Editing Iran–Iraq War (section)

==Background==
===Iran–Iraq relations===
{{Main|Iran–Iraq relations|Shatt al-Arab dispute}}

[[File:1975 Algiers Agreement.jpg|thumb|A meeting of [[Mohammad Reza Pahlavi]], [[Houari Boumédiène]], and [[Saddam Hussein]] (left to right) during the Algiers Agreement in 1975]]
In April 1969, Iran abrogated the 1937 treaty over the [[Shatt al-Arab]] and Iranian ships stopped paying tolls to Iraq when they used the Shatt al-Arab.<ref>Karsh, Efraim ''The Iran–Iraq War 1980–1988'', London: Osprey, 2002 pp. 7–8</ref> The Shah argued that the 1937 treaty was unfair to Iran because almost all river borders around the world ran along the ''[[thalweg]]'', and because most of the ships that used the Shatt al-Arab were Iranian.<ref>Bulloch, John and Morris, Harvey ''The Gulf War'', London: Methuen, 1989 p. 37.</ref> Iraq threatened war over the Iranian move, but on 24 April 1969, an Iranian tanker escorted by Iranian warships ([[Joint Operation Arvand]]) sailed down the Shatt al-Arab, and Iraq—being the militarily weaker state—did nothing.<ref name="Karsh, Efraim page 8">Karsh, Efraim ''The Iran–Iraq War 1980–1988'', London: Osprey, 2002 p. 8</ref> The Iranian abrogation of the 1937 treaty marked the beginning of a period of acute Iraqi–Iranian tension that would see [[1974–75 Shatt al-Arab conflict|significant bloodshed]] and was to last until the [[1975 Algiers Agreement|Algiers Agreement of 1975]].<ref name="Karsh, Efraim page 8"/>

The relationship between the governments of Iran and Iraq briefly improved in 1978, when Iranian agents in Iraq discovered plans for a pro-Soviet ''coup d'état'' against Iraq's government. When informed of this plot, Saddam ordered the execution of dozens of his army's officers, and in a sign of reconciliation, expelled from Iraq [[Ruhollah Khomeini]], an exiled leader of clerical opposition to the Shah.<ref name="Farrokh 03" /><ref name=iranchamber-iraniraqwar>{{cite web|url=http://www.iranchamber.com/history/iran_iraq_war/iran_iraq_war1.php|title=Iran–Iraq War 1980–1988|work=History of Iran|publisher=Iran Chamber Society|access-date=29 June 2012|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20171011172148/http://www.iranchamber.com/history/iran_iraq_war/iran_iraq_war1.php|archive-date=11 October 2017|url-status=live}}</ref>

===After the Iranian Revolution===
{{See also|Iranian Revolution|Consolidation of the Iranian Revolution|Iran hostage crisis|Iranian Embassy siege|Iraqi invasion of Iran}}

Tensions between Iraq and Iran were fuelled by Iran's Islamic revolution and its appearance of being a [[Pan-Islamism|Pan-Islamic]] force, in contrast to Iraq's [[Arab nationalism]].<ref>{{cite journal|last1=Asadzade|first1=Peyman|title=War and Religion: The Iran−Iraq War|journal=Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics|date=2019|doi=10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.013.812|isbn=978-0190228637|url=https://oxfordre.com/politics/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.001.0001/acrefore-9780190228637-e-812|access-date=21 April 2020|archive-date=23 October 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201023123429/https://oxfordre.com/politics/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.001.0001/acrefore-9780190228637-e-812|url-status=live}}</ref> Despite Iraq's goal of regaining the [[Shatt al-Arab]]{{NoteTag|Called ''Arvand Rood'' ({{lang|fa|اروندرود}}) in Iran and ''Shatt al-Arab'' ({{lang|ar|شط العرب}}) in Iraq|name=waterway}}, the Iraqi government initially seemed to welcome the [[Iranian revolution]], which overthrew Shah [[Mohammad Reza Pahlavi]], who was seen as a common enemy.<ref name=efraimkarsh /> There were frequent clashes along the Iran–Iraq border throughout 1980, with Iraq publicly complaining of at least 544 incidents and Iran citing at least 797 violations of its border and airspace.<ref name="Cambridge University Press">{{cite book|last1=Murray|first1=Williamson|last2=Woods|first2=Kevin M.|title=The Iran–Iraq War, A Military and Strategic History|chapter=A context of 'bitterness and anger'|publisher=[[Cambridge University Press]]|year=2014|isbn=978-1107062290|pages=58–59 (e-book, page numbers approximate)}}</ref>

