Editing National Security Act of 1947 (section)

== Background ==
From 1921 to 1945, Congress considered approximately 50 bills to reorganize the armed forces. Mostly due to opposition by both the Department of the Navy and the War Department, all but one failed to reach the floor of the House, and even this one was defeated by a vote of 153 to 135 in 1932.<ref name="OSDHistVol1">>{{cite book |last1=Rearden |first1=Steven |title=History of the Office of Secretary of Defense, Vol. 1: The Formative Years 1947-1950 |date=1984 |publisher=Historical Office, the Office of the Secretary of Defense |location=Washington, DC |isbn=978-0160768095 |url=https://history.defense.gov/Portals/70/Documents/secretaryofdefense/OSDSeries_Vol1.pdf|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150915090541/http://history.defense.gov/Portals/70/Documents/secretaryofdefense/OSDSeries_Vol1.pdf|url-status=dead|archive-date=September 15, 2015}}</ref> However, by the end of World War 2, several factors forced leaders to more seriously consider restructuring the military to improve unity.

=== Pearl Harbor ===
By 1945, the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor had already been investigated several times, for example by the [[Roberts_Commissions|Roberts Commission]], and would continue to be investigated through almost the end of the century. One of the findings that emerged was the probable role of intelligence failures linked to interservice bickering between Pearl Harbor's Army and Navy commanders, General Walter Short and Admiral Husband Kimmel. Though not a court martial, the Roberts Commission explicitly accused the two of dereliction of duty for not conferring to coordinate in light of the warnings.<ref> “Admiral Kimmel, General Short Held Derelict in Duties,” ''The Miami Daily News,'' 25 January, 1942.</ref>

=== Joint Operations in World War 2 ===
During World War 2, interservice cooperation remained voluntary, requiring complex interchanges of liaisons for planning and operations. Additionally, the Army and Navy often competed for resources, for example industrial production and new recruits. Enabling operations under these conditions had required the creation of numerous joint agencies and interdepartmental committees.

World War 2 had also given the US military two case studies of joint operations between Europe and the Pacific. In the Pacific, the Army and Navy had experienced constant friction from command and logistics problems. In Europe, the [[Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS)]], created based on the [[Chiefs_of_Staff_Committee|British Chiefs of Staff Committee]], had smoothed over these coordination problems and became President Roosevelt's principal military advisors.<ref name="OSDHistVol1" />

The JCS became a key source of advocacy for creating a single unified military department after the war. Following studies by the JCS Joint Strategic Survey Committee on ways to resolve joint roles and missions problems, George Marshall published a memo in support of postwar unification on November 2, 1942. Marshall's memo called for the following:<ref name="OSDHistVol1" />

* Reorganizing the Navy and War Departments into a single department led by a civilian secretary
* Creating an independent air force under the new department
* Creating an independent supply service under the new department
* Placing each of the four services under a civilian secretary and a military chief of staff
* Creating a "United States General Staff" made up of the four service chiefs plus a chief of staff to the President.

=== The Rise of Air Power ===
During both World Wars, but particularly World War 2, aviation had become increasingly important. The aircraft carrier had overtaken the battleship as the Navy's premier surface combatant. Army airmen had called for an independent air service since 1919, and the Army's Air Corps had already been expanded into what bordered on a separate service. Finally, the advent of nuclear weapons delivered by bombers led some leaders, such as [[Curtis LeMay]], to believe air power would inevitably become more decisive than ground warfare or sea power. The time seemed right to create an independent air force, but it would require congressional action.<ref name="OSDHistVol1" />

=== Shrinking budgets ===
Immediately following the war, confronting the Soviets was a lower priority than ending wartime austerity, balancing the federal budget, and returning to peace. This situation would not change until the Soviet Union developed nuclear weapons in 1949, followed by the Korean War in 1950.<ref name="OSDHistVol1" />

In this environment, forces were rapidly demobilized, and budgets were slashed. In Fiscal Year 1946, the military's total budget ceiling was approximately $42 billion. In Fiscal Year 1947, it was $14 billion. On V-J Day, the US military consisted of the Army's 91 Army divisions, 9 Marine Corps divisions, 1,166 combat ships in the Navy, and 213 combat groups in the Army Air Forces. By the end of demobilization on June 30, 1947, the Army had 10 divisions, the Marine Corps had 2 divisions, the Navy had 343 combat ships, and the Army Air Forces had 63 groups of which only 11 were fully operational.<ref name="OSDHistVol1" />

