Editing Politics of Indonesia (section)

==History==
===Old Order: Liberal Democracy and Guided Democracy===
{{further|Liberal democracy period in Indonesia|Guided Democracy in Indonesia}}

The '''"Old Order"''' (1950–1965) in Indonesia has long been understood to be a period of turmoil and crisis, characterized by rebellions and political unrest. The weakness of Indonesia's democracy and its gradual transition to authoritarianism during the Old Order can be attributed to conventional modernization theory, which suggests that without strong socioeconomic structures, successful transitions to democracy are unlikely.<ref>{{Cite web | url=https://digitallibrary.tsu.ge/book/2019/feb/reader/Jorjoliani-Principles-of-Comparative-Politics.pdf | title=Principles of comparative politics | archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230120034128/https://digitallibrary.tsu.ge/book/2019/feb/reader/Jorjoliani-Principles-of-Comparative-Politics.pdf | archive-date=2023-01-20 }}</ref> Indeed, it was not until the late 1960s when urbanization took place that the Indonesian government began to build a stronger democracy.<ref name="rba.gov.au">{{Cite web | url=https://www.rba.gov.au/publications/bulletin/2011/dec/pdf/bu-1211-4.pdf | title=The Growth and Development of the Indonesian Economy | archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230304023725/https://www.rba.gov.au/publications/bulletin/2011/dec/pdf/bu-1211-4.pdf | archive-date=4 March 2023 }}</ref>

During the '''"Liberal Democracy"''' period (1950–1957), Indonesia aspired to renew its global status and achieve modernity as a newly independent country.<ref>{{cite journal | url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/41329000.pdf | jstor=41329000 | title=Indonesia in the 1950s: Nation, modernity, and the post-colonial state | last1=Nordholt | first1=Henk Schulte | journal=Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde | year=2011 | volume=167 | issue=4 | pages=386–404 | doi=10.1163/22134379-90003577 }}</ref> In line with this vision, it sought to establish a democratic parliamentary system, bringing forth a "multi-party system, cabinet government under a prime minister, and a ceremonial president".<ref name="academic.oup.com">{{cite book | chapter-url=https://academic.oup.com/book/3541/chapter/144797452 | doi=10.1093/0199246467.003.0014 | chapter=Indonesia's Democratic Transition: Playing by the Rules | title=The Architecture of Democracy | date=2002 | last1=Liddle | first1=R. William | pages=373–399 | isbn=0-19-924646-7 }}</ref> However, the economic instability inherited from colonial rule significantly hindered their democratic nation-building vision: the Indonesian economy struggled to recover from the hardships of colonial occupation, with economic growth being stagnant and inflation reaching over 600% between the 1950s-1960s.<ref>{{cite journal | url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/422154.pdf | jstor=422154 | title=Indonesia's Democratic Past and Future | last1=Liddle | first1=R. William | journal=Comparative Politics | year=1992 | volume=24 | issue=4 | pages=443–462 | doi=10.2307/422154 | access-date=4 March 2023 | archive-date=24 March 2020 | archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200324081800/https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/422154.pdf | url-status=live }}</ref> Indonesia's economy heavily relied on the agricultural sector, but without diversification and industrialization, the government became vulnerable to polarization and instability.<ref name="rba.gov.au"/>

Moreover, Indonesia's abundance of natural resources, such as coffee, rubber, and cocoa, made it susceptible to the political resource curse:<ref name="assets.publishing.service.gov.uk">{{Cite web | url=https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/57a08c05ed915d3cfd001100/wp35.pdf | title=A future resource curse
in Indonesia: The political economy of natural resources, conflict and development | archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230304023738/https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/57a08c05ed915d3cfd001100/wp35.pdf | archive-date=2023-03-04|date=4 March 2023 }}</ref> Indonesia's resource wealth led to corruption, inequality, and political instability, hindering economic and social progress; the concentration of wealth and power in the hands of a few elites with a monopoly over these resources worsened the country's economic and political problems. This ultimately led to rising political tensions and the government's loss of control.<ref name="assets.publishing.service.gov.uk"/>

