Editing Mind–body dualism (section)

==Types==
[[Ontology|Ontological]] dualism makes dual commitments about the nature of existence as it relates to mind and matter, and can be divided into three different types:

# ''[[Substance dualism]]'' asserts that mind and matter are fundamentally distinct kinds of foundations.<ref name="Hart" />
# ''[[Property dualism]]'' suggests that the ontological distinction lies in the differences between properties of mind and matter (as in [[emergentism]]).<ref name="Hart" />
# ''[[Predicate dualism]]'' claims the irreducibility of mental predicates to physical predicates.<ref name="Hart" />

==={{Anchor|Substance dualism|Cartesian dualism}}Substance or Cartesian dualism<!-- 'Substance dualism', 'Substance Dualism', 'Cartesian dualism', and 'Cartesian Dualism' redirect here. -->===
'''Substance dualism''' asserts that mind and matter are fundamentally distinct kinds of foundations. There are different types of substance dualism. Most substance dualists hold the view that the mind and body are capable of causally affecting each other, known as [[Interactionism (philosophy of mind)|interactionism]].<ref>{{Cite web|author=Calef, Scott|date=2024|title=Dualism and Mind|url=https://iep.utm.edu/dualism-and-mind/|website=Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy|language=en-GB|archive-date=June 23, 2024|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240623215936/https://iep.utm.edu/dualism-and-mind/|url-status=live}}</ref> Notable defenders of substance dualism include [[John Foster (philosopher)|John Foster]], [[Stewart Goetz]], [[Richard Swinburne]] and [[Charles Taliaferro]].<ref name="Mousavirad 2023">{{Cite journal |last1=Mousavirad |first1=Seyyed Jaaber |last2=Philosophy Documentation Center |date=2023 |title=Coherence of Substance Dualism |url=https://www.pdcnet.org/oom/service?url_ver=Z39.88-2004&rft_val_fmt=&rft.imuse_id=ipq_2023_0063_0001_0033_0042&svc_id=info:www.pdcnet.org/collection |journal=International Philosophical Quarterly |volume=63 |issue=1 |pages=41–42 |doi=10.5840/ipq20231114214 |s2cid=265269649 |issn=0019-0365}}</ref><ref>{{cite journal|author=Swinburne, Richard|year=1996|title=Dualism Intact|journal=Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian Philosophers|url=https://place.asburyseminary.edu/faithandphilosophy/vol13/iss1/4/|volume=13|issue=1|pages=68–77|doi=10.5840/faithphil199613116}}</ref><ref>{{cite journal|author=Givens, Terryl L.|year=2012|title=Reviewed Work: A Brief History of the Soul by Stewart Goetz, Charles Taliaferro|journal=Church History|volume=81|issue=3|pages=656–658|doi=10.1017/S0009640712001357 |jstor=23252345}}</ref><ref>Taliaferro, Charles. (2018). ''Substance Dualism: A Defense''. In Jonathan J. Loose, Angus John Louis Menuge & J. P. Moreland. ''The Blackwell Companion to Substance Dualism''. Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 41–60</ref>

Cartesian dualism, most famously defended by [[René Descartes]], argues that there are two kinds of substances: mental and physical.<ref name="SEP"/><ref>{{Cite web|date=2016|title=Cartesian dualism|url=https://www.oxfordreference.com/display/10.1093/oi/authority.20110803095552351|website=Oxford Reference|language=en-GB}}</ref> Descartes states that the mental can exist outside of the body, and the body cannot think. Substance dualism is important historically for having given rise to much thought regarding the famous [[mind–body problem]]. It is compatible with theologies which claim that immortal souls occupy an independent realm of existence distinct from that of the physical world.<ref name="Hart"/> Cartesians tend to equate the soul to the mind.<ref name="Moreland 2010">{{cite journal|author=Moreland, J. P.|year=2010|title=The Origin of the Soul in Light of Twinning, Cloning, and Frozen Etnbryos|journal=Journal of the International Society of Christian Apologetics|url=https://theologicalstudies.org.uk/pdf/jisca/03-1_001.pdf|volume=3|issue=1|pages=1–12}}</ref>

