Editing Ion Antonescu (section)

==Biography==

===Early life and career===
Born in the town of [[Pitești]], north-west of the capital [[Bucharest]], Antonescu was the [[Lineal descendant|scion]] of an [[upper-middle class]] [[Romanian Orthodox Church|Romanian Orthodox]] family with some military tradition.<ref name="d372">Deletant, p. 37</ref> He was especially close to his mother, Lița Baranga, who survived his death.<ref>Deletant, pp. 70, 257</ref> His father, an army officer, wanted Ion to follow in his footsteps and thus sent him to attend the Infantry and Cavalry School in [[Craiova]].<ref name="d37">Deletant, p. 37</ref> During his childhood, his father divorced his mother to marry a woman who was a Jewish convert to Orthodoxy.<ref name="Ancel pages 463-479">Ancel, Jean "Antonescu and the Jews" pp. 463–479 from ''The Holocaust and History The Known, the Unknown, the Disputed and the Reexamined'' edited by Michael Berenbaum and Abraham Peck, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1998 p. 465.</ref> The breakup of his parents' marriage was a traumatic event for the young Antonescu, and he made no secret of his dislike of his stepmother, whom he always depicted as a ''femme fatale'' who destroyed what he saw as his parents' happy marriage.<ref name="Ancel pages 463-479"/>

According to one account, Antonescu was briefly a classmate of [[Wilhelm Filderman]], the future [[History of the Jews in Romania|Romanian Jewish community]] activist whose interventions with ''Conducător'' Antonescu helped save a number of his coreligionists.<ref>Penkower, pp. 152–153</ref> After graduation, in 1904, Antonescu joined the Romanian Army with the rank of Second Lieutenant. He spent the following two years attending courses at the Special Cavalry Section in [[Târgoviște]].<ref name=d37/> Reportedly, Antonescu was a zealous and goal-setting student, upset by the slow pace of promotions, and compensated for his diminutive stature through toughness.<ref name="r1">Delia Radu, [http://www.bbc.co.uk/romanian/news/story/2008/08/080801_serial_antonescu_episod1.shtml "Serialul 'Ion Antonescu și asumarea istoriei' (1)"], [[BBC]], Romanian edition, 1 August 2008.</ref> In time, the reputation of being a tough and ruthless commander, together with his reddish hair, earned him the nickname ''Câinele Roșu'' ("The Red Dog").<ref name=r1/> Antonescu also developed a reputation for questioning his commanders and for appealing over their heads whenever he felt they were wrong.<ref name=r1/>

During the repression of the [[1907 Romanian Peasants' Revolt|1907 peasants' revolt]], he headed a cavalry unit in [[Covurlui County]].<ref name=d37/><ref name=r1/> Opinions on his role in the events diverge: while some historians believe Antonescu was a particularly violent participant in quelling the revolt,<ref name=r1/><ref name=fv301>Veiga, p. 301</ref> others equate his participation with that of regular officers<ref name=r1/> or view it as outstandingly tactful.<ref name=d37/> In addition to restricting peasant protests, Antonescu's unit subdued [[Socialism|socialist]] activities in [[Galați]] port.<ref name=fv301/> His handling of the situation earned him praise from [[King of Romania|King]] [[Carol I of Romania|Carol I]], who sent Crown Prince (future monarch) [[Ferdinand I of Romania|Ferdinand]] to congratulate him in front of the whole garrison.<ref name=d37/> The following year, Antonescu was promoted to Lieutenant, and, between 1911 and 1913, he attended the [[Carol I National Defence University|Advanced War School]], receiving the rank of Captain upon graduation.<ref name=d37/> In 1913, during the [[Second Balkan War]] against [[Bulgaria]], Antonescu served as a [[Staff (military)|staff officer]] in the First Cavalry Division in [[Dobruja]].<ref name=d37/>

===World War I===
[[File:1916 - Generalul Prezan, Olga Prezan, Olga Prezan, o rudă, maior Ion Antonescu, căpitan M. Tomaide - văr lui Antonescu.PNG|thumb|upright=1.2|left|Major Ion Antonescu (second from the right) with General [[Constantin Prezan]] and his wife Olga Prezan (first and second from the left, respectively), 1916]]
{{Fascism in Romania|people}}
[[File:Ofițerii Secția Operațiuni Marele Cartier General Român 1918.jpg|thumb|Antonescu (''bottom row, centre'') with the other officers of the Section "Operations" of the wartime General Staff (''Marele Cartier General''), end of March 1918]]
After 1916, when Romania entered World War I on the [[Allies of World War I|Allied]] side, Ion Antonescu acted as chief of staff for General [[Constantin Prezan]].<ref name=d37/> When enemy troops crossed the mountains from [[Transylvania]] into [[Wallachia]], Antonescu was ordered to design a defence plan for Bucharest.<ref name=d37/>

The Romanian royal court, army, and administration were subsequently forced to retreat into [[Moldavia]]. Antonescu took part in an important decision involving defensive efforts, an unusual promotion which probably stoked his ambitions.<ref name=r1/> In December, as Prezan became the [[Chief of the Romanian General Staff|Chief of the General Staff]], Antonescu, who was by now a major, was named the head of operations, being involved in the defence of Moldavia. He contributed to the tactics used during the [[Battle of Mărășești]] (July–August 1917), when Romanians under General [[Eremia Grigorescu]] managed to stop the advance of German forces under the command of Field Marshal [[August von Mackensen]].<ref>Deletant, pp. 37–38</ref> Being described as "a talented if prickly individual",<ref>Prit Buttar, [[Bloomsbury Publishing]], 22 September 2016, ''Russia's Last Gasp: The Eastern Front 1916–17'', p. 320</ref> Antonescu lived in Prezan's proximity for the remainder of the war and influenced his decisions.<ref name=d38>Deletant, p. 38</ref> Such was the influence of Antonescu on General Prezan that General [[Alexandru Averescu]] used the formula "Prezan (Antonescu)" in his memoirs to denote Prezan's plans and actions.<ref>Larry Watts, Eastern European Monographs, 1993, ''Romanian Cassandra'', p. 43</ref>

That autumn, Romania's main ally, the [[Russian Provisional Government]], left the conflict. Its successor, [[Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic|Bolshevik Russia]], made peace with the [[Central Powers]], leaving Romania the only enemy of the Central Powers on the [[Eastern Front (World War I)|Eastern Front]]. In these conditions, the Romanian government made its own [[Treaty of Bucharest (1918)|peace treaty with the Central Powers]]. Romania broke the treaty later in the year, on the grounds that King Ferdinand I had not signed it. During the interval, Antonescu, who viewed the separate peace as "the most rational solution," was assigned command over a cavalry regiment.<ref name=d38/> The renewed offensive played a part in ensuring the [[union of Transylvania with Romania]]. After the war, Antonescu's merits as an operations officer were noticed by, among others, politician [[Ion G. Duca]], who wrote that "his [Antonescu's] intelligence, skill and activity, brought credit on himself and invaluable service to the country."<ref name=d38/> Another event occurring late in the war is also credited with having played a major part in Antonescu's life: in 1918, Crown Prince [[Carol II of Romania|Carol]] (the future King Carol II) left his army posting to marry a commoner. This outraged Antonescu, who developed enduring contempt for the future king.<ref name=r1/>

===Diplomatic assignments and General Staff positions===
[[File:AntonescuYCodreanu1935.jpg|thumb|right|General Antonescu (''left'') with [[Corneliu Zelea Codreanu]], ''Căpitan'' of the Iron Guard, at a skiing event in 1935]]
Lieutenant Colonel Ion Antonescu retained his visibility in the public eye during the interwar period. He participated in the political campaign to earn recognition at the [[Paris Peace Conference, 1919|Paris Peace Conference]] of 1919 for Romania's gains in Transylvania. His nationalist argument about a future state was published as the essay ''Românii. Origina<!-- sic -->, trecutul, sacrificiile și drepturile lor'' ("The Romanians. Their Origin, Their Past, Their Sacrifices and Their Rights"). The booklet advocated extension of Romanian rule beyond the confines of [[Greater Romania]], and recommended, at the risk of war with the emerging [[Kingdom of Yugoslavia]], the annexation of all [[Banat]] areas and the [[Timok Valley]].<ref>Haynes, pp. 113, 115</ref> Antonescu was known for his frequent and erratic changes of mood, going from being extremely angry to being calm to angry again to being calm again within minutes, behaviour that often disoriented those who had to work with him.<ref name="Ancel pages 463-479"/> The Israeli historian [[Jean Ancel]] wrote that Antonescu's frequent changes of mood were due to the syphilis he contracted as a young man, a condition he suffered from for the rest of his life.<ref name="Ancel pages 463-479"/>

He became attache in Paris in 1922. He negotiated a credit worth 100 million French francs to purchase French weaponry.<ref>Martin Thomas, "To arm an ally: French arms sales to Romania, 1926–1940." ''Journal of Strategic Studies'' 19.2 (1996): 231–259.</ref> He worked together with Romanian diplomat [[Nicolae Titulescu]]; the two became personal friends.<ref name="d39">Deletant, p. 39.</ref> He was also in contact with the Romanian-born conservative aristocrat and writer [[Marthe Bibesco]], who introduced Antonescu to the ideas of [[Gustave Le Bon]], a researcher of [[crowd psychology]] who had an influence on Fascism.<ref name="jvg186">[[Jaap van Ginneken]], ''Crowds, Psychology, and Politics, 1871–1899'', [[Cambridge University Press]], Cambridge, 1992, p. 186. {{ISBN|0-521-40418-5}}.</ref> Bibesco saw Antonescu as a new version of 19th century nationalist Frenchman [[Georges Boulanger]], introducing him as such to Le Bon.<ref name=jvg186/> In 1923, he made the acquaintance of lawyer [[Mihai Antonescu]], who was to become his close friend, legal representative and political associate.<ref>Deletant, pp. 301–302</ref>

After returning to Romania in 1926, Antonescu resumed his teaching in Sibiu, and, in the autumn of 1928, became Secretary-General of the [[Ministry of National Defense (Romania)|Defence Ministry]] in the [[Vintilă Brătianu]] cabinet.<ref name=d39/> He married [[Maria Antonescu|Maria Niculescu]], for long a resident of France, who had been married twice before: first to a [[Romanian Police]] officer, with whom she had a son, Gheorghe (died 1944), and then to a Frenchman of Jewish origin.<ref>Deletant, pp. 39, 45, 290</ref> After a period as Deputy Chief of the General Staff,<ref name=d39/> he was appointed its Chief (1933–1934). These assignments coincided with the rule of Carol's underage son [[Michael I of Romania|Michael I]] and his regents, and with Carol's seizure of power in 1930. During this period Antonescu first grew interested in the [[Iron Guard]], an antisemitic and fascist-related movement headed by [[Corneliu Zelea Codreanu]]. In his capacity as Deputy Chief of Staff, he ordered the Army's intelligence unit to compile a report on the faction, and made a series of critical notes on Codreanu's various statements.<ref name=d39/>

