Editing Philosophy of science (section)

==Introduction==

===Defining science===
{{Main|Demarcation problem}}
[[File:Allan Ramsay - David Hume, 1711 - 1776. Historian and philosopher - PG 3521 - National Galleries of Scotland.jpg|thumb|upright|In formulating 'the problem of induction', David Hume devised one of the most pervasive puzzles in the philosophy of science. ]]
[[File:Karl Popper.jpg|thumb|Karl Popper in the 1980s. Popper is credited with formulating 'the demarcation problem', which considers the question of how we distinguish between science and pseudoscience. |upright]]
Distinguishing between science and [[non-science]] is referred to as the demarcation problem. For example, should [[psychoanalysis]], [[creation science]], and [[historical materialism]] be considered pseudosciences? [[Karl Popper]] called this the central question in the philosophy of science.<ref name="Thornton2006">{{cite web|url = http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/popper/|title = Karl Popper|access-date = 2007-12-01|last = Thornton|first = Stephen|year = 2006|website = Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy|archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20070627013103/http://plato.stanford.edu//entries///popper/|archive-date = 2007-06-27|url-status = live}}</ref> However, no unified account of the problem has won acceptance among philosophers, and some regard the problem as unsolvable or uninteresting.<ref>{{cite encyclopedia |url=http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/pseudo-science/#NonSciPosSci |title=Science and Pseudo-science |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150905091332/http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/pseudo-science/#NonSciPosSci |archive-date=2015-09-05 |date=2008 |encyclopedia=Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy}}</ref><ref name="Laudan1983">{{cite book | last = Laudan | first = Larry | editor-first1 = Adolf |editor-last1=Grünbaum |editor-first2=Robert Sonné |editor-last2=Cohen |editor-first3=Larry |editor-last3=Laudan | title = Physics, Philosophy, and Psychoanalysis: Essays in Honor of Adolf Grünbaum | year = 1983 | publisher = Springer | isbn = 978-90-277-1533-3 | chapter = The Demise of the Demarcation Problem}}</ref> [[Martin Gardner]] has argued for the use of a [[Potter Stewart standard]] ("I know it when I see it") for recognizing pseudoscience.<ref>{{cite book|url = https://books.google.com/books?id=SqOPw9Yq-MEC&q=pseudoscience+potter+stewart&pg=PA13|pages = 12–13|title = The Pseudoscience Wars: Immanuel Velikovsky and the Birth of the Modern Fringe|first = Michael D.|last = Gordin|publisher = University of Chicago Press|year = 2012|isbn = 978-0-226-30442-7}}</ref>

Early attempts by the [[logical positivists]] grounded science in observation while non-science was non-observational and hence meaningless.<ref name="Uebel2006">{{cite web|url = http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/vienna-circle/|title = Vienna Circle|access-date = 2007-12-01|last = Uebel|first = Thomas|year = 2006|website = Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy|archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20070626224948/http://plato.stanford.edu//entries///vienna-circle/|archive-date = 2007-06-26|url-status = live}}</ref> Popper argued that the central property of science is [[falsifiability]]. That is, every genuinely scientific claim is capable of being proven false, at least in principle.<ref name="Popper1959">{{cite book | last = Popper | first = Karl | author-link = Karl Popper | title = The logic of scientific discovery | year = 2004|edition=reprint| publisher = Routledge Classics | location = London & New York | url=https://books.google.com/books?id=Yq6xeupNStMC&q=the+logic+of+scientific+discovery | isbn=978-0-415-27844-7 | postscript=First published 1959 by Hutchinson & Co.}}</ref>

