Editing Luftwaffe (section)

==History==
===Origins===
{{main|Luftstreitkräfte|Aviation in World War I}}
[[File:Bundesarchiv Bild 183-2004-0430-501, Jagdstaffel 11, Manfred v. Richthofen.jpg|thumb|right|[[Manfred von Richthofen]] with other members of {{lang|de|[[Jagdstaffel 11|Jasta 11]]}}, 1917 as part of the {{lang|de|[[Luftstreitkräfte]]}}]]
The Imperial German Army Air Service was founded in 1910 with the name {{lang|de|Die Fliegertruppen des deutschen Kaiserreiches}}, most often shortened to {{lang|de|Fliegertruppe}}. It was renamed the {{lang|de|[[Luftstreitkräfte]]}} on 8 October 1916.<ref>{{harvnb|Blumberg|2014|p=39}}</ref> The air war on the [[Western Front (World War I)|Western Front]] received the most attention in the annals of the earliest accounts of military aviation, since it produced aces such as [[Manfred von Richthofen]], [[Ernst Udet]], [[Oswald Boelcke]], and [[Max Immelmann]]. After the defeat of Germany, the service was dissolved on 8 May 1920 under the conditions of the Treaty of Versailles, which also mandated the destruction of all German military aircraft.

Since the Treaty of Versailles forbade Germany to have an air force, German pilots trained in secret. Initially, civil aviation schools within Germany were used, yet only light [[Trainer aircraft|trainers]] could be used in order to maintain the façade that the trainees were going to fly with civil airlines such as {{lang|de|[[Deutsche Luft Hansa]]}}. To train its pilots on the latest combat aircraft, Germany solicited the help of the Soviet Union, which was also isolated in Europe. A [[Lipetsk fighter-pilot school|secret training airfield was established at Lipetsk]] in 1924 and operated for approximately nine years using mostly Dutch and Soviet, but also some German, training aircraft before being closed in 1933. This base was officially known as the 4th squadron of the 40th wing of the [[Red Army]]. Hundreds of Luftwaffe pilots and technical personnel visited, studied, and were trained at Soviet Air Force schools in several locations in Central Russia.<ref>{{harvnb|Stein|1962|pp=54–71}}</ref> Roessing, Blume, Fosse, Teetsemann, Heini, Makratzki, Blumendaat, and many other future Luftwaffe aces were trained in the USSR in joint Soviet-German schools that were set up under the patronage of [[Ernst August Köstring]].

The first steps towards the Luftwaffe's formation were undertaken just months after [[Adolf Hitler]] came to power. [[Hermann Göring]], a World War I ace, became National {{lang|de|Kommissar}} for aviation with former ''Luft Hansa'' director [[Erhard Milch]] as his deputy. In April 1933, the [[Ministry of Aviation (Nazi Germany)|Reich Aviation Ministry]] ({{lang|de|Reichsluftfahrtministerium}} or RLM) was established. The RLM was in charge of the development and production of aircraft. Göring's control over all aspects of aviation became absolute. On 25 March 1933, the [[German Air Sports Association]] absorbed all private and national organisations, while retaining its 'sports' title. On 15 May 1933, all military aviation organisations in the RLM were merged, forming the Luftwaffe; its official 'birthday'.<ref>{{harvnb|Hooton|2007a|p=30}}</ref> The [[National Socialist Flyers Corps]] ({{lang|de|Nationalsozialistisches Fliegerkorps}} or NSFK) was formed in 1937 to give pre-military flying training to male youths, and to engage adult sport aviators in the Nazi movement. Military-age members of the NSFK were drafted into the Luftwaffe. As all such prior NSFK members were also Nazi Party members, this gave the new Luftwaffe a strong Nazi ideological base in contrast to the other branches of the {{lang|de|Wehrmacht}} (the ''[[German Army (1935–1945)|Heer]]'' (army) and the {{lang|de|[[Kriegsmarine]]}} (navy)). Göring played a leading role in the buildup of the Luftwaffe in 1933–36, but had little further involvement in the development of the force after 1936, and Milch became the "''de facto''" minister until 1937.<ref>{{harvnb|Hooton|2007a|p=31}}</ref>

The absence of Göring in planning and production matters was fortunate. Göring had little knowledge of current aviation, had last flown in 1922, and had not kept himself informed of the latest events. Göring also displayed a lack of understanding of doctrine and technical issues in aerial warfare which he left to others more competent. The Commander-in-Chief left the organisation and building of the Luftwaffe, after 1936, to Erhard Milch. However, Göring, as a part of Hitler's inner circle, provided access to financial resources and materiel for rearming and equipping the Luftwaffe.<ref>{{harvnb|Corum|1997|pp=124–125}}</ref>

Another prominent figure in German air power construction this time was [[Helmuth Wilberg]]. Wilberg later played a large role in the development of German air doctrine. Having headed the {{lang|de|[[Reichswehr]]}} air staff for eight years in the 1920s, Wilberg had considerable experience and was ideal for a senior staff position.<ref>{{harvnb|Corum|1997|p=125}}</ref> Göring considered making Wilberg Chief of Staff (CS). However, it was revealed Wilberg had a Jewish mother. For that reason, Göring could not have him as CS. Not wishing his talent to go to waste, Göring ensured the [[racial policy of Nazi Germany]] did not apply to him. Wilberg remained in the air staff, and under [[Walther Wever (general)|Walther Wever]] helped draw up the Luftwaffe's principle doctrinal texts, "The Conduct of the Aerial War" and "Regulation 16".<ref>{{harvnb|Corum|1997|p=127}}</ref><ref>{{harvnb|Hooton|2010|pp=20–21}}</ref>

===Preparing for war: 1933–1939===
====Wever years, 1933–1936====
[[File:Bundesarchiv Bild 146-1976-026-04A, Walter Wever.jpg|thumb|upright|[[Walther Wever (general)|Walther Wever]], Chief of the Luftwaffe General Staff, 1933–1936]]
The German officer corps was keen to develop [[strategic bombing]] capabilities against its enemies. However, economic and geopolitical considerations had to take priority. The German air power theorists continued to develop strategic theories, but emphasis was given to army support, as Germany was a continental power and expected to face ground operations following any declaration of hostilities.<ref>{{harvnb|Murray|1983|p=1}}</ref>