The [[Heliocentrism|Copernican Revolution]] and the scientific discoveries of the 17th century reinforced the belief that the scientific method was the unique way of knowledge. Bodies were seen as biological organisms to be studied in their constituent parts (materialism) by means of [[anatomy]], [[physiology]], [[biochemistry]] and physics (reductionism).<ref name="PMC_3115289">{{cite journal|first1=Neeta|last1=Mehta|title=Mind-body Dualism: A critique from a Health Perspective|journal=Mens Sana Monogr.|year=2011|volume=9|issue=1|pages=202–209|pmid= 21694971|pmc=3115289|doi=10.4103/0973-1229.77436|doi-broken-date=25 November 2024 |oclc= 8663197050|issn=0973-1229|doi-access=free}}</ref> Mind–body dualism remained the biomedical paradigm and model for the following three centuries.<ref name="PMC_3115289"/>

===Emergent dualism===

Emergent dualism is a type of substance dualism that has been defended by [[William Hasker]] and [[Dean Zimmerman (philosopher)|Dean Zimmerman]].<ref>{{cite journal|author=Baker, Lynne Rudder|year=2002|title=Reviewed Work: The Emergent Self William Hasker|journal=Philosophy and Phenomenological Research|volume=65|issue=3|pages=734–736|jstor=3071148}}</ref><ref name="Dilley 2003">{{cite journal|author=Dilley, Frank B.|year=2003|title=A Critique of Emergent Dualism|journal=Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian Philosophers|url=https://place.asburyseminary.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1914&context=faithandphilosophy|volume=20|issue=1|pages=37–49|doi=10.5840/faithphil200320114}}</ref><ref>Hasker, William. (2018). ''The Case for Emergent Dualism''. In Jonathan J. Loose, Angus J. L. Menuge, J. P. Moreland. ''The Blackwell Companion to Substance Dualism''. Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 61–72. {{ISBN|978-1119375265}}</ref><ref name="Spackman 2013">{{cite journal|author=Spackman, John|year=2013|title=Consciousness and the Prospects for Substance Dualism|journal=Philosophy Compass|url=https://www.newdualism.org/papers/J.Spackman/Spackman-PhilComp2013.pdf|volume=8|issue=11|pages=1054–106|doi=10.1111/phc3.12009|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240411145024/https://www.newdualism.org/papers/J.Spackman/Spackman-PhilComp2013.pdf |archive-date=11 April 2024 }}</ref> Emergent dualism asserts that mental substances come into existence when physical systems such as the brain reach a sufficient level of complexity.<ref name="Spackman 2013"/> Hasker defines emergent dualism as:

{{blockquote|Human persons are not identical to any physical body, but consist of a physical body and a non-physical substantial soul, and (b) the human soul is naturally
emergent from and dependent on the structure and function of a living human brain and nervous system.<ref>Rickabaugh, Brandon L. [https://philarchive.org/archive/RICAED-2 ''Against Emergent Dualism'']. In Jonathan J. Loose, Angus J. L. Menuge, J. P. Moreland. (2018). ''The Blackwell Companion to Substance Dualism''. Wiley-Blackwell. {{ISBN|978-1119375265}}</ref>}}

Hasker has argued that emergent dualism is consistent with neuroscientific discoveries showing the dependence of mind on brain.<ref name="Dilley 2003"/><ref>{{cite journal|author=Gasparov, Ignor|year=2013|title=Substance Dualism and the Unity of Consciousness|journal=Forum Philosophicum|url=https://forumphilosophicum.ignatianum.edu.pl/docannexe/file/5420/7_gasparov.pdf|volume=18|issue=1|pages=109–123|doi=10.35765/forphil.2013.1801.07 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230615133655/https://forumphilosophicum.ignatianum.edu.pl/docannexe/file/5420/7_gasparov.pdf |archive-date=15 June 2023 }}</ref> He likens the individual mind to a magnetic field in its qualitative difference from the physical properties that generate it and also in its ability to act on the brain that generates it.<ref name="Dilley 2003"/> Consciousness is said to arise when the brain reaches a certain threshold level of organizational complexity and when properly organized gives rise to the soul.<ref>{{cite journal|author=Hershenov, David B; Taylor, Adam P.|year=2014|title=Split brains: no headache for the soul theorist|journal=Religious Studies|url=|volume=50|issue=4|pages=487–503|doi=10.1017/S0034412514000109 |jstor=43670546}}</ref>

