Editing Nicaraguan Armed Forces (section)

== History ==

[[File:US Navy 110324-N-WX845-656 U.S. Marine Sgt. Michael Roth, assigned to Marine Corps Training and Advisory Group, observes Nicaraguan sailors and sol.jpg|thumb|Nicaraguan military members train during a visit by the U.S. Navy]]

===National Guard, 1925–1979===
{{main|National Guard (Nicaragua)}}
The long years of strife between the liberal and conservative political factions and the existence of private armies led the United States to sponsor the National Guard as an apolitical institution to assume all military and police functions in Nicaragua.<ref name=":42">Tartter, Jean R. "National Guard, 1927-79". In {{Harvnb|Merrill|1994|pp=195–197}}.</ref> The marines provided the training, but their efforts were complicated by a guerrilla movement led by [[Augusto César Sandino]].<ref name=":42" /> Sandino opposed the United States-backed military force, which was composed mostly of his political enemies, and continued to resist the marines and the fledgling National Guard from a stronghold in the mountainous areas of northern Nicaragua.<ref name=":42" />

Upon the advent of the United States Good Neighbor Policy in 1933, the marines withdrew.<ref name=":42" /> Having reached a strength of about 3,000 by the mid-1930s, the guard was organized into company units, although the Presidential Guard component approached battalion size.<ref name=":42" /> Despite hopes for an apolitical force, however, the National Guard soon became the personal tool of the Somoza dynasty.<ref name=":42" /> Expanded to more than 10,000 during the civil war of 1978–79, the guard consisted of a reinforced battalion as its primary tactical unit, a Presidential Guard battalion, a mechanized company, an engineer battalion, artillery and antiaircraft batteries, and one security company in each of the country's sixteen departments.<ref name=":42" />

The National Guard's main arms were rifles and machine guns, later augmented by antiaircraft guns and mortars.<ref name=":42" /> Although Nicaragua was not actively involved in [[World War II]], it qualified for United States Lend-Lease military aid in exchange for U.S. base facilities at [[Corinto, Nicaragua|Corinto]].<ref name=":42" /> Additional shipments of small arms and transportation and communication equipment followed, as well as some training and light transport aircraft.<ref name=":42" />

United States military aid to the National Guard continued under the Rio de Janeiro Treaty of Mutual Defense (1947), but stopped in 1976 after relations with the administration of [[Anastasio Somoza Debayle]] (1967–72, 1974–79) worsened.<ref name=":42" /> Some United States equipment of World War II vintage was also purchased from other countries—Staghound armored cars and M4 Sherman medium tanks from [[Israel]] and F-51 Mustang fighter aircraft from Sweden.<ref name=":42" /> Except for minor frontier skirmishes with [[Honduras]] in 1957 over a border dispute, the National Guard was not involved in any conflict with its neighbors.<ref name=":42" /> The guard's domestic power, however, gradually broadened to embrace not only its original internal security and police functions but also control over customs, telecommunications, port facilities, radio broadcasting, the merchant marine, and civil aviation.<ref name=":42" />

===Military under the Sandinista government, 1979–1990===
{{main|Sandinista Popular Army}} {{see also|FSLN}}
To replace the [[National Guard (Nicaragua)|National Guard]], the Sandinistas established a new national army, the '''[[Sandinista Popular Army]]''' ''(Ejército Popular Sandinista—EPS)'', and a police force, the [[Sandinista Police]] ''([[Policía Sandinista]])''.<ref name=":0">Bras, Marisabel. "Consolidation of the Revolution, 1979-80". In {{Harvnb|Merrill|1994|p=41}}.</ref> These two groups, contrary to the original Puntarenas Pact were controlled by the Sandinistas and trained by personnel from [[Cuba]], Eastern Europe, and the Soviet Union.<ref name=":0" /> Opposition to the overwhelming FSLN influence in the security forces did not surface until 1980.<ref name=":0" />