For these reasons, between 1933 and 1934, the Luftwaffe's leadership was primarily concerned with tactical and operational methods. In aerial terms, the army concept of {{lang|de|[[Truppenführung]]}} was an operational concept, as well as a tactical doctrine. In World War I, the {{lang|de|Fliegertruppe's}} initial, 1914–15 era {{lang|de|[[Feldflieger Abteilung]]}} observation/reconnaissance air units, each with six two-seater aircraft apiece, had been attached to specific army formations and acted as support. [[Dive bomber]] units were considered essential to {{lang|de|Truppenführung}}, attacking enemy headquarters and lines of communications.<ref name="Corum 1997, p. 129">{{harvnb|Corum|1997|p=129}}</ref> Luftwaffe "Regulation 10: The Bomber" ({{lang|de|Dienstvorschrift 10: Das Kampfflugzeug}}), published in 1934, advocated air superiority and approaches to ground attack tactics without dealing with operational matters. Until 1935, the 1926 manual "Directives for the Conduct of the Operational Air War" continued to act as the main guide for German air operations. The manual directed OKL to focus on limited operations (not strategic operations): the protection of specific areas and support of the army in combat.<ref name="Corum 1997, p. 129"/>

With an effective tactical-operational concept,<ref>{{harvnb|Corum|1997|p=130}}</ref> the German air power theorists needed a strategic doctrine and organisation. {{ill|Robert Knauss|de}}, a serviceman (not a pilot) in the {{lang|de|Luftstreitkräfte}} during World War I, and later an experienced pilot with ''Lufthansa'',<ref>{{harvnb|Corum|1997|p=132}}</ref> was a prominent theorist of air power. Knauss promoted the [[Giulio Douhet]] theory that air power could win wars alone by destroying enemy industry and breaking enemy morale by "terrorising the population" of major cities. This advocated attacks on civilians.<ref>{{harvnb|Corum|1997|p=133}}</ref> The General Staff blocked the entry of Douhet's theory into doctrine, fearing revenge strikes against German civilians and cities.<ref>{{harvnb|Corum|1997|pp=133–134}}</ref>

In December 1934, Chief of the Luftwaffe General Staff [[Walther Wever (general)|Walther Wever]] sought to mold the Luftwaffe's battle doctrine into a strategic plan. At this time, Wever conducted war games (simulated against France) in a bid to establish his theory of a strategic bombing force that would, he thought, prove decisive by winning the war through the destruction of enemy industry, even though these exercises also included tactical strikes against enemy ground forces and communications. In 1935, "Luftwaffe Regulation 16: The Conduct of the Air War" was drawn up. In the proposal, it concluded, "The mission of the Luftwaffe is to serve these goals."<ref name="Hooton 2007, ''Luftwaffe at War: Gathering Storm'', p. 34">{{harvnb|Hooton|2007a|p=34}}</ref><ref>{{harvnb|Hooton|2010|p=28}}</ref>

Historian [[James Corum]] states that under this doctrine, the Luftwaffe leadership rejected the practice of "[[Strategic bombing|terror bombing]]" (see [[Blitzkrieg#Luftwaffe|Luftwaffe strategic bombing doctrine]]).<ref name="Corum 1997, p. 7">{{harvnb|Corum|1997|p=7}}</ref> According to Corum, terror bombing was deemed to be "counter-productive", increasing rather than destroying the enemy's will to resist.<ref>{{harvnb|Corum|1997|pp=143–144}}</ref> Such bombing campaigns were regarded as diversion from the Luftwaffe's main operations; destruction of the enemy armed forces.<ref>{{harvnb|Corum|1997|p=146}}</ref>

Nevertheless, Wever recognised the importance of [[strategic bombing]]. In newly introduced doctrine, ''The Conduct of the Aerial Air War'' in 1935, Wever rejected the theory of Douhet<ref>{{harvnb|Corum|1997|p=143}}</ref> and outlined five key points to air strategy:<ref>{{harvnb|Corum|1997|p=138}}</ref>
<blockquote>
#To destroy the enemy air force by bombing its bases and aircraft factories, and defeating enemy air forces attacking German targets
#To prevent the movement of large enemy ground forces to the decisive areas by destroying railways and roads, particularly bridges and tunnels, which are indispensable for the movement and supply of forces
#To support the operations of the army formations, independent of railways, i.e, armoured forces and motorised forces, by impeding the enemy advance and participating directly in ground operations
#To support naval operations by attacking naval bases, protecting Germany's naval bases and participating directly in naval battles
#To paralyze the enemy armed forces by stopping production in the armaments factories
</blockquote>

Wever began planning for a strategic bomber force and sought to incorporate strategic bombing into a war strategy. He believed that tactical aircraft should only be used as a step to developing a strategic air force. In May 1934, Wever initiated a seven-year project to develop the so-called "[[Ural bomber]]", which could strike as far as into the heart of the Soviet Union. In 1935, this design competition led to the [[Dornier Do 19]] and [[Junkers Ju 89]] prototypes, although both were underpowered. In April 1936, Wever issued requirements for the 'Bomber A' design competition: a range of {{convert|6,700|km|mi}} with a {{convert|900|kg|lb}} bomb load. However Wever's vision of a "Ural" bomber was never realised,<ref>{{harvnb|Hooton|2007a|p=33}}</ref> and his emphasis on strategic aerial operations was lost.<ref>{{harvnb|Corum|1997|p=224}}</ref> The only design submittal for Wever's 'Bomber A' that reached production was [[Heinkel]]'s ''Projekt 1041'', which culminated in the production and frontline service as Germany's only operational heavy bomber, the [[Heinkel He 177 Greif|Heinkel He 177]], on 5 November 1937, the date on which it received its [[List of RLM aircraft designations#101-200|RLM airframe number]].{{sfn|Griehl|Dressel1998|p=9}}

In 1935, the military functions of the RLM were grouped into the {{lang|de|[[Oberkommando der Luftwaffe]]}} (OKL; "Air Force High Command").