As forces were reduced and budgets were cut, unification seemed like a promising way to save money by reducing duplication, and this would become a theme to which its proponents would repeatedly return. It also created a sense of urgency to quickly institutionalize lessons learned from World War 2. However, the shrinking budgets also created a zero-sum game environment which encouraged interservice bickering by pitting Army and Navy advocates against each other.<ref name="OSDHistVol1" />

=== Executive Power ===
Before [[World War II]], [[United States congressional committee|congressional committees]] oversaw the [[Cabinet of the United States|Cabinet]]-level [[United States Department of War|War Department]] and [[United States Department of the Navy|Navy Department]], and while each department was separate from the other, both were able to obtain [[Military aircraft|aircraft]].<ref name=":2">{{cite book |last1=Kurtz |first1=James H. |last2=Crerar |first2=John H. |title=Military Roles and Missions: Past Revisions and Future Prospects |date=March 2009 |publisher=Institute for Defense Analyses |id={{DTIC|ADA519426}} }}{{pn|date=October 2023}}</ref> During this time, the President had a level of authority over the departments.<ref name=":2" /> After the [[attack on Pearl Harbor]], Congress passed the [[War Powers Act of 1941|First War Powers Act]], which authorized the sitting president "to make such redistribution of functions among executive agencies as he may deem necessary" provided that it is "only in matters relating to the conduct of the present war" and that these authorities will expire "six months after the termination of the war."<ref name=":2" /><ref>First War Powers Act of 1941, Pub.L. No. 77-354, 55 Stat. 838 (1941).  https://govtrackus.s3.amazonaws.com/legislink/pdf/stat/55/STATUTE-55-Pg838.pdf</ref> 

During World War II, then-[[Chief of Staff of the United States Army|chief of staff of the Army]] [[George C. Marshall|George Marshall]] brought the idea of unification of the armed services to President [[Franklin D. Roosevelt]], but "he was routinely rebuffed on the grounds that a substantive discussion of this option while the country was at war might undermine the [[war effort]]."<ref name=":13">{{cite book |chapter=Present at the Legislation: The 1947 National Security Act |pages=5–24 |jstor=resrep12044.5 |title=Organizing for National Security |date=2000 |publisher=Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College |url=https://press.armywarcollege.edu/monographs/125/ |last1=Stuart |first1=Douglas }}</ref> On August 26, 1944, future president [[Harry S. Truman]], who was a senator at the time, wrote that "under such a set-up [of unification] another Pearl Harbor will not have to be feared" in his article "Our Armed Forces Must Be United".<ref name=":13" /> Military problems apparent during World War II that turned attention to the need for unification were a lack of [[Combat readiness|preparedness]], a lack of attention to "[[Military logistics|logistics in war]]," and a "lack of coordination among the services."<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Lee |first1=Gus C. |title=The Organization for National Security |journal=Public Administration Review |date=1949 |volume=9 |issue=1 |pages=36–44 |doi=10.2307/972661 |jstor=972661 }}</ref> 

In the years following the war, President Truman had been pushing for the unification of the armed services until the passing of the National Security Act of 1947, having [[Military science|research]] conducted on the topic since 1944<ref name=":3" /> and having expressed his desire for Congress to act on the issue as early as April 6, 1946.<ref name=":13" /> He stated in a letter to Congress on June 15, 1946, that he "consider[s] it vital that we have a unified force for our [[National security|national defense]]."<ref>The Associated Press. (June 15, 1946). "President's program to unify the services, with Army-Navy views". ''The New York Times''. {{ProQuest|107793495}}</ref> President Truman had worked closely with the Army and the Navy to establish a consensus, but the departments struggled to come to an agreement until 1947.<ref name=":2" /><ref>{{cite news |title=ARMY-NAVY DISPUTE BACK AT WHITE HOUSE |id={{ProQuest|107493837}} |url=https://www.nytimes.com/1946/06/01/archives/armynavy-dispute-back-at-white-house.html |work=The New York Times |date=1 June 1946 }}</ref>