Editing Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact (section)

==Background==
{{Main|Soviet–German relations before 1941|Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact negotiations}}
{{Events leading to World War II}}
[[File:Map Europe 1923-en.svg|thumb|Territorial changes in Europe after World War I (as of 1923). Note that the creation of the [[Irish Free State]] and Northern Ireland is not shown.]]
[[File:Poland1937linguistic.jpg|thumb|The [[Second Polish Republic]] with major languages spoken, 1937]]

The outcome of [[World War I]] was disastrous for both the [[German Empire|German]] and the [[Russian Empire|Russian]] empires. The [[Russian Civil War]] broke out in late 1917 after the [[Bolshevik Revolution]] and [[Vladimir Lenin]], the first leader of the new [[Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic|Soviet Russia]], recognised the independence of Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland. Moreover, facing a German military advance, Lenin and [[Leon Trotsky|Trotsky]] were forced to agree to the [[Treaty of Brest-Litovsk]],<ref>{{cite web|url=http://wwi.lib.byu.edu/index.php/The_Peace_Treaty_of_Brest-Litovsk|date=3 March 1918|title=Peace Treaty of Brest-Litovsk|publisher=BYU|access-date=21 January 2009|archive-date=5 December 2017|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20171205093104/https://wwi.lib.byu.edu/index.php/The_Peace_Treaty_of_Brest-Litovsk|url-status=live}}.</ref> which ceded many western Russian territories to Germany. After the German collapse, a [[Allied intervention in the Russian Civil War|multinational Allied-led army]] intervened in the civil war (1917–1922).{{Sfn|Montefiore|2005|p=32}}

On 16 April 1922, the German [[Weimar Republic]] and the Soviet Union agreed to the [[Treaty of Rapallo (1922)|Treaty of Rapallo]] in which they renounced territorial and financial claims against each other.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/interwar/rapallo.htm|title=German–Russian agreement|place=Rapallo|date=16 April 1922|publisher=Mt Holyoke|access-date=7 February 2009|archive-date=15 January 2010|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20100115132135/http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/interwar/rapallo.htm|url-status=dead}}.</ref> Each party also pledged neutrality in the event of an attack against the other with the [[Treaty of Berlin (1926)]].<ref>{{cite web|url=http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/berlin_001.asp|title=Treaty of Berlin Between the Soviet Union and Germany|date=24 April 1926|publisher=Yale|access-date=7 February 2009|archive-date=31 March 2009|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090331135149/http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/berlin_001.asp|url-status=live}}.</ref> Trade between the two countries had fallen sharply after World War I, but trade agreements signed in the mid-1920s helped to increase trade to {{Reichsmark|433&nbsp;million|link=yes}} per year by 1927.{{Sfn|Ericson|1999|pp=14–5}}

