Editing Moral relativism (section)

==Variations==

===Descriptive===
Descriptive moral relativism is merely the [[positivism|positive]] or descriptive position that there exist, in fact, fundamental disagreements about the right course of action even when the same facts hold true and the same consequences seem likely to arise.<ref name=stanford>{{Cite web
  | last = Swoyer
  | first = Chris
  | date = February 22, 2003
  | title = Relativism
  | url = http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/relativism/#1.2
  | access-date = May 10, 2010}}</ref> It is the observation that different cultures have different moral standards.

Descriptive relativists do not necessarily advocate the tolerance of all behavior in light of such disagreement; that is to say, they are not necessarily normative relativists. Likewise, they do not necessarily make any commitments to the semantics, [[ontology]], or [[epistemology]] of moral judgement; that is, not all descriptive relativists are meta-ethical relativists.

Descriptive relativism is a widespread position in academic fields such as [[anthropology]] and [[sociology]], which simply admit that it is incorrect to assume that the same moral or ethical frameworks are always in play in all historical and cultural circumstances.<ref>{{cite web
 |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/relativism/
 |title=Relativism
 |last1=Baghramian
 |first1=Maria
 |last2=Carter
 |first2=J.Adam
 |date=2020-09-21
 |editor-last=Zalta
 |editor-first=Edward N.
 |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
 |access-date=2020-12-13
 }}</ref>

===Meta-ethical===
Meta-ethical moral relativists believe not only that people disagree about moral issues, but that terms such as "good", "bad", "right" and "wrong" do not stand subject to [[Universality (philosophy)|universal]] [[truth]] conditions at all; rather, they are relative to the traditions, convictions, or practices of an individual or a group of people.<ref name="stanford" /> The American anthropologist [[William Graham Sumner]] was an influential advocate of this view.  He argues in his 1906 work ''Folkways'' that what people consider right and wrong is shaped entirely—not primarily—by the traditions, customs, and practices of their culture.  Moreover, since in his analysis of human understanding there cannot be any higher moral standard than that provided by the local morals of a culture, no trans-cultural judgement about the rightness or wrongness of a culture's morals could possibly be justified.{{citation needed|date=April 2020}}

Meta-ethical relativists are, first, descriptive relativists: they believe that, given the same set of facts, some societies or individuals will have a fundamental disagreement about what a person ''ought'' to do or prefer (based on societal or individual [[norm (sociology)|norm]]s). What's more, they argue that one cannot adjudicate these disagreements using any available independent standard of evaluation—any appeal to a relevant standard would always be merely personal or at best societal.{{citation needed|date=April 2020}}

This view contrasts with [[moral universalism]], which argues that, even though well-intentioned persons disagree, and some may even remain unpersuadable (e.g. someone who is closed-minded), there is still a meaningful sense in which an action could be more "moral" (morally preferable) than another; that is, they believe there ''are'' objective standards of evaluation that seem worth calling "moral facts"—regardless of whether they are universally accepted.{{citation needed|date=April 2020}}

===Normative===
Normative moral relativists believe not only the meta-ethical thesis, but that it has normative implications on what we ought to do. Normative moral relativists argue that meta-ethical relativism implies that we ''ought'' to tolerate the behavior of others even when it runs counter to our personal or cultural moral standards. Most philosophers do not agree, partially because of the challenges of arriving at an "ought" from relativistic premises.<ref name="Stanford">{{cite book|url=https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2016/entries/moral-relativism/|title=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy|first=Chris|last=Gowans|chapter=Moral Relativism |editor-first=Edward N.|editor-last=Zalta|date=15 October 2017|publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University|via=Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy}}</ref> Meta-ethical relativism seems to eliminate the normative relativist's ability to make prescriptive claims. In other words, normative relativism may find it difficult to make a statement like "we think it is moral to tolerate behaviour" without always adding "other people think ''intolerance'' of certain behaviours is moral".<ref>{{Cite web|title=Tolerance is more than putting up with things – it's a moral virtue|url=http://theconversation.com/tolerance-is-more-than-putting-up-with-things-its-a-moral-virtue-31507|last=Witenberg|first=Rivka T.|website=The Conversation|date=16 September 2014 |language=en|access-date=2020-05-28}}</ref> Some philosophers even argue that intolerance is, to some degree, important. As [[Russell Blackford]] puts it, "we need not adopt a quietism about moral traditions that cause hardship and suffering. Nor need we passively accept the moral norms of our own respective societies, to the extent that they are ineffective or counterproductive or simply unnecessary".<ref>at the end of his review at http://jetpress.org/v21/blackford3.htm</ref> That is, it is perfectly reasonable (and practical) for a person or group to defend their subjective values against others, even if there is no universal prescription or morality. We can also criticize other cultures for failing to pursue even ''their own goals'' effectively.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Gowans |first=Chris |date=2004-02-19 |title=Moral Relativism |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2016/entries/moral-relativism/#RelTol}}</ref>

The moral relativists may also still try to make sense of non-universal statements like "in this country, it is wrong to do X" or even "to me, it is right to do Y".<ref name="Stanford"/>

[[Moral universalist]]s argue further that their system often ''does'' justify tolerance, and that disagreement with moral systems does not always demand interference, and certainly not aggressive interference.<ref name="Stanford"/> For example, the [[utilitarian]] might call another society's practice 'ignorant' or 'less moral', but there would still be much debate about courses of action (e.g. whether to focus on providing better education, or technology, etc.).<ref>{{Cite web |title=Introduction to Utilitarianism – Utilitarianism.net |url=https://www.utilitarianism.net/introduction-to-utilitarianism |access-date=2022-04-14 |website=Utilitarianism |language=en-US}}</ref>