Following the untimely death of Wever in early June 1936 in an [[Gust lock#Safety|aviation-related accident]], by the late 1930s the Luftwaffe had no clear purpose. The air force was not subordinated to the army support role, and it was not given any particular strategic mission. German doctrine fell between the two concepts. The Luftwaffe was to be an organisation capable of carrying out broad and general support tasks rather than any specific mission. Mainly, this path was chosen to encourage more flexible use of air power and offer the ground forces the right conditions for a decisive victory. In fact, on the outbreak of war, only 15% of the Luftwaffe's aircraft were devoted to ground support operations, counter to the long-held myth that the Luftwaffe was designed for only tactical and operational missions.<ref>{{harvnb|Buckley|1998|pp=85–86}}</ref>

====Change of direction, 1936–37====
[[File:Bundesarchiv Bild 146-1984-112-13, Ernst Udet.jpg|thumb|left|upright=0.7|General [[Ernst Udet]]. Along with [[Albert Kesselring]], Udet was responsible for establishing the design trend of German aircraft. His focus was on tactical army support air forces.]]
Wever's participation in the construction of the Luftwaffe came to an abrupt end on 3 June 1936 when he was killed along with his engineer in a [[Heinkel He 70 Blitz|Heinkel He 70]] Blitz, ironically on the very day that his "Bomber A" heavy bomber design competition was announced. After Wever's death, Göring began taking more of an interest in the appointment of Luftwaffe staff officers. Göring appointed his successor [[Albert Kesselring]] as Chief of Staff and [[Ernst Udet]] to head the Reich's Air Ministry Technical Office ({{lang|de|Technisches Amt}}), although he was not a technical expert. Despite this Udet helped change the Luftwaffe's tactical direction towards fast medium bombers to destroy enemy air power in the battle zone rather than through industrial bombing of its aviation production.<ref name="Hooton 2007, ''Luftwaffe at War: Gathering Storm'', p. 34"/>

Kesselring and Udet did not get on. During Kesselring's time as CS, 1936–1937, a power struggle developed between the two as Udet attempted to extend his own power within the Luftwaffe. Kesselring also had to contend with Göring appointing "yes men" to positions of importance.<ref>{{harvnb|Corum|1997|p=225}}</ref> Udet realised his limitations, and his failures in the production and development of German aircraft would have serious long term consequences.<ref>{{harvnb|Corum|1997|p=227}}</ref>

The failure of the Luftwaffe to progress further towards attaining a strategic bombing force was attributable to several reasons. Many in the Luftwaffe command believed medium bombers to be sufficient power to launch strategic bombing operations against Germany's most likely enemies; France, Czechoslovakia, and Poland.<ref>{{harvnb|Murray|1983|p=10}}</ref> The United Kingdom presented greater problems. {{Lang|de|[[General der Flieger]]}} [[Hellmuth Felmy]], commander of {{lang|de|[[Luftflotte 2]]}} in 1939, was charged with devising a plan for an air war over the British Isles. Felmy was convinced that Britain could be defeated through morale bombing. Felmy noted the alleged panic that had broken out in London during the [[Munich Agreement|Munich crisis]], evidence he believed of British weakness. A second reason was technical. German designers had never solved the issues of the Heinkel He 177A's design difficulties, brought on by the requirement from its inception on 5 November 1937 to have moderate dive-bombing capabilities in a 30-meter wingspan aircraft. Moreover, Germany did not possess the economic resources to match the later British and American effort of 1943–1944, particularly in large-scale mass production of [[Bomber B#High-output aviation engines for the Luftwaffe|high power output aircraft engines]] (with output of over least 1,500 kW (2,000 hp). In addition, the OKL had not foreseen the industrial and military effort strategic bombing would require. By 1939 the Luftwaffe was not much better prepared than its enemies to conduct a strategic bombing campaign,<ref name="auto">{{harvnb|Murray|1983|p=11}}</ref> with fatal results during the [[Battle of Britain]].<ref>{{harvnb|Overy|1980|p=31}}</ref>

The German rearmament programme faced difficulties acquiring raw materials. Germany imported most of its essential materials for rebuilding the Luftwaffe, in particular rubber and aluminum. Petroleum imports were particularly vulnerable to blockade. Germany pushed for synthetic fuel plants but still failed to meet demands. In 1937 Germany imported more fuel than it had at the start of the decade. By summer 1938, only 25% of the requirements could be covered. In steel materials, industry was operating at barely 83% of capacity, and by November 1938 Göring reported the economic situation was serious.<ref>{{harvnb|Murray|1983|p=2}}</ref> The {{lang|de|[[Oberkommando der Wehrmacht]]}} (OKW), the overall command for all German military forces, ordered reductions in raw materials and steel used for armament production. The figures for reduction were substantial: 30% steel, 20% copper, 47% aluminum, and 14% rubber.<ref>{{harvnb|Murray|1983|p=3}}</ref> Under such circumstances, it was not possible for Milch, Udet, or Kesselring to produce a formidable strategic bombing force even had they wanted to do so.<ref name="auto"/>

The development of aircraft was now confined to the production of twin-engined medium bombers that required much less material, manpower, and aviation production capacity than Wever's "Ural Bomber". German industry could build two medium bombers for one heavy bomber and the RLM would not gamble on developing a heavy bomber which would also take time. Göring remarked, "the ''Führer'' will not ask how big the bombers there are, but only how many there are."<ref>{{harvnb|Homze|1976|p=125}}</ref> The premature death of Wever, one of the Luftwaffe's finest officers, left the Luftwaffe without a strategic air force during World War II, which eventually proved fatal to the German war effort.<ref name="Hooton 2007, ''Luftwaffe at War: Gathering Storm'', p. 34"/>{{sfn|Dressel|Griehl|1994|p= 176}}<ref>{{harvnb|Bergström|2007|pp=129–130}}</ref>

The lack of strategic capability should have been apparent much earlier. The [[Occupation of Czechoslovakia (1938–1945)|Sudeten Crisis]] highlighted German unpreparedness to conduct a strategic air war (although the British and French were in a much weaker position), and Hitler ordered the Luftwaffe be expanded to five times its earlier size.{{sfn|Ketley|Rolfe|1996|p=3}} The OKL badly neglected the need for transport aircraft; even in 1943, transport units were described as {{lang|de|Kampfgeschwadern zur besonderen Verwendung}} (Bomber Units on Special Duties, KGzbV).{{sfn|Ketley|Rolfe|1996|p=7}} and only grouping them together into dedicated cargo and personnel transport wings ({{lang|de|Transportgeschwader}}) during that year. In March 1938, as the ''[[Anschluss]]'' was taking place, Göring ordered Felmy to investigate the prospect of air raids against Britain. Felmy concluded it was not possible until bases in [[Belgium]] and the [[Netherlands]] were obtained and the Luftwaffe had heavy bombers. It mattered little, as war was avoided by the Munich Agreement, and the need for long-range aircraft did not arise.<ref>{{harvnb|Hooton|2007a|p=77}}</ref>