At the beginning of the 1930s, the [[Nazi Party]]'s [[Adolf Hitler's rise to power|rise to power]] increased tensions between Germany and the Soviet Union, along with other countries with ethnic [[Slavs]], who were considered "[[Untermensch]]en" (subhuman) according to [[racial policy of Nazi Germany|Nazi racial ideology]].{{Sfn|Bendersky|2000|p=177}} Moreover, the [[Antisemitism|antisemitic]] Nazis associated ethnic Jews with both [[communism]] and [[Capitalism|financial capitalism]], [[Third Position|both of which they opposed]].<ref>{{cite book |last1=Lee |first1=Stephen J |last2=Paul |first2=Shuter |title=Weimar and Nazi Germany |publisher=Heinemann|year=1996|isbn=0-435-30920-X|page=33}}.</ref>{{Sfn|Bendersky|2000|p=159}} Nazi theory held that Slavs in the Soviet Union were being ruled by "[[Jewish Bolshevism|Jewish Bolshevik]]" masters.<ref>{{cite book|last1=Müller|first1=Rolf-Dieter|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=IfHaDYVfGlgC |first2=Gerd R |last2=Ueberschär |title=Hitler's War in the East, 1941–1945: A Critical Assessment |publisher=Berghahn|year=2002|isbn=978-1-57181-293-3|page=244}}.</ref> Hitler had spoken of an inevitable battle for the acquisition of land for Germany in the east.<ref>{{Cite book|last=Kershaw|first=Ian|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=TpVrCwAAQBAJ&pg=PT171 |title=Hitler: 1889-1936 Hubris|date=17 April 2000|publisher=W. W. Norton & Company|isbn=978-0-393-25420-4|language=en}}</ref> The resulting manifestation of German anti-Bolshevism and an increase in Soviet foreign debts caused a dramatic decline in German–Soviet trade.{{Efn|To {{Reichsmark|53 million|link=yes}} in German imports (0.9% of Germany's total imports and 6.3% of Russia's total exports) and {{Reichsmark|34 million}} in German exports (0.6% of Germany's total exports and 4.6% of Russia's total imports) in 1938.<ref>{{cite journal|last=Ericson|first=Edward E III|title=Karl Schnurre and the Evolution of Nazi–Soviet Relations, 1936–1941|journal=German Studies Review|volume=21|date=May 1998|pages=263–83|issue=2|doi=10.2307/1432205|jstor=1432205}}</ref>}} Imports of Soviet goods to Germany fell to {{Reichsmark|223&nbsp;million}} in 1934 by the more [[isolationist]] [[Stalinist]] regime asserting power and by the abandonment of postwar [[Treaty of Versailles]] military controls, both of which decreased Germany's reliance on Soviet imports.{{Sfn|Ericson|1999|pp=14–5}}{{Sfn|Hehn|2005|p=212}}{{clarify |reason=Hehn 2005 sfn ref missing citation |date=July 2014}}

In 1935 Germany, after a previous [[German–Polish declaration of non-aggression]], [[Hermann Göring]] proposed a military alliance with Poland against the Soviet Union, but this was rejected.<ref>{{cite book |last1=Weinberg |first1=Gerhard L. |title=Hitler's Foreign Policy 1933-1939: The Road to World War II |date=1 March 2010 |publisher=Enigma Books |isbn=978-1-936274-84-0 |page=152 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=o5FiQbU_nAkC&dq=goring+poland+alliance&pg=PA152 |access-date=25 July 2024 |language=en}}</ref>

In 1936, Germany and [[Kingdom of Italy#Fascist regime (1922–1943)|Fascist Italy]] supported the [[Nationalist faction (Spanish Civil War)|Spanish Nationalists]] in the [[Spanish Civil War]], but the Soviets supported the [[Second Spanish Republic|Spanish Republic]].<ref name="Jurado 2006, p. 5">{{cite book|last1=Jurado|first1=Carlos Caballero|first2=Ramiro|last2=Bujeiro|title=The Condor Legion: German Troops in the Spanish Civil War|publisher=Osprey|year=2006 |isbn=1-84176-899-5|pages=5–6}}</ref> Thus, the Spanish Civil War became a [[proxy war]] between Germany and the Soviet Union.<ref>{{cite book|first=Michael|last=Lind|title=Vietnam, the Necessary War: A Reinterpretation of America's Most Disastrous Military Conflict|publisher=Simon & Schuster|year=2002|isbn=978-0-684-87027-4|page=59}}</ref> In 1936, Germany and [[Japanese Empire|Japan]] entered the [[Anti-Comintern Pact]].<ref name="weinberg">{{cite book|last=Gerhard|first=Weinberg |title=The Foreign Policy of Hitler's Germany Diplomatic Revolution in Europe 1933–36|place=Chicago|publisher=University of Chicago Press|year=1970|page=346}}</ref> and they were joined a year later by [[Kingdom of Italy|Italy]],<ref>{{cite book|first=Robert Melvin|last=Spector |title=World Without Civilization: Mass Murder and the Holocaust, History, and Analysis|page=257}}</ref> despite Italy having previously signed the [[Italo-Soviet Pact]].<ref>{{cite web |title=Italy and Soviet Sign Treaty |url=https://www.nytimes.com/1933/09/03/archives/italy-and-soviet-sign-amity-treaty-the-pact-of-nonaggression.html |website=[[The New York Times]] |date=3 September 1933 |access-date=15 October 2024}}</ref>

