Editing Proposition (section)

==Relation to the mind==
In relation to the mind, propositions are discussed primarily as they fit into [[propositional attitudes]]. Propositional attitudes are simply attitudes characteristic of [[folk psychology]] (belief, desire, etc.) that one can take toward a proposition (e.g. 'it is raining,' 'snow is white,' etc.). In English, propositions usually follow folk psychological attitudes by a "that clause" (e.g. "Jane believes ''that'' it is raining"). In [[philosophy of mind]] and [[psychology]], mental states are often taken to primarily consist in propositional attitudes. The propositions are usually said to be the "mental content" of the attitude. For example, if Jane has a mental state of believing that it is raining, her mental content is the proposition 'it is raining.' Furthermore, since such mental states are ''about'' something (namely, propositions), they are said to be [[intentionality|intentional]] mental states.

Explaining the relation of propositions to the mind is especially difficult for non-mentalist views of propositions, such as those of the logical positivists and Russell described above, and [[Gottlob Frege]]'s view that propositions are [[Platonist]] entities, that is, existing in an abstract, non-physical realm.<ref>{{cite web |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/platonism/#4.2 |title=Platonism in metaphysics: Propositions |last=Balaguer |first=Mark |date=2016 |website=Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher= |access-date=30 June 2021}}</ref> So some recent views of propositions have taken them to be mental. Although propositions cannot be particular thoughts since those are not shareable, they could be types of cognitive events<ref>{{cite book |last=Soames |first=Scott |author-link= |date=2014 |title=New Thinking about Propositions |url=https://global.oup.com/academic/product/new-thinking-about-propositions-9780199693764 |location=New York |publisher=Oxford University Press |editor-last1=King |editor-first1=Jeffrey C. |editor-last2=Soames |editor-first2=Scott |editor-last3=Speaks |editor-first3=Jeff |chapter=Propositions as cognitive event types |chapter-url=https://dornsife.usc.edu/assets/sites/678/docs/BookChapters/New_Thinking_About_Propositions/NTP_Chapter_6.pdf  |isbn=9780199693764}}</ref> or properties of thoughts (which could be the same across different thinkers).<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Joaquin |first1=Jeremiah Joven B. |last2=Franklin |first2=James |date=2021 |title=A causal-mentalist view of propositions |url=https://www.organonf.com/journal/jeremiahjovenjoaquinjamesfranklin/ |journal=Organon F |volume=28 |issue= |pages= |doi= |access-date=30 June 2021}}</ref>

Philosophical debates surrounding propositions as they relate to propositional attitudes have also recently centered on whether they are internal or external to the agent, or whether they are mind-dependent or mind-independent entities. For more, see the entry on [[Internalism#Philosophy of mind|internalism and externalism]] in philosophy of mind.