These failures were not exposed until wartime. In the meantime, German designs of mid-1930s origin such as the [[Messerschmitt Bf 109]], the [[Heinkel He 111]], the [[Junkers Ju 87]] Stuka, and the [[Dornier Do 17]], performed very well. All first saw active service in the [[Condor Legion]] against Soviet-supplied aircraft. The Luftwaffe also quickly realised the days of the biplane fighter were finished, the [[Heinkel He 51]] being switched to service as a trainer. Particularly impressive were the Heinkel and Dornier, which fulfilled the Luftwaffe's requirements for bombers that were faster than 1930s-era fighters, many of which were biplanes or strut-braced monoplanes.

Despite the participation of these aircraft (mainly from 1938 onward), it was the venerable [[Junkers Ju 52]] (which soon became the backbone of the {{lang|de|Transportgruppen}}) that made the main contribution. During the [[Spanish Civil War]] Hitler remarked, "Franco ought to erect a monument to the glory of the Junkers Ju 52. It is the aircraft which the Spanish revolution has to thank for its victory."<ref>{{harvnb|Hooton|2007a|p=51}}</ref>

====Dive-bombing====
[[File:Bundesarchiv Bild 101I-646-5188-17, Flugzeuge Junkers Ju 87.jpg|thumb|right|[[Junkers Ju 87]]Ds over the Eastern Front, winter 1943–44]]
Poor accuracy from level bombers in 1937 led the Luftwaffe to grasp the benefits of dive-bombing. The latter could achieve far better accuracy against tactical ground targets than heavier conventional bombers. Range was not a key criterion for this mission. It was not always feasible for the army to move heavy artillery over recently captured territory to bombard fortifications or support ground forces, and dive bombers could do the job faster. Dive bombers, often single-engine two-man machines, could achieve better results than larger six or seven-man aircraft, at a tenth of the cost and four times the accuracy. This led to Udet championing the dive bomber, particularly the [[Junkers Ju 87]].<ref>{{harvnb|Hooton|2007a|p=38}}</ref>

Udet's "love affair" with dive-bombing seriously affected the long-term development of the Luftwaffe, especially after Wever's death. The tactical strike aircraft programmes were meant to serve as interim solutions until the next generation of aircraft arrived. In 1936 the [[Junkers Ju 52]] was the backbone of the German bomber fleet. This led to a rush on the part of the RLM to produce the [[Junkers Ju 86]], the Heinkel He 111, and the Dornier Do 17 before a proper evaluation was made. The Ju 86 was poor while the He 111 showed the most promise. The Spanish Civil War convinced Udet (along with limited output from the German munitions industry) that wastage was not acceptable in munition terms. Udet sought to build dive-bombing into the [[Junkers Ju 88]] and conveyed the same idea, initiated specifically by the OKL for the [[Heinkel He 177 Greif|Heinkel He 177]], approved in early November 1937. In the case of the Ju 88, 50,000 modifications had to be made. The weight was increased from seven to twelve tons. This resulted in a speed loss of 200 km/h. Udet merely conveyed the OKL's own dive-bombing capability request to [[Ernst Heinkel]] concerning the He 177, who vehemently opposed such an idea, which ruined its development as a heavy bomber.<ref>{{harvnb|Murray|1983|p=14}}</ref> Göring was not able to rescind the dive-bombing requirement for the He 177A until September 1942.{{sfn|Griehl|Dressel|1998|p= 53}}

====Mobilisation, 1938–1941====
By the summer of 1939, the Luftwaffe had ready for combat nine {{lang|de|Jagdgeschwader}} (fighter wings) mostly equipped with the [[Messerschmitt Bf 109 variants|Messerschmitt Bf 109E]], four ''[[Organization of the Luftwaffe (1933–1945)|Zerstörergeschwader]]'' (destroyer wings) equipped with the [[Messerschmitt Bf 110]] heavy fighters, 11 {{lang|de|[[Kampfgeschwader]]}} (bomber wings) equipped mainly with the Heinkel He 111 and the Dornier Do 17Z, and four {{lang|de|Sturzkampfgeschwader}} (dive bomber wings) primarily armed with the iconic Junkers Ju 87B ''Stuka''.<ref>{{harvnb|Hooton|2007a|p=79}}</ref> The Luftwaffe was just starting to accept the Junkers Ju 88A for service, as it had encountered design difficulties, with only a dozen aircraft of the type considered combat-ready. The Luftwaffe's strength at this time stood at 373,000 personnel (208,000 flying troops, 107,000 in the Flak Corps, and 58,000 in the Signals Corps). Aircraft strength was 4,201 operational aircraft: 1,191 bombers, 361 dive bombers, 788 fighters, 431 heavy fighters, and 488 transports. Despite deficiencies, it was an impressive force.<ref>{{harvnb|Corum|1997|p=271}}</ref>

However, even by the spring of 1940, the Luftwaffe still had not mobilised fully. Despite the shortage of raw materials, Udet had increased production through introducing a 10-hour working day for aviation industries and rationalising production. During this period 30 {{lang|de|Kampfstaffeln}} and 16 {{lang|de|Jagdstaffeln}} were raised and equipped. A further five {{lang|de|Zerstörergruppen}} ("Destroyer groups") were created (JGr 101, 102, 126, 152 and 176), all equipped with the Bf 110.<ref>{{harvnb|Hooton|2007a|p=23}}</ref>

The Luftwaffe also greatly expanded its aircrew training programmes by 42%, to 63 flying schools. These facilities were moved to eastern Germany, away from possible Allied threats. The number of aircrew reached 4,727, an increase of 31%. However, the rush to complete this rapid expansion scheme resulted in the deaths of 997 personnel and another 700 wounded. 946 aircraft were also destroyed in these accidents. The number of aircrew completing their training was up to 3,941, The Luftwaffe's entire strength was now 2.2 million personnel.<ref>{{harvnb|Hooton|2007a|p=24}}</ref>