On 31 March 1939, Britain extended a guarantee to Poland that "if any action clearly threatened Polish independence, and if the Poles felt it vital to resist such action by force, Britain would come to their aid". Hitler was furious since that meant that the British were committed to political interests in Europe and that his land grabs such as the takeover of Czechoslovakia would no longer be taken lightly. His response to the political checkmate would later be heard at a rally in [[Wilhelmshaven]]: "No power on earth would be able to break German might, and if the Western Allies thought Germany would stand by while they marshalled their '[[satellite states]]' to act in their interests, then they were sorely mistaken". Ultimately, Hitler's discontent with a British–Polish alliance led to a restructuring of strategy towards Moscow. [[Alfred Rosenberg]] wrote that he had spoken to [[Hermann Göring]] of the potential pact with the Soviet Union: "When Germany's life is at stake, even a temporary alliance with Moscow must be contemplated". Sometime in early May 1939 at [[Berghof (residence)|Berghof]], Ribbentrop showed Hitler a film of Stalin viewing his military in a recent parade. Hitler became intrigued with the idea of allying with the Soviets and Ribbentrop recalled Hitler saying that Stalin "looked like a man he could do business with". Ribbentrop was then given the nod to pursue negotiations with Moscow.<ref>{{Cite book|title=The devils' alliance: Hitler's pact with Stalin, 1939-41|last=Roger|first=Moorhouse|date=7 January 2016|isbn=9780099571896|location=London|oclc=934937192}}{{page needed|date=September 2019}}</ref>

===Munich Conference===
Hitler's fierce anti-Soviet rhetoric was one of the reasons that Britain and France decided that Soviet participation in the 1938 [[Munich Conference]] on [[Czechoslovakia]] would be both dangerous and useless.<ref>{{cite news|title=Hitler and Russia|newspaper=The Times|date=24 June 1941|place=London}}.</ref> In the [[Munich Agreement]] that followed<ref>{{cite web|place=Munich|date=29 September 1938|publisher=Yale |url=http://avalon.law.yae.edu/imt/munich1.asp|title=Agreement concluded at between Germany, Great Britain, France and Italy}}{{dead link|date=February 2018 |bot=InternetArchiveBot |fix-attempted=yes}}</ref> the conference agreed to a [[German occupation of Czechoslovakia|German annexation]] of part of Czechoslovakia in late 1938, but in early 1939 it had been completely dissolved.{{Sfn|Kershaw|2001|pp=157–8}} The policy of [[appeasement]] toward Germany was conducted by the governments of British Prime Minister [[Neville Chamberlain]] and French Prime Minister [[Édouard Daladier]].{{Sfn|Kershaw|2001|p=124}} The policy immediately raised the question of whether the Soviet Union could avoid being next on Hitler's list.<ref>{{cite journal|first=Max|last=Beloff|title=Soviet Foreign Policy, 1929–41: Some Notes|journal=Soviet Studies|volume=2|date=Oct 1950|pages=123–137|issue=2|doi=10.1080/09668135008409773}}</ref> and to stay neutral in a war initiated by Germany in the hope that Germany and the Soviet Union would wear each other out and put an end to both regimes.<ref>{{harvs|nb|last=Carr|year1=1949a|year2=1949b}}</ref> Meanwhile the Soviet leadership believed that the West wanted to encourage German aggression in the East.{{Sfn|Kershaw|2001|p=194}} 
[[File:Münchner abkommen5 en.svg|thumb|All territories taken from Czechoslovakia by its neighbours in October 1938 ([[Munich Agreement]]) and March 1939]]
For Germany, an [[autarky|autarkic]] economic approach and an alliance with Britain were impossible and so closer relations with the Soviet Union to obtain [[raw materials]] became necessary.{{Sfn|Ericson|1999|pp=1–2}} Besides economic reasons, an expected British blockade during a war would also create massive shortages for Germany in a number of key raw materials.{{Sfn|Ericson|1999|pp=3–4}} After the Munich Agreement, the resulting increase in German military supply needs and Soviet demands for military machinery made talks between the two countries occur from late 1938 to March 1939.{{Sfn|Ericson|1999|pp=29–35}} Also, the third Soviet [[Five-year plans of the Soviet Union|five-year plan]] required new infusions of technology and industrial equipment.{{Sfn|Ericson|1999|pp=1–2}}{{Sfn|Hehn|2005|pp=42–43}}{{clarify |reason=Hehn 2005 sfn ref missing citation |date=July 2014}} German war planners had estimated serious shortfalls of raw materials if Germany entered a war without the Soviet supply.{{Sfn|Ericson|1999|p=44}}