[[File:Portrait of Ruhollah Khomeini.jpg|thumb|255x255px|[[Ruhollah Khomeini]] rose to power after the [[Iranian revolution]].]]
[[Ayatollah]] Ruhollah Khomeini called on Iraqis to overthrow the Ba'ath government, which was received with considerable anger in Baghdad.<ref name=efraimkarsh /> On 17 July 1979, despite Khomeini's call, Saddam gave a speech praising the Iranian Revolution and called for an Iraqi–Iranian friendship based on non-interference in each other's internal affairs.<ref name=efraimkarsh /> When Khomeini rejected Saddam's overture by calling for Islamic revolution in Iraq,<ref name="Farrokh 03" /> Saddam was alarmed.<ref name=efraimkarsh /> Iran's new Islamic administration was regarded in [[Baghdad]] as an irrational, existential threat to the Ba'ath government, especially because the Ba'ath party, having a secular nature, discriminated against and posed a threat to the fundamentalist [[Shia]] movement in Iraq, whose clerics were Iran's allies within Iraq and whom Khomeini saw as oppressed.<ref name=efraimkarsh />

On 1 April 1980, the [[Islamic Dawa Party]], an Iraqi Islamist group with supportive ties to Iran, attempted to assassinate [[Tariq Aziz]], a high ranking Ba'athist and Iraq's deputy prime minister, in retaliation for a 30 March decree declaring "membership of Dawa [to be] a capital offense".<ref>{{cite book|last1=Murray|first1=Williamson|last2=Woods|first2=Kevin M.|title=The Iran–Iraq War, A Military and Strategic History|chapter=A context of 'bitterness and anger'|publisher=[[Cambridge University Press]]|year=2014|isbn=978-1107062290|pages=57–58 (e-book, page numbers approximate)}}</ref> The attempt failed and instead killed several civilians.<ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.theguardian.com/Iraq/Story/0,2763,943280,00.html|title=Christian outsider in Saddam's inner circle|work=The Guardian|location=London, UK|access-date=24 December 2007|first=Brian|last=Whitaker|date=25 April 2003}}</ref> This failed assassination plot, carried out by an Iran-backed group, formed a part of Iraq's [[casus belli]] for the invasion of Iran.<ref name=gsick03>{{cite journal|last=Sick|first=Gary|title=Iran: Confronting terrorism|journal=The Washington Quarterly|year=2003|volume=26|issue=4|pages=83–98|doi=10.1162/016366003322387127|s2cid=153688389}}</ref> Iraq's immediate response was to order the [[Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr#Execution|execution]] of [[Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr]], an Iraqi Shi'ite cleric seen as the public face of the Dawa movement, along with al-Sadr's sister.<ref>{{cite book|last1=Murray|first1=Williamson|last2=Woods|first2=Kevin M.|title=The Iran–Iraq War, A Military and Strategic History|chapter=A context of 'bitterness and anger'|publisher=[[Cambridge University Press]]|year=2014|isbn=978-1107062290|pages=57–58, 145–146 (e-book, page numbers approximate)}}</ref> On 30 April, Iraq organised [[Iranian Embassy siege|an attack on the Iranian embassy in London]].<ref name="Cambridge University Press"/>

