Editing Relativism (section)

==Forms of relativism==
===Anthropological versus philosophical relativism===
[[Anthropological relativism]] refers to a [[methodology|methodological]] stance, in which the researcher suspends (or brackets) their own cultural prejudice while trying to understand beliefs or behaviors in their contexts. This has become known as [[methodological relativism]], and concerns itself specifically with avoiding [[ethnocentrism]] or the application of one's own cultural standards to the assessment of other cultures.<ref>{{Cite news
 |first=Harry
 |last=Collins
 |author-link=Harry Collins
 |title=What's wrong with relativism?
 |url=http://physicsworld.com/cws/article/print/1607
 |work=[[Physics World]]
 |publisher=IOP Publishing
 |location=[[Bristol, UK]]
 |date=1998-04-01
 |access-date=2008-04-16
 |quote=...methodological relativism - impartial assessment of how knowledge develops - is the key idea for sociology of scientific knowledge...}}</ref> This is also the basis of the so-called "[[emic]]" and "[[etic]]" distinction, in which:
* An ''emic'' or ''insider'' account of behavior is a description of a society in terms that are meaningful to the participant or actor's own culture; an emic account is therefore culture-specific, and typically refers to what is considered "[[common sense]]" within the culture under observation.
* An ''etic'' or outsider account is a description of a society by an observer, in terms that can be applied to other cultures; that is, an etic account is culturally neutral, and typically refers to the conceptual framework of the social scientist. (This is complicated when it is scientific research itself that is under study, or when there is theoretical or terminological disagreement within the social sciences.)

Philosophical relativism, in contrast, asserts that the truth of a proposition depends on the metaphysical, or theoretical frame, or the instrumental method, or the context in which the proposition is expressed, or on the person, groups, or culture who interpret the proposition.<ref>{{cite book| url = https://books.google.com/books?id=U5lKIVkSPtcC| title = Locke, Shaftesbury, and Hutcheson: Contesting Diversity in the Enlightenment and Beyond|first1=Daniel|last1=Carey|year=2005|location=Cambridge|publisher=Cambridge University Press| isbn = 9781139447904}}</ref>

Methodological relativism and philosophical relativism can exist independently from one another, but most anthropologists base their methodological relativism on that of the philosophical variety.<ref>{{cite web| url = https://www.jstor.org/stable/2796798| title = Methodological and Philosophical Relativism by Gananath Obeyesekere| jstor = 2796798}}</ref>

===Descriptive versus normative relativism===
The concept of relativism also has importance both for [[philosophy|philosophers]] and for [[anthropology|anthropologists]] in another way. In general, anthropologists engage in descriptive relativism ("how things are" or "how things seem"), whereas philosophers engage in [[Norm (philosophy)|normative]] relativism ("how things ought to be"), although there is some overlap (for example, descriptive relativism can pertain to concepts, normative relativism to truth).

Descriptive relativism assumes that certain cultural groups have different modes of thought, standards of reasoning, and so forth, and it is the anthropologist's task to describe, but not to evaluate the validity of these principles and practices of a cultural group. It is possible for an anthropologist in his or her fieldwork to be a descriptive relativist about some things that typically concern the philosopher (e.g., ethical principles) but not about others (e.g., logical principles). However, the descriptive relativist's empirical claims about epistemic principles, moral ideals and the like are often countered by anthropological arguments that such things are universal, and much of the recent literature on these matters is explicitly concerned with the extent of, and evidence for, cultural or moral or linguistic or human universals.<ref>{{Cite book |first = Donald E. |last = Brown |author-link = Donald Brown (anthropologist) |title = Human Universals |publisher = [[McGraw-Hill]] |year = 1991 |isbn = 0-87722-841-8 |url-access = registration |url = https://archive.org/details/culturalconnecti00voge }}</ref>

The fact that the various species of descriptive relativism are empirical claims may tempt the philosopher to conclude that they are of little philosophical interest, but there are several reasons why this is not so. First, some philosophers, notably Kant, argue that certain sorts of cognitive differences between human beings (or even all rational beings) are impossible, so such differences could never be found to obtain in fact, an argument that places a priori limits on what empirical inquiry could discover and on what versions of descriptive relativism could be true. Second, claims about actual differences between groups play a central role in some arguments for normative relativism (for example, arguments for normative ethical relativism often begin with claims that different groups in fact have different moral codes or ideals). Finally, the anthropologist's descriptive account of relativism helps to separate the fixed aspects of human nature from those that can vary, and so a descriptive claim that some important aspect of experience or thought does (or does not) vary across groups of human beings tells us something important about human nature and the human condition.

Normative relativism concerns normative or [[Value (ethics)|evaluative]] claims that modes of thought, standards of reasoning, or the like are only right or wrong relative to a framework. 'Normative' is meant in a general sense, applying to a wide range of views; in the case of beliefs, for example, normative correctness equals truth. This does not mean, of course, that framework-relative correctness or truth is always clear, the first challenge being to explain what it amounts to in any given case (e.g., with respect to concepts, truth, epistemic norms). Normative relativism (say, in regard to normative ethical relativism) therefore implies that things (say, ethical claims) are not simply true in themselves, but only have [[truth value]]s relative to broader frameworks (say, moral codes). (Many normative ethical relativist arguments run from premises about ethics to conclusions that assert the relativity of truth values, bypassing general claims about the nature of truth, but it is often more illuminating to consider the type of relativism under question directly.)<ref>{{cite book| chapter-url = http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/relativism/#1.2| title = Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy| chapter = Relativism| year = 2022| publisher = Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University}}</ref>

===Legal relativism===
In English [[common law]], two (perhaps three) separate standards of proof are recognized:
* proof based on the [[Burden of proof (law)#Preponderance of the evidence|balance of probabilities]]  is the lesser standard used in [[Civil law (common law)|civil litigation]], which cases mostly concern money or some other penalty, that, if further and better evidence should emerge, is reasonably reversible.
* proof  [[reasonable doubt|beyond reasonable doubt]] is used in [[criminal law]] cases where an accused's right to [[personal freedom]] or [[survival]] is in question,  because such  [[punishment]] is not reasonably reversible.
* Absolute truth is so complex as to be only capable of being fully understood by the [[Omniscience|omniscient]] established during the [[Tudor period]] as the one true [[God in Christianity|God]]  <ref>[https://www.lawyersnjurists.com/article/reasonable-doubt-v-balance-of-probability/Lawyers & Jurists website:  Reasonable doubt v balance of probability]</ref>