Editing Idealism (section)

==Definitions==
''Idealism'' is a term with several related meanings. It comes via [[Latin]] ''[[idea]]'' from the [[Ancient Greek]] ''[[idea]]'' (ἰδέα) from ''idein'' (ἰδεῖν), meaning "to see". The term entered the English language by 1743.<ref>{{cite web |title=idealism, n. |url=https://www.oed.com/view/Entry/90960 |publisher=[[Oxford English Dictionary]]}}</ref><ref>{{cite web |date=20 June 2023 |title=idealism, n. |url=https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/idealism |publisher=[[Merriam-Webster]]}}</ref> The term idealism was first used in the abstract metaphysical sense of the "belief that reality is made up only of ideas" by [[Christian Wolff (philosopher)|Christian Wolff]] in 1747.<ref name="SEP3">{{cite encyclopedia |title=Idealism |encyclopedia=[[Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy]] |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |location=Stanford, California |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2018/entries/idealism/ |date=30 August 2015 |author-link=Martin Kramer |editor-last=Zalta |editor-first=Edward N. |last2=Horstmann |first2=Rolf-Peter |last1=Guyer |first1=Paul}}</ref> The term re-entered the English language in this abstract sense by 1796.<ref>{{cite web |title=idealism, n. |url=https://www.etymonline.com/search?q=idealism |publisher=[[Online Etymological Dictionary]]}}</ref> [[A. C. Ewing]] gives this influential definition:

<blockquote>the view that there can be no physical objects existing apart from some experience...provided that we regard thinking as part of experience and do not imply by "experience" passivity, and provided we include under experience not only human experience but the so-called "Absolute Experience" or the experience of a God such as Berkeley postulates.<ref name=":3">Guyer, 2023, p. 3.</ref></blockquote>

A more recent definition by Willem deVries sees idealism as "roughly, the genus comprises theories that attribute ontological priority to the mental, especially the conceptual or ideational, over the non-mental."<ref name=":3" /> As such, idealism entails a rejection of [[materialism]] (or [[physicalism]]) as well as the rejection of the mind-independent existence of matter (and as such, also entails a rejection of [[Mind–body dualism|dualism]]).<ref>Guyer at al., 2023, p. 4.</ref>

There are two main definitions of idealism in contemporary philosophy, depending on whether its thesis is epistemic or metaphysical:

* [[Metaphysics|Metaphysical]] idealism or [[Ontology|ontological]] idealism is the view which holds that all of reality is in some way mental (or spirit, reason, or will) or at least ultimately grounded in a fundamental basis which is mental.<ref name=":2">Guyer et al., 2023, pp. 1–2.</ref> This is a form of metaphysical [[monism]] because it holds that there is only one type of thing in existence. The modern paradigm of a Western metaphysical idealism is [[George Berkeley|Berkeley]]'s immaterialism.<ref name=":2" /> Other such idealists are [[Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel|Hegel]], and [[F. H. Bradley|Bradley]].
* [[Epistemological idealism]] (or "formal" idealism) is a position in [[epistemology]] that holds that all [[knowledge]] is based on mental structures, not on "things in themselves". Whether a mind-independent reality is accepted or not, all that we have knowledge of are mental phenomena.<ref name=":2" /> The main source of Western epistemic idealist arguments is the transcendental idealism of [[Immanuel Kant|Kant]].<ref name=":2" /> Other thinkers who have defended epistemic idealist arguments include [[Ludwig Boltzmann]] and [[Brand Blanshard]].