Saddam's primary interest in war may have also stemmed from his desire to right the supposed "wrong" of the [[Algiers Agreement (1975)|Algiers Agreement]], in addition to finally achieving his desire of becoming the regional superpower.<ref name="Farrokh 03" /><ref>{{cite book|last1=Murray|first1=Williamson|last2=Woods|first2=Kevin M.|title=The Iran–Iraq War, A Military and Strategic History|chapter=A context of 'bitterness and anger'|publisher=[[Cambridge University Press]]|year=2014|isbn=978-1107062290|pages=61–62 (e-book, page numbers approximate)|quote=Certainly Saddam believed that the oil-rich areas of Arabistan (Khuzestan) were within his reach, a goal his intelligence services seemed delighted to further.}}</ref> Saddam's goal was to supplant [[Egypt]] as the "leader of the Arab world" and to achieve [[hegemony]] over the Persian Gulf.<ref name="Brittanica Saddam Hussein">{{cite web|title=Britannica Online Encyclopedia: Saddam Hussein|url=https://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/277539/Saddam-Hussein/284496/Presidency|access-date=28 October 2012|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150503191210/https://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/277539/Saddam-Hussein/284496/Presidency|archive-date=3 May 2015|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{cite book|author-link=Kanan Makiya|last=Makiya|first=Kanan|title=Republic of Fear: The Politics of Modern Iraq|edition=Updated|url=https://archive.org/details/republicoffearpo00maki|url-access=registration|publisher=[[University of California Press]]|year=1998|isbn=978-0520921245|page=273}}</ref> He saw Iran's increased weakness due to revolution, sanctions, and international isolation.<ref name=AggrPolitics>{{cite book|title=The Iran–Iraq War: The Politics of Aggression|year=1993|publisher=University Press of Florida|location=Gainesville|isbn=978-0-8130-1177-6|editor=Rajaee, Farhang}}</ref> Saddam had invested heavily in Iraq's military since his defeat against Iran in 1975, buying large amounts of weaponry from the Soviet Union and France. Between 1973 and 1980 alone, Iraq purchased an estimated 1,600 tanks and [[Armoured personnel carrier|APC]]s and over 200 Soviet-made aircraft.<ref>{{cite book|last1=Murray|first1=Williamson|last2=Woods|first2=Kevin M.|title=The Iran–Iraq War, A Military and Strategic History|chapter=The opponents|publisher=[[Cambridge University Press]]|year=2014|isbn=978-1107062290|pages=71–73 (e-book, page numbers approximate)}}</ref>