In April and May 1941, Udet headed the Luftwaffe delegation inspecting the Soviet aviation industry in compliance with the [[Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact]]. Udet informed Göring "that Soviet air forces are very strong and technically advanced." Göring decided not to report the facts to Hitler, hoping that a surprise attack would quickly destroy the USSR.<ref name="RF">"Боевые операции люфтваффе", Москва 2008 г., изд. Яуза-пресс, по "Rise and fall of the German Air Force", Лондон 1948 г., пер. П.Смирнов, {{ISBN|978-5-9955-0028-5}}</ref> {{page needed|date=May 2025}}Udet realised that the upcoming war with the USSR might cripple Germany. Udet, torn between truth and loyalty, suffered a psychological breakdown and even tried to tell Hitler the truth, but Göring told Hitler that Udet was lying, then took Udet under control by giving him drugs at drinking parties and hunting trips. Udet's drinking and psychological condition became a problem, but Göring used Udet's dependency to manipulate him.<ref name="RF2">Who is who in the Third Reich (Кто был кто в Третьем рейхе. Биографический энциклопедический словарь. М., 2003)</ref>{{page needed|date=May 2025}}

===Luftwaffe organisation===
{{Main|Organization of the Luftwaffe (1933–45)}}

====Luftwaffe commanders====
[[File:Defendants in the dock at the Nuremberg Trials.jpg|thumb|right|Defendants in the dock during the [[Nuremberg trials]]. The main target of the prosecution was [[Hermann Göring]] (at the left edge on the first row of benches), considered to be the most important surviving Nazi official after Adolf Hitler's death.]]
Throughout the history of Nazi Germany, the Luftwaffe had only two commanders-in-chief. The first was Göring, with the second and last being {{lang|de|[[Generalfeldmarschall]]}} [[Robert Ritter von Greim]]. His appointment as commander-in-chief of the Luftwaffe was concomitant with his promotion to {{lang|de|Generalfeldmarschall}}, the last German officer in World War II to be promoted to the highest rank. Other officers promoted to the second highest military rank in Germany were Kesselring, [[Hugo Sperrle]], Milch, and [[Wolfram von Richthofen]].

At the end of the war, with [[Battle of Berlin|Berlin surrounded by the Red Army]], [[Göring telegram|Göring suggested to Hitler that he take over leadership of the Reich.]]<ref>{{harvnb|Killen|2003|p=291}}</ref> Hitler ordered his arrest and execution, but Göring's SS guards did not carry out the order, and Göring survived to be [[Nuremberg trials|tried at Nuremberg]].<ref>{{harvnb|Killen|2003|p=300}}</ref>

Sperrle was prosecuted at the [[High Command Trial|OKW trial]], one of the last twelve of the Nuremberg trials after the war. He was acquitted on all four counts. He died in Munich in 1953.

===Organisation and chain of command===
{{Main|Organization of the Luftwaffe (1933–45)}}
At the start of the war the Luftwaffe had four {{lang|de|Luftflotten}} (air fleets), each responsible for roughly a quarter of Germany. As the war progressed more air fleets were created as the areas under German rule expanded. As one example, {{lang|de|[[Luftflotte 5]]}} was created in 1940 to direct operations in Norway and Denmark, and other {{lang|de|Luftflotten}} were created as necessary. Each {{lang|de|Luftflotte}} would contain several {{lang|de|Fliegerkorps}} (Air Corps), {{lang|de|Fliegerdivision}} (Air Division), {{lang|de|Jagdkorps}} (Fighter Corps), {{lang|de|Jagddivision}} (Air Division), or {{lang|de|Jagdfliegerführer}} (Fighter Air Command). Each formations would have attached to it a number of units, usually several {{lang|de|Geschwader}}, but also independent {{lang|de|Staffeln}} and {{lang|de|[[Kampfgruppe|Kampfgruppen]]}}.<ref name="Luftwaffe Tactical Organisation">{{cite web|url=https://www.feldgrau.com/WW2-German-Luftwaffe-High-Command/|title=High Command of the Luftwaffe|work=feldgrau.com|access-date=26 September 2012}}</ref> {{lang|de|Luftflotten}} were also responsible for the training aircraft and schools in their operational areas.<ref name="Ketley and Rolfe, p. 4">{{harvnb|Ketley|Rolfe |1996|p=4}}</ref>

A {{lang|de|Geschwader}} was commanded by a {{lang|de|[[Geschwaderkommodore]]}}, with the rank of either major, {{lang|de|[[Oberstleutnant]]}} ([[lieutenant colonel]]) or {{lang|de|[[Oberst]]}} ([[colonel]]). Other "staff" officers within the unit with administrative duties included the adjutant, technical officer, and operations officer, who were usually (though not always) experienced aircrew or pilots still flying on operations. Other specialist staff were navigation, signals, and intelligence personnel. A {{lang|de|Stabschwarm}} (headquarters [[Flight (military unit)|flight]]) was attached to each {{lang|de|Geschwader}}.<ref name="Luftwaffe Tactical Organisation"/>

A {{lang|de|Jagdgeschwader}} (hunting wing) (JG) was a single-seat day fighter {{lang|de|Geschwader}}, typically equipped with Bf 109 or Fw 190 aircraft flying in the fighter or fighter-bomber roles. Late in the war, by 1944–45, [[Jagdgeschwader 7|JG 7]] and [[Jagdgeschwader 400|JG 400]] (and the jet specialist [[Jagdverband 44|JV 44]]) flew much more advanced aircraft, with [[Jagdgeschwader 1 (World War II)|JG 1]] working up with the [[Heinkel He 162]] "emergency fighter" at war's end. A {{lang|de|Geschwader}} consisted of groups ({{lang|de|Gruppen}}), which in turn consisted of {{lang|de|Jagdstaffel}} (fighter squadrons). Hence, Fighter Wing 1 was JG 1, its first {{lang|de|Gruppe}} (group) was I./JG 1, using a [[Roman numerals|Roman numeral]] for the {{lang|de|Gruppe}} number only, and its first {{lang|de|Staffel}} (squadron) was 1./JG 1. {{lang|de|Geschwader}} strength was usually 120–125 aircraft.<ref name="Luftwaffe Tactical Organisation"/>

Each {{lang|de|Gruppe}} was commanded by a {{lang|de|Kommandeur}}, and a {{lang|de|Staffel}} by a {{lang|de|Staffelkapitän}}. However, these were "appointments", not ranks, within the Luftwaffe. Usually, the {{lang|de|Kommodore}} would hold the rank of {{lang|de|Oberstleutnant}} or, exceptionally, an {{lang|de|Oberst}}. Even a {{lang|de|Leutnant}} (second lieutenant) could find himself commanding a {{lang|de|Staffel}}.

