Editing Nuclear proliferation (section)

==History of nuclear non-proliferation efforts==
Early efforts to prevent nuclear proliferation involved intense government secrecy, the wartime acquisition of known [[uranium]] stores (the [[Combined Development Trust]]), and at times even outright [[sabotage]]—such as the [[Norwegian heavy water sabotage|bombing of a heavy-water facility in Norway]] thought to be used for a German nuclear program. These efforts began immediately after the discovery of [[nuclear fission]] and its military potential.<ref>{{Cite book|title=The Law of Arms Control and the International Non-Proliferation Regime|last=Coppen|first=Tom|publisher=Brill Nijhoff|year=2017|isbn=978-9004333161|location=Leiden|pages=4}}</ref> None of these efforts were explicitly public, because the weapon developments themselves were kept secret until the [[Atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki|bombing of Hiroshima]].

Earnest international efforts to promote nuclear non-proliferation began soon after [[World War II]], when the [[Harry S. Truman|Truman Administration]] proposed the [[Baruch Plan]]<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.atomicarchive.com/resources/documents/deterrence/baruch-plan.html|title=The Baruch Plan &#124; Arms Control, Deterrence and Nuclear Proliferation &#124; Historical Documents &#124; atomicarchive.com|website=atomicarchive.com|access-date=1 July 2023|archive-date=13 February 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200213002703/http://www.atomicarchive.com/Docs/Deterrence/BaruchPlan.shtml|url-status=dead}}</ref> of 1946, named after [[Bernard Baruch]], America's first representative to the [[United Nations Atomic Energy Commission]] (UNAEC). The [[Baruch Plan]], which drew heavily from the [[Acheson–Lilienthal Report]] of 1946, proposed the verifiable dismantlement and destruction of the U.S. nuclear arsenal (which, at that time, was the only nuclear arsenal in the world) after all governments had cooperated successfully to accomplish two things: (1) the establishment of an "international atomic development authority," which would actually own and control all military-applicable nuclear materials and activities, and (2) the creation of a system of automatic sanctions, which not even the [[United Nations Security Council|U.N. Security Council]] could veto, and which would proportionately punish states attempting to acquire the capability to make nuclear weapons or [[fissile material]].

Baruch's plea for the destruction of nuclear weapons invoked basic moral and religious intuitions. In one part of his address to the UN, Baruch said, "Behind the black portent of the new atomic age lies a hope which, seized upon with faith, can work out our salvation. If we fail, then we have damned every man to be the slave of Fear. Let us not deceive ourselves. We must elect World Peace or World Destruction.... We must answer the world's longing for peace and security."<ref>{{cite web|last=Baruch|first=Bernard|title=The Baruch Plan|url=http://www.atomicarchive.com/Docs/Deterrence/BaruchPlan.shtml|access-date=24 April 2007|archive-date=13 February 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200213002703/http://www.atomicarchive.com/Docs/Deterrence/BaruchPlan.shtml|url-status=dead}}</ref> With this remark, Baruch helped launch the field of [[nuclear ethics]], to which many policy experts and scholars have contributed.

Although the Baruch Plan enjoyed wide international support, it failed to emerge from the UNAEC because the Soviet Union planned to veto it in the Security Council. Still, it remained official American policy until 1953, when [[Dwight D. Eisenhower|President Eisenhower]] made his "[[Atoms for Peace]]" proposal before the [[United Nations General Assembly|U.N. General Assembly]]. Eisenhower's proposal led eventually to the creation of the [[International Atomic Energy Agency]] (IAEA) in 1957. Under the "Atoms for Peace" program thousands of scientists from around the world were educated in nuclear science and then dispatched home, where many later pursued secret weapons programs in their home country.<ref name="Catherine Collins and Douglas Frantz 2007">{{cite web |url=http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/IK29Df02.html |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080513222228/http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/IK29Df02.html |url-status=dead |archive-date=13 May 2008 |title=How you helped build Pakistan's bomb |access-date=30 November 2007 |publisher=Asia Times Online |year=2007 |author=Catherine Collins and Douglas Frantz }}</ref>

Efforts to conclude an international agreement to limit the spread of nuclear weapons did not begin until the early 1960s, after four nations (the United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and France) had acquired nuclear weapons (see [[List of states with nuclear weapons]] for more information). Although these efforts stalled in the early 1960s, they renewed once again in 1964, after China detonated a nuclear weapon. In 1968, governments represented at the [[Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee]] (ENDC) finished negotiations on the text of the NPT. In June 1968, the U.N. General Assembly endorsed the NPT with General Assembly Resolution 2373 (XXII), and in July 1968, the NPT opened for signature in [[Washington, D.C.]], [[London]] and [[Moscow]]. The NPT entered into force in March 1970.

Since the mid-1970s, the primary focus of non-proliferation efforts has been to maintain, and even increase, international control over the [[fissile material]] and specialized technologies necessary to build such devices because these are the most difficult and expensive parts of a nuclear weapons program. The main materials whose generation and distribution are controlled are highly [[enriched uranium]] and [[plutonium]]. Other than the acquisition of these special materials, the scientific and technical means for weapons construction to develop rudimentary, but working, nuclear explosive devices are considered to be within the reach of industrialized nations.

Since its founding by the [[United Nations]] in 1957, the [[International Atomic Energy Agency]] (IAEA) has promoted two, sometimes contradictory, missions: on the one hand, the Agency seeks to promote and spread internationally the use of civilian nuclear energy; on the other hand, it seeks to prevent, or at least detect, the diversion of civilian nuclear energy to nuclear weapons, nuclear explosive devices or purposes unknown. The IAEA now operates a safeguards system as specified under Article III of the [[Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty]] (NPT) of 1968, which aims to ensure that civil stocks of uranium and plutonium, as well as facilities and technologies associated with these nuclear materials, are used only for peaceful purposes and do not contribute in any way to proliferation or nuclear weapons programs. It is often argued that the proliferation of nuclear weapons to many other states has been prevented by the extension of assurances and mutual defence treaties to these states by nuclear powers, but other factors, such as national prestige, or specific historical experiences, also play a part in hastening or stopping nuclear proliferation.<ref name="test">Beatrice Heuser, 'Beliefs, Cultures, Proliferation and Use of Nuclear Weapons', in Eric Herring (ed.): Preventing the Use of Weapons of Mass Destruction Special Issue of Journal of Strategic Studies Vol. 23 No. 1 (March 2000), pp.74–100</ref><ref>"Proliferation and/or Alliance? The Federal Republic of Germany", in Leopoldo Nuti and Cyril Buffet (eds.): ''Dividing the Atom'', special issue of ''Storia delle Relazioni Internazionali'' (Autumn 1998).</ref>