On 31 March 1939, in response to Germany's defiance of the Munich Agreement and the creation of the [[Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia]],<ref>{{cite book|first1=Martin|last1=Collier|first2=Philip |last2=Pedley|title=Germany, 1919–45}}.</ref> Britain pledged its support and that of France to guarantee the independence of Poland, Belgium, Romania, Greece and Turkey.<ref>{{cite book|first1=Hermann |last1=Kinder|first2=Werner|last2=Hilgemann|title=The Anchor Atlas of World History|volume=II|page=[https://archive.org/details/anchoratlasofwor00kind/page/165 165]|publisher=Anchor Press, Doubleday |place=New York|year=1978|isbn=0-385-13355-3 |url=https://archive.org/details/anchoratlasofwor00kind}}</ref> On 6 April, Poland and Britain agreed to [[Anglo-Polish alliance|formalise the guarantee as a military alliance]], pending negotiations.<ref>{{cite book |first=Andrew J|last=Crozier|title=The Causes of the Second World War|page=151}}.</ref> On 28 April, Hitler denounced the 1934 [[German–Polish declaration of non-aggression]] and the 1935 [[Anglo–German Naval Agreement]].<ref name=radio>{{cite book |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=12dk9bizqIAC&q=abrogated+hitler+reichstag&pg=PA173 |title=Manipulating the Ether: The Power of Broadcast Radio in Thirties America|first=Robert J |last=Brown|isbn=0-7864-2066-9|date=1 January 2004|publisher=McFarland }}.</ref>

In mid-March 1939, attempting to contain Hitler's expansionism, the Soviet Union, Britain and France started to trade a flurry of suggestions and counterplans on a potential political and military agreement.{{sfn|Carley|1993}}{{Sfn|Watson|2000|pp=696–8}} Informal consultations started in April, but the main negotiations began only in May.{{Sfn|Watson|2000|pp=696–8}} Meanwhile, throughout early 1939, Germany had secretly hinted to Soviet diplomats that it could offer better terms for a political agreement than could Britain and France.{{Sfn|Roberts|2006|p=30}}<ref name=tent>{{cite web|url=http://avalon.law.yale.edu/subject_menus/nazsov.asp|title=Tentative Efforts To Improve German–Soviet Relations, April 17 – August 14, 1939|publisher=Yale|access-date=26 October 2012|archive-date=11 February 2011|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110211171826/http://avalon.law.yale.edu/subject_menus/nazsov.asp|url-status=live}}.</ref><ref name="Grogin">{{cite book|title=Natural Enemies: The United States and the Soviet Union in the Cold War, 1917–1991|first=Robert C|last=Grogin|year=2001|publisher=Lexington|page=28}}.</ref>