Similarly, a bomber wing was a {{lang|de|Kampfgeschwader}} (KG), a night fighter wing was a {{lang|de|Nachtjagdgeschwader}} (NJG), a dive bomber wing was a {{lang|de|Stukageschwader}} (StG), and units equivalent to those in RAF Coastal Command, with specific responsibilities for coastal patrols and search and rescue duties, were {{lang|de|Küstenfliegergruppen}} (Kü.Fl. Gr.). Specialist bomber groups were known as {{lang|de|Kampfgruppen}} (KGr). The strength of a bomber {{lang|de|Geschwader}} was about 80–90 aircraft.<ref name="Luftwaffe Tactical Organisation"/>

===Personnel===
{{See also|Luftwaffe personnel structure|Ranks and insignia of the Luftwaffe (1935–1945)}}
{|class="wikitable floatright"
|+Luftwaffe strength during the fall of 1941<ref name="Zentner">{{harvnb|Zentner|1963|p=325}}</ref>
|-
! align="left" width="150" | Forces
! align="left" width="50" | Personnel strength
|-
| Flying units 
|style="text-align: right;"| 500,000
|-
| Anti-aircraft units 
|style="text-align: right;"| 500,000
|-
| Air signal units 
|style="text-align: right;"| 250,000
|-
| Construction units 
|style="text-align: right;"| 150,000
|-
| {{lang|de|[[Landsturm]]}} (militia) units 
|style="text-align: right;"| 36,000
|}
The peacetime strength of the Luftwaffe in the spring of 1939 was 370,000 men. After mobilisation in 1939 almost 900,000 men served, and just before [[Operation Barbarossa]] in 1941 personnel strength had reached 1.5 million men.<ref name="Zentner" /> The Luftwaffe reached its largest personnel strength during the period November 1943 to June 1944, with almost three million men and women in uniform; 1.7 million of these were male soldiers, 1 million male {{lang|de|[[Ranks and insignia of the German Army (1935–1945)#Armed Forces officials (Wehrmachtbeamte)|Wehrmachtsbeamte]]}} and civilian employees, and almost 300,000 female and male auxiliaries ({{lang|de|[[Luftwaffenhelfer]]}}).<ref>{{harvnb|Richhardt|2002|p=258}}</ref> In October 1944, the anti-aircraft units had 600,000 soldiers and 530,000 auxiliaries, including 60,000 male members of the {{lang|de|[[Reich Labour Service|Reichsarbeitsdienst]]}}, 50,000 {{lang|de|Luftwaffenhelfer}} (males age 15–17), 80,000 {{lang|de|Flakwehrmänner}} (males above military age) and {{lang|de|Flak-V-soldaten}} (males unfit for military service), and 160,000 female {{lang|de|Flakwaffenhelferinnen}} and {{lang|de|RAD-Maiden}}, as well as 160,000 foreign personnel ([[Hiwi (volunteer)|Hiwis]]).<ref>[http://zweiter-weltkrieg-lexikon.de/geschuetze-/13-flugabwehrkanonen-flak/1058-der-einsatz-von-behelfspersonal-bei-der-flak Der Einsatz von Behelfspersonal bei der Flak] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160921202651/http://zweiter-weltkrieg-lexikon.de/geschuetze-/13-flugabwehrkanonen-flak/1058-der-einsatz-von-behelfspersonal-bei-der-flak |date=21 September 2016}} Retrieved 15 September 2016.</ref><ref>[http://www.airpower.at/news03/0813_luftkrieg_ostmark/luftwaffe.htm Die Deutsche Luftwaffe in der Ostmark] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170426010724/http://www.airpower.at/news03/0813_luftkrieg_ostmark/luftwaffe.htm |date=26 April 2017}} Retrieved 15 September 2016.</ref>

===Spanish Civil War===
{{Main|Operational history of the Luftwaffe (1939–1945)|l1 = Operational history of the Luftwaffe (1939–1945)}}
[[File:Bundesarchiv Bild 183-H25224, Guernica, Ruinen.jpg|thumb|upright=1.35|[[Bombing of Guernica|Ruins of Guernica]], 1937]]
The Luftwaffe's Condor Legion experimented with new doctrine and aircraft during the Spanish Civil War. It helped the ''[[FET y de las JONS|Falange]]'' under [[Francisco Franco]] to defeat the Republican forces. Over 20,000 German airmen gained combat experience that would give the Luftwaffe an important advantage going into the Second World War. One infamous operation was the bombing of [[Guernica]] in the [[Basque Country (autonomous community)|Basque country]]. It is commonly assumed this attack was the result of a "terror doctrine" in Luftwaffe doctrine. The raids on Guernica and [[Madrid]] caused many civilian casualties and a wave of protests from abroad. It has been suggested that the bombing of Guernica was carried out for military tactical reasons, in support of ground operations, but the town was not directly involved in any fighting at that point in time. It was not until 1942 that the Germans started to develop a bombing policy in which civilians were the primary targets, although [[the Blitz]] on London and many other British cities involved indiscriminate bombing of civilian areas,<ref name="Corum 1997, p. 7"/> 'nuisance raids' which could even involve the machine-gunning of civilians and livestock.<ref>{{harvnb|Neitzel|Weltzer|2012|pp=57–58}}</ref>

===World War II===
[[File:Spitfires camera gun film shows tracer ammunition.jpg|thumb|left|[[Gun camera]] film showing tracer ammunition from a Supermarine Spitfire hitting a [[Heinkel He 111]] bomber on its starboard quarter]]
When World War II began in 1939, the Luftwaffe was one of the most technologically advanced air forces in the world. During the [[Invasion of Poland|Polish Campaign]] that triggered the war, it quickly established air superiority, and then air supremacy. It supported the German Army operations which ended the campaign in five weeks. The Luftwaffe's performance was as the OKL had hoped. The Luftwaffe rendered invaluable support to the army,<ref>{{harvnb|Hooton|2007b|p=93}}</ref> mopping up pockets of resistance. Göring was delighted with the performance.<ref>{{harvnb|Hooton|2007b|p=91}}</ref> Command and control problems occurred, but flexibility and improvisation in both the army and the Luftwaffe solved these problems. The Luftwaffe was to have in place a ground-to-air communication system, which played a vital role in the success of 1940's {{lang|de|[[Manstein Plan|Fall Gelb]]}}.<ref>{{harvnb|Buckley|1998|p=127}}</ref>