By 1980, Iraq possessed 242,000 soldiers, second only to [[Egypt]] in the Arab world,<ref>{{cite book|author-link=Kanan Makiya|last=Makiya|first=Kanan|title=Republic of Fear: The Politics of Modern Iraq|edition=Updated|url=https://archive.org/details/republicoffearpo00maki|url-access=registration|publisher=[[University of California Press]]|year=1998|isbn=978-0520921245|pages=33–34}}</ref> 2,350 tanks<ref>{{cite book|last1=Murray|first1=Williamson|last2=Woods|first2=Kevin M.|title=The Iran–Iraq War, A Military and Strategic History|chapter=The opponents|publisher=[[Cambridge University Press]]|year=2014|isbn=978-1107062290|pages=77–79 (e-book, page numbers approximate)}}</ref> and 340 combat aircraft.<ref>{{cite book|last1=Murray|first1=Williamson|last2=Woods|first2=Kevin M.|title=The Iran–Iraq War, A Military and Strategic History|chapter=The opponents|publisher=[[Cambridge University Press]]|year=2014|isbn=978-1107062290|pages=79–80 (e-book, page numbers approximate)}}</ref> Watching the disintegration of the powerful Iranian army that frustrated him in 1974–1975, he saw an opportunity to attack, using the threat of Islamic Revolution as a pretext.<ref name="Fürtig">{{cite journal|title=Den Spieß umgedreht: iranische Gegenoffensive im Ersten Golfkrieg|trans-title=Turning of the Tables: the Iranian counter-offensive during the first Gulf War|first=Henner|last=Fürtig|language=de|journal=[[Damals]]|issue=5|year=2012|pages=10–13}}</ref><ref name="Murray and Woods pp. 104-106">{{cite book|last1=Murray|first1=Williamson|last2=Woods|first2=Kevin M.|title=The Iran–Iraq War, A Military and Strategic History|chapter=1980: The Iraqi invasion begins|publisher=[[Cambridge University Press]]|year=2014|isbn=978-1107062290|pages=104–106 (e-book, page numbers approximate)|quote=While the evidence now available suggests the skirmishes were more a convenient excuse for war, questions still remain.}}</ref> Iraqi [[Directorate of General Military Intelligence|military intelligence]] reported in July 1980 that despite Iran's bellicose rhetoric, "it is clear that, at present, Iran has no power to launch wide offensive operations against Iraq, or to defend on a large scale."<ref>{{cite book|last1=Murray|first1=Williamson|last2=Woods|first2=Kevin M.|title=The Iran–Iraq War, A Military and Strategic History|chapter=A context of 'bitterness and anger'|publisher=[[Cambridge University Press]]|year=2014|isbn=978-1107062290|pages=59–61, 63 (e-book, page numbers approximate)}}</ref><ref>{{cite journal|author-link=Hal Brands|last=Brands|first=Hal|url=https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/10.1080/14682745.2011.564612|title=Saddam Hussein, the United States, and the invasion of Iran: was there a green light?|journal=[[Cold War History (journal)|Cold War History]]|volume=12|issue=2|year=2012|publisher=[[Routledge]]|page=334|doi=10.1080/14682745.2011.564612|s2cid=154354622|access-date=15 February 2022|archive-date=15 February 2022|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220215093258/https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/10.1080/14682745.2011.564612|url-status=live|issn=1468-2745}}</ref> Days before the Iraqi invasion and in the midst of rapidly escalating cross-border skirmishes, Iraqi military intelligence again reiterated on 14 September that "the enemy deployment organization does not indicate hostile intentions and appears to be taking on a more defensive mode".<ref>{{cite book|last1=Murray|first1=Williamson|last2=Woods|first2=Kevin M.|title=The Iran–Iraq War, A Military and Strategic History|chapter=1980: The Iraqi invasion begins|publisher=[[Cambridge University Press]]|year=2014|isbn=978-1107062290|pages=103–106 (e-book, page numbers approximate)}}</ref>

Some scholars writing prior to the opening of formerly classified Iraqi archives, such as Alistair Finlan, argued that Saddam was drawn into a conflict with Iran due to the border clashes and Iranian meddling in Iraqi domestic affairs. Finlan stated in 2003 that the Iraqi invasion was meant to be a limited operation in order to send a political message to the Iranians to keep out of Iraqi domestic affairs,<ref>{{cite book|last1=Finlan|first1=Alistair|title=Essential Histories – The Gulf War 1991|date=2003|publisher=Routledge|location=New York|isbn=0-203-57971-2|page=1}}</ref> whereas Kevin M. Woods and Williamson Murray stated in 2014 that the balance of evidence suggests Saddam was seeking "a convenient excuse for war" in 1980.<ref name="Murray and Woods pp. 104-106"/>

On 8 March 1980, Iran announced it was withdrawing its ambassador from Iraq, downgraded its diplomatic ties to the [[charge d'affaires]] level, and demanded that Iraq do the same.<ref name=efraimkarsh /> The following day, Iraq declared Iran's ambassador [[persona non grata]], and demanded his withdrawal from Iraq by 15 March.<ref name=cia80>{{cite report|url=http://www.foia.cia.gov/docs/DOC_0001251999/DOC_0001251999.pdf|title=National Intelligence Daily|publisher=Central Intelligence Agency|date=10 March 1980|url-status=dead|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20101105212626/http://www.foia.cia.gov/docs/DOC_0001251999/DOC_0001251999.pdf|archive-date=5 November 2010}}</ref>