===Thomistic dualism===

Thomistic dualism is a type of dualism derived from the views of [[Thomas Aquinas]].<ref name="Feser 2005">{{cite book |last=Feser |first=Edward |date=2006 |title=Philosophy of Mind: A Beginner's Guide |url=https://library.ucaphil.online/assets/files/Philosophy-ofMind-Feser.pdf |url-status= |pages=221–228| publisher=Oneworld Publications |isbn=978-1851684786|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240927010324/https://library.ucaphil.online/assets/files/Philosophy-ofMind-Feser.pdf |archive-date=September 27, 2024}}</ref> [[Edward Feser]] has written that:

{{blockquote|Aristotelians and Thomists (those philosophers whose views are derived from St.Thomas Aquinas) sometimes suggest that their hylomorphic position is no more a version of dualism than it is of materialism. But though their view is not a Cartesian form of dualism, it is clear from a consideration of how the human soul differs from the souls of plants and animals (at least on the Thomistic variation of hylomorphism) that the view does amount to a kind of dualism: Thomistic dualism or hylomorphic dualism, as it has variously been called.<ref name="Feser 2005"/>}}

[[Thomism|Thomistic]] substance dualism has been defended by [[J. P. Moreland]] and [[Scott B. Rae]].<ref>{{cite journal|author=Reichenbach, Bruce R.|year=2002|title=J. P. Moreland & Scott B. Rae, Body and Soul: Human Nature and the Crisis in Ethics|journal=Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian Philosophers|url=https://place.asburyseminary.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1883&context=faithandphilosophy|volume=19|issue=1|pages=112–116|doi=10.5840/faithphil200219112}}</ref><ref name="Van Dyke 2009">{{cite journal|author=Van Dyke, Christina|year=2009|title=Not Properly a Person: The Rational Soul and 'Thomistic Substance Dualism'|journal=Faith and Philosophy|url=https://www.pdcnet.org/faithphil/content/faithphil_2009_0026_0002_0186_0204|volume=26|issue=2|pages=186–204|doi=10.5840/faithphil200926226}}</ref> Thomistic substance dualism distinguishes itself from Cartesian substance dualism by denying that the body and soul are different substances. Instead, a person is composed of only one substance the soul while the body is considered an ensouled physical structure.<ref name="Van Dyke 2009"/> J. P. Moreland has commented:

{{blockquote|Thomistic substance dualism is not a dualism of two separable substances. There is only one substance, though I do not identify it with the body/soul composite. Rather, I take the one substance to be the soul, and the body to be an ensouled biological and physical structure that depends on the soul for its existence.<ref name="Moreland 2010"/>}}

[[Eleonore Stump]] has suggested that [[Thomas Aquinas]]'s views on matter and the soul are difficult to define in contemporary discussion but he would fit the criteria as a non-Cartesian substance dualist.<ref>{{cite journal|author=Stump, Eleonore|year=1995|title=Non-Cartesian Substance Dualism and Materialism Without Reductionism|journal=Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian Philosophers|url=https://place.asburyseminary.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1552&context=faithandphilosophy|volume=12|issue=4|pages=505–531|doi=10.5840/faithphil199512430}}</ref>