An area of study or speculation that masquerades as science in an attempt to claim a legitimacy that it would not otherwise be able to achieve is referred to as [[pseudoscience]], [[fringe science]], or [[junk science]].<ref>{{cite dictionary |title=Pseudoscientific&nbsp;– pretending to be scientific, falsely represented as being scientific |dictionary=Oxford American Dictionary |publisher=[[Oxford English Dictionary]]}}</ref><ref>{{cite journal |last=Hansson |first=Sven Ove |date=1996 |title=Defining Pseudoscience |journal=Philosophia Naturalis |volume=33 |pages=169–176}}, as cited in {{cite encyclopedia |url=http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/pseudo-science/#NonSciPosSci |title= Science and Pseudo-science |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150905091332/http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/pseudo-science/#NonSciPosSci |archive-date=2015-09-05 |date= 2008 |encyclopedia=Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy}}. The Stanford article states: "Many writers on pseudoscience have emphasized that pseudoscience is non-science posing as science. The foremost modern classic on the subject (Gardner 1957) bears the title [[Fads and Fallacies in the Name of Science]]. According to Brian Baigrie (1988, 438), "[w]hat is objectionable about these beliefs is that they masquerade as genuinely scientific ones." These and many other authors assume that to be pseudoscientific, an activity or a teaching has to satisfy the following two criteria (Hansson 1996): (1) it is not scientific, and (2) its major proponents try to create the impression that it is scientific".</ref><ref>{{cite book |last1=Hewitt |first1=Paul G. |last2=Suchocki |first2=John |last3=Hewitt |first3=Leslie A. |title=Conceptual Physical Science |publisher= Addison Wesley |edition=3rd |date=2003 |isbn=0-321-05173-4}}</ref><ref>{{cite book |last=Bennett |first=Jeffrey O. |title=The Cosmic Perspective |edition=3rd |publisher=Addison Wesley |date=2003 |isbn=0-8053-8738-2}}</ref><ref>Gauch HG Jr. ''Scientific Method in Practice'' (2003).</ref><ref>A 2006 [[National Science Foundation]] report on Science and engineering indicators quoted [[Michael Shermer]]'s (1997) definition of pseudoscience: '"claims presented so that they appear [to be] scientific even though they lack supporting evidence and plausibility"(p. 33). In contrast, science is "a set of methods designed to describe and interpret observed and inferred phenomena, past or present, and aimed at building a testable body of knowledge open to rejection or confirmation" (p. 17)'. {{Cite book|last=Shermer |first=Michael |year=1997|title=Why People Believe Weird Things: Pseudoscience, Superstition, and Other Confusions of Our Time|location=New York|publisher=W.H. Freeman and Company|isbn=978-0-7167-3090-3}} as cited by {{Cite book|title=Science and engineering indicators 2006|chapter=Science and Technology: Public Attitudes and Understanding|chapter-url=https://www.nsf.gov/statistics/seind06/c7/c7s2.htm|year=2006 |author1 = National Science Foundation|author2 = Division of Science Resources Statistics|author-link1=National Science Foundation}}</ref><ref>"A pretended or spurious science; a collection of related beliefs about the world mistakenly regarded as being based on scientific method or as having the status that scientific truths now have," from the ''[[Oxford English Dictionary]]'', second edition 1989.</ref> Physicist [[Richard Feynman]] coined the term "[[cargo cult science]]" for cases in which researchers believe they are doing science because their activities have the outward appearance of it but actually lack the "kind of utter honesty" that allows their results to be rigorously evaluated.<ref name='cargocultscience'>{{cite web |url=http://calteches.library.caltech.edu/51/2/CargoCult.pdf |title=Cargo Cult Science |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20131201231202/http://calteches.library.caltech.edu/51/2/CargoCult.pdf |archive-date=2013-12-01 |author-link=Richard Feynman |last=Feynman |first=Richard |access-date=2015-10-25}}</ref>

===Scientific explanation===
{{Main|Scientific explanation}}

A closely related question is what counts as a good scientific explanation. In addition to providing predictions about future events, society often takes scientific theories to provide [[explanation]]s for events that occur regularly or have already occurred. Philosophers have investigated the criteria by which a scientific theory can be said to have successfully explained a phenomenon, as well as what it means to say a scientific theory has [[explanatory power]].{{cn|date=March 2025}}