As Chief of Staff, Antonescu reportedly had his first confrontation with the political class and the monarch. His projects for weapon modernization were questioned by defence minister [[Paul Angelescu]], leading Antonescu to present his resignation.<ref name=d39/> According to another account, he completed an official report on the [[embezzlement]] of Army funds which indirectly implicated Carol and his ''[[camarilla]]'' (''see [[Škoda Affair]]'').<ref name=r1/><ref>Veiga, p. 281</ref> The king consequently ordered him out of office, provoking indignation among sections of the political mainstream.<ref name=r1/> On Carol's orders, Antonescu was placed under surveillance by the ''[[Siguranța Statului]]'' intelligence service, and closely monitored by the [[Ministry of Administration and Interior (Romania)|Interior Ministry]] Undersecretary [[Armand Călinescu]].<ref name=d40>Deletant, p. 40</ref> The officer's political credentials were on the rise, as he was able to establish and maintain contacts with people on all sides of the political spectrum, while support for Carol plummeted. Among these were contacts with the two main democratic groups, the [[National Liberal Party (Romania, 1875)|National Liberal]] and the [[National Peasants' Party|National Peasants']], parties known respectively as PNL and PNȚ.<ref name=r1/> He was also engaged in discussions with the rising [[far right]], antisemitic and fascist movements; although in competition with each other, both the [[National Christian Party]] (PNC) of [[Octavian Goga]] and the Iron Guard sought to attract Antonescu to their side.<ref name=r1/><ref>Deletant, pp. 34, 40–41; Veiga, p. 281</ref> In 1936, to the authorities' alarm, Army General and Iron Guard member [[Gheorghe Cantacuzino-Grănicerul]] arranged a meeting between Antonescu and the movement's leader, Corneliu Codreanu. Antonescu is reported to have found Codreanu arrogant, but to have welcomed his revolutionizing approach to politics.<ref name=d40/>

===Defence portfolio and the Codreanu trials===
In late 1937, after the [[1937 Romanian general election|December general election]] came to an inconclusive result, Carol appointed Goga [[Prime Minister of Romania|Prime Minister]] over a far right cabinet that was the first executive to impose [[racial discrimination]] in its treatment of the [[History of the Jews in Romania|Jewish community]]. Goga's appointment was meant to curb the rise of the more popular and even more radical Codreanu. Initially given the [[Ministry of Communications and Information Society (Romania)|Communications portfolio]] by his rival, Interior Minister [[Armand Călinescu]], Antonescu repeatedly demanded the office of Defence Minister, which he was eventually granted.<ref>Deletant, pp. 40–41</ref> His mandate coincided with a troubled period, and saw Romania having to choose between its traditional alliance with France, Britain, the crumbling [[Little Entente]] and the League of Nations or moving closer to [[Nazi Germany]] and its [[Anti-Comintern Pact]]. Antonescu's own contribution is disputed by historians, who variously see him as either a supporter of the Anglo-French alliance or, like the PNC itself, more favourable to cooperation with [[Adolf Hitler]]'s Germany.<ref name=r1/> At the time, Antonescu viewed Romania's alliance with the Entente as insurance against Hungarian and [[Soviet Union|Soviet]] [[revanchism]], but, as an [[Anti-communism|anti-communist]], he was suspicious of the [[Franco-Soviet Treaty of Mutual Assistance|Franco-Soviet rapprochement]].<ref>Veiga, pp. 281, 296</ref> Particularly concerned about Hungarian demands in Transylvania, he ordered the General Staff to prepare for a western attack.<ref>Deletant, pp. 42–43</ref> However, his major contribution in office was in relation to an internal crisis: as a response to violent clashes between the Iron Guard and the PNC's own fascist militia, the ''[[Lăncieri]]'', Antonescu extended the already imposed [[martial law]].<ref>Deletant, p. 41</ref>

The Goga cabinet ended when the tentative rapprochement between Goga and Codreanu<ref>''Final Report'', p. 43; Deletant, pp. 34, 42; Veiga, pp. 246–247</ref> prompted Carol to overthrow the democratic system and proclaim his own authoritarian regime (''see [[1938 Constitution of Romania]], [[National Renaissance Front]]''). The deposed Premier died in 1938, while Antonescu remained a close friend of his widow, [[Veturia Goga]].<ref name="d70">Deletant, p. 70.</ref> By that time, revising his earlier stance, Antonescu had also built a close relationship with Codreanu, and was even said to have become his confidant.<ref name=d42>Deletant, p. 42</ref><ref name=itrelatiile>{{in lang|ro}} Ilarion Țiu, [http://www.revistaerasmus.go.ro/numarul_14/tiu_i2.html "Relațiile regimului autoritar al lui Carol al II-lea cu opoziția. Studiu de caz: arestarea conducerii Mișcării Legionare"]{{dead link|date=April 2017 |bot=InternetArchiveBot |fix-attempted=yes }}, in [http://www.revisaerasmus.go.ro/ ''Revista Erasmus'']{{dead link|date=November 2017 |bot=InternetArchiveBot |fix-attempted=yes }}, 14/2003-2005, at the [[University of Bucharest]] Faculty of History</ref> On Carol's request, he had earlier asked the Guard's leader to consider an alliance with the king, which Codreanu promptly refused in favour of negotiations with Goga, coupled with claims that he was not interested in political battles, an attitude supposedly induced by Antonescu himself.<ref>Deletant, pp. 41–43</ref>

Soon afterward, Călinescu, acting on indications from the monarch, arrested Codreanu and prosecuted him in two successive trials. Antonescu, whose mandate of Defence Minister had been prolonged under the premiership of [[Miron Cristea]], resigned in protest of Codreanu's arrest.<ref name=d44>Deletant, p. 44</ref> Antonescu's mandate ended on 30 March 1938. He also served as Air and Marine Minister between 2 February and his resignation on 30 March.<ref>Charles D. Pettibone, Trafford Publishing, 2012, ''The Organization and Order or Battle of Militaries in World War II: Volume VII: Germany's and Imperial Japan's Allies & Puppet States'', pp. 10–11</ref> He was a celebrity defence witness at the latter's first<ref name=itrelatiile/> and second trials.<ref name=d44/> During the latter, which resulted in Codreanu's conviction for [[treason]], Antonescu vouched for his friend's honesty while shaking his hand in front of the jury.<ref name=d44/> Upon the conclusion of the trial, the king ordered his former minister [[Internment|interned]] at [[Predeal]], before assigning him to command the [[Third Army (Romania)|Third Army]] in the remote eastern region of [[Bessarabia]] (and later removing him after Antonescu expressed sympathy for Guardists imprisoned in [[Chișinău]]).<ref>Deletant, pp. 45, 293</ref> Attempting to discredit his rival, Carol also ordered Antonescu's wife to be tried for [[bigamy]], based on a false claim that her divorce had not been finalized. Defended by Mihai Antonescu, the officer was able to prove his detractors wrong.<ref>Deletant, pp. 45, 58, 302</ref> Codreanu himself was taken into custody and discreetly killed by the [[Jandarmeria Română|Gendarmes]] acting on Carol's orders (November 1938).<ref>Cioroianu, p. 54; Deletant, pp. 35, 50; Ornea, pp. 320–321; Veiga, p. 257</ref>

Carol's regime slowly dissolved into crisis, a dissolution accelerated after the start of [[World War II]], when the military success of the core [[Axis Powers]] and the [[Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact|non-aggression pact]] signed by Germany and the [[Soviet Union]] saw Romania isolated and threatened (''see [[Romania during World War II]]''). In 1940, two of Romania's regions, Bessarabia and [[Northern Bukovina]], were lost to a [[Soviet occupation of Bessarabia and northern Bukovina|Soviet occupation]] consented to by the king. This came as Romania, exposed by the [[Fall of France]], was seeking to align its policies with those of Germany.<ref>Deletant, pp. 3, 10–27, 45–47; Ornea, pp. 323–325; Veiga, pp. 256–257, 266–269</ref> Antonescu himself had come to value a pro-Axis alternative after the 1938 [[Munich Agreement]], when Germany imposed demands on [[Czechoslovak Republic (1918–1938)|Czechoslovakia]] with the acquiescence of France and the United Kingdom, leaving locals to fear that, unless reoriented, Romania would follow.<ref>Deletant, pp. 45–46</ref> Angered by the territorial losses of 1940, General Antonescu sent Carol a general note of protest, and, as a result, was arrested and interned at [[Bistrița Monastery]].<ref name=r1/><ref>Deletant, pp. 46–47. Deletant notes the determining factor for this decision was Antonescu's link to the Iron Guard.</ref> While there, he commissioned Mihai Antonescu to establish contacts with Nazi German officials, promising to advance German economic interest, particularly in respect to the [[Oil industry in Romania|local oil industry]], in exchange for endorsement.<ref>Deletant, pp. 47, 293</ref> Commenting on Antonescu's ambivalent stance, Hitler's minister to Romania, [[Wilhelm Fabricius]], wrote to his superiors: "I am not convinced that he is a safe man."<ref>''Final Report'', pp. 57, 60; Deletant, p. 47</ref>

===Rise to power===
[[File:Standard of Marshal Ion Antonescu.svg|thumb|200px|Banner of Ion Antonescu as ''[[Conducător]]'']]
[[File:Ion Antonescu portrait (3x4 cropped).jpg|thumb|200px|Antonescu's official portrait, 1942]]
[[File:Antonescu post stamp.jpg|thumb|1942 post stamp featuring Antonescu]]
Romania's elite had been intensely Francophile ever since Romania had won its independence in the 19th century, indeed so Francophile that the defeat of France in June 1940 had the effect of discrediting the entire elite.<ref>Crampton, Richard ''Eastern Europe in the Twentieth Century and After'', London: Routledge, 1997 p. 117.</ref> Antonescu's internment ended in August, during which interval, under Axis pressure, Romania had ceded Southern Dobruja to Bulgaria (''see [[Treaty of Craiova]]'') and [[Northern Transylvania]] to [[Hungary]] (''see [[Second Vienna Award]]''). The latter grant caused consternation among large sections of Romania's population, causing Carol's popularity to fall to a record low and provoking large-scale protests in Bucharest, the capital. These movements were organized competitively by the pro-[[Allies of World War II|Allied]] PNȚ, headed by [[Iuliu Maniu]], and the pro-Nazi Iron Guard.<ref name=r1/> The latter group had been revived under the leadership of [[Horia Sima]], and was organizing a ''[[coup d'état]]''.<ref>Deletant, pp. 48–51, 66; Griffin (1993), p. 126; Ornea, pp. 325–327</ref> In this troubled context, Antonescu simply left his assigned residence. He may have been secretly helped in this by German intercession,<ref>Browning, p. 211</ref> but was more directly aided to escape by socialite [[Alice Sturdza]], who was acting on Maniu's request.<ref name=d48>Deletant, p. 48</ref> Antonescu subsequently met with Maniu in [[Ploiești]], where they discussed how best to manage the political situation.<ref name=r1/><ref name=d48/><ref>Ornea, pp. 325–326. According to Deletant, also present were Maniu's assistants [[Corneliu Coposu]] and [[Aurel Leucuția]].</ref> While these negotiations were carried out, the monarch himself was being advised by his entourage to recover legitimacy by governing in tandem with the increasingly popular Antonescu, while creating a new political majority from the existing forces.<ref name=r1/><ref name=d48/> 

