Editing Peace of Nicias (section)

==Background==
In 425 BC, the Spartans had lost the battles of [[Battle of Pylos|Pylos]] and [[Battle of Sphacteria|Sphacteria]], a severe defeat resulting in the Athenians holding 292 prisoners. At least 120 were [[Spartiates]], who had recovered by 424 BC, when the Spartan general [[Brasidas]] captured [[Amphipolis]]. In the same year, the Athenians suffered a major defeat in [[Boeotia]] at the [[Battle of Delium]], and in 422 BC, they were defeated again at the [[Battle of Amphipolis]] in their attempt to take back that city. Both Brasidas, the leading Spartan general, and [[Cleon]], the leading politician in Athens, were killed at Amphipolis. By then, both sides were exhausted and ready for peace.

The treaty was signed with the agreement of both Sparta and Athens, considering the disadvantages faced by both polis during the first Peloponnesian War. The Athenians were motivated after they lost the Battle of Delium and the Battle of Amphipolis, which eroded their confidence in military strength. They were also concerned about their allies, worrying that they may be emboldened by the loss of Athens, potentially leading to a rebellion among them. The Athenian regretted not reaching an agreement earlier when a favourable opportunity for a peace treaty was offered by Sparta during the Battle of Pylos. <ref>[[Thucydides]], ''[[History of the Peloponnesian War]]'', Book 5, chapter 14</ref>

From Sparta’s perspective, the failures in battles caused them to lose confidence and feel stressed about the future trajectory of the Peloponnesian War, while the new threat resulting from the termination of the peace treaty with the Argives further heightened Spartan's willingness to pursue peace. For the Spartans, the failure of the yearly invasion tactic had extended the war beyond Sparta's expectation, and the losses at Pylos and Cythera, had made Sparta ready for peace. <ref>Seager, Robin. “After the Peace of Nicias: Diplomacy and Policy, 421-416 B. C.” The Classical Quarterly 26, no. 2 (1976): 249-69. http://www.jstor.org/stable/638270</ref> Also, Sparta had a strong incentive for peace, given its significant disadvantage position in the Peloponnesian War after the death of Brasidas. The morale of the Spartans suffered greatly from the loss of soldiers and Brasidas since their chances of winning the war had diminished, and they were unable to execute any of Brasidas’s plans with their own forces. As a result, the Spartans strongly desired peace compared to the beginning of the war. <ref>[[Thucydides]], ''[[History of the Peloponnesian War]]'', Book 5, chapter 13</ref> 

Furthermore, the thirty-year peace treaty with Argos was about to expire, and the Argives (inhabitants of Argos) refused to sign another truce unless Cynuria, a contested border region between Sparta and Argos, was restored to them. The Spartans calculated that it would be difficult to win both wars against the Athenians and the Argives at the same time. Moreover, they anticipated potential uprisings by some of the cities in Peloponnesus against the Argives based on past experience. <ref>[[Thucydides]], ''[[History of the Peloponnesian War]]'', Book 5, chapter 14)</ref> Therefore, the immense loss and stress faced by Sparta easily pushed them to negotiate with Athens to restore their military power, and prevent attacks from both Athens and Argos. 
 
Within these situations faced by Sparta and Athen, both polis were probably weary by 421, and were willing to let the war end in a deadlock, until they could restore allies from different peninsulas affected by the war. This viewpoint is reinforced by clear evidence that neither Athen nor Sparta had managed to strike their opponent with a fatal blow in a decade of scattered battling, and such a blow did not appear in a short while. <ref> Legon, Ronald P. “The Peace of Nicias.” Journal of Peace Research 6, no. 4 (1969): 323-34. https://doi.org/10.1177/002234336900600403</ref>