Other terms for Thomistic dualism include hylomorphic dualism or [[Thomistic hylomorphism]] which are contrasted with substance dualism.<ref name="Feser 2005"/><ref>{{cite journal|author=Stango, Marco|year=2017|title=Understanding Hylomorphic Dualism|journal=Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association|url=https://www.pdcnet.org/acpaproc/content/acpaproc_2017_0091_0145_0158?file_type=pdf|volume=91|issue=|pages=145–158|doi=10.5840/acpaproc2019102295}}</ref><ref>{{cite journal|author=Skrzypek, Jeremy W.|year=2021|title=Not Just a Terminological Difference: Cartesian Substance Dualism vs Thomistic Hylomorphism|journal= Roczniki Filozoficzne|url=https://ojs.tnkul.pl/index.php/rf/article/view/15765|volume=69|issue=1|pages=103–117|doi=10.18290/rf21691-10|doi-access=free}}</ref> Hylomorphism is distinct from substance dualism as it holds the view that the immaterial (form) and material (matter) are not distinct substances and only share an efficient causality.<ref name="Feser 2005"/>

Thomistic scholars such as Paul Chutikorn and Edward Feser have written that Aquinas was not a substance dualist.<ref name="Chutikorn 2018">{{Cite web|author=Chutikorn, Paul|date=2018|title=A Thomistic Critique of Cartesian Dualism|url=https://thomistica.net/essays/2018/11/9/a-thomistic-critique-of-cartesian-dualism|website=Thomistica|language=en-GB|archive-date=September 25, 2024|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240925123920/https://thomistica.net/essays/2018/11/9/a-thomistic-critique-of-cartesian-dualism|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web|author=Feser, Edward|date=2020|title=Soul Proprietor|url=https://www.firstthings.com/article/2020/02/soul-proprietor|website=First Things|language=en-GB|archive-date=September 25, 2024|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240925182235/https://www.firstthings.com/article/2020/02/soul-proprietor|url-status=live}}</ref> Edward Feser who has defended hylomorphic dualism has suggested that it has advantages over substance dualism such as offering a possible solution to the interaction problem.<ref name="Feser 2005"/> Paul Chutikorn has commented that "adopting Aquinas' view of substance will provide a solution to the problem by avoiding altogether the position that man is made up of dual substances. Rather, Aquinas shows us that we can acknowledge a duality within substance itself, while maintaining its inherent substantial unity".<ref name="Chutikorn 2018"/>

Aristotelian hylomorphic dualism also has many similarities with Thomistic dualism.<ref>{{Cite web|date=2023|title=Aristotelian Hylomorphic Dualism|url=https://thomistica.net/essays/https/thomisticanet/quaestiones-url/hylomorphic-dualism|website=Thomistica|language=en-GB|archive-date=September 27, 2024|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240927022733/https://thomistica.net/essays/https/thomisticanet/quaestiones-url/hylomorphic-dualism|url-status=live}}</ref> [[Michael Egnor]] is a notable advocate of Aristotelian dualism.<ref name="Stoke 2017">{{Cite web|author=Stoke, David|date=2017|title=Review of the 2017 Annual Meeting|url=https://christianscientific.org/review-of-the-2017-annual-meeting/|website=The Christian Scientific Society|language=en-GB|archive-date=September 22, 2024|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240922232435/https://christianscientific.org/review-of-the-2017-annual-meeting/|url-status=live}}</ref><ref name="Conference 2021">{{Cite web|date=2021|title=Science Beyond Materialism: Cosmology, Astrobiology, Consciousness|url=https://christianscholarsconference.org/panel/science-beyond-materialism-cosmology-astrobiology-consciousness/|website=Thomas H. Olbricht Christian Scholars Conference|language=en-GB|archive-date=September 22, 2024|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240922233432/https://christianscholarsconference.org/panel/science-beyond-materialism-cosmology-astrobiology-consciousness/|url-status=live}}</ref>