On 2 September 1940, Valer Pop, a courtier and an important member of the ''camarilla'', first advised Carol to appoint Antonescu as Prime Minister as the solution to the crisis.<ref>Haynes, Rebecca "Germany and the Establishment of the Romanian National Legionary State, September 1940" pp. 700–725 from ''The Slavonic and East European Review'', Volume 77, Issue # 4. October 1999 p. 711</ref> Pop's reasons for advising Carol to appoint Antonescu as Prime Minister were partly because Antonescu, who was known to be friendly with the Iron Guard and who had been imprisoned under Carol, was believed to have enough of an oppositional background to Carol's regime to appease the public and partly because Pop knew that Antonescu, for all his Legionary sympathies, was a member of the elite and believed he would never turn against it. When Carol proved reluctant to make Antonescu Prime Minister, Pop visited the German legation to meet with Fabricius on the night of 4 September 1940 to ask that the German minister phone Carol to tell him that the ''Reich'' wanted Antonescu as Prime Minister, and Fabricius promptly did just that.<ref>Haynes, Rebecca " Germany and the Establishment of the Romanian National Legionary State, September 1940" pp. 700–725 from ''The Slavonic and East European Review'', Volume 77, Issue # 4. October 1999 p. 712.</ref> Carol and Antonescu accepted the proposal, Antonescu being ordered to approach political party leaders Maniu of the PNȚ and [[Dinu Brătianu]] of the PNL.<ref name=r1/><ref name=d48/><ref>Kelso, p. 96</ref> They all called for Carol's [[abdication]] as a preliminary measure,<ref name=r1/><ref name=d48/><ref>Ornea, pp. 325–327; Roper, p. 8</ref> while Sima, another leader sought after for negotiations, could not be found in time to express his opinion.<ref name=d48/> Antonescu partly complied with the request but also asked Carol to bestow upon him the [[reserve power]]s for Romanian heads of state.<ref name=r1/><ref>Deletant, pp. 48–49; Ornea, pp. 326–327</ref> Carol yielded and, on 5 September 1940, the general became Prime Minister, and Carol transferred most of his [[European interwar dictatorships|dictatorial powers]] to him.<ref name=r1/><ref>''Final Report'', p. 320; Morgan, p. 85; Ornea, p. 326</ref> The latter's first measure was to curtail potential resistance within the Army by relieving [[Bucharest Garrison]] chief [[Gheorghe Argeșanu]] of his position and replacing him with [[Dumitru Coroamă]].<ref>Ornea, p. 327</ref> Shortly afterward, Antonescu heard rumours that two of Carol's loyalist generals, [[Gheorghe Mihail]] and [[Paul Teodorescu]], were planning to have him killed.<ref>Deletant, pp. 49–50, 52, 194</ref> In reaction, he forced Carol to abdicate, while General Coroamă was refusing to carry out the royal order of shooting down Iron Guardist protesters.<ref>Deletant, pp. 49–50</ref>

Michael ascended the throne for the second time, while Antonescu's dictatorial powers were confirmed and extended.<ref name=r1/><ref>Cioroianu, p. 54; Deletant, pp. 52–55; Griffin (1993), p. 126; Kelso, p. 96; Roper, p. 8</ref> On 6 September, the day Michael formally assumed the throne, he issued a royal decree declaring Antonescu ''[[Conducător]]'' (leader) of the state. The same decree relegated the monarch to a ceremonial role.<ref>Deletant, pp. 52–55</ref> Among Antonescu's subsequent measures was ensuring the safe departure into self-exile of Carol and his mistress [[Elena Lupescu]], granting protection to the royal train when it was attacked by armed members of the Iron Guard.<ref name=r1/> The regime of King Carol had been notorious for being the most corrupt regime in Europe during the 1930s, and when Carol fled Romania, he took with him the better part of the Romanian treasury, leaving the new government with enormous financial problems.<ref name="Crampton, Richard pp. 117-118">Crampton, Richard ''Eastern Europe in the Twentieth Century and After'', London: Routledge, 1997 pp. 117–118.</ref> Antonescu had expected, perhaps naïvely, that Carol would take with him enough money to provide for a comfortable exile, and was surprised that Carol had cleared out almost the entire national treasury. For the next four years, a major concern of Antonescu's government was attempting to have the Swiss banks where Carol had deposited the assets return the money to Romania; this effort did not meet with success.<ref name="Crampton, Richard pp. 117-118"/> 

Horia Sima's subsequent cooperation with Antonescu was endorsed by high-ranking Nazi German officials, many of whom feared the Iron Guard was too weak to rule on its own.<ref>Deletant, pp. 49–51; Veiga, pp. 279–280. Veiga mentions in particular [[Heinrich Himmler]], head of the ''[[Schutzstaffel]]'' organization, who, although inclined to support Sima, advised the latter to let the general take hold of government.</ref> Antonescu therefore received the approval of Ambassador Fabricius.<ref>Deletant, p. 49; Ornea, pp. 326–327, 339</ref> Despite early promises, Antonescu abandoned projects for the creation of a [[Central government|national government]],<ref name=r1/><ref>Deletant, pp. 55–56; Ornea, p. 326</ref> and opted instead for a [[Coalition government|coalition]] between a [[military dictatorship]] lobby and the Iron Guard.<ref name=r1/><ref>Deletant, pp. 52–68; Gella, p. 171; Geran Pilon, p. 59; Kelso, pp. 96–97; Kenney, pp. 92–93; Morgan, p. 85; Ornea, pp. 326–327; Veiga, pp. 281–282, 296, 327. According to Kelso and Ornea, Antonescu was turned down by all political forces except the Iron Guard. Deletant (pp. 55–56) notes that these refusals were motivated by Sima's requests, which Maniu perceived as excessive.</ref> He later justified his choice by stating that the Iron Guard "represented the political base of the country at the time."<ref>Deletant, p. 55</ref> Right from the outset, Antonescu clashed with Sima over economic questions, with Antonescu's main concern being to get the economy growing so as to provide taxes for a treasury looted by Carol, while Sima favoured populist economic measures that Antonescu insisted there was no money for.<ref>Crampton, Richard ''Eastern Europe in the Twentieth Century and After'', London: Routledge, 1997 p. 118.</ref>

===Antonescu-Sima partnership===
[[File:HoriaSimaIonAntonescuMiguelDeRumaniaPactoTripartito.jpeg|thumb|250px|[[Horia Sima]], Antonescu and King [[Michael I of Romania]], 1940]]
The resulting regime, deemed the ''[[National Legionary State]]'', was officially proclaimed on 14 September. On that date, the Iron Guard was remodelled into [[One-party state|the only legally permitted party]] in Romania. Antonescu continued as Premier and ''Conducător'', and was named as the Guard's honorary commander. Sima became Deputy Premier and leader of the Guard.<ref name=r1/><ref>''Final Report'', pp. 43, 46, 54, 62, 109–112; Browning, p. 211; Deletant, pp. 1–2, 57–68; Gella, p. 171; Geran Pilon, p. 59; Griffin (1993), p. 126; Ioanid, pp. 231–232; Kelso, pp. 96–97; Nicholls, p. 6; Ornea, pp. 58, 215–216, 327–329; Veiga, pp. 281–283</ref><ref name="pddlroutl">Peter Davies, Derek Lynch, ''The Routledge Companion to Fascism and the Far Right'', [[Routledge]], London, 2002, p. 196. {{ISBN|0-415-21494-7}}.</ref><ref name=Payne>{{cite book|title=A History of Fascism, 1914–1945|url=https://archive.org/details/historyoffascism00payn|url-access=registration|last=Payne|first=Stanley|author-link=Stanley G. Payne|publisher=[[University of Wisconsin Press]]|date=1995|isbn=0203501322}}</ref> Antonescu subsequently ordered the Guardists imprisoned by Carol to be set free.<ref>Ornea, p. 215</ref> On 6 October, he presided over the Iron Guard's mass rally in Bucharest, one in a series of major celebratory and commemorative events organized by the movement during the late months of 1940.<ref>Deletant, p. 59; Ornea, p. 333</ref> However, he tolerated the PNȚ and PNL's informal existence, allowing them to preserve much of their political support.<ref>Deletant, pp. 74–75; Veiga, pp. 280–281, 304</ref>

There followed a short-lived and always uneasy partnership between Antonescu and Sima. In late September, the new regime denounced all pacts, accords and diplomatic agreements signed under Carol, bringing the country into Germany's orbit while subverting its relationship with a former [[Balkans|Balkan]] ally, the [[Kingdom of Yugoslavia]].<ref>Haynes, p. 102</ref> Germans troops entered the country in stages, in order to defend the local oil industry<ref>Browning, p. 211; Deletant, p. 61</ref> and help instruct their Romanian counterparts on ''[[Blitzkrieg]]'' tactics.<ref>''Final Report'', p. 62; Deletant, p. 61; Veiga, pp. 295–296</ref> On 23 November, Antonescu was in [[Berlin]], where his signature sealed Romania's commitment to the main Axis instrument, the [[Tripartite Pact]].<ref name=r1/><ref>Deletant, pp. 1, 2–3, 61–62, 280; Haynes, pp. 102, 107; Nicholls, p. 225; Veiga, p. 296</ref> Two days later, the country also adhered to the Nazi-led [[Anti-Comintern Pact]].<ref>Nicholls, p. 225</ref> Other than these generic commitments, Romania had no treaty binding it to Germany, and the Romanian-German alliance functioned informally.<ref>Cioroianu, p. 54; Deletant, pp. 62, 92, 275</ref> Speaking in 1946, Antonescu claimed to have followed the pro-German path in continuation of earlier policies, and for fear of a Nazi [[protectorate]] in Romania.<ref>Deletant, p. 51</ref>