===Iranian military preparations===

In Iran, severe officer purges, including numerous executions ordered by [[Sadegh Khalkhali]], the new [[Islamic Revolutionary Court|Revolutionary Court]] judge, and shortages of spare parts for Iran's American and British-made equipment had crippled Iran's once-mighty [[military of Iran|military]]. Between February and September 1979, Iran's government executed 85 senior generals and forced all [[Major general|major-generals]] and most [[Brigadier general|brigadier-generals]] into early retirement.<ref name=efraimkarsh />

[[File:Abulhassan Banisadr iran iraq war.jpg|thumb|Iranian President [[Abolhassan Banisadr]], who was also commander-in-chief, inspecting a Jeep-mounted [[M40 recoilless rifle|106mm recoilless anti-tank gun]]]]

By September 1980, the revolutionary government had purged some 12,000 officers of all levels from the army. These purges drastically reduced the Iranian military's operational capacities.<ref name="efraimkarsh" />

On the eve of the revolution in 1978, international experts in military science had deemed Iran's armed forces the world's fifth most powerful.<ref name="farmanfarmaian11">{{cite news|url=http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2011/02/201121393446561799.html|publisher=Al Jazeera|title=What makes a revolution succeed?|date=14 February 2011|last=Farmanfarmaian|first=Roxane|access-date=1 October 2012|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20121105001633/http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2011/02/201121393446561799.html|archive-date=5 November 2012|url-status=live}}</ref> However, by the eve of war with Iraq, the recently formidable Iranian army was in many crucial ways a shell of its former self, having been badly weakened by losses in experienced personnel. The desertion rate had reached 60%, the officer corps was devastated and its most highly skilled soldiers and aviators had been exiled, imprisoned, or executed. When the invasion occurred, many pilots and officers were released from prison, or had their executions commuted to combat the Iraqis. Throughout the war, Iran never managed to fully recover from this [[brain drain|flight of human capital]].<ref name="parstimes">{{cite web|url=http://www.parstimes.com/history/national_security.html|title=National Security|work=Pars Times|access-date=8 September 2012|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130515172515/http://www.parstimes.com/history/national_security.html|archive-date=15 May 2013|url-status=live}}</ref>

Many junior officers were promoted to generals, resulting in the army being more integrated as a part of the regime by the war's end.<ref name="parstimes" /> Meanwhile, a new [[paramilitary]] organisation gained prominence in Iran, the [[Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps]].<ref name="Ottolenghi 2011">{{cite web|last=Ottolenghi|first=Emanuelle|title=The Pasdaran: Inside Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps|url=http://www.defenddemocracy.org/media-hit/the-pasdaran-inside-irans-islamic-revolutionary-guard-corps/|date=3 September 2011|publisher=Foundation for Defense of Democracies|access-date=13 October 2012|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120625224142/http://www.defenddemocracy.org/media-hit/the-pasdaran-inside-irans-islamic-revolutionary-guard-corps|archive-date=25 June 2012|url-status=live}}</ref> Created to protect the new regime and serve as a counterbalance to the army, the ''Revolutionary Guards''{{efn| Also known in Iran as the ''Sepah-e-Pasdaran''}} (IRGC) had been trained to act only as a militia and struggled to adapt as needed following the Iraqi invasion, initially refusing to fight alongside the regular army, resulting in many defeats. It was not until 1982 that the two groups began carrying out combined operations.<ref name="pollack04">{{cite book|last=Pollack|first=Kenneth M.|title=Arabs at War: Military Effectiveness, 1948–1991|year=2004|publisher=University of Nebraska Press|location=Lincoln|isbn=978-0-8032-8783-9|chapter=Iraq}}</ref>

