Editing Nash equilibrium (section)

==Applications==
Game theorists use Nash equilibrium to analyze the outcome of the [[strategy|strategic interaction]] of several [[decision making|decision makers]]. In a strategic interaction, the outcome for each decision-maker depends on the decisions of the others as well as their own. The simple insight underlying Nash's idea is that one cannot predict the choices of multiple decision makers if one analyzes those decisions in isolation. Instead, one must ask what each player would do taking into account what the player expects the others to do. Nash equilibrium requires that one's choices be consistent: no players wish to undo their decision given what the others are deciding.

The concept has been used to analyze hostile situations such as wars and arms races<ref>Schelling, Thomas, ''[https://books.google.com/books?id=7RkL4Z8Yg5AC&q=thoma+schelling+strategy+of+conflict The Strategy of Conflict]'', copyright 1960, 1980, Harvard University Press, {{isbn|0-674-84031-3}}.</ref> (see [[prisoner's dilemma]]), and also how conflict may be mitigated by repeated interaction (see [[tit-for-tat]]). It has also been used to study to what extent people with different preferences can cooperate (see [[Battle of the sexes (game theory)|battle of the sexes]]), and whether they will take risks to achieve a cooperative outcome (see [[stag hunt]]). It has been used to study the adoption of [[technical standard]]s,{{citation needed|date=June 2012}} and also the occurrence of [[bank run]]s and [[Currency crisis|currency crises]] (see [[coordination game]]). Other applications include traffic flow (see [[Wardrop's principle]]), how to organize auctions (see [[auction theory]]), the outcome of efforts exerted by multiple parties in the education process,<ref>{{Cite journal | doi = 10.1162/REST_a_00013| title = Must Try Harder: Evaluating the Role of Effort in Educational Attainment| journal = Review of Economics and Statistics| volume = 92| issue = 3| pages = 577| year = 2010| last1 = De Fraja | first1 = G. | last2 = Oliveira | first2 = T. | last3 = Zanchi | first3 = L. | s2cid = 57072280| hdl = 2108/55644| hdl-access = free}}</ref> regulatory legislation such as environmental regulations (see [[tragedy of the commons]]),<ref>{{Cite journal | doi = 10.1111/j.1467-9248.1996.tb00338.x| title = Game Theory and the Politics of Global Warming: The State of Play and Beyond| journal = Political Studies| volume = 44| issue = 5| pages = 850–871| year = 1996| last1 = Ward | first1 = H. | s2cid = 143728467}},</ref> natural resource management,<ref>{{Cite journal | doi = 10.1093/icesjms/fsx062| title = Risks and benefits of catching pretty good yield in multispecies mixed fisheries |
 journal = ICES Journal of Marine Science | volume = 74 | issue = 8 | pages = 2097–2106 | year = 2017| last1 = Thorpe | first1 = Robert B. | last2 = Jennings | first2 = Simon | last3 = Dolder | first3 = Paul J. | doi-access = free }},</ref> analysing strategies in marketing,<ref>{{Cite web|title = Marketing Lessons from Dr. Nash - Andrew Frank|url = http://blogs.gartner.com/andrew_frank/2015/05/25/marketing-lessons-from-dr-nash/|access-date = 2015-08-30|date = 2015-05-25}}</ref> penalty kicks in [[association football|football]] (I.e. soccer; see [[matching pennies]]),<ref>{{Cite journal | doi = 10.1257/00028280260344678| title = Testing Mixed-Strategy Equilibria when Players Are Heterogeneous: The Case of Penalty Kicks in Soccer| journal = American Economic Review| volume = 92| issue = 4| pages = 1138| year = 2002| last1 = Chiappori | first1 = P. -A. | last2 = Levitt | first2 = S. | last3 = Groseclose | first3 = T. | url = http://pricetheory.uchicago.edu/levitt/Papers/ChiapporiGrosecloseLevitt2002.pdf| citeseerx = 10.1.1.178.1646}}</ref> [[robot navigation]] in crowds,<ref>{{cite arXiv |eprint=2403.01537 |author1=Muchen Sun |author2=Francesca Baldini |title=Mixed-Strategy Nash Equilibrium for Crowd Navigation |date=2024 |author4=Peter Trautman |author3=Katie Hughes |author5=Todd Murphey|class=cs.RO }}</ref> energy systems, transportation systems, evacuation problems<ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Djehiche|first1=B.|last2=Tcheukam|first2=A.|last3=Tembine|first3=H.|date=2017|title=A Mean-Field Game of Evacuation in Multilevel Building|journal=IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control|volume=62|issue=10|pages=5154–5169|doi=10.1109/TAC.2017.2679487|s2cid=21850096|issn=0018-9286}}</ref> and wireless communications.<ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Djehiche|first1=Boualem|last2=Tcheukam|first2=Alain|last3=Tembine|first3=Hamidou|date=2017-09-27|title=Mean-Field-Type Games in Engineering|journal= AIMS Electronics and Electrical Engineering|volume=1|pages=18–73|language=en|doi=10.3934/ElectrEng.2017.1.18|arxiv=1605.03281|s2cid=16055840}}</ref>