During the National Legionary State period, earlier antisemitic legislation was upheld and strengthened, while the "[[Romanianization]]" of Jewish-owned enterprises became standard official practice.<ref name=r1/><ref>''Final Report'', pp. 19–20, 31, 103, 109–113, 181–183, 185–190, 202–208, 382–385; Achim, pp. 163, 167; Browning, p. 211; Deletant, pp. 59, 62–63, 103–108, 251–252; Kelso, pp. 100–101; Ornea, pp. 331, 393–394; Veiga, pp. 289–290, 296, 301</ref> Immediately after coming into office, Antonescu himself expanded the anti-Jewish and [[Nuremberg Laws|Nuremberg law]]-inspired legislation passed by his predecessors Goga and [[Ion Gigurtu]],<ref>''Final Report'', pp. 19–20, 31, 43, 87, 116–117, 183–199, 320, 384; Deletant, pp. 103–108, 131, 308–314; Ioanid, pp. 231–232; Ornea, p. 391; Weber, p. 160</ref> while tens of new anti-Jewish regulations were passed in 1941–1942.<ref>''Final Report'', pp. 183–203, 320; Deletant, pp. 103–107, 131, 308–314</ref> This was done despite his formal pledge to [[Wilhelm Filderman]] and the [[Federation of Jewish Communities of Romania|Jewish Communities Federation]] that, unless engaged in "sabotage," "the Jewish population will not suffer."<ref>''Final Report'', pp. 206–207; Deletant, pp. 58, 104</ref> Antonescu did not reject the application of Legionary policies, but was offended by Sima's advocacy of [[Paramilitary|paramilitarism]] and the Guard's frequent recourse to street violence.<ref name=r1/><ref>''Final Report'', pp. 46, 109–113, 117–118, 181–182, 186; Ancel (2005 a), pp. 32–33, 317; Deletant, pp. 55–57, 58–68, 104–105; Gella, p. 171; Griffin (1993), pp. 126–127; Ornea, pp. 332–341; Roper, p. 8; Veiga, p. 282</ref> He drew much hostility from his partners by extending some protection to former dignitaries whom the Iron Guard had arrested.<ref>Deletant, p. 60</ref> One early incident opposed Antonescu to the Guard's newspaper ''[[Buna Vestire]]'', which accused him of leniency and was subsequently forced to change its editorial board.<ref>Ornea, pp. 334–335</ref> By then, the Legionary press was routinely claiming that he was obstructing revolution and aiming to take control of the Iron Guard, and that he had been transformed into a tool of [[Freemasonry in Romania|Freemasonry]] (''see [[Anti-Masonry]]'').<ref>Ornea, pp. 338–339, 341–343; Veiga, pp. 291, 297</ref> The political conflict coincided with major social challenges, including the influx of refugees from areas lost earlier in the year and a [[1940 Bucharest earthquake|large-scale earthquake affecting Bucharest]].<ref>Deletant, pp. 21, 24, 26, 131, 139–140, 318; Veiga, pp. 282–283, 290–291, 300–301, 305</ref>

Disorder peaked in the last days of November 1940, when, after uncovering the circumstances of Codreanu's death, the fascist movement ordered retaliations against political figures previously associated with Carol, carrying out the [[Jilava Massacre]], the assassinations of [[Nicolae Iorga]] and [[Virgil Madgearu]], and several other acts of violence.<ref name=r1/><ref>''Final Report'', pp. 46, 110–111; Deletant, pp. 60–61, 297–298, 302; Ornea, pp. 335–341, 347; Veiga, pp. 291–294, 311–312</ref> As retaliation for this insubordination, Antonescu ordered the Army to resume control of the streets,<ref>''Final Report'', pp. 110–111; Veiga, pp. 293–295</ref> unsuccessfully pressured Sima to have the assassins detained, ousted the Iron Guardist prefect of Bucharest [[Romanian Police|Police]] [[Ștefan Zăvoianu]], and ordered Legionary ministers to swear an oath to the ''Conducător''.<ref>Ornea, p. 341</ref> His condemnation of the killings was nevertheless limited and discreet, and, the same month, he joined Sima at a burial ceremony for Codreanu's newly discovered remains.<ref>Ornea, p. 341; Veiga, pp. 294–295</ref> The widening gap between the dictator and Sima's party resonated in Berlin. When, in December, Legionary [[Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Romania)|Foreign Minister]] [[Mihail R. Sturdza]] obtained the replacement of Fabricius with [[Manfred Freiherr von Killinger]], perceived as more sympathetic to the Iron Guard, Antonescu promptly took over leadership of the ministry, with the compliant diplomat [[Constantin Greceanu]] as his right hand.<ref>Deletant, pp. 63, 301</ref> In Germany, such leaders of the [[Nazi Party]] as [[Heinrich Himmler]], [[Baldur von Schirach]] and [[Joseph Goebbels]] threw their support behind the Legionaries,<ref name=r1/><ref>''Final Report'', pp. 62–63; Veiga, pp. 280, 296</ref> whereas [[List of German foreign ministers|Foreign Minister]] [[Joachim von Ribbentrop]] and the [[Wehrmacht]] stood by Antonescu.<ref name=r1/> The latter group was concerned that any internal conflict would threaten Romania's oil industry, vital to the German war effort.<ref name=r1/><ref>Deletant, pp. 25–27, 47, 61, 287</ref> The German leadership was by then secretly organizing ''[[Operation Barbarossa]]'', the attack on the Soviet Union.<ref>''Final Report'', p. 63; Deletant, pp. 61–62, 76–78</ref><ref name="r2">Delia Radu, [http://www.bbc.co.uk/romanian/news/story/2008/08/080801_serial_antonescu_episod2.shtml "Serialul 'Ion Antonescu și asumarea istoriei' (2)"], [[BBC]], Romanian edition, 1 August 2008.</ref>

===Legionary Rebellion and Operation Barbarossa===
[[File:Joachim von Ribbentrop and Ion Antonescu at party Munich.jpg|thumb|Antonescu with German foreign minister [[Joachim von Ribbentrop]] in June 1941]]
[[File:Bundesarchiv Bild 183-B03212, München, Staatsbesuch Jon Antonescu bei Hitler.jpg|thumb|Antonescu and [[Adolf Hitler]] at the ''[[Hochschule für Musik und Theater München|Führerbau]]'' in [[Munich]] (June 1941). [[Joachim von Ribbentrop]] and ''[[Generalfeldmarschall]]'' [[Wilhelm Keitel]] in the background]]

Antonescu's plan to act against his coalition partners in the event of further disorder hinged on Hitler's approval,<ref name= r1/><ref name= pddlroutl/><ref>''Final Report'', pp. 62–63, 113; Browning, p. 211; Deletant, pp. 62–68; Griffin (1993), p. 127; Harvey, p. 497; Morgan, pp. 85–86, 188; Nicholls, p. 225; Ornea, pp. 338–339, 342, 345; Roper, p. 8; Veiga, pp. 295–297, 327</ref><ref name="dslill228">D. S. Lewis, ''Illusions of Grandeur: Mosley, Fascism and British Society, 1931–81'', [[Manchester University Press]], Manchester, 1987, p. 228. {{ISBN|0-7190-2355-6}}.</ref> a vague signal of which had been given during ceremonies confirming Romania's adherence to the Tripartite Pact.<ref name=r1/><ref>Veiga, p. 296</ref> A decisive turn occurred when Hitler invited Antonescu and Sima both over for discussions: whereas Antonescu agreed, Sima stayed behind in Romania, probably plotting a ''coup d'état''.<ref name=r1/><ref>Deletant, pp. 63–65; Ornea, pp. 342–343; Veiga, pp. 296–297</ref> While Hitler did not produce a clear endorsement for clamping down on Sima's party, he made remarks interpreted by their recipient as oblique blessings.<ref>Deletant, pp. 64, 299; Veiga, p. 297</ref> On 14 January 1941 during a German-Romanian summit, Hitler informed Antonescu of his plans to invade the Soviet Union later that year and asked Romania to participate.<ref name="ReferenceA">Ancel, Jean "Antonescu and the Jews" pp. 463–479 from ''The Holocaust and History The Known, the Unknown, the Disputed and the Reexamined'' edited by Michael Berenbaum and Abraham Peck, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1998 p. 466.</ref> By this time, Hitler had come to the conclusion that while Sima was ideologically closer to him, Antonescu was the more competent leader capable of ensuring stability in Romania while being committed to aligning his country with the Axis.

The Antonescu-Sima dispute erupted into violence in January 1941, when the Iron Guard instigated a series of attacks on public institutions and [[Bucharest pogrom |a pogrom]], incidents collectively known as the "[[Legionnaires' rebellion and Bucharest pogrom|Legionary Rebellion]]."<ref name= r1/><ref>''Final Report'', pp. 43, 46, 62–63, 103, 112–115, 181, 208, 382; Ancel (2005 a), pp. 33, 402–403, 408; Browning, pp. 211–212; Deletant, pp. 64–68, 71–72; Ioanid, pp. 232, 236; Ornea, pp. 219, 250, 284, 343–348; Penkower, pp. 148–149; Veiga, pp. 297–304, 312–313</ref> This came after the mysterious assassination of Major Döring, a German agent in Bucharest, which was used by the Iron Guard as a pretext to accuse the ''Conducător'' of having a secret anti-German agenda,<ref>Deletant, pp. 64–65, 299; Ornea, p. 343</ref> and made Antonescu oust the Legionary [[Ministry of Administration and Interior (Romania)|Interior Minister]], [[Constantin Petrovicescu]], while closing down all of the Legionary-controlled "Romanianization" offices.<ref>''Final Report'', p. 186; Deletant, pp. 64–65, 105–106; Ornea, p. 343; Veiga, pp. 297–298</ref> Various other clashes prompted him to demand the resignation of all Police commanders who sympathized with the movement.<ref>Deletant, pp. 64–65; Ornea, p. 343; Veiga, p. 298</ref> After two days of widespread violence, during which Guardists killed some 120 Bucharest Jews,<ref name=r1/><ref>''Final Report'', pp. 43, 46, 103, 112–115, 208, 382; Ancel (2005 a), pp. 402–403; Browning, pp. 211–212; Deletant, pp. 66, 71–72, 299–300; Ioanid, p. 232; Veiga, pp. 298–299, 301</ref> Antonescu sent in the Army, under the command of General [[Constantin Sănătescu]].<ref name=r1/> German officials acting on Hitler's orders, including the new Ambassador [[Manfred Freiherr von Killinger]], helped Antonescu eliminate the Iron Guardists, but several of their lower-level colleagues actively aided Sima's subordinates.<ref>''Final Report'', pp. 62–63, 125; Harvey, p. 497; Veiga, pp. 301–302, 313</ref> Goebbels was especially upset by the decision to support Antonescu, believing it to have been advantageous to "the Freemasons."<ref>''Final Report'', p. 63; Harvey, pp. 497–498</ref>

After the purge of the Iron Guard, Hitler kept his options open by granting [[political asylum]] to Sima—whom Antonescu's courts [[Capital punishment in Romania|sentenced to death]]—and to other Legionaries in similar situations.<ref>''Final Report'', pp. 63, 382; Browning, pp. 211–212; Harvey, p. 498</ref> The Guardists were detained in special conditions at [[Buchenwald concentration camp|Buchenwald]] and [[Dachau concentration camp|Dachau]] [[Nazi concentration camps|concentration camps]].<ref>Browning, p. 212; Deletant, p. 87; Harvey, p. 498; Morgan, p. 188; Veiga, pp. 301–302</ref> In parallel, Antonescu publicly obtained the cooperation of ''Codreanists'', members of an Iron Guardist wing which had virulently opposed Sima, and whose leader was Codreanu's father [[Ion Zelea Codreanu]].<ref>Ornea, pp. 329–331, 346–348</ref> Antonescu again sought backing from the PNȚ and PNL to form a national cabinet, but his rejection of [[Parliamentary system|parliamentarism]] made the two groups refuse him.<ref>Deletant, pp. 68, 301</ref>