An additional paramilitary militia was founded in response to the invasion, the "Army of 20 Million", commonly known as the [[Basij]].<ref name="Alfoneh 2010">{{cite web|last=Alfoneh|first=Ali|title=The Basij Resistance Force|url=http://iranprimer.usip.org/resource/basij-resistance-force|work=The Iran Primer|date=6 October 2010|publisher=United States Institute of Peace|access-date=13 October 2012|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130120132917/http://iranprimer.usip.org/resource/basij-resistance-force|archive-date=20 January 2013|url-status=dead}}</ref> The Basij were poorly armed and had members as young as 12 and as old as 70. They often acted in conjunction with the Revolutionary Guard, launching so-called [[human wave attack]]s and other campaigns against the Iraqis.<ref name="Alfoneh 2010" /> They were subordinate to the Revolutionary Guard, and they made up most of the manpower that was used in the Revolutionary Guard's attacks.<ref name="Farrokh 03" />

Stephen Pelletiere wrote in his 1992 book ''The Iran–Iraq War: Chaos in a Vacuum'':

{{blockquote|The human wave has been largely misconstrued both by the popular media in the West and by many scholars. The Iranians did not merely assemble masses of individuals, point them at the enemy, and order a charge. The waves were made up of the 22-man squads mentioned above [in response to Khomeini's call for the people to come to Iran's defence, each mosque organised 22 volunteers into a squad]. Each squad was assigned a specific objective. In battle, they would surge forward to accomplish their missions, and thus gave the impression of a human wave pouring against enemy lines.<ref>''The Iran–Iraq War: Chaos in a Vacuum''. Stephen C. Pelletiere{{ISBN missing|date=September 2024}}</ref>{{page needed|date=September 2024}}}}

Despite neglect by the new regime, at the outset of the conflict, Iran still had at least 1,000 operational tanks and several hundred functional aircraft and could [[cannibalization (parts)|cannibalise]] equipment to procure spare parts.{{efn| A resort that became increasingly necessary as the war continued. Though Iran could and did acquire weapons from multiple foreign manufacturers; the pre-revolution arsenal was composed overwhelmingly of US made weaponry, meaning obtaining additional spare parts was not an option.}}<ref name="pollack04" /> Continuous sanctions greatly limited Iran from acquiring many additional heavy weapons, including tanks and aircraft.<ref name="parstimes" />

===Iraqi military preparations===
[[File:Locator map Iran Khuzestan Province.png|thumb|The location of [[Khuzestan province]] in Iran, which Iraq planned to annex]]

In addition, the area around the [[Shatt al-Arab]] posed no obstacle for Iraqi river-crossing equipment. Iraq correctly deduced that Iran's defences at the crossing points around the [[Karkheh River|Karkheh]] and [[Karoun]] Rivers were undermanned and that the rivers could be easily crossed. Iraqi intelligence was also informed that the Iranian forces in [[Khuzestan province]], which consisted of two divisions prior to the revolution, now only consisted of several ill-equipped and under-strength [[battalion]]s with only a handful of operational [[company (military unit)|company]]-sized tank units.<ref name="iranchamber-iraniraqwar" />

The only qualms the Iraqis had were over the [[Islamic Republic of Iran Air Force]] (formerly the [[Imperial Iranian Air Force]]). Despite the purge of several key pilots and commanders, as well as the lack of spare parts, the air force showed its power during local uprisings and rebellions. They were also active after the failed U.S. attempt to rescue [[Iran hostage crisis|its hostages]], [[Operation Eagle Claw]]. Based on these observations, Iraq's leaders decided to carry out a surprise [[airstrike]] against the Iranian air force's infrastructure prior to the main invasion.<ref name=iranchamber-iraniraqwar />