'''"Guided Democracy"''', which was in place from 1957 to 1966, aimed to bring about political stability, modernization, and development under the leadership of President Sukarno.<ref name="Brill">{{cite book | chapter-url=https://brill.com/display/book/9789004437722/BP000001.xml | doi=10.1163/9789004437722_002 | chapter=Introduction | title=Authoritarian Modernization in Indonesia's Early Independence Period | year=2020 | pages=1–17 | publisher=Brill | isbn=9789004437722 | s2cid=242813604 | last1=Fakih | first1=Farabi | access-date=4 March 2023 | archive-date=4 March 2023 | archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230304023731/https://brill.com/display/book/9789004437722/BP000001.xml | url-status=live }}</ref> Initially, Sukarno sought to build political institutions to bolster representation and resolve conflicts of regionalism, social class, and religion that plagued the Parliament during the Liberal Democracy era.<ref name="academic.oup.com"/> However, power became increasingly centralized to the executive branch in the latter half of Guided Democracy, with Sukarno assuming a dictator-like role in the government.<ref name="Brill"/> Indonesia's gradual transition to authoritarianism during the Guided Democracy period exemplifies the failure of the democratic project in the country due to weak socio-economic structures and the political resource curse that undermined its democratic development.

===Transition to the New Order===
{{further|Transition to the New Order}}

The transition to the "[[New Order (Indonesia)|New Order]]" in the mid-1960s, ousted Sukarno after 22 years in the position. One of the most tumultuous periods in [[History of Indonesia|the country's modern history]], it was the commencement of [[Suharto]]'s three-decade presidency. Described as the great ''[[dhalang]]'' ("puppet master"), Sukarno drew power from balancing the opposing and increasingly antagonistic forces of the army and the [[Communist Party of Indonesia]] (PKI).

By 1965, the PKI extensively penetrated all levels of government and gained influence at the expense of the army.<ref>Ricklefs (1991), pp. 271-283</ref> On 30 September 1965, six of the military's most senior officers were killed in an action (generally labelled an "attempted coup") by the so-called [[30 September Movement]], a group from within the armed forces. Within a few hours, [[Suharto|Major General Suharto]] mobilised forces under his command and took control of Jakarta.  Anti-communists, initially following the army's lead, went on [[Indonesian mass killings of 1965–66|a violent purge of communists throughout the country]], killing an estimated half million people and destroying the PKI, which was officially blamed for the crisis.<ref>{{cite video|people=Chris Hilton (writer and director)|title=Shadowplay|medium=Television documentary|publisher=Vagabond Films and Hilton Cordell Productions|date=2001 }}; Ricklefs (1991), pages 280–283, 284, 287–290</ref><ref>{{cite journal|title=Unresolved Problems in the Indonesian Killings of 1965-1966|author=Robert Cribb|journal=Asian Survey|volume=42|issue=4|year=2002|pages=550–563|doi=10.1525/as.2002.42.4.550|s2cid=145646994}}; Friend (2003), page 107-109, 113.</ref>

The politically weakened Sukarno was [[Supersemar|forced to transfer key political and military powers]] to General Suharto, who had become head of the armed forces. In March 1967, the Provisional [[People's Consultative Assembly]] (MPRS) named General Suharto acting president. He was formally appointed president one year later. Sukarno lived under virtual house arrest until his death in 1970. In contrast to the stormy nationalism, revolutionary rhetoric, and economic failure that characterised the early 1960s under the left-leaning Sukarno, Suharto's pro-Western "New Order" stabilised the economy but continued the official state philosophy of [[Pancasila (politics)|''Pancasila'']].

===New Order===
{{further|New Order (Indonesia)}}
Sukarno-Indonesia's first national figure and president-dissolved the elected assembly, introduced a concept known as Guided Democracy, and reinstated the 1945 constitution in 1959.<ref name='justicdd'/> The period of Guided Democracy was marked by the creation of a plethora of ministries, by the rise of the Indonesia Communist Party (Partai Komunis Indonesia; PKI) to a position of political dominance, and by the emergence of the army as a major anticommunist political force.<ref name='justicdd'/> The structure collapsed with an attempted coup d'état in 1965, which led to the downfall of Sukarno.<ref name='justicdd'/> Under Suharto, Sukarno's successor, Indonesia entered a new political era, officially called the New Order<ref name='justicdd'>{{cite web | url=https://www.britannica.com/place/Indonesia/Justice | title=Indonesia - Justice &#124; Britannica | access-date=7 November 2022 | archive-date=6 March 2023 | archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230306022807/https://www.britannica.com/place/Indonesia/Justice | url-status=live }}</ref>

The '''New Order''' ({{langx|id|Orde Baru}}) is the term coined by President [[Suharto]] to characterise his regime as he came to power in 1966. He used this term to contrast his rule with that of his predecessor, [[Sukarno]] (dubbed the "Old Order," or ''Orde Lama''). The term "New Order" in more recent times has become synonymous with the Suharto years (1966–1998).