Meanwhile, the EPS developed, with support from Cuba and the Soviet Union, into the largest and best equipped military force in [[Central America]].<ref name=":0" /> Simultaneously, with the introduction of Patriotic Military Service (1983), a conscription system, EPS forces reached approximately 80,000 active-duty members by 1990.<ref name=":0" /> Patriotic Military Service required males, ranging in age from seventeen to twenty-six, to serve four years in the military (two years active duty and two years in the reserves).<ref name=":5">Tartter, Jean R. "Sandinista People's Army, 1979-90". In {{Harvnb|Merrill|1994|p=199}}.</ref> This conscription system did not require women to enlist; however, they could do so voluntarily.<ref name=":5" />

The Patriotic Military Service system was an extremely unpopular initiative taken by the Sandinista government.<ref name=":5" /> Draft dodging was rampant as young men fled the country in order to avoid conscription.<ref name=":5" /> Additionally, massive demonstrations and antidraft protests plagued the country.<ref name=":5" /> The unpopularity of the draft was believed to have been a large factor in the Sandinista election defeat in 1990.<ref name=":5" />

The Armed Forces performed very well in terms of human rights under the Sandinistas. Upon visiting Nicaragua, human rights organizations such as Amnesty International, Americas Watch, and the Human Rights Commission of the Organization of American States found “little evidence of the extreme types of human rights violations so common under…US-backed regimes.”<ref name=":4">{{Cite book|title=Nicaragua: The First Five Years|last=Walker|first=Thomas W.|publisher=Praeger Publishers|year=1985|location=New York|pages=114}}</ref> These organizations were also unable to find any examples of state-sponsored death squads, use of physical torture propagated by the state, and very few disappearances/executions.<ref name=":4" /> Although the investigations led by human rights organizations excluded unruly soldiers acting violently on their own accord. In this context, it was discovered that the government's “usual response…was to investigate and discipline those responsible.”<ref name=":4" />

===Nicaraguan Armed Forces, 1990–1995===
Under an agreement between President-elect [[Violeta Chamorro|Chamorro]] of the [[National Opposition Union (Nicaragua, 1990)|National Opposition Union]] (Unión Nacional Oppositora – UNO) and the defeated FSLN party, General [[Humberto Ortega]], former defense minister and commander in chief of the EPS under the Sandinistas, remained at the head of the armed forces.<ref name=":6">Tartter, Jean R. "Armed forces after 1990". In {{Harvnb|Merrill|1994|pp=207–210}}.</ref> By a law that took effect in April 1990, the EPS became [[subordinate]] to President Chamorro as commander in chief.<ref name=":6" /> Chamorro also retained the Ministry of Defense portfolio.<ref name=":6" />

Chamorro's authority over the EPS was very limited.<ref name=":6" /> There were no Ministry of Defense offices and no vice ministers to shape national defense policies or exercise civilian control over the armed forces.<ref name=":6" /> Under the Law of Military Organization of the Sandinista Popular Army enacted just before Chamorro's election victory, Humberto Ortega retained authority over promotions, military construction, and force deployments.<ref name=":6" /> He contracted for [[weapon]]s procurement and drafted the military [[budget]] presented to the government.<ref name=":6" /> Only an overall budget had to be submitted to the legislature, thus avoiding a line-item review by the National Assembly.<ref name=":6" />

Sandinista officers remained at the head of all general staff directorates and military regions.<ref name=":6" /> The chief of the army, Major General [[Joaquín Cuadra Lacayo]], continued in his pre-Chamorro position.<ref name=":6" /> Facing domestic pressure to remove Humberto Ortega and the risk of curtailment of United States aid as long as Sandinistas remained in control of the armed forces, Chamorro announced that Ortega would be replaced in 1994.<ref name=":6" /> Ortega challenged her authority to relieve him and reiterated his intention to remain at the head of the EPS until the army reform program was completed in 1997.<ref name=":6" /> This date was later advanced to the first half of 1995.<ref name=":6" />

The army reform measures were launched with deep cuts in personnel strengths, the abolition of conscription, and disbanding of the [[Sandinista Popular Army#Sandinista People.27s Militia|militia]].<ref name=":6" /> The size of the army declined from a peak strength of 97,000 troops to an estimated 15,200 in 1993, accomplished by voluntary discharges and forced retirements.<ref name=":6" /> Under the Sandinistas, the army general staff embodied numerous branches and directorates artillery, combat readiness, communications, Frontier Guards, military construction, intelligence, counterintelligence, training, operations, organization and mobilization, personnel, and logistics.<ref name=":6" /> Most of these bodies appear to have been retained, although they have been trimmed and reorganized.<ref name=":6" /> The Nicaraguan Air Force and [[Nicaraguan Navy|Navy]] were also subordinate to the army general staff.<ref name=":6" />