Antonescu traveled to Germany and met Hitler on eight more occasions between June 1941 and August 1944.<ref>Deletant, p. 280</ref> Such close contacts helped cement an enduring relationship between the two dictators, and Hitler reportedly came to see Antonescu as the only trustworthy person in Romania,<ref name=r1/><ref name="d62">Deletant, p. 62.</ref> and the only foreigner to consult on military matters.<ref>''Final Report'', pp. 65, 168; Deletant, pp. 1, 280; Harvey, p. 498</ref> The American historian [[Gerhard Weinberg]] wrote that Hitler after first meeting Antonescu "...was greatly impressed by him; no other leader Hitler met other than Mussolini ever received such consistently favourable comments from the German dictator. Hitler even mustered the patience to listen to Antonescu's lengthy disquisitions on the glorious history of Romania and the perfidy of the Hungarians—a curious reversal for a man who was more accustomed to regaling visitors with tirades of his own."<ref>Weinberg, Gerhard ''A World At Arms'', Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994 pp. 195–196.</ref> In later statements, Hitler offered praise to Antonescu's "breadth of vision" and "real personality."<ref name="adh498">Harvey, p. 498.</ref> A remarkable aspect of the Hitler-Antonescu friendship was neither could speak other's language. Hitler only knew German, while the only foreign language Antonescu knew was French, in which he was completely fluent.<ref>Ancel, Jean ''The History of the Holocaust in Romania'', Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2011 p. 214</ref> During their meetings, Antonescu spoke French, which was then translated into German by Hitler's interpreter [[Paul Schmidt (interpreter)|Paul Schmidt]] and vice versa, since Schmidt did not speak Romanian either. 

The German military presence increased significantly in early 1941, when, using Romania as a base, Hitler invaded the rebellious Kingdom of Yugoslavia and the [[Kingdom of Greece (Glücksburg)|Kingdom of Greece]] (''see [[Balkans Campaign (World War II)|Balkans Campaign]]'').<ref>''Final Report'', pp. 63–64; Deletant, pp. 61–63, 75–76, 304</ref> In parallel, Romania's relationship with the United Kingdom, at the time the only major adversary of Nazi Germany, erupted into conflict: on 10 February 1941, [[Prime Minister of the United Kingdom|British Premier]] [[Winston Churchill]] recalled [[List of diplomats from the United Kingdom to Romania|His Majesty's Ambassador]] [[Reginald Hoare]], and approved the [[blockade]] of Romanian ships in British-controlled ports.<ref>Deletant, pp. 26–27, 75</ref> On 12 June 1941, during another summit with Hitler, Antonescu first learned of the "special" nature of Operation Barbarossa, namely, that the war against the Soviet Union was to be an ideological war to "annihilate" the forces of "Judeo-Bolshevism," a "war of extermination" to be fought without any mercy; Hitler even showed Antonescu a copy of the "Guidelines for the Conduct of the Troops in Russia" he had issued to his forces about the "special treatment" to be handed out to Soviet Jews.<ref name="ReferenceA"/> Antonescu completely accepted Hitler's ideas about Operation Barbarossa as a "race war" between the Aryans, represented by the Nordic Germans and Latin Romanians on the Axis side vs. the Slavs and Asians, commanded by the Jews on the Soviet side.<ref name="Ancel, Jean pp. 325-326">Ancel, Jean ''The History of the Holocaust in Romania'', Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2011, pp. 325–326</ref> Besides anti-Semitism, there was an extremely strong current of anti-Slavic and anti-Asian racism to Antonescu's remarks about the "Asiatic hordes" of the Red Army.<ref name="Ancel, Jean, p. 325">Ancel, Jean ''The History of the Holocaust in Romania'', Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2011, p. 325</ref> The Asians Antonescu referred were the various Asian peoples of the Soviet Union, such as the [[Kazakhs]], [[Kalmyks]], [[Mongols]], [[Uzbeks]], [[Buryats]], etc. During his summit with Hitler in June 1941, Antonescu told the ''Führer'' that he believed it was necessary to "once and for all" eliminate Russia as a power because the Russians were the most powerful Slavic nation and that as a Latin people, the Romanians had an inborn hatred of all Slavs and Jews.<ref name="Ancel, Jean, p. 325"/> Antonescu went on to tell Hitler: "Because of its racial qualities, Romania can continue to play its role as an anti-Slavic buffer for the benefit of Germany."<ref name="Ancel, Jean, p. 325"/> Ancel wrote that Romanian anti-Slavic racism differed from the German variety in that the Romanians had traditionally feared the Slavic peoples whereas the Germans had traditionally held the Slavic peoples in contempt.<ref>Ancel, Jean, ''The History of the Holocaust in Romania'', Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2011, p. 326</ref> In Antonescu's mind, the Romanians as a Latin people had attained a level of civilization that the Slavs were nowhere close to, but theoretically the Slavic Russians and Ukrainians might be able to reach under Romanian auspices, although Antonescu's remarks to Hitler that "We must fight this race (i.e. the Slavs) resolutely" together, "with the need for 'colonization' of Transnistria," suggests that he did think this would happen in his own lifetime.<ref name="Ancel, Jean pp. 325-326"/> Subsequently, the Romanians assigned to Barbarossa were to learn that as a Latin people, the Germans considered them to be their inferiors, albeit not as inferior as the Slavs, Asians and Jews who were viewed as ''[[untermensch]]en'' ("sub-humans").<ref name="Ancel, Jean pp. 325-326"/> Hitler's promise to Antonescu that after the war, the Germanic and Latin races would rule the world in a partnership turned out to be meaningless.<ref name="Ancel, Jean, p. 325"/>

[[File:Signal 16-1941..jpg|thumb|King Michael I and Antonescu at the border, on the river Prut, watching the deployment of the Romanian Army in 1941]]
In June of that year, Romania joined the attack on the Soviet Union, led by Germany in coalition with Hungary, [[Finland]], the [[Slovak Republic (1939–1945)|State of Slovakia]], the [[Kingdom of Italy]], and the [[Independent State of Croatia]]. Antonescu had been made aware of the plan by German envoys, and supported it enthusiastically even before Hitler extended Romania an offer to participate.<ref>Deletant, pp. 78–80, 83</ref> On 18 June 1941, Antonescu gave orders to his generals about "cleansing the ground" of Jews when Romanian forces entered Bessarabia and Bukovina.<ref name="ReferenceA"/> Right from the start, Antonescu proclaimed the war against the Soviet Union to be a "holy war", a "crusade" in the name of Eastern Orthodox faith and the Romanian race against the forces of "Judeo-Bolshevism".<ref>Ancel, Jean ''The History of the Holocaust in Romania'', Lincoln: [[University of Nebraska Press]], 2011, p. 436.</ref> The propaganda of the Antonescu regime demonized everything Jewish as Antonescu believed that Communism was invented by the Jews, and all of the Soviet leaders were really Jews.<ref name="Ancel, Jean page 437">Ancel, Jean ''The History of the Holocaust in Romania'', Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2011, p. 437.</ref> Reflecting Antonescu's anti-Slavic feelings, despite the fact that the war was billed as a "crusade" in defence of Orthodoxy against "Judeo-Bolshevism", the war was not presented as a struggle to liberate the Orthodox Russians and Ukrainians from Communism; instead rule by "Judeo-Bolshevism" was portrayed as something brought about the innate moral inferiority of the Slavs, who thus needed to be ruled by the Germans and the Romanians.<ref name="Ancel, Jean page 437"/> The Romanian force engaged formed a ''General Antonescu Army Group'' under the effective command of German general [[Eugen Ritter von Schobert]].<ref>''Final Report'', p. 253; Deletant, pp. 80, 83</ref> Romania's campaign on the [[Eastern Front (World War II)|Eastern Front]] began without a formal declaration of war, and was consecrated by Antonescu's statement: "Soldiers, I order you, cross the [[Prut River]]" (in reference to the Bessarabian border between Romania and post-1940 Soviet territory).<ref>Deletant, p. 80</ref> A few days after this, a large-scale pogrom was carried out in [[Iași]] with Antonescu's agreement; thousands of Jews were killed in the bloody [[Iași pogrom]].<ref name=r2/><ref>''Final Report'', pp. 120–126, 200, 204, 208–209, 243–244, 285–286, 315, 321, 323, 327–329; Ancel (2005 a), ''passim''; Deletant, pp. 130–140, 316–317; Ioanid, p. 233; Trașcă, pp. 398–399; Weber, p. 167</ref> Antonescu had followed a generation of younger right-wing Romanian intellectuals led by [[Corneliu Zelea Codreanu]] who in the 1920s–30s had rejected the traditional [[Francophile|Francophila]] of the Romanian elites and their adherence to Western notions of universal democratic values and human rights.<ref>Ancel, Jean "Antonescu and the Jews" pp. 463–479 from ''The Holocaust and History The Known, the Unknown, the Disputed and the Reexamined'' edited by Michael Berenbaum and Abraham Peck, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1998 pp. 464, 467.</ref> Antonescu made it clear that his regime rejected the moral principles of the "demo-liberal world" and he saw the war as an ideological struggle between his spiritually pure "national-totalitarian regime" vs. "Jewish morality".<ref name="ReferenceB">Ancel, Jean "Antonescu and the Jews" pp. 463–479 from ''The Holocaust and History The Known, the Unknown, the Disputed and the Reexamined'' edited by Michael Berenbaum and Abraham Peck, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1998 p. 467.</ref> Antonescu believed that the liberal humanist-democratic-capitalist values of the West and Communism were both invented by the Jews to destroy Romania.<ref name="ReferenceB"/> In a lengthy speech just before the war, Antonescu attacked democracy in the most violent terms as it allowed Jews equal rights and thus to undercut the Romanian "national idea".<ref name="ReferenceB"/> As such, Antonescu stated what was needed was a "new man" who would be "tough", "virile" and willing to fight for an ethnically and religiously "pure" Romania.<ref name="ReferenceB"/> Despite his quarrel with Sima, much of Antonescu's speech clearly reflected the influence of the ideas of the Iron Guard that Antonescu had absorbed in the 1930s.<ref name="ReferenceB"/> Antonescu's anti-Semitism and sexism went so far that he tacitly condoned the rape of Jewish women and girls in Bessarabia and northern Bukovinia by his forces under the grounds that he was going take away all of the property that the Jews had "stolen" from the Romanians, and as far he was concerned, Jewish females were just another piece of property.<ref name="Ancel, Jean pages 438-439">Ancel, Jean ''The History of the Holocaust in Romania'', Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2011, pp. 438–439</ref> Since the Jewish women were going to exterminated anyway, Antonescu felt there was nothing wrong about letting his soldiers and gendarmes have "some fun" before shooting them.<ref name="Ancel, Jean pages 438-439"/>