Immediately following the [[30 September Movement|attempted coup]] in 1965, the political situation was uncertain, but the New Order found much popular support from groups wanting a separation from Indonesia's problems since its independence. The 'generation of 66' (''[[Angkatan 66]]'') epitomised talk of a new group of young leaders and new intellectual thought. Following communal and political conflicts, and economic collapse and social breakdown of the late 1950s through to the mid-1960s, the New Order was committed to achieving and maintaining political order, economic development, and the removal of mass participation in the political process. The features of the New Order established from the late 1960s were thus a strong political role for the military, the bureaucratisation and corporatisation of political and societal organisations, and selective but effective repression of opponents. Strident [[anti-communism]] remained a hallmark of the regime for its subsequent 32 years.

Within a few years, however, many of its original allies had become indifferent or averse to the New Order, which comprised a military faction supported by a narrow civilian group. Among much of the pro-democracy movement which forced [[Fall of Suharto|Suharto to resign in 1998]] and then gained power, the term "New Order" has come to be used pejoratively. It is frequently employed to describe figures who were either tied to the New Order, or who upheld the practises of his authoritarian regime, such as corruption, [[collusion]] and [[nepotism]] (widely known by the acronym KKN: ''korupsi'', ''kolusi'', ''nepotisme'').<ref>[http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2001/08/24/stop-talk-kkn.html Stop talk of KKN] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20141026103742/http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2001/08/24/stop-talk-kkn.html|date=26 October 2014 }}. The Jakarta Post (24 August 2001).</ref>

===Reform era===
{{further|Post-Suharto era}}
[[Image:IndonesianElections.gif|thumb|left|300px|Map showing the parties/organisations with the largest vote share per province in Indonesia's elections from 1971 to 2019]]
The '''Post-Suharto era''' began with the [[fall of Suharto]] in 1998 during which Indonesia has been in a period of transition, an era known as ''Reformasi'' (English: ''Reform''<ref>''US Indonesia Diplomatic and Political Cooperation Handbook'', Int'l Business Publications, 2007, {{ISBN|1433053306}}, [https://books.google.com/books?id=zvfZnRoC_YQC&pg=RA1-PA102 page CRS-5]{{Dead link|date=October 2023 |bot=InternetArchiveBot |fix-attempted=yes }}</ref><ref>Robin Bush, ''Nahdlatul Ulama and the Struggle for Power Within Islam and Politics in Indonesia'', Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2009, {{ISBN|9812308768}}, [https://books.google.com/books?id=Ssg0aiSEyy0C&pg=PA111 page 111]</ref><ref>Ryan Ver Berkmoes, ''Lonely Planet Indonesia'', 2010, {{ISBN|1741048303}}, [https://books.google.com/books?id=4GMBFsaFNN4C&pg=PA49 page 49]</ref>). This period has seen a more open and liberal political-social environment.

Indonesia's transition to democracy was a key part of the broader reform era.<ref name="ReferenceA">{{cite journal |last1=Hara |first1=Abubakar E. |title=The Difficult Journey of Democratization in Indonesia |journal=Contemporary Southeast Asia |date=August 2001 |volume=23 |issue=2 |pages=307–326 |jstor=25798548}}</ref> Democratic transitions tend to be grouped into two categories: bottom-up transitions where people rise up and overthrow an existing regime, and top-down transitions where an authoritarian ruler introduces liberalizing reforms leading to democratic transition.<ref>Clark et al, Foundations of Comparative Politics, 2018</ref> Indonesia experienced a transition toward democratic rule that involved both bottom-up and top-down forces after the fall of the authoritarian regime in 1998, thus altering the political structure of the country.<ref name="ReferenceB">{{cite journal |last1=Abdulbaki |first1=Louay |title=Democratisation in Indonesia: From Transition to Consolidation |journal=Asian Journal of Political Science |date=2008 |volume=16 |issue=2 |pages=151–172 |doi=10.1080/02185370802204099 |url=https://www.researchgate.net/publication/249042179}}</ref> Differences in democratization across developing countries, including Indonesia, is common and may be explained by different theoretical models.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Geddes |first1=Barbara |title=What Do We Know About Democratization After Twenty Years? |journal=Annual Review of Political Science |date=June 1999 |volume=2 |issue=1 |pages=115–144 |doi=10.1146/annurev.polisci.2.1.115}}</ref> While Indonesia has been considered a democracy since the fall of the authoritarian regime in 1998, democratic consolidation has not completely been achieved.<ref>Liddel, “Improving the Quality of Democracy in Indonesia”, 2002</ref>

