Editing Moral realism (section)

==Robust versus minimal moral realism==
A delineation of moral realism into a minimal form, a moderate form, and a robust form has been put forward in the literature.<ref name=Sturgeon/>

The robust model of moral realism commits moral realists to three theses:<ref name="Väyrynen">Väyrynen, Pekka (2005). "Moral Realism", ''Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2nd Edition'', Donald M. Borchert (ed.). ([http://philosophy.ucdavis.edu/pekkav/research/moralrealism.pdf link] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080512150623/http://philosophy.ucdavis.edu/pekkav/research/moralrealism.pdf |date=2008-05-12 }})</ref>

* ''The semantic thesis:'' The primary semantic role of moral predicates (such as "right" and "wrong") is to refer to moral properties (such as rightness and wrongness), so that moral statements (such as "honesty is good" and "slavery is unjust") purport to represent moral facts, and express propositions that are true or false (or approximately true, largely false, and so on).
* ''The alethic thesis:'' Some moral propositions are in fact true.
* ''The metaphysical thesis:'' Moral propositions are true when actions and other objects of moral assessment have the relevant moral properties (so that the relevant moral facts obtain), where these facts and properties are robust: their metaphysical status, whatever it is, is not relevantly different from that of (certain types of) ordinary non-moral facts and properties.

The minimal model leaves off the metaphysical thesis, treating it as matter of contention ''among'' moral realists (as opposed to ''between'' moral realists and moral anti-realists). This dispute is not insignificant, as acceptance or rejection of the metaphysical thesis is taken by those employing the robust model as the key difference between moral realism and moral anti-realism. Indeed, the question of how to classify certain [[Logical possibility|logically possible]] (if eccentric) views&mdash;such as the rejection of the semantic and alethic theses in conjunction with the acceptance of the metaphysical thesis&mdash;turns on which model we accept.<ref name=Joyce>Joyce, Richard (2007), "Moral Anti-Realism", ''The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2007 Edition)'', [[Edward N. Zalta]] (ed.). ([http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2007/entries/moral-anti-realism/ link])</ref> Someone employing the robust model might call such a view "realist non-cognitivism," while someone employing the minimal model might simply place such a view alongside other, more traditional, forms of non-cognitivism.

The robust model and the minimal model also disagree over how to classify [[Ethical subjectivism|moral subjectivism]] (roughly, the view that moral facts are not mind-independent in the relevant sense, but that moral statements may still be true).<ref>{{Citation|last=Joyce|first=Richard|title=Moral Anti-Realism|date=2016|url=https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2016/entries/moral-anti-realism/|encyclopedia=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy|editor-last=Zalta|editor-first=Edward N.|edition=Winter 2016|publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University|access-date=2021-03-08 |quote= Non-objectivism (as it will be called here) allows that moral facts exist but holds that they are, in some manner to be specified, constituted by mental activity...The present discussion uses the label “non-objectivism” instead of the simple “subjectivism” since there is an entrenched usage in metaethics for using the latter to denote the thesis that in making a moral judgment one is reporting (as opposed to expressing) one's own mental attitudes (e.g., “Stealing is wrong” means “I disapprove of stealing”).}}</ref> The historical association of subjectivism with moral anti-realism in large part explains why the robust model of moral realism has been dominant&mdash;even if only implicitly&mdash;both in the traditional and contemporary philosophical literature on metaethics.<ref name=Joyce/>

In the minimal sense of realism, [[R.&nbsp;M. Hare]] could be considered a realist in his later works, as he is committed to the objectivity of value judgments, even though he denies that moral statements express propositions with [[truth-value]]s per se. Moral constructivists like [[John Rawls]] and [[Christine Korsgaard]]<ref name=Korsgaard>Korsgaard, Christine (1996). ''The Sources of Normativity'', New York: [[Cambridge University Press]].</ref> may also be realists in this minimalist sense; the latter describes her own position as procedural realism. Some readings of evolutionary science such as those of [[Charles Darwin]] and [[James Mark Baldwin]] have suggested that in so far as an [[ethics]] may be associated with survival strategies and natural selection then such behavior may be associated with a moderate position of moral realism equivalent to an ethics of survival.