After becoming the first Romanian to be granted the [[Knight's Cross of the Iron Cross]], which he received from Hitler at their 6 August meeting in the [[Ukraine|Ukrainian]] city of [[Berdychiv]], Antonescu was promoted to [[Marshal of Romania]] by royal decree on 22 August, in recognition for his role in restoring the eastern frontiers of [[Greater Romania]].<ref name=d83,86,280,305>Deletant, pp. 83, 86, 280, 305</ref> In a report to Berlin, a German diplomat wrote that Marshal Antonescu had syphilis and that "among [Romanian] cavalry officers this disease is as widespread as a common cold is among German officers. The Marshal suffers from severe attacks of it every several months."<ref name="Ancel pages 463-479"/> Antonescu took one of his most debated decisions when, with Bessarabia's conquest almost complete, he committed Romania to Hitler's war effort beyond the [[Dniester]]—that is, beyond territory that had been part of Romania between the wars—and thrust deeper into Soviet territory, thus waging a [[war of aggression]].<ref name=r2/><ref>''Final Report'', p. 320; Boia, pp. 270–271; Deletant, pp. 51, 84–87, 90–91, 254; King, pp. 93–94; Trașcă, pp. 377–380</ref> On 30 August, Romania occupied a territory it deemed "[[Transnistria (World War II)|Transnistria]]", formerly a part of the [[Ukrainian SSR]] (including the entire [[Moldavian ASSR]] and further territories).<ref name=r2/><ref>Achim, pp. 171, 184; Browning, p. 277; Deletant, pp. 86–87; King, pp. 93–94; Trașcă, p. 380sqq</ref> Like the decision to continue the war beyond Bessarabia, this earned Antonescu much criticism from the semi-clandestine PNL and PNȚ.<ref name=r2/> Insofar as the war against the Soviet Union was a war to recover Bessarabia and northern Bukovina – both regions that been a part of Romania until June 1940 and that had Romanian majorities – the conflict had been very popular with the Romanian public opinion.<ref name=":0">Ancel, Jean ''The History of the Holocaust in Romania'', Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2011, pp. 334–335.</ref> But the idea of conquering Transnistria was not as that region had never been part of Romania, and a minority of the people were ethnic Romanian.<ref name=":0"/> Soon after the takeover, the area was assigned to a civil administration apparatus headed by [[Gheorghe Alexianu]] and became the site for the main component of the [[Holocaust in Romania]]: a mass deportation of the [[Bessarabian Jews|Bessarabian]] and [[History of the Jews in Ukraine|Ukrainian Jews]], followed later by transports of [[Roma minority in Romania|Romani Romanians]] and Jews from Moldavia proper (that is, the portions of Moldavia west of the Prut).

The accord over Transnistria's administration, signed in [[Tighina]], also placed areas between the Dniester and the [[Dnieper]] under Romanian military occupation, while granting control over all resources to Germany.<ref>Deletant, p. 166; Trașcă, p. 384</ref> In September 1941, Antonescu ordered Romanian forces to take Odessa, a prize he badly wanted for reasons of prestige.<ref>Ancel, Jean ''The History of the Holocaust in Romania'', Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2011, p. 334.</ref> Russians had traditionally been seen in Romania as brutal aggressors, and for Romanian forces to take a major Soviet city and one of the largest Black Sea ports like Odessa would be a sign of how far Romania had been "regenerated" under Antonescu's leadership. Much to Antonescu's intense fury, the Red Army were able to halt the Romanian offensive on Odessa and 24 September 1941 Antonescu had to reluctantly ask for the help of the Wehrmacht with the drive on Odessa.<ref name="Ancel, Jean page 335">Ancel, Jean ''The History of the Holocaust in Romania'', Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2011, p. 335.</ref> On 16 October 1941 Odessa fell to the German-Romanian forces. The Romanian losses had been so heavy that the area around Odessa was known to the Romanian Army as the Vale of Tears.<ref name="Ancel, Jean page 335"/> Antonescu's anti-Semitism was sharpened by the Odessa fighting as he was convinced that the only reason why the Red Army had fought so fiercely around Odessa was that the average Russian soldier had been terrorized by bloodthirsty Jewish commissars into fighting hard.<ref name="Ancel, Jean page 335"/> When [[Wilhelm Filderman]] wrote a letter to Antonescu complaining about the murder of Jews in Odessa, Antonescu wrote back: "Your Jews, who have become Soviet commissars, are driving Soviet soldiers in the Odessa region into a futile bloodbath, through horrendous terror techniques as the Russian prisoners themselves have admitted, simply to cause us heavy losses".<ref name="Ancel, Jean page 335"/> Antonescu ended his letter with the claim that Russian Jewish commissars had savagely tortured Romanian POWs and that the entire Jewish community of Romania, Filderman included were morally responsible for all of the losses and sufferings of the Romanians around Odessa.<ref name="Ancel, Jean page 335"/> In the fall of 1941, Antonescu planned to deport all of the Jews of the ''Regat'', southern Bukovina and southern Transylvania into Transnistria as the prelude to killing them, but this operation was vetoed by Germany, who complained that Antonescu had not finished killing the Jews of Transnistria yet.<ref name="Ancel, Jean pages 459-460">Ancel, Jean ''The History of the Holocaust in Romania'', Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2011, pp. 459–460.</ref> This veto was largely motivated by bureaucratic politics, namely if Antonescu exterminated all of the Jews of Romania himself, there would be nothing for the SS and the ''Auswärtiges Amt'' to do.<ref name="Ancel, Jean pages 459-460"/> Killinger informed Antonescu that Germany would reduce its supplies of arms if Antonescu went ahead with his plans to deport the Jews of the ''Regat'' into Transnistria and told him he would be better off deporting the Jews to the death camps in Poland that the Germans were already busy building.<ref>Ancel, Jean ''The History of the Holocaust in Romania'', Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2011, p. 304.</ref> Since Romania had almost no arms industry of its own and was almost entirely dependent upon weapons from Germany to fight the war, Antonescu had little choice, but to comply with Killinger's request.

===Reversal of fortunes===
{{Multiple image
| image1            = Bundesarchiv Bild 183-B23201, Joachim von Ribbentrop und Ion Antonescu.jpg
| image2            = Marshal Erich von Manstein and Marshal Ion Antonescu.jpg
| caption1          = Antonescu being greeted by [[Joachim von Ribbentrop]] during a 1943 visit to Germany
| caption2          = [[Erich von Manstein]] (''left'') welcomes Antonescu and General Dumitrescu (''right'') during a 1943 visit to Germany
}}
The Romanian Army's inferior arms, insufficient armour and lack of training had been major concerns for the German commanders since before the start of the operation.<ref>Deletant, pp. 77–78, 83, 94–96</ref> One of the earliest major obstacles Antonescu encountered on the Eastern Front was the resistance of [[Odessa]], a Soviet port on the [[Black Sea]]. Refusing any German assistance, he ordered the Romanian Army to maintain a [[Siege of Odessa (1941)|two-month siege]] on heavily fortified and well-defended positions.<ref name=r2/><ref>Trașcă, pp. 385–389</ref> The ill-equipped [[4th Army (Romania)|4th Army]] suffered losses of some 100,000 men.<ref>Deletant, pp. 87–88; Trașcă, pp. 385–387</ref> Antonescu's popularity again rose in October, when the fall of Odessa was celebrated triumphantly with a parade through Bucharest's ''[[Arcul de Triumf]]'', and when many Romanians reportedly believed the war was as good as won.<ref name=r2/> In Odessa itself, the aftermath included a [[1941 Odessa massacre|large-scale massacre]] of the Jewish population, ordered by the Marshal as retaliation for a bombing which killed a number of Romanian officers and soldiers (General [[Ioan Glogojeanu]] among them).<ref name=r2/><ref>''Final Report'', pp. 150–157, 245, 321, 323; Ancel (2005 a), p. 291; Deletant, pp. 171–177, 248–253, 261, 276–277, 328–329; Trașcă, p. 389sqq</ref> The city subsequently became the administrative capital of Transnistria.<ref name=r2/><ref>Deletant, pp. 167–168; Gella, p. 171</ref> According to one account, the Romanian administration planned to change Odessa's name to ''Antonescu''.<ref>Nicholls, p. 6; White, p. 175</ref> Antonescu's planned that once the war against the Soviet Union was won to invade Hungary to take back Transylvania and Bulgaria to take back the Dobruja with Antonescu being especially keen on the former.<ref name="Weinberg, Gerhard page 521">Weinberg, Gerhard ''A World At Arms'', Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994 p. 521.</ref> Antonescu planned on attacking Hungary to recover Transylvania at the first opportunity and regarded Romanian involvement on the Eastern Front in part as a way of proving to Hitler that Romania was a better German ally than Hungary, and thus deserving of German support when the planned Romanian-Hungarian war began.<ref name="Weinberg, Gerhard page 521"/> The ''Conducător'' had also created an [[Croatian–Romanian–Slovak friendship proclamation|intra-Axis alliance]] against [[Kingdom of Hungary (1920–1946)|Hungary]] along with [[Independent State of Croatia|Croatia]] and [[Slovak Republic (1939–1945)|Slovakia]].<ref>''Third Axis Fourth Ally: Romanian Armed Forces in the European War, 1941–1945'', by Mark Axworthy, Cornel Scafeş and Cristian Crăciunoiu, p. 73</ref>

As the Soviet Union recovered from the initial shock and slowed down the Axis offensive at the [[Battle of Moscow]] (October 1941 – January 1942), Romania was asked by its allies to contribute a larger number of troops.<ref name="r3">Delia Radu, [http://www.bbc.co.uk/romanian/news/story/2008/08/080801_serial_antonescu_episod3.shtml "Serialul 'Ion Antonescu și asumarea istoriei' (3)"], [[BBC]], Romanian edition, 1 August 2008.</ref> A decisive factor in Antonescu's compliance with the request appears to have been a special visit to Bucharest by Wehrmacht chief of staff [[Wilhelm Keitel]], who introduced the ''Conducător'' to Hitler's plan for attacking the [[Caucasus]] (''see [[Battle of the Caucasus]]'').<ref name=r3/> The Romanian force engaged in the war reportedly exceeded German demands.<ref name=r3/> It came to around 500,000 troops<ref name=r3/><ref name=d2>Deletant, p. 2</ref> and thirty actively involved divisions.<ref>Nicholls, p. 6</ref> As a sign of his satisfaction, Hitler presented his Romanian counterpart with a luxury car.<ref name=r3/> On 7 December 1941, after reflecting on the possibility for Romania, Hungary and Finland to change their stance, the British government responded to repeated Soviet requests and declared war on all three countries.<ref>Deletant, pp. 90–92</ref> Following [[Empire of Japan|Japan]]'s [[attack on Pearl Harbor]] and in compliance with its Axis commitment, Romania declared war on the [[United States]] within five days. These developments contrasted with Antonescu's own statement of 7 December: "I am an ally of the [German] Reich against [the Soviet Union], I am neutral in the conflict between Great Britain and Germany. I am for America against the Japanese."<ref name=d92>Deletant, p. 92</ref>