Since 1990 the mission of the EPS has been to ensure the security of the [[national border]]s and to deal with internal disturbances.<ref name=":6" /> Its primary task has been to prevent disorder and violence wrought by armed bands of former [[Contras|Contra]] and Sandinista soldiers.<ref name=":6" />

In November and December 1992, the EPS was deployed alongside the National Police to prevent violence during demonstrations by the National Workers' Front for improved pay and benefits.<ref name=":6" /> The EPS and the Frontier Guards also assist the police in [[narcotic]]s control.<ref name=":6" /> A small EPS contingent works alongside demobilized Contras in a Special Disarmament Brigade to reduce the arsenal of weapons in civilian hands.<ref name=":6" />

===National Army of Nicaragua, 1995–2006===
In 1995, the National Army of Nicaragua (Ejército de Nicaragua), having never previously been fully apolitical evolved, through constitutional reforms, into a more traditional Central American military.<ref name=":1">{{Cite book|title=Latin American Politics and Development|last=Millett|first=Richard L.|publisher=Westview Press|year=2018|editor-last=Kline|editor-first=Harvey F.|edition=Ninth |location=New York|pages=387|chapter=Nicaragua: An Uncertain Future|editor-last2=Wade|editor-first2=Christine J.|editor-last3=Wiarda|editor-first3=Howard J.}}</ref> As ties to the FSLN weakened, military leaders turned over power regularly without “fuss,” refrained from becoming involved in the political realm, and the overall size of the military significantly decreased.<ref name=":1" />

=== National Army of Nicaragua, 2006–present ===
Under President Ortega, multiple changes have occurred strengthening FSLN control over the national military. During 2010, the national assembly “passed changes that allowed [the] politicization of the country’s security forces, while expanding these agencies’ domestic powers.”<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Thaler|first=Kai M.|date=April 2017|title=Nicaragua: A Return to Caudillismo|url=https://muse.jhu.edu/article/653384/pdf|journal=Journal of Democracy|volume=28|issue=2 |pages=159|doi=10.1353/jod.2017.0032 |s2cid=152214826 |via=Project Muse|url-access=subscription}}</ref> This change effectively erased the shift towards being an apolitical force from 1995 to 2006. Then in 2014, President Ortega supported a constitutional reform removing the defense and governance ministries “from the security forces’ chain of command, reducing oversight and leaving [President] Ortega in charge of appointing military and police commanders.”<ref name=":2">{{Cite journal|last=Thaler|first=Kai M.|date=April 2017|title=Nicaragua: A Return to Caudillismo|url=https://muse.jhu.edu/article/653384/pdf|journal=Journal of Democracy|volume=28|issue=2 |pages=160|doi=10.1353/jod.2017.0032 |s2cid=152214826 |via=Project Muse|url-access=subscription}}</ref> This action enhanced President Ortega’s political and personal control over the nation’s security forces and personnel.

President Ortega has also strengthened his ability to control the general population through two different national security initiatives. In 2015, the Sovereign Security Law, “erased barriers between internal and external security, and gave the Ortega government wide discretion to use coercion against any person or entity deemed a threat to the state, society, or economy.”<ref name=":2" /> The Sovereign Security Law provided the Ortega administration the right to infringe upon the basic human rights protected in the Nicaraguan constitution, if deemed necessary. Also, CPCs “have been replaced by Family, Community, and Life Cabinets (Gabinetes).”<ref name=":2" /> These cabinets are linked to the police and provide the government with a means to keep communities under constant surveillance.<ref name=":2" />

In the contemporary period, multiple changes have taken place in the military regarding purpose and structure. The military currently serves as a force for national defense, public security, civil defense, and national development. In 2014, an expansion of institutional powers granted the military with the opportunity for greater involvement in international security initiatives.<ref name=":1" /> The National Army of Nicaragua also has the highest public approval ratings of any Nicaraguan institution.<ref name=":1" />