Editing Physicalism (section)

== Definition of physicalism in philosophy ==
The word "physicalism" was introduced into philosophy in the 1930s by [[Otto Neurath]] and [[Rudolf Carnap]].<ref>{{cite book|chapter-url = https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/physicalism/|title = Physicalism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)|chapter = Physicalism|year = 2022|publisher = Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University}}</ref>

The use of "physical" in physicalism is a philosophical concept and can be distinguished from alternative definitions found in the literature (e.g., [[Karl Popper]] defined a physical proposition as one that can at least in theory be denied by observation<ref name="Popper2002" />). A "physical property", in this context, may be a metaphysical or logical combination of properties which are not physical in the ordinary sense. It is common to express the notion of "metaphysical or logical combination of properties" using the notion of supervenience. Supervenience is the idea that there cannot be two events alike in all physical respects but differing in some mental respect, or that an object cannot alter in some mental respect without altering in some physical respect.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Davidson |first=Donald |title="Mental Events," reprinted in Donald Davidson (ed.) 1980, 207–225. |date=1970}}</ref><ref>See Bennett and McLaughlin, 2011</ref><ref>{{Cite book |last=Davidson |first=Donald |title="Mental Events" |date=1970}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal |last=Davidson |first=Donald |date=1995 |title="Laws and Cause" |journal=Dialectica, 49: 2–4: 263–279.}}</ref><ref>Davidson D., 1993, “Thinking Causes”, in Heil and Mele.</ref> The reason to introduce supervenience is that physicalists usually suppose the existence of various abstract concepts that are non-physical in the ordinary sense of the word.

=== Type physicalism ===
{{See also|Type physicalism}}

[[Type physicalism]], also known as mind-body identity theory, holds that [[Mental event|mental events]] can be grouped into types that correlate with types of physical events.<ref name="DStoljar" /> For instance, one type of mental events, such as pain, correlates with a particular type of physical events, such as C-fiber firings. On this account, all instances of pain correspond to situations where C-fibers are firing. Type physicalism can be understood as the position that there is an identity between types: any mental type is identical with some physical type.

A common argument against type physicalism is the problem of [[multiple realizability]]. Multiple realizability posits that the same mental state can be realized by different physical states. Another way to put it is that there is a many-to-one mapping from physical states to mental states.<ref name="BechtelMundale19992">{{Cite journal |last1=Bechtel |first1=William |author-link1=William Bechtel |last2=Mundale |first2=Jennifer |date=1999 |title=Multiple Realizability Revisited: Linking Cognitive and Neural States |journal=Philosophy of Science |volume=66 |issue=2 |pages=175–207 |doi=10.1086/392683 |issn=0031-8248 |jstor=188642 |s2cid=122093404}}</ref><ref name="Kim1993" /><ref name="Fodor1974" />

=== Token physicalism ===
{{See also|Anomalous monism}}

Token physicalism is the proposition that every particular mental event is a particular physical event (token physical event) but that there is no type-to-type mapping between mental events and physical events.<ref name="DStoljar" /> The most common example of token physicalism is Davidson's anomalous monism.<ref>Davidson, D. (1970) "Mental Events", in ''Actions and Events'', Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980.</ref> One of token physicalism's strengths is that it is compatible with multiple realizability. Mental states such as pain may be realized in any number of widely different physical events, without any type-like similarity between these physical events.