The Soviet Union, which feared Western powers and the possibility of "capitalist encirclements", had little hope of preventing war and wanted nothing less than an ironclad military alliance with France and Britain{{sfn|Carley|1993|p =324}} to provide guaranteed support for a two-pronged attack on Germany.{{Sfn|Watson|2000|p=695}} Stalin's adherence to the collective security line was thus purely conditional.<ref>{{Cite journal|title=Review of Raack, R, ''Stalin's Drive to the West, 1938–1945: The Origins of the Cold War''|journal=The Journal of Modern History|first=G|last=Roberts|volume=69|date=December 1997|page=787|issue=4}}.</ref> Britain and France believed that war could still be avoided and that since the Soviet Union was so weakened by the [[Great Purge]]{{sfn|Watt|1989|p=118}} that it could not be a main military participant.{{Sfn|Watson|2000|p=695}} Many military sources{{clarify|date=May 2017}} were at variance with the last point, especially after the [[Soviet–Japanese border conflicts|Soviet victories]] over the Japanese [[Kwantung Army]] in [[Manchukuo|Manchuria]].{{sfn|Carley|1993|pp=303–41}} France was more anxious to find an agreement with the Soviet Union than Britain was. As a continental power, France was more willing to make concessions and more fearful of the dangers of an agreement between the Soviet Union and Germany.{{Sfn|Watson|2000|p=696}} The contrasting attitudes partly explain why the Soviets have often been charged with playing a double game in 1939 of carrying on open negotiations for an alliance with Britain and France but secretly considering propositions from Germany.{{Sfn|Watson|2000|p=696}}

By the end of May, drafts had been formally presented.{{Sfn|Watson|2000|pp=696–8}} In mid-June, the main tripartite negotiations started.{{Sfn|Watson|2000|p=704}} Discussions were focused on potential guarantees to Central and Eastern Europe in the case of German aggression.{{sfn|Carley|1993|pp=322–3}} The Soviets proposed to consider that a political turn towards Germany by the [[Baltic states]] would constitute an "indirect aggression" towards the Soviet Union.{{Sfn|Watson|2000|p=708}} Britain opposed such proposals because they feared the Soviets' proposed language would justify a Soviet intervention in Finland and the Baltic states or push those countries to seek closer relations with Germany.{{Sfn|Shirer|1990|p=502}}<ref>{{cite book|last=Hiden|first=John|title=The Baltic and the Outbreak of the Second World War|url=https://archive.org/details/balticoutbreakse00hide|url-access=limited|publisher=Cambridge University Press|year=2003|isbn=0-521-53120-9|page=[https://archive.org/details/balticoutbreakse00hide/page/n59 46]}}.</ref> The discussion of a definition of "indirect aggression" became one of the sticking points between the parties, and by mid-July, the tripartite political negotiations effectively stalled while the parties agreed to start negotiations on a military agreement, which the Soviets insisted had to be reached at the same time as any political agreement.{{Sfn|Watson|2000|pp=710–1}} One day before the military negotiations began, the Soviet [[Politburo]] pessimistically expected the coming negotiations to go nowhere and formally decided to consider German proposals seriously.<ref>{{cite book|last1=Gromyko|first1=Andrei|url=https://www.alibris.com/Soviet-foreign-policy-1917-1980-Andrei-Andreevich-Gromyko/book/6233636?collectible=1&qsort=p&matches=1|first2=B. N. Ponomarev|last2=Ponomarev|title=Soviet foreign policy : 1917-1980 Collectible Soviet foreign policy : 1917-1980|publisher=Progressive Publishers|year=1981|page=89|access-date=18 January 2018|archive-date=21 March 2022|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220321000120/https://www.alibris.com/Soviet-foreign-policy-1917-1980-Andrei-Andreevich-Gromyko/book/6233636?collectible=1&qsort=p&matches=1|url-status=live}}.</ref> The military negotiations began on 12 August in Moscow, with a British delegation headed by Admiral Sir [[Reginald Drax]], French delegation headed by General [[:fr:Aimé Doumenc|Aimé Doumenc]] and the Soviet delegation headed by [[Kliment Voroshilov]], the commissar of defence, and [[Boris Shaposhnikov]], chief of the general staff. Without written credentials, Drax was not authorised to guarantee anything to the Soviet Union and had been instructed by the British government to prolong the discussions as long as possible and to avoid answering the question of whether Poland would agree to permit Soviet troops to enter the country if the Germans invaded.<ref>{{cite book|last1=Butler|first1=Susan | author-link = Susan Butler (American writer) |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=TwXTCwAAQBAJ&q=Reginald+Drax+Voroshilov&pg=PA173|title=Roosevelt and Stalin: Portrait of a Partnership |publisher=Vintage Books|year=2016|isbn= 9780307741813|page=173}}.</ref>