Editing Mental event (section)

== Relation to mind–body problem ==
Some state that the mental and the physical are the very same property which cause any event(s). This view is known as [[Monism#Types|substance monism]]. An opposing view is [[Dualism (philosophy of mind)#Substance or Cartesian dualism|substance dualism]], which claims that the mental and physical are fundamentally different and can exist independently. A third approach is [[Donald Davidson (philosopher)|Donald Davidson]]'s ''[[anomalous monism]]''. The [[Philosophy of Action]] states that every action is caused by prior thoughts or feelings, and understanding those mental events would in turn explain behavior.<ref>{{Cite book|title=The Blackwell Dictionary of Western Philosophy|date=2004|publisher=John Wiley & Sons, Ltd|edition=1|doi=10.1002/9780470996379|isbn = 9780470996379|editor1-last = Bunnin|editor1-first = Nicholas|editor2-last = Yu|editor2-first = Jiyuan}}</ref>

[[Physicalism]], a form of substance monism, states that everything that exists is either physical or depends on that which is physical.<ref>{{Cite web|url=http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2016/entries/physicalism|title=Physicalism|last=Stoljar|first=Daniel|date=2016|editor-last=Zalta|editor-first=Edward|website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2016 Edition).|access-date=2016-11-23}}</ref> The existence of mental events has been used by philosophers as an argument against physicalism. For example, in his 1974 paper ''[[What Is it Like to Be a Bat?]]'', Thomas Nagel argues that physicalist [[Theory of mind|theories of mind]] cannot explain an organism's subjective experience because they cannot account for its mental events.

[[Epiphenomenalism]], according to Stanford, "Is the view that mental events are caused by physical events in the brain, but have no effect upon any physical events."<ref>Robinson, William, "Epiphenomenalism", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2019 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2019/entries/epiphenomenalism/</ref> This stance then brings up the idea of [[introspection]]. According to David Lieberman, [[introspection]] is the ability for a person to observe his or her own mental state or events.<ref>Lieberman, D. A. (2021). Chapter 10 Working Memory. In Learning and Memory (2nd ed., p. 13). Cambridge University Press.</ref> Mental events can happen consciously and subconsciously at any given point. All mental events take place due to external stimuli. Which then must be processed via [[working memory]].