A process of constitutional reform lasted from 1999 to 2002, with four amendments producing major changes.{{sfn|Indrayana|2008|pages=360-361}} Among these were [[term limit]]s of up to two five-year terms for the president and [[Vice President of Indonesia|vice president]] and measures to institute [[Separation of powers|checks and balances]]. The highest state institution is the [[People's Consultative Assembly]] ({{langx|id|Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat}}, MPR), whose functions previously included electing the president and vice-president (since 2004 the president has been elected directly by the people), establishing broad guidelines of state policy, and amending the constitution. The 695-member MPR includes all 550 members of the [[House of Representatives (Indonesia)|House of Representatives]] ({{langx|id|Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat}}, DPR) plus 130 members of [[Regional Representative Council]] ({{langx|id|Dewan Perwakilan Daerah}}, DPD) elected by the 26 provincial parliaments and 65 appointed members from societal groups.{{sfn|Indrayana|2008|pages=361-362}}

The DPR, which is the premier legislative institution, originally included 462 members elected through a mixed proportional/district representational system and thirty-eight appointed members of the [[Indonesian Armed Forces]] (TNI) and [[Indonesian National Police|police]] (POLRI). TNI/POLRI representation in the DPR and MPR ended in 2004. Societal group representation in the MPR was eliminated in 2004 through further constitutional change.{{sfn|Indrayana|2008|pages=293-296}}<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/DH16Ae06.html|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20020819185214/http://atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/DH16Ae06.html|url-status=unfit|archive-date=19 August 2002|title=Indonesia's military: Business as usual|date=16 August 2002}}</ref> Having served as rubberstamp bodies in the past, the DPR and MPR have gained considerable power and are increasingly assertive in oversight of the executive branch. Under constitutional changes in 2004, the MPR became a [[bicameral legislature]], with the creation of the DPD, in which each province is represented by four members, although its legislative powers are more limited than those of the DPR. Through his/her appointed cabinet, the president retains the authority to conduct the administration of the government.{{sfn|Indrayana|2008|pages=265,361,441}}

A general election in June 1999 produced the first freely elected national, provincial and regional parliaments in over 40 years. In October 1999, the MPR elected a compromise candidate, [[Abdurrahman Wahid]], as the country's fourth president, and [[Megawati Sukarnoputri]]—a daughter of Sukarno—as the vice-president. Megawati's [[Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle|PDI-P]] party had won the largest share of the vote (34%) in the general election, while [[Golkar]], the dominant party during the New Order, came in second (22%). Several other, mostly Islamic parties won shares large enough to be seated in the DPR. Other nationwide democratic elections took place in 2004, 2009, 2014, and 2019.
[[Image:Indonesian Political System.svg|350px|thumb|left|The Indonesian political system before and after the constitutional amendments]]

In Indonesia, while free and fair elections have been held and a constitution guaranteeing certain rights and freedoms exists, corruption and involvement of money in politics persists.<ref>Indonesia Investments web page</ref> Corruption in regional government is often revenue-related, involving bribery and theft of public goods for personal gain, and identifies political corruption, such as fraudulent behavior and deviant lobbying techniques, as the type committed by government officials.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Ibrahim |first1=Risnaldi |last2=Yusoff |first2=Mohammad Agus |last3=Koling |first3=Huma Magridoni |title=Patterns and Causes of Corruption Among Government Officials in Indonesia |journal=Adabi: Journal of Public Administration and Business |date=July 2018 |volume=1 |issue=1 |pages=74–91 |url=https://www.researchgate.net/publication/327630207 |access-date=21 May 2024}}</ref> Additionally, one of the primary reasons Indonesia may not be considered a consolidated democracy is due to their lack of “civilian control over the military”.<ref name="ReferenceB"/> Indonesia has created democratic institutions, but there is still progress that must be made to address the challenges the country currently faces in order to consolidate democracy.<ref name="ReferenceA"/>