In the spring of 1940 the Luftwaffe assisted the {{lang|de|Kriegsmarine}} and {{lang|de|Heer}} in the [[Operation Weserübung|invasion of Norway]]. Flying in reinforcements and winning air superiority, the Luftwaffe contributed decisively to the German conquest.<ref>{{harvnb|Corum|1997|pp=274–275}}</ref>

In May and June 1940, the Luftwaffe contributed to the unexpected German success in the [[Battle of France]]. It destroyed three Allied Air Forces and helped secure the defeat of France in just over six weeks.<ref>{{harvnb|Corum|1997|pp= 275–277}}</ref> However, it could not [[Battle of Dunkirk|destroy the British Expeditionary Force at Dunkirk]] despite intense bombing. The [[British Expeditionary Force (World War II)|BEF]] escaped to continue the war.<ref>{{harvnb|Killen|2003|pp=114–116}}</ref>

During the Battle of Britain in summer 1940, the Luftwaffe inflicted severe damage on Britain's [[Royal Air Force]], but did not achieve the air superiority that Hitler had demanded for [[Operation Sea Lion|the proposed invasion of Britain]], which was postponed and then canceled in December 1940.<ref>{{harvnb|Killen|2003|p=149}}</ref> The Luftwaffe ravaged British cities during the Blitz of 1940–1941, but failed to break British morale, and the RAF shot down German planes by over a two to one ratio. Hitler had already ordered preparations for Operation Barbarossa, the invasion of the Soviet Union.

In spring 1941 the Luftwaffe helped its [[Axis powers|Axis]] partner, Italy, secure victory in the [[Balkans campaign (World War II)|Balkans Campaign]] and continued to support Italy or the [[Italian Social Republic]] in the [[Mediterranean and Middle East theatre of World War II|Mediterranean, Middle East and African theaters]] until May 1945.

In June 1941, Germany invaded the Soviet Union. Despite destroying [[German-Soviet air war 22 June 1941|thousands of Soviet aircraft]],<ref>
{{cite book
 | last1                = Stahel
 | first1               = David
 | author-link1         = David Stahel
 | year            = 2009
 | title                = Operation Barbarossa and Germany's Defeat in the East
 | url                  = https://books.google.com/books?id=k-bubnhoueEC
 | series               = Cambridge Military Histories
 | issn= 1754-758X
 | edition              = reprint
 | publisher            = Cambridge University Press
 | publication-date     = 2012
 | page                 = 301
 | isbn                 = 978-0521768474
 | access-date          = 16 July 2021
 | quote                = In the opening days of Barbarossa the Luftwaffe inflicted carnage on the Soviet air force [...]. One authority put the figure at 4,614 Soviet aircraft destroyed by the end of June, 3,176 of these being eliminated on  the ground and 1,438 in the air. By comparison, German losses amounted to just 330 planes.
}}
</ref> the Luftwaffe failed to destroy the [[Soviet Air Forces|Red Air Force]] altogether. Lacking strategic bombers (the very "Ural bombers" that Wever had asked for six years before) the Luftwaffe could not strike at Soviet production-centres regularly or with the needed force.<ref>{{harvnb|Killen|2003|pp= 171–184}}</ref> The [[Aerial warfare during Operation Barbarossa|Axis and Soviet air operations during Operation Barbarossa]] consumed vast numbers of men and planes. As the war dragged on, the Luftwaffe was eroded in strength. German defeats at the [[Battle of Stalingrad]] in 1942 and in the [[Battle of Kursk]] in 1943 ensured the gradual decline of the {{lang|de|Wehrmacht}} on the [[Eastern Front (World War II)|Eastern Front]].

British historian [[Frederick Taylor (historian)|Frederick Taylor]] asserts that "all sides bombed each other's cities during the war. Half a million Soviet citizens, for example, died from German [[Strategic bombing during World War II|bombing]] during the invasion and occupation of Russia. That's roughly equivalent to the number of German citizens who died from Allied raids."<ref name=Hawley>{{Cite news|first= Charles |last= Hawley |url=http://www.spiegel.de/international/0,1518,341239,00.html |title=Spiegel Interview: 'Dresden Bombing Is To Be Regretted Enormously' |work=[[Der Spiegel]] |date=11 February 2005 |access-date=2 February 2014 |archive-url= https://web.archive.org/web/20110629145324/http://www.spiegel.de/international/0,1518,341239,00.html |archive-date= 29 June 2011 |url-status=live}}</ref>

The Luftwaffe defended [[German-occupied Europe]] against the growing offensive power of [[RAF Bomber Command]] and, starting in the summer of 1942, the steadily building strength of the [[United States Army Air Forces]]. The mounting demands of the [[Defence of the Reich]] campaign gradually destroyed the Luftwaffe's fighter arm. Despite its belated use of advanced turbojet and rocket-propelled aircraft for bomber-destroyer duties, it was overwhelmed by Allied numbers and a lack of trained pilots and fuel. A last-ditch attempt, known as [[Operation Bodenplatte]], to win air superiority on 1 January 1945 failed. After the ''Bodenplatte'' effort, the Luftwaffe ceased to be an effective fighting force.
[[File:Adolf Hitler among soldiers at a field airport on the Eastern Front January 1943.jpg|thumb|[[Adolf Hitler]] visiting Luftwaffe soldiers January 1943.]]
German day- and night-fighter pilots claimed more than 70,000 aerial victories during World War II.<ref>{{harvnb|Dierich|1976|p=35}}</ref> Of these, an estimated 745 victories were attributed to [[Messerschmitt Me 262]] jet fighters.<ref>{{cite book| first1=Hugh |last1=Morgan |first2= John |last2=Weal |title=German Jet Aces of World War 2 |publisher= Osprey Publishing |series =Aircraft of the Aces No 17 |location= London |date=1998 |page= 78 |isbn=	9781855326347}}</ref> [[Anti-aircraft warfare|Flak]] shot down 25,000–30,000 Allied planes. Broken down according to the different Allied forces, about 25,000 were American planes,<ref>SAF/FMCE, USAF Summaries for 1945–2005, United States Air Force Statistical Digest, 1983</ref> about 20,000 British, 46,100 Soviet,<ref>Г. Ф. Кривошеев, Россия и СССР в войнах XX века – Потери вооруженных сил Статистическое исследование, Москва "Олма-Пресс", 2001, p. 430 (G. F. Krivoseev, Russia and USSR in the XX century wars. Armed forces losses: statistical research, Olma-Press, Moscow, 2001, p. 430)</ref> 1,274 French,<ref>E.R. Hooton, Luftwaffe at War – Blitzkrieg in the West: Volume 2, Chevron/Ian Allan, London, 2007 {{ISBN|978-1-85780-272-6}}</ref>{{page needed|date=December 2023}} 375 Polish,<ref>John Ellis, World War II: A Statistical Survey: The Essential Facts and Figures for All the Combatants, Facts on File Inc., 1993, p. 259</ref> and 81 Dutch as well as aircraft from other Allied nationalities.