[[File:Marshal Ion Antonescu and General Ewald von Kleist at an airfield.jpg|thumb|Antonescu arrives at the front with General [[Paul Ludwig Ewald von Kleist|Ewald von Kleist]] in June 1942, during the Axis summer offensive [[Case Blue]]]]

A crucial change in the war came with the [[Battle of Stalingrad]] in June 1942 – February 1943, a major defeat for the Axis. [[Romanian armies in the Battle of Stalingrad|Romania's armies]] alone lost some 150,000 men (either dead, wounded or captured)<ref name=r3/> and more than half of the country's divisions were wiped out.<ref>Deletant, pp. 96–97, 99; Gella, p. 171; Penkower, p. 161</ref> 
The loss of two entire Romanian armies who all either killed or captured by the Soviets produced a major crisis in German-Romanian relations in the winter of 1943 with many people in the Romanian government for the first time questioning the wisdom of fighting on the side of the Axis.<ref name="Weinberg, Gerhard pages 460-461">Weinberg, Gerhard ''A World At Arms'', Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994 pp. 460–461.</ref> Outside of the elites, by 1943 the continuing heavy losses on the Eastern Front, anger at the contempt which the Wehrmacht treated their Romanian allies and declining living standards within Romania made the war unpopular with the Romanian people, and consequently the ''Conducător'' himself. The American historian [[Gerhard Weinberg]] wrote that: "The string of broken German promises of equipment and support, the disregard of warnings about Soviet offensive preparations, the unfriendly treatment of retreating Romanian units by German officers and soldiers and the general German tendency to blame their own miscalculations and disasters on their allies all combined to produce a real crisis in German-Romanian relations."<ref name="Weinberg, Gerhard pages 460-461"/> For part of that interval, the Marshal had withdrawn from public life, owing to an unknown affliction, which is variously rumoured to have been a [[mental breakdown]], a [[foodborne illness]] or a symptom of the [[syphilis]] he had contracted earlier in life.<ref>Deletant, pp. 209–210, 335</ref> He is known to have been suffering from digestive problems, treating himself with food prepared by Marlene von Exner, an [[Austria]]n-born [[dietitian]] who moved into [[Adolf Hitler's vegetarianism|Hitler's service]] after 1943.<ref>[[Traudl Junge]], [[Melissa Müller]], ''[[Until the Final Hour|Até o fim: Os últimos dias de Hitler contados por sua secretária]]'', Ediouro Publicações, Rio de Janeiro, 2005, pp. 106–107, 191. {{ISBN|85-00-01682-5}}</ref> 
[[File:Mareșal tank destroyer M-05 prototype.jpg|thumb|The [[Mareșal (tank destroyer)|Mareșal tank destroyer]], named after Marshal Antonescu, who was involved in its development. It later inspired the German [[Hetzer]]]]
Upon his return, Antonescu blamed the Romanian losses on German overseer [[Arthur Hauffe]], whom Hitler agreed to replace.<ref>Deletant, pp. 98–99</ref> In parallel with the military losses, Romania was confronted with large-scale economic problems. Romania's oil was the ''Reich'''s only source of natural oil after the invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941 to August 1944 (Germany also had synthetic oil plants operating from 1942 onwards), and as such for economic reasons, Romania was always treated as a major ally by Hitler.<ref name="Weinberg, Gerhard page 521"/> While Germany [[Monopoly|monopolized]] Romania's exports,<ref>''Final Report'', pp. 63, 117, 168; Deletant, pp. 26–27, 75; Harvey, p. 545</ref> it defaulted on most of its payments.<ref>Harvey, p. 545</ref> Like all countries whose exports to Germany, particularly in oil, exceeded imports from that country, [[Economy of Romania|Romania's economy]] suffered from Nazi control of the [[exchange rate]] (''see [[Economy of Nazi Germany]]'').<ref>Deletant, p. 26; Harvey, pp. 544–545</ref> On the German side, those directly involved in harnessing Romania's economic output for German goals were economic planners [[Hermann Göring]] and [[Walther Funk]], together with [[Hermann Neubacher]], the Special Representative for Economic Problems.<ref>Deletant, pp. 26–27</ref> A recurring problem for Antonescu was attempting to obtain payments for all of the oil he shipped to Germany while resisting German demands for increased oil production.<ref name="Weinberg, Gerhard page 521"/> The situation was further aggravated in 1942, as [[United States Army Air Forces|USAAF]] and [[Royal Air Force|RAF]] were able to bomb the oil fields in [[Prahova County]] (''see [[Bombing of Romania in World War II]], [[Operation Tidal Wave]]'').<ref>Chant, p. 75; Deletant, p. 27; Gella, p. 171</ref> Official sources from the following period amalgamate military and civilian losses of all kinds, which produces a total of 554,000 victims of the war.<ref>Gella, p. 173; Weber, p. 164</ref> To improve the Romanian army's effectiveness, the [[Mareșal (tank destroyer)|Mareșal tank destroyer]] was developed starting in late 1942. Marshal Antonescu, after whom the vehicle was named, was involved in the project himself.<ref>''Third Axis Fourth Ally: Romanian Armed Forces in the European War, 1941–1945'', by Mark Axworthy, Cornel Scafeş and Cristian Crăciunoiu, p. 228</ref> The vehicle later influenced the development of the German [[Hetzer]].<ref>''Third Axis Fourth Ally: Romanian Armed Forces in the European War, 1941–1945'', by Mark Axworthy, Cornel Scafeş and Cristian Crăciunoiu, p. 229</ref><ref>Steven J. Zaloga, Tanks of Hitler’s Eastern Allies 1941–45, p. 31</ref>

In this context, the Romanian leader acknowledged that Germany was losing the war, and he therefore authorized his Deputy Premier and new Foreign Minister Mihai Antonescu to set up contacts with the Allies.<ref name=r3/><ref>''Final Report'', p. 252; Cioroianu, p. 51; Deletant, pp. 230–240, 341–344; Penkower, pp. 153, 161</ref> In early 1943, Antonescu authorized his diplomats to contact British and American diplomats in Portugal and Switzerland to see if were possible for Romania to sign an armistice with the Western powers.<ref name="Weinberg, Gerhard page 461">Weinberg, Gerhard ''A World At Arms'', Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994 p. 461.</ref> The Romanian diplomats were informed that no armistice was possible until an armistice was signed with the Soviet Union, a condition Antonescu rejected.<ref name="Weinberg, Gerhard page 461"/> In parallel, he allowed the PNȚ and the PNL to engage in parallel talks with the Allies at various locations in neutral countries.<ref name=r3/><ref>Deletant, pp. 75, 231–240, 341–344; Roper, pp. 8, 14</ref> The discussions were strained by the [[Allies of World War II|Western Allies]]' call for an [[unconditional surrender]], over which the Romanian envoys bargained with Allied diplomats in [[Sweden]] and [[Egypt]] (among them the Soviet representatives [[Nikolai Novikov (diplomat)|Nikolai Novikov]] and [[Alexandra Kollontai]]).<ref>Deletant, pp. 231, 233–234, 236–239, 342–345</ref> Antonescu was also alarmed by the possibility of war being carried on Romanian territory, as had happened in Italy after [[Allied invasion of Italy|Operation Avalanche]].<ref>Deletant, pp. 234–236</ref> The events also prompted hostile negotiations aimed at toppling Antonescu, and involving the two political parties, the young monarch, diplomats and soldiers.<ref name=r3/><ref>Deletant, pp. 237–240, 343–344; Roper, p. 14</ref> A major clash between Michael and Antonescu took place during the first days of 1943, when the 21-year-old monarch used his New Year's address on [[Romanian Radio Broadcasting Company|national radio]] to part with the Axis war effort.<ref>Deletant, pp. 236, 337</ref>

===Ouster and arrest===
{{main|King Michael's Coup}}
In March 1944, the Soviet [[Red Army]] broke the [[Southern Bug]] and Dniester fronts, advancing on Bessarabia. This came just as [[Field marshal (United Kingdom)|Field Marshal]] [[Henry Maitland Wilson]], the British [[Supreme Allied Commander]] of the [[Mediterranean and Middle East theatre of World War II|Mediterranean theatre]], presented Antonescu with an [[ultimatum]].<ref name=r3/> After a new visit to Germany and a meeting with Hitler, Antonescu opted to continue fighting alongside the remaining Axis states, a decision which he later claimed was motivated by Hitler's promise to allow Romania possession of [[Northern Transylvania]] in the event of an Axis victory.<ref name=r3/> Upon his return, the ''Conducător'' oversaw a counteroffensive which stabilized the front on a line between Iași and [[Chișinău]] to the north and the lower Dniester to the east.<ref name=r3/> This normalized his relations with Nazi German officials, whose alarm over the possible loss of an ally had resulted in the ''[[Operation Margarethe II|Margarethe II]]'' plan, an adapted version of the [[Operation Margarethe|Nazi takeover in Hungary]].<ref name=r3/><ref>Chant, p. 124; Deletant, pp. 234–235, 342</ref>

However, Antonescu's non-compliance with the terms of Wilson's ultimatum also had drastic effects on Romania's ability to exit the war.<ref name=r3/> By then, Antonescu was conceiving of a [[separate peace]] with the Western Allies,<ref name=r3/><ref>Deletant, p. 231; White, p. 158</ref> while maintaining contacts with the Soviets.<ref>Deletant, pp. 233–234, 238–239; Kelso, p. 129</ref> In parallel, the mainstream opposition movement came to establish contacts with the [[Romanian Communist Party]] (PCR), which, although minor numerically, gained importance for being the only political group to be favoured by Soviet leader [[Joseph Stalin]].<ref>Cioroianu, pp. 51–52; Deletant, pp. 237–240, 343–344; Gella, p. 172; Roper, pp. 8–9, 13–14</ref> On the PCR side, the discussions involved [[Lucrețiu Pătrășcanu]] and later [[Emil Bodnăraș]].<ref name=r3/><ref>Deletant, pp. 238–240, 343–344</ref> Another participating group at this stage was the old [[Romanian Social Democratic Party (1927-1948)|Romanian Social Democratic Party]].<ref>Cioroianu, p. 51; Deletant, pp. 238–239, 344; Roper, p. 14; Weber, p. 156</ref>

