Editing Reliabilism (section)

==Overview==
A broadly reliabilist theory of knowledge is roughly as follows:

<blockquote>Given that ''p'' stands for any [[proposition]] (such as, ''the sky is blue''), then one knows that ''p'' if and only if ''p'' is true, one believes that ''p'' is true, and one has arrived at the belief that ''p'' is true through some ''reliable process.''</blockquote>

A broadly reliabilist theory of justified belief can be stated as follows:

<blockquote>One has a justified belief that ''p'' if, and only if, the belief is the result of a reliable process.</blockquote>

Moreover, a similar account can be given (and an elaborate version of this [[Warrant and Proper Function|has been given]] by [[Alvin Plantinga]]) for such notions as 'warranted belief' or 'epistemically rational belief'.

Leading proponents of reliabilist theories of knowledge and justification have included [[Alvin Goldman]], [[Marshall Swain]], [[Kent Bach]] and more recently, Alvin Plantinga.  Goldman's article "[[A Causal Theory of Knowing]]" (''Journal of Philosophy'', '''64''' (1967), pp.&nbsp;357–372) is generally credited as being the first full treatment of the theory, though [[D. M. Armstrong]] is also regarded as an important source, and (according to [[Hugh Mellor]]) [[Frank P. Ramsey|Frank Ramsey]] was the very first to state the theory, albeit in passing.

One classical or traditional [[philosophical analysis|analysis]] of 'knowledge' is ''[[justified true belief]]''. In order to have a valid claim of knowledge for any proposition, one must be justified in believing "p" and "p" must be true. Since [[Gettier]]<ref>{{cite journal|url=https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-01439314/file/2013%20Gettier%20Conocimiento.pdf|title=Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?|year=1963|first=Edmund L.|last=Gettier|journal=Analysis|volume=23|issue=6|pages=121–123|doi=10.1093/analys/23.6.121|jstor=3326922}}</ref> proposed his counterexamples the traditional analysis has included the further claim that knowledge must be more than justified true belief.  Reliabilist theories of knowledge are sometimes presented as an alternative to that theory: rather than justification, all that is required is that the belief be the product of a reliable process.  But reliabilism need not be regarded as an alternative, but instead as a further explication of the traditional analysis.  On this view, those who offer reliabilist theories of justification further analyze the 'justification' part of the traditional analysis of 'knowledge' in terms of reliable processes.  Not all reliabilists agree with such accounts of justification, but some do.