=== Khuzestan ===
It is widely accepted among scholars that Iraq sought to annex,<ref>{{cite book|last1=Murray|first1=Williamson|title=The Iran–Iraq War, A Military and Strategic History|last2=Woods|first2=Kevin M.|publisher=[[Cambridge University Press]]|year=2014|isbn=9781107062290|pages=61–62 (e-book, page numbers approximate)|chapter=A context of 'bitterness and anger'|quote=Certainly Saddam believed that the oil-rich areas of Arabistan (Khuzestan) were within his reach, a goal his intelligence services seemed delighted to further.}}</ref> or at least to establish [[suzerainty]] over,<ref name="Britannica Iran–Iraq War">{{cite encyclopedia|title=Iran–Iraq War|encyclopedia=[[Encyclopædia Britannica]]|url=https://www.britannica.com/event/Iran-Iraq-War|access-date=2021-09-02|archive-date=30 August 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210830211148/https://www.britannica.com/event/Iran-Iraq-War|url-status=live}}</ref> Iran's [[Khuzestan province]], but Saddam Hussein publicly denied this in November 1980.<ref>Ariane M. Tabatabai, ''No Conquest, No Defeat: Iran's National Security Strategy'', Oxford University Press, 2020, p. 198. {{ISBN?}}</ref>

===Border conflicts leading up to the war===
{{Main|Iraqi invasion of Iran#Border conflicts}}

[[File:Shatt al arab.png|thumb|The [[Shatt al-Arab]] on the [[Iran–Iraq border]]]]

On 10 September 1980, Iraq forcibly reclaimed territories in Zain al-Qaws and Saif Saad that it had been promised under the terms of the [[1975 Algiers Agreement]] but that Iran had never handed over, leading to both Iran and Iraq voiding the treaty, on 14 September and 17 September, respectively. As a result, the only outstanding border dispute between Iran and Iraq at the time of the Iraqi invasion of 22 September was the question of whether Iranian ships would fly Iraqi flags and pay Iraq navigation fees for a stretch of the Shatt al-Arab river spanning several miles.<ref>{{cite book|last1=Murray|first1=Williamson|last2=Woods|first2=Kevin M.|title=The Iran–Iraq War, A Military and Strategic History|chapter=A context of 'bitterness and anger'|publisher=[[Cambridge University Press]]|year=2014|isbn=978-1107062290|pages=62–63 (e-book, page numbers approximate)|quote=On 7 September 1980, Iraq accused Iran of shelling Iraqi villages in the territories of Zain al-Qaws and Saif Saad on 4 September 1980. Iraq demanded that the Iranian forces in those territories evacuate and return the villages to Iraq. Tehran gave no reply. Iraqi forces then moved to 'liberate' the villages, and on 10 September announced that its forces had done so in a short, sharp military engagement.&nbsp;... On 14 September 1980, Iran announced it would no longer abide by the 1975 Algiers Agreement. Given the scene that was set, it was no surprise that on 17 September, five days before the invasion, Iraq declared the accords null and void.&nbsp;... On 22 September, Iraqi units crossed the frontier.}}</ref><ref>{{cite book|author-link=Kanan Makiya|last=Makiya|first=Kanan|title=Republic of Fear: The Politics of Modern Iraq|edition=Updated|url=https://archive.org/details/republicoffearpo00maki|url-access=registration|publisher=[[University of California Press]]|year=1998|isbn=978-0520921245|page=270|quote=There remains the issue of sovereignty over Shatt al-Arab.&nbsp;... Granted that this might have been a genuine motive for abrogating the 1975 treaty, and reclaiming title to the whole Shatt, what was the point of the invasion on September 22? Iraq had taken back by unilateral action on September 10 the only strips of territory it still claimed under the treaty. There was no longer any 'territory' as such on the other side to conquer. The Ba'th had already followed the Shah's example of 1971 when he unilaterally took over the three islands in the Gulf.}}</ref>