Large-scale [[Bombing of Bucharest in World War II|Allied bombings of Bucharest]] took place in spring 1944, while the Soviet [[Red Army]] approached Romanian borders.<ref>Deletant, pp. 240, 344; Kelso, p. 129; Nicholls, p. 6</ref> The [[Second Jassy–Kishinev Offensive|Battle for Romania]] began in late summer: while German commanders [[Johannes Frießner]] and [[Otto Wöhler]] of the [[Army Group South Ukraine]] attempted to hold [[Bukovina]], Soviet [[Steppe Front]] leader [[Rodion Malinovsky]] stormed into the areas of Moldavia defended by [[Petre Dumitrescu]]'s troops.<ref>Chant, pp. 84, 303</ref> In reaction, Antonescu attempted to stabilize the front on a line between [[Focșani]], [[Nămoloasa]] and [[Brăila]], deep inside Romanian territory.<ref name=r3/> On 5 August, he visited Hitler one final time in [[Kętrzyn]]. On this occasion, the German leader reportedly explained that his people had betrayed the Nazi cause, and asked him if Romania would go on fighting (to which Antonescu reportedly answered in vague terms).<ref>Deletant, pp. 239–240</ref> After [[Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Soviet Union)|Soviet Foreign Minister]] [[Vyacheslav Molotov]] more than once stated that the Soviet Union was not going to require Romanian subservience,<ref>Chant, p. 124; Deletant, p. 237</ref> the factions opposing Antonescu agreed that the moment had come to overthrow him, by carrying out the [[King Michael's Coup|Royal Coup of 23 August]].<ref name=r3/><ref>Ancel (2005 a), p. 321; Bucur (2004), pp. 173–176; Chant, pp. 84–85, 124–125, 303; Cioroianu, pp. 50–55; Deletant, pp. 3–4, 241–246, 265–266, 343–346; Gella, p. 172; Guran & Ștefan, p. 112; Ioanid, pp. 235–236; Kelso, p. 129; Kenney, p. 93; Kent, p. 52; King, p. 94; Morgan, p. 188; Nicholls, pp. 6, 166–167; Roper, pp. 13–15; Weber, pp. 152–154, 158–159; White, p. 158</ref> On that day, the sovereign asked Antonescu to meet him in the [[Royal Palace of Bucharest|Royal Palace]], where he presented him with a request to take Romania out of its Axis alliance.<ref name=r3/><ref>Deletant, pp. 241–242; Roper, p. 14</ref> The ''Conducător'' refused, and was promptly arrested by soldiers of the guard, being replaced as Premier with General [[Constantin Sănătescu]], who presided over a [[National unity government|national government]].<ref name=r3/><ref>Cioroianu, p. 55; Deletant, pp. 242–243; Roper, p. 14</ref>

The new Romanian authorities declared peace with the Allies and advised the population to greet Soviet troops.<ref name=r3/> On 25 August, as Bucharest was successfully defending itself against German retaliations, Romania declared war on Nazi Germany.<ref>Chant, pp. 84–85, 124–125, 303; Gella, p. 172; Kelso, p. 129</ref> The events disrupted German domination in the Balkans, putting a stop to the ''Maibaum'' offensive against [[Yugoslav Partisans]].<ref>Chant, p. 122</ref> The coup was nevertheless a unilateral move, and, until the signature of an [[armistice]] on 12 September,<ref name=r3/><ref>''Final Report'', p. 316; Cioroianu, p. 51; Deletant, pp. 247–248; Kelso, p. 130; Nicholls, pp. 167, 225</ref> the country was still perceived as an enemy by the Soviets, who continued to take Romanian soldiers as [[Prisoner of war|prisoners of war]].<ref name=r3/> In parallel, Hitler reactivated the Iron Guardist exile, creating a Sima-led [[government in exile]] that did not survive the [[End of World War II in Europe|war's end in Europe]].<ref>Harvey, p. 498; Morgan, p. 188; Veiga, pp. 302–303, 313–314</ref>

Placed in the custody of PCR militants, Antonescu spent the interval at a house in Bucharest's [[Vatra Luminoasă]] quarter.<ref name=r3/><ref>Deletant, pp. 243–244, 345–346</ref> He was afterward handed to the [[Soviet occupation of Romania|Soviet occupation forces]], who transported him to [[Moscow]], together with his deputy Mihai Antonescu, Governor of Transnistria [[Gheorghe Alexianu]], [[Ministry of National Defense (Romania)|defence minister]] [[Constantin Pantazi]], [[Gendarmerie (Romania)|Gendarmerie]] commander [[Constantin Vasiliu]] and Bucharest [[Romanian Police|Police]] chief [[Mircea Elefterescu]].<ref name=r3/><ref name=d244>Deletant, p. 244</ref> They were subsequently kept in luxurious detention at a mansion nearby the city,<ref name=r3/><ref>Cioroianu, p. 296; Deletant, pp. 244, 246</ref> and guarded by [[SMERSH]], a special [[counter-intelligence]] body answering directly to Stalin.<ref name=r3/> Shortly after [[German Instrument of Surrender|Germany surrendered]] in May 1945, the group was moved to [[Lubyanka Building|Lubyanka prison]]. There, Antonescu was interrogated and reputedly pressured by SMERSH operatives, among them [[Viktor Abakumov]], but transcripts of their conversations were never sent back to Romania by the Soviet authorities.<ref name=r3/><ref>Deletant, pp. 246, 346</ref> Later research noted that the main issues discussed were the German-Romanian alliance, the war on the Soviet Union, the economic toll on both countries, and [[The Holocaust in Romania|Romania's participation]] in [[the Holocaust]] (defined specifically as crimes against "peaceful Soviet citizens").<ref name=r3/> At some point during this period, Antonescu attempted suicide in his quarters.<ref name=r3/><ref name=d244/> He was returned to Bucharest in spring 1946 and held in [[Jilava Prison]]. He was subsequently interrogated by prosecutor [[Avram Bunaciu]], to whom he complained about the conditions of his detainment, contrasting them with those in Moscow, while explaining that he was a [[vegetarian]] and demanding a special diet.<ref>Deletant, p. 249</ref>

===Trial and execution===
{{see also|Post–World War II Romanian war crime trials}}
In May 1946, Antonescu was prosecuted at the first in a series of [[Romanian People's Tribunals|People's Tribunals]], on charges of [[war crime]]s, [[crimes against the peace]] and [[treason]].<ref name=r3/><ref>''Final Report'', pp. 317–331; Cioroianu, pp. 295–296; Deletant, pp. 245–261, 346–350; Frankowski, pp. 218–219</ref> The tribunals had first been proposed by the PNȚ,<ref name=r3/> and were comparable to the [[Nuremberg Trials]] in [[Allied-occupied Germany]].<ref name=r3/><ref>''Final Report'', pp. 316, 319–320, 331; Deletant, pp. 247–248, 261</ref> The Romanian legislative framework was drafted by coup participant Pătrășcanu, a PCR member who had been granted leadership of the [[Ministry of Justice and Citizenship Freedoms (Romania)|Justice Ministry]].<ref>''Final Report'', pp. 316–317; Frankowski, p. 219; Ioanid, p. 235</ref> Despite the idea having earned support from several sides of the political spectrum, the procedures were politicized in a sense favourable to the PCR and the Soviet Union,<ref name=r3/><ref>''Final Report'', pp. 313–331; Cioroianu, pp. 295–296; Deletant, pp. 245–261; Frankowski, pp. 218–219</ref> and posed a legal problem for being based on ''[[Ex post facto law|ex post facto]]'' decisions.<ref name=d248,255>Deletant, pp. 248, 255</ref> The first such local trial took place in 1945, resulting in the sentencing of [[Iosif Iacobici]], [[Nicolae Macici]], [[Constantin Trestioreanu]] and other military commanders directly involved in planning or carrying out the [[1941 Odessa massacre|Odessa massacre]].<ref>''Final Report'', p. 314; Deletant, pp. 172, 248–249, 328</ref>

Antonescu was represented by [[Constantin Paraschivescu-Bălăceanu]] and [[Titus Stoica]], two [[public defender]]s whom he had first consulted with a day before the procedures were initiated.<ref name=d251>Deletant, p. 251</ref> The prosecution team, led by [[Vasile Stoican]], and the panel of judges, presided over by [[Alexandru Voitinovici]], were infiltrated by PCR supporters.<ref>''Final Report'', pp. 313, 322; Deletant, pp. 250–251</ref> Both consistently failed to admit that Antonescu's foreign policies were overall dictated by Romania's positioning between Germany and the Soviet Union.<ref name=r3/><ref>''Final Report'', pp. 320–321; Deletant, p. 248</ref> Nevertheless, and although references to the mass murders formed just 23% of the indictment and corpus of evidence (ranking below charges of anti-Soviet aggression),<ref>''Final Report'', p. 321</ref> the procedures also included Antonescu's admission of and self-exculpating take on war crimes, including the deportations to Transnistria.<ref name=r3/><ref>''Final Report'', pp. 240–241, 252, 321–322; Achim, p. 168; Deletant, pp. 73, 252–255, 261, 276–277; Kelso, p. 97</ref> They also evidence his awareness of the Odessa massacre, accompanied by his claim that few of the deaths were his direct responsibility.<ref>''Final Report'', p. 245; Deletant, pp. 173–174, 252–253, 261, 276–277, 329</ref> One notable event at the trial was a testimony by PNȚ leader [[Iuliu Maniu]]. Reacting against the aggressive tone of other accusers, Maniu went on record saying: "We [Maniu and Antonescu] were political adversaries, not [[Human cannibalism|cannibals]]."<ref name=r3/> Upon leaving the bench, Maniu walked toward Antonescu and shook his hand.<ref name=r3/><ref>Deletant, pp. 255–256, 348</ref>

[[File:Antonescu execution.jpg|thumb|Antonescu's execution at Jilava, 1 June 1946]]

Ion Antonescu was found guilty of the charges. This verdict was followed by two sets of [[appeal]]s, which claimed that the restored and amended [[1923 Constitution of Romania|1923 Constitution]] did not offer a framework for the People's Tribunals and prevented [[Capital punishment in Romania|capital punishment]] during peacetime, while noting that, contrary to the armistice agreement, only one power represented within the [[Allied Commission]] had supervised the tribunal.<ref name=d248,255/> They were both rejected within six days, in compliance with a legal deadline on the completion of trials by the People's Tribunals.<ref>Deletant, pp. 248, 261</ref> King Michael subsequently received pleas for [[Pardon|clemency]] from Antonescu's lawyer and his mother, and reputedly considered asking the Allies to reassess the case as part of the actual Nuremberg Trials, taking Romanian war criminals into foreign custody.<ref>Deletant, pp. 255–257, 349–350</ref> Subjected to pressures by the new Soviet-backed [[Petru Groza]] executive, he issued a decree in favour of execution.<ref>Deletant, pp. 256–259, 349–350</ref> Together with his co-defendants Mihai Antonescu, Alexianu and Vasiliu, the former ''Conducător'' was executed by a military [[firing squad]] on 1 June 1946. Antonescu supporters circulated false rumours that regular soldiers had refused to fire at their commander, and that the squad was mostly composed of Jewish policemen.<ref>Deletant, pp. 259, 350</ref> Another apologetic claim insists that he himself ordered the squad to shoot, but footage of the event has proven it false.<ref>Deletant, pp. 5, 259</ref> However, he did refuse a blindfold and raised his hat in salute once the order was given.<ref>Deletant, p. 259</ref> The execution site, some distance away from the locality of [[Jilava]] and the prison fort, was known as ''Valea Piersicilor'' ("Valley of the Peach Trees").<ref name=r3/><ref>Cioroianu, p. 296; Deletant, p. 259</ref> His final written statement was a letter to his wife, urging her to withdraw into a [[convent]], while stating the belief that posterity would reconsider his deeds and accusing Romanians of being "ungrateful".<ref>Deletant, p. 260</ref>