One early and influential account of scientific explanation is the [[deductive-nomological]] model. It says that a successful scientific explanation must deduce the occurrence of the phenomena in question from a [[scientific law]].<ref name="Hempel1948">{{cite journal
 | last1 = Hempel
 | first1 = Carl G.
 | author-link = Carl Hempel
 |first2=Paul
|last2=Oppenheim
 | year = 1948
 | title = Studies in the Logic of Explanation
 | journal = Philosophy of Science
 | volume = 15
 | pages = 135–175
 | doi = 10.1086/286983
 | issue = 2| citeseerx = 10.1.1.294.3693
 | s2cid = 16924146
 }}</ref> This view has been subjected to substantial criticism, resulting in several widely acknowledged counterexamples to the theory.<ref name="Salmon1992">{{cite book
 | last1 = Salmon
 | first1 = Merrilee
 | first2 = John |last2=Earman |first3=Clark |last3=Glymour |first4=James G. |last4=Lenno |first5=Peter |last5=Machamer |first6=J.E. |last6=McGuire |first7=John D. |last7=Norton |first8=Wesley C. |last8=Salmon |first9=Kenneth F. |last9=Schaffner
 | title = Introduction to the Philosophy of Science
 | year = 1992
 | publisher = Prentice-Hall
 | isbn = 978-0-13-663345-7}}</ref> It is especially challenging to characterize what is meant by an explanation when the thing to be explained cannot be deduced from any law because it is a matter of chance, or otherwise cannot be perfectly predicted from what is known. [[Wesley C. Salmon|Wesley Salmon]] developed a model in which a good scientific explanation must be statistically relevant to the outcome to be explained.<ref name="Salmon1971">{{cite book
 | last = Salmon
 | first = Wesley
 | title = Statistical Explanation and Statistical Relevance
 | url = https://archive.org/details/statisticalexpla0000unse
 | url-access = registration
 | year = 1971
 | location = Pittsburgh
 | publisher = University of Pittsburgh Press| isbn = 9780822974116
 }}</ref><ref name="Woodward2003">{{cite web
|url = http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/scientific-explanation/
|title = Scientific Explanation
|access-date = 2007-12-07
|last = Woodward
|first = James
|year = 2003
|website = Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
|archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20070706080422/http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/scientific-explanation/
|archive-date = 2007-07-06
|url-status = live
|author1-link=James Woodward (philosopher)
}}</ref> Others have argued that the key to a good explanation is unifying disparate phenomena or providing a causal mechanism.<ref name="Woodward2003" />

===Justifying science===
{{Main|Problem of induction}}

Although it is often taken for granted, it is not at all clear how one can infer the validity of a general statement from a number of specific instances or infer the truth of a theory from a series of successful tests.<ref name="StanInduction">{{cite web|url = http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/induction-problem/|title = The Problem of Induction|access-date = 2014-02-25|last1 = Vickers|first1 = John|year = 2013|website = Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy|archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20140407014814/http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/induction-problem/|archive-date = 2014-04-07|url-status = live}}</ref> For example, a chicken observes that each morning the farmer comes and gives it food, for hundreds of days in a row. The chicken may therefore use [[inductive reasoning]] to infer that the farmer will bring food ''every'' morning. However, one morning, the farmer comes and kills the chicken. How is scientific reasoning more trustworthy than the chicken's reasoning?

One approach is to acknowledge that induction cannot achieve certainty, but observing more instances of a general statement can at least make the general statement more [[Probability|probable]]. So the chicken would be right to conclude from all those mornings that it is likely the farmer will come with food again the next morning, even if it cannot be certain. However, there remain difficult questions about the process of interpreting any given evidence into a probability that the general statement is true. One way out of these particular difficulties is to declare that all beliefs about scientific theories are [[Bayesian probability|subjective]], or personal, and correct reasoning is merely about how evidence should change one's subjective beliefs over time.<ref name=StanInduction/>

