF's [[V-bombers]]. But in the early 1960s developments in [[radar]] and [[surface-to-air missiles]] made it clear that [[bombers]] were becoming vulnerable, and would be unlikely to penetrate Soviet airspace. Free-fall nuclear weapons would no longer be a credible deterrent.

To address this problem, in May 1960 the British Prime Minister, [[Harold Macmillan]] arranged a deal with US President [[Dwight D. Eisenhower|Eisenhower]] to equip the V bombers with the US-designed [[AGM-48 Skybolt]]. The Skybolt was a {{convert|1000|mi|km|adj=on}} range ballistic missile that allowed the launching bombers to remain well away from Soviet defences and launch attacks that would be basically invulnerable. With this range, the V bombers would have to fly only a few hundred miles from their bases before being in range for an attack on [[Moscow]].

Under the agreement the UK's contribution to the programme was limited to developing suitable mounting points on the [[Avro Vulcan]] bomber, installing the required guidance systems that fed the missiles updated positioning information, and development of a British version of the US [[W47]] warhead to arm it, the RE.179 [http://www.skomer.u-net.com/projects/alpha.htm] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120518080528/http://www.skomer.u-net.com/projects/alpha.htm |date=18 May 2012 }}.

===The Skybolt crisis===
The incoming [[John F. Kennedy|Kennedy]] administration expressed serious doubts of both Skybolt and the US deterrent force in general. [[Robert McNamara]] was highly critical of the US bomber fleet, which he saw as obsolete in an age of [[ICBM]]s. Skybolt was seen simply as a means of continuing the existence of a system he no longer considered credible, and given the rapidly improving capabilities of ICBM [[inertial guidance]] systems, a precision strike capability with free-fall bombs would no longer be needed. McNamara was equally concerned about the UK also having its own nuclear force, and worried that the US could be drawn into a war by the UK. He wanted to bring the UK into a [[dual key|dual-key]] arrangement.

McNamara first broached the idea of cancelling Skybolt with the British in November 1962. When this was reported in the House of Commons, a storm of protest broke out. A [[Nassau Agreement|meeting]] was arranged to settle the issue, and Macmillan stated in no uncertain terms that the UK would be retaining their independent deterrent capability, no matter what the cost. With development of their Polaris-derived warheads well along, a suitable launch platform would be developed, if need be.

Faced with a clear failure in policy terms, Kennedy gave up on the idea of strong-arming Britain into accepting a dual-key arrangement. By the end of the [[Nassau Agreement|series of meetings]], the UK had [[Polaris Sales Agreement|gained the much more impressive Polaris system]], and would start development of a new submarine to launch it. The [[SSBNs]] would then take over the nuclear deterrent role from the RAF's V bombers from 1968 onwards.