The highest-scoring day-fighter pilot was [[Erich Hartmann]] with 352 confirmed kills, of which all but 7 were on the Eastern front against the Soviets. The leading aces in the west were [[Hans-Joachim Marseille]] with 158 kills (most of which were against British Commonwealth forces in the [[Desert campaign]]), and [[Georg-Peter Eder]] with 56 kills of aircraft from the USAAF (of a total of 78). The most successful night-fighter pilot, [[Heinz-Wolfgang Schnaufer]], is credited with 121 kills. 103 German fighter pilots shot down more than 100 enemy aircraft for a total of roughly 15,400 aerial victories. Roughly a further 360 pilots claimed between 40 and 100 aerial victories for round about 21,000 victories. Another 500 fighter pilots claimed between 20 and 40 victories for a total of 15,000 victories. Part of the reason German pilots scored such high victory totals was that they were in combat for the duration of the war-unlike the Allies, who rotated their flyers out of combat after a certain amount of time to recuperate or to impart their skills in training other pilots -  German pilots flew until they were killed, captured, or too badly wounded to keep flying. It is relatively certain that 2,500 German fighter pilots attained ace status, having achieved at least five aerial victories.<ref name=autogenerated2>{{harvnb|Obermaier|1989|p= 241}}</ref><ref>Uwe Feist, ''The Fighting Me 109'', Arms and Armour Press, London, 1993, p. 51</ref> These achievements were honored with 453 German single and twin-engine ([[Messerschmitt Bf 110]]) day-fighter pilots receiving the [[Knight's Cross of the Iron Cross]]. Intense personal rivalry may have played an important role in motivating high-performing aces (who scored the vast majority of aerial victories). Public recognition in the form of medals and mentions in the army bulletin spurred efforts of peers who had previously flown with award-winners<ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Ager |first1=Philipp |last2=Bursztyn |first2=Leonardo |last3=Leucht |first3=Lukas |last4=Voth |first4=Hans-Joachim |title=''Killer Incentives: Rivalry, Performance and Risk-Taking among German Fighter Pilots, 1939–45'' |journal=The Review of Economic Studies |volume=89 |issue=5 |date=October 2022 |pages=2257–2292 |doi=10.1093/restud/rdab085}}</ref>
. 85 night-fighter pilots, including 14 crew members, were awarded the Knight's Cross.<ref name=autogenerated1>{{harvnb|Obermaier|1989|p=14}}</ref> Some bomber pilots were also highly successful. ''Stuka'' and {{lang|de|Schlachtflieger}} pilot [[Hans-Ulrich Rudel]] flew 2,530 ground-attack missions and claimed the destruction of more than 519 tanks and a battleship, among others. He became the most highly decorated German serviceman of the Second World War. Bomber pilot [[Hansgeorg Bätcher]] flew more than 658 combat missions, destroying numerous ships and other targets.

Luftwaffe losses, on the other hand, were high as well. The estimated total number of destroyed and damaged for the war totalled 76,875 aircraft. Of these, about 43,000 were lost in combat, the rest in operational accidents and during training.<ref>Alessandro Giorgi, ''Chronology of World War II 1939–1945'', 2017</ref>{{page needed|date=December 2023}} By type, losses totalled 21,452 fighters, 12,037 bombers, 15,428 trainers, 10,221 twin-engine fighters, 5,548 ground attack craft, 6,733 reconnaissance planes, and 6,141 transports.<ref>John Ellis, ''World War II: A Statistical Survey: The Essential Facts and Figures for All the Combatants'', Facts on File Inc., 1993, p. 258</ref>

According to the General Staff of the {{lang|de|Wehrmacht}} the losses of the flight personnel until February 1945 amounted to:<ref name="Hahn, Fritz 1945">Hahn, Fritz. ''Waffen und Geheimwaffen des deutschen Heeres 1933–1945. Band I. Infanteriewaffen, Pionierwaffen, Artilleriewaffen, Pulver, Spreng- und Kampfstoffe''  Koblenz: Bernard & Graefe Verlag, 1986 – {{ISBN|3-7637-5830-5}}</ref>{{page needed|date=December 2023}}

{|class="wikitable" style=text-align:right;
!
!Officers
!Enlisted
|-
!Killed in action 
|6,527
|43,517
|-
!Wounded in action
|4,194
|27,811
|-
!Missing in action 
|4,361
|27,240
|-
!Total
|15,082
|98,568
|}

According to official statistics, total Luftwaffe casualties, including ground personnel, amounted to 138,596 killed and 156,132 missing through 31 January 1945.<ref>{{cite news |last1= Schramm |first1= Percy E. |title= Die deutschen Verluste im Zweiten Weltkrieg |url= https://www.zeit.de/1949/43/die-deutschen-verluste-im-zweiten-weltkrieg/ |work= Die Zeit |date= 21 November 2012 |language= de-DE |access-date= 1 February 2019 |archive-url= https://web.archive.org/web/20180710010422/https://www.zeit.de/1949/43/die-deutschen-verluste-im-zweiten-weltkrieg |archive-date= 10 July 2018 |url-status= live}}
</ref>