===Property dualism===
{{Main|Property dualism}}

Property dualism asserts that an ontological distinction lies in the differences between properties of mind and matter, and that consciousness may be ontologically irreducible to [[neurobiology]] and physics. It asserts that when matter is organized in the appropriate way (i.e., in the way that living human bodies are organized), mental properties emerge. Hence, it is a sub-branch of [[emergent materialism]]. What views properly fall under the ''property dualism'' rubric is itself a matter of dispute. There are different versions of property dualism, some of which claim independent categorisation.<ref name="ist-socrates.berkeley.edu">[[John Searle|Searle, John]]. [1983] 2002. "[https://web.archive.org/web/20061210160023/http://ist-socrates.berkeley.edu/~jsearle/132/PropertydualismFNL.doc Why I Am Not a Property Dualist]." Archived from the [http://ist-socrates.berkeley.edu/~jsearle/132/PropertydualismFNL.doc original] on 10 December 2006.</ref>

Non-reductive physicalism is a form of property dualism in which it is asserted that all mental states are causally reducible to physical states. One argument for this has been made in the form of [[anomalous monism]] expressed by [[Donald Davidson (philosopher)|Donald Davidson]], where it is argued that mental events are identical to physical events, however, strict law-governed causal relationships cannot describe relations of mental events. Another argument for this has been expressed by [[John Searle]], who is the advocate of a distinctive form of physicalism he calls [[biological naturalism]]. His view is that although mental states are ontologically irreducible to physical states, they are [[Causality|causally reducible]]. He has acknowledged that "to many people" his views and those of property dualists look a lot alike, but he thinks the comparison is misleading.<ref name="ist-socrates.berkeley.edu" />

===Epiphenomenalism===
{{Main|Epiphenomenalism}}

Epiphenomenalism is a form of property dualism, in which it is asserted that one or more mental states do not have any influence on physical states (both ontologically and causally irreducible). It asserts that while material causes give rise to [[Sensation (psychology)|sensations]], [[Volition (psychology)|volitions]], [[idea]]s, etc., such mental phenomena themselves cause nothing further: they are causal dead-ends. This can be contrasted to [[Interactionism (philosophy of mind)|interactionism]], on the other hand, in which mental causes can produce material effects, and vice versa.<ref name="Rob">[[Howard Robinson|Robinson, Howard]]. 2003. "Dualism." pp. 85–101 in ''The Blackwell Guide to Philosophy of Mind'', edited by S. Stich and T. Warfield. Oxford: Blackwell.</ref>

==={{Anchor|Predicate monism}}Predicate dualism<!--'Predicate dualism' redirects here-->===
'''Predicate dualism'''<!--boldface per WP:R#PLA--> is a view espoused by such non-reductive physicalists as [[Donald Davidson (philosopher)|Donald Davidson]] and [[Jerry Fodor]], who maintain that while there is only one ontological category of substances and properties of substances (usually physical), the predicates that we use to describe mental events cannot be redescribed in terms of (or reduced to) physical predicates of natural languages.<ref name="Davidson">Davidson, Donald. 1980. ''Essays on Actions and Events''. Oxford University Press. {{ISBN|0-19-924627-0}}.</ref><ref>Fodor, Jerry. 1968. ''Psychological Explanation''. Random House. {{ISBN|0-07-021412-3}}.</ref>

''Predicate dualism'' is most easily defined as the negation of ''predicate monism''. '''Predicate monism''' can be characterized as the view subscribed to by [[eliminative materialism|eliminative materialists]], who maintain that such intentional predicates as ''believe'', ''desire'', ''think'', ''feel'', etc., will eventually be eliminated from both the language of science and from ordinary language because the entities to which they refer do not exist. Predicate dualists believe that so-called "[[folk psychology]]," with all of its [[propositional attitude]] ascriptions, is an ineliminable part of the enterprise of describing, explaining, and understanding human mental states and behavior.

For example, Davidson subscribes to [[anomalous monism]], according to which there can be no strict psychophysical laws which connect mental and physical events under their descriptions as ''mental'' and ''physical'' events. However, all mental events also have physical descriptions. It is in terms of the latter that such events can be connected in law-like relations with other physical events. Mental predicates are irreducibly different in character (rational, holistic, and necessary) from physical predicates (contingent, atomic, and causal).<ref name="Davidson" />