Some argue that what scientists do is not inductive reasoning at all but rather [[abductive reasoning]], or inference to the best explanation. In this account, science is not about generalizing specific instances but rather about hypothesizing explanations for what is observed. As discussed in the previous section, it is not always clear what is meant by the "best explanation". [[Ockham's razor]], which counsels choosing the [[Simplicity|simplest]] available explanation, thus plays an important role in some versions of this approach. To return to the example of the chicken, would it be simpler to suppose that the farmer cares about it and will continue taking care of it indefinitely or that the farmer is fattening it up for slaughter? Philosophers have tried to make this [[heuristic]] principle more precise regarding theoretical [[Occam's razor|parsimony]] or other measures. Yet, although various measures of simplicity have been brought forward as potential candidates, it is generally accepted that there is no such thing as a theory-independent measure of simplicity. In other words, there appear to be as many different measures of simplicity as there are theories themselves, and the task of choosing between measures of simplicity appears to be every bit as problematic as the job of choosing between theories.<ref name="StanSimple">{{cite web|url = http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/simplicity/|title = Simplicity|access-date = 2014-02-25|last1 = Baker|first1 = Alan|year = 2013|website = Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy|archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20140326180129/http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/simplicity/|archive-date = 2014-03-26|url-status = live}}</ref> [[Nicholas Maxwell]] has argued for some decades that unity rather than simplicity is the key non-empirical factor in influencing the choice of theory in science, persistent preference for unified theories in effect committing science to the acceptance of a metaphysical thesis concerning unity in nature. In order to improve this problematic thesis, it needs to be represented in the form of a hierarchy of theses, each thesis becoming more insubstantial as one goes up the hierarchy.<ref>[[Nicholas Maxwell]] (1998) [https://global.oup.com/academic/product/the-comprehensibility-of-the-universe-9780199261550?lang=en&cc=gb The Comprehensibility of the Universe] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180227214410/https://global.oup.com/academic/product/the-comprehensibility-of-the-universe-9780199261550?lang=en&cc=gb |date=2018-02-27 }} Clarendon Press; (2017) [http://www.paragonhouse.com/xcart/Understanding-Scientific-Progress-Aim-Oriented-Empiricism.html Understanding Scientific Progress: Aim-Oriented Empiricism] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180220210819/http://www.paragonhouse.com/xcart/Understanding-Scientific-Progress-Aim-Oriented-Empiricism.html |date=2018-02-20 }}, Paragon House, St. Paul</ref>

===Observation inseparable from theory===
[[Image:Einstein cross.jpg|thumb|right|Seen through a telescope, the [[Einstein cross]] seems to provide evidence for five different objects, but this observation is theory-laden. If we assume the theory of [[general relativity]], the image only provides evidence for two objects.|alt=Five balls of light are arranged in a cross shape.|263x263px]]
When making observations, scientists look through telescopes, study images on electronic screens, record meter readings, and so on. Generally, on a basic level, they can agree on what they see, e.g., the thermometer shows 37.9 degrees C. But, if these scientists have different ideas about the theories that have been developed to explain these basic observations, they may disagree about what they are observing. For example, before [[Albert Einstein]]'s [[General relativity|general theory of relativity]], observers would have likely interpreted an image of the [[Einstein cross]] as five different objects in space. In light of that theory, however, astronomers will tell you that there are actually only two objects, one in the center and [[Gravitational lens|four different images]] of a second object around the sides. Alternatively, if other scientists suspect that something is wrong with the telescope and only one object is actually being observed, they are operating under yet another theory. Observations that cannot be separated from theoretical interpretation are said to be [[theory-laden]].<ref name="StanTheoryObs">{{cite web|url = http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/science-theory-observation/|title = Theory and Observation in Science|access-date = 2014-02-25|last1 = Bogen|first1 = Jim|year = 2013|website = Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy|archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20140227105420/http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/science-theory-observation/|archive-date = 2014-02-27|url-status = live}}</ref>

All observation involves both [[philosophy of perception|perception]] and [[cognitive process|cognition]]. That is, one does not make an observation passively, but rather is actively engaged in distinguishing the phenomenon being observed from surrounding sensory data. Therefore, observations are affected by one's underlying understanding of the way in which the world functions, and that understanding may influence what is perceived, noticed, or deemed worthy of consideration. In this sense, it can be argued that all observation is theory-laden.<ref name=StanTheoryObs/>

===The purpose of science===
{{See also|Scientific realism|Instrumentalism}}

Should science aim to determine ultimate truth, or are there questions that science [[Empirical limits in science|cannot answer]]? ''Scientific realists'' claim that science aims at truth and that one ought to regard [[scientific theories]] as true, approximately true, or likely true. Conversely, ''scientific anti-realists'' argue that science does not aim (or at least does not succeed) at truth, especially truth about [[unobservable]]s like electrons or other universes.<ref name="Levin1984">{{cite book
 | last = Levin
 | first = Michael
 | editor = Jarrett Leplin
 | title = Scientific Realism
 | year = 1984
 | publisher = University of California Press
 | location = Berkeley
 | isbn = 978-0-520-05155-3
 | pages = [https://archive.org/details/scientificrealis0000unse/page/124 124–1139]
 | chapter = What Kind of Explanation is Truth?
 | chapter-url = https://archive.org/details/scientificrealis0000unse/page/124
 }}
</ref> [[Instrumentalism|Instrumentalists]] argue that scientific theories should only be evaluated on whether they are useful. In their view, whether theories are true or not is beside the point, because the purpose of science is to make predictions and enable effective technology.