After the Reformasi, Indonesia became a [[patronage]] democracy, where state resources are distributed among political parties. While patronage weakens democratic institutions and accountability, it serves as a powerful incentive for compromise and cooperation. Parties get into governing coalitions regardless of ideology to access state resources. This cut across identity-based cleavages. President [[Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono]]'s leadership contained social conflict by mediating between conflicting forces and accommodating potential opposition. Yudhoyono's presidency was a period of democratic stagnation but also of peace, stability, and absence of [[political polarization]]. The [[2014 Indonesian presidential election]] marked a rise of polarization, with an [[Islamist]]-[[Pluralism (political philosophy)|pluralist]] divide, which continued in the [[2017 Jakarta gubernatorial election]] and the [[2019 Indonesian presidential election]].<ref>{{cite book |last1=Warburton |first1=Eve |editor1-last=Carothers |editor1-first=Thomas |editor2-last=O'Donohue |editor2-first=Andrew |title=Democracies Divided: The Global Challenge of Political Polarization |date=2019 |publisher=[[Brookings Institution Press]] |isbn=978-0-8157-3722-3 |pages=201–227 |chapter=Polarization and Democratic Decline in Indonesia}}</ref>

Currently, scholars are conflicted about the strength and durability of Indonesia's democracy. Indonesia scores well on certain characteristics of democracy, such as political rights, classifying it as a democracy in the [[Democracy|minimalist]] interpretation of the word.<ref name=":0" /> However, the country lacks other aspects of democracy that are usually required for a regime to reach [[democratic consolidation]], such as adequate [[civil rights]] protections.<ref name=":0" />

A [[Democracy|minimalist]] view of democracy classifies political regimes purely in terms of their institutions and procedures rather than the outcomes they produce. Specifically, a regime must implement [[free and fair election]]s.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Binder 1 Francois 2 Trebbi 3 |first=Chris 1 Patrick 2 Francesco 3 |date=October 2014 |title=A Theory of Minimalist Democracy |url=https://www.nber.org/system/files/working_papers/w20552/w20552.pdf |journal=National Bureau of Economic Research |pages=1–51 |access-date=4 March 2023 |archive-date=4 March 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230304023110/https://www.nber.org/system/files/working_papers/w20552/w20552.pdf |url-status=live }}</ref> In Indonesia, the president is directly elected and can serve up to two five-year terms.<ref name=":0" /> There are limited voting irregularities, and international election monitors consider the elections free and fair. Additionally, in 2019, the Constitutional Court rejected claims of widespread [[voter fraud]]. The right to organize competing political parties is respected, and the system allows for the competition of several political parties.<ref name=":0" /> Thus, according to the minimalist definition, Indonesia is a democracy.

However, a [[Democracy|maximalist]] approach to democracy claims that free and fair elections are insufficient to consider a regime a democracy.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Bachheimer |first=Christian |date=2021-06-12 |title=Consolidating Indonesia's deteriorating democracy |url=https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2021/06/12/consolidating-indonesia-deteriorating-democracy/ |access-date=2023-03-04 |website=East Asia Forum |language=en |archive-date=4 March 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230304023111/https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2021/06/12/consolidating-indonesia-deteriorating-democracy/ |url-status=live }}</ref> Maximalists argue that these countries must also guarantee other social, political, and economic rights, often those found in [[Democratic consolidation|consolidated democracies]].<ref name=":1">{{Cite book |last1=Kendall-Taylor |first1=Andrea |url=https://www.oxfordpoliticstrove.com/display/10.1093/hepl/9780198820819.001.0001/hepl-9780198820819-chapter-2 |title=2. Defining Democracy |last2=Lindstaedt |first2=Natasha |last3=Frantz |first3=Erica |publisher=Oxford University Press |year=2020 |isbn=978-0-19-186051-5 |language=en-US |doi=10.1093/hepl/9780198820819.003.0002}}</ref> These include [[human rights]] protections, [[civil rights]], [[egalitarianism]], [[judicial independence]], and more.<ref name=":1" />