Realists often point to the success of recent scientific theories as evidence for the truth (or near truth) of current theories.<ref name="Boyd2002"/><ref>Specific examples include:
* {{cite book
 | last = Popper
 | first = Karl
 | author-link = Karl Popper
 | title = Conjectures and Refutations
 | year = 2002
 | publisher = Routledge Classics
 | location = London & New York
 | url=https://books.google.com/books?id=fZnrUfJWQ-YC&q=conjectures+and+refutations
 |isbn=978-0-415-28594-0
 |postscript=First published 1963 by Routledge and Kegan Paul}}
* {{cite book
 | last = Smart
 | first = J.J.C.
 | title = Between Science and Philosophy
 | url = https://archive.org/details/betweenscienceph0000smar
 | url-access = registration
 | year = 1968
 | publisher = Random House
 | location = New York}}
* {{cite book
 | last = Putnam
 | first = Hilary
 | author-link = Hilary Putnam
 | title = Mathematics, Matter and Method (Philosophical Papers, Vol. I)
 | year = 1975
 | publisher = Cambridge University Press
 | location = London}}
* {{cite book
 | last = Putnam
 | first = Hilary
 | author-link = Hilary Putnam
 | title = Meaning and the Moral Sciences
 | year = 1978
 | publisher = Routledge and Kegan Paul
 | location = London}}
* {{cite book
 | last = Boyd
 | first = Richard
 | editor = Jarrett Leplin
 | title = Scientific Realism
 | year = 1984
 | publisher = University of California Press
 | location = Berkeley
 | isbn = 978-0-520-05155-3
 | pages = [https://archive.org/details/scientificrealis0000unse/page/41 41–82]
 | chapter = The Current Status of Scientific Realism
 | chapter-url = https://archive.org/details/scientificrealis0000unse/page/41
 }}</ref> Antirealists point to either the many false theories in the [[history of science]],<ref name="Stanford2006">{{cite book
 | last = Stanford
 | first = P. Kyle
 | title = Exceeding Our Grasp: Science, History, and the Problem of Unconceived Alternatives
 | year = 2006
 | publisher = Oxford University Press
 | isbn = 978-0-19-517408-3}}</ref><ref name="Laudan1981">{{cite journal
 | last = Laudan
 | first = Larry
 | author-link = Larry Laudan
 | year = 1981
 | title = A Confutation of Convergent Realism
 | journal = Philosophy of Science
 | volume = 48
 | pages = 218–249
 | doi = 10.1086/288975| citeseerx = 10.1.1.594.2523
 | s2cid = 108290084
 }}</ref> epistemic morals,<ref name="vanFraassen1980"/> the success of false [[Scientific modelling|modeling]] assumptions,<ref name="Winsberg2006">{{cite journal
 | last = Winsberg
 | first = Eric
 | s2cid = 18275928
 |date=September 2006
 | title = Models of Success Versus the Success of Models: Reliability without Truth
 | journal = Synthese
 | volume = 152
 | pages = 1–19
 | doi = 10.1007/s11229-004-5404-6}}</ref> or widely termed [[postmodern]] criticisms of objectivity as evidence against scientific realism.<ref name="Boyd2002">{{cite web
|url = http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/scientific-realism/
|title = Scientific Realism
|access-date = 2007-12-01
|last = Boyd
|first = Richard
|year = 2002
|website = Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
|archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20070706080354/http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/scientific-realism/
|archive-date = 2007-07-06
|url-status = live
}}</ref> Antirealists attempt to explain the success of scientific theories without reference to truth.<ref name="Stanford2000">{{cite journal
 | last = Stanford
 | first = P. Kyle
 | s2cid = 35878807
 |date=June 2000
 | title = An Antirealist Explanation of the Success of Science
 | journal = Philosophy of Science
 | volume = 67
 | pages = 266–284
 | doi = 10.1086/392775
 | issue = 2}}</ref> Some antirealists claim that scientific theories aim at being accurate only about observable objects and argue that their success is primarily judged by that criterion.<ref name="vanFraassen1980">
{{cite book
 | last = van Fraassen
 | first = Bas
 | author-link = Bas van Fraassen
 | title = The Scientific Image
 | year = 1980
 | publisher = The Clarendon Press
 | location = Oxford
 | isbn = 978-0-19-824424-0 }}</ref>

==== Real patterns ====
The notion of [[real patterns]] has been propounded, notably by philosopher [[Daniel Dennett|Daniel C. Dennett]], as an intermediate position between strong realism and [[eliminative materialism]].{{technical inline|please define|date=May 2025}} This concept delves into the investigation of patterns observed in scientific phenomena to ascertain whether they signify underlying truths or are mere constructs of human interpretation. Dennett provides a unique ontological account concerning real patterns, examining the extent to which these recognized patterns have predictive utility and allow for efficient compression of information.<ref>Dennett, D. (1991). Real Patterns. The Journal of Philosophy.</ref>

The discourse on real patterns extends beyond philosophical circles, finding relevance in various scientific domains. For example, in biology, inquiries into real patterns seek to elucidate the nature of biological explanations, exploring how recognized patterns contribute to a comprehensive understanding of biological phenomena.<ref>Burnston, D. C. (2017). Real Patterns in Biological Explanation. Philosophy of Science.</ref> Similarly, in chemistry, debates around the reality of chemical bonds as real patterns continue.<ref>Seifert, V. A. (2022). The Chemical Bond is a Real Pattern. Philosophy of Science.</ref>

Evaluation of real patterns also holds significance in broader scientific inquiries. Researchers, like Tyler Millhouse, propose criteria for evaluating the realness of a pattern, particularly in the context of universal patterns and the human propensity to perceive patterns, even where there might be none.<ref>Millhouse, T. (2020). Really real patterns. Australasian Journal of Philosophy.</ref> This evaluation is pivotal in advancing research in diverse fields, from climate change to machine learning, where recognition and validation of real patterns in scientific models play a crucial role.<ref>Santa Fe Institute. (2022). Real patterns in science & cognition. https://www.santafe.edu/news-center/news/real-patterns-science-cognition</ref>

===Values and science===
Values intersect with science in different ways. There are epistemic values that mainly guide the scientific research. The scientific enterprise is embedded in particular culture and values through individual practitioners. Values emerge from science, both as product and process and can be distributed among several cultures in the society. When it comes to the justification of science in the sense of general public participation by single practitioners, science plays the role of a mediator between evaluating the standards and policies of society and its participating individuals, wherefore science indeed falls victim to vandalism and sabotage adapting the means to the end.<ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Rosenstock|first1=Linda|last2=Lee|first2=Lore Jackson|date=January 2002|title=Attacks on Science: The Risks to Evidence-Based Policy|journal=American Journal of Public Health|volume=92|issue=1|pages=14–18|doi=10.2105/ajph.92.1.14|issn=0090-0036|pmc=1447376|pmid=11772749}}</ref>

[[File:Thomas-kuhn-portrait.png|thumb|upright|Thomas Kuhn is credited with coining the term "[[paradigm shift]]" to describe the creation and evolution of scientific theories.]]
If it is unclear what counts as science, how the process of confirming theories works, and what the purpose of science is, there is considerable scope for values and other social influences to shape science. Indeed, [[Value (personal and cultural)|values]] can play a role ranging from determining which research gets funded to influencing which theories achieve scientific consensus.<ref name="StanSocial">{{cite web|url = http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/scientific-knowledge-social/|title = The Social Dimensions of Scientific Knowledge|access-date = 2014-03-06|last1 = Longino|first1 = Helen|year = 2013|website = Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy|archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20140326140904/http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/scientific-knowledge-social/|archive-date = 2014-03-26|url-status = live}}</ref> For example, in the 19th century, cultural values held by scientists about race shaped research on [[evolution]], and values concerning [[social class]] influenced debates on [[phrenology]] (considered scientific at the time).<ref>Douglas Allchin, "Values in Science and in Science Education," in International Handbook of Science Education, B.J. Fraser and K.G. Tobin (eds.), 2:1083–1092, Kluwer Academic Publishers (1988).</ref> [[Feminist epistemology|Feminist philosophers of science]], sociologists of science, and others explore how social values affect science.