Thus, metaphysical idealism holds that reality itself is non-physical, immaterial, or experiential at its core, while [[Epistemological idealism|epistemological idealist]] arguments merely affirm that reality can only be known through ideas and mental structures (without necessarily making metaphysical claims about [[Thing-in-itself|things in themselves]]).<ref name="Brittanica3">Daniel Sommer Robinson, [https://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/281802/idealism "Idealism"], ''Encyclopædia Britannica''</ref> Because of this, A.C. Ewing argued that instead of thinking about these two categories as forms of idealism proper, we should instead speak of epistemic and metaphysical arguments for idealism.<ref name=":0">Guyer, Paul and Rolf-Peter Horstmann, [https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2023/entries/idealism/ "Idealism", ''The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy''] (Spring 2023 Edition), Edward N. Zalta & Uri Nodelman (eds.).</ref>

These two ways of arguing for idealism are sometimes combined to defend a specific type of idealism (as done by Berkeley), but they may also be defended as independent theses by different thinkers. For example, while F. H. Bradley and McTaggart focused on metaphysical arguments, [[Josiah Royce]], and [[Brand Blanshard]] developed epistemological arguments.<ref>Guyer et al., 2023, p. 5.</ref>

Furthermore, one might use epistemic arguments, but remain neutral about the metaphysical nature of things in themselves. This metaphysically neutral position, which is not a form of metaphysical idealism proper, may be associated with figures like [[Rudolf Carnap]], [[Willard Van Orman Quine|Quine]], [[Donald Davidson (philosopher)|Donald Davidson]], and perhaps even Kant himself (though he is difficult to categorize).<ref>Guyer et al., 2023, p. 4.</ref> The most famous kind of epistemic idealism is associated with [[Kantianism]] and [[transcendental idealism]], as well as with the related [[Neo-Kantianism|Neo-Kantian]] philosophies. Transcendental idealists like Kant affirm epistemic idealistic arguments without committing themselves to whether reality as such, the "[[Thing-in-itself|thing in itself]]", is ''ultimately'' mental.

=== Types of metaphysical idealism ===
Within metaphysical idealism, there are numerous further sub-types, including forms of [[Pluralism (philosophy)|pluralism]], which hold that there are many independent mental [[Substance theory|substances]] or minds, such as [[Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz|Leibniz]]' [[monadology]], and various forms of [[monism]] or [[absolute idealism]] (e.g. Hegelianism or [[Advaita Vedanta]]), which hold that the fundamental mental reality is a single unity or is grounded in some kind of singular [[Absolute (philosophy)|Absolute]]. Beyond this, idealists disagree on which aspects of the mental are more metaphysically basic. [[Platonic idealism]] affirms that ideal [[Theory of forms|forms]] are more basic to reality than the things we perceive, while [[subjective idealism|subjective idealists]] and [[phenomenalism|phenomenalists]] privilege sensory experiences. [[Personalism]], meanwhile, sees [[person]]s or [[Self|selves]] as fundamental.

A common distinction is between subjective and objective forms of idealism. [[Subjective idealism|Subjective idealists]] like [[George Berkeley]] reject the existence of a mind-independent or "external" world (though not the ''appearance'' of such phenomena in the mind). However, not all idealists restrict the real to subjective experience. [[Objective idealism|Objective idealists]] make claims about a trans-empirical world, but simply deny that this world is essentially divorced from or ontologically prior to mind or consciousness as such. Thus, objective idealism asserts that the reality of experiencing includes and transcends the realities of the object experienced and of the mind of the observer.<ref>Dictionary definition http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/objective+idealism</ref>

Idealism is sometimes categorized as a type of metaphysical [[anti-realism]] or [[skepticism]]. However, idealists need not reject the existence of an objective reality that we can obtain knowledge of, and can merely affirm that this real natural world is mental.<ref>Dunham et al. 2011, p. 4</ref><ref name=":1">Chalmers, David (2019). Idealism and the Mind-Body Problem. In William Seager (ed.), ''The Routledge Handbook of Panpsychism''. New York: Routledge. pp. 353–373.</ref> Thus, [[David Chalmers]] writes of anti-realist idealisms (which would include Berkeley's) and realist forms of idealism, such as "[[Panpsychism|panpsychist]] versions of idealism where fundamental microphysical entities are conscious subjects, and on which matter is realized by these conscious subjects and their relations."<ref name=":1" />

Chalmers further outlines the following taxonomy of idealism:<blockquote>Micro-idealism is the thesis that concrete reality is wholly grounded in micro-level mentality: that is, in mentality associated with fundamental microscopic entities (such as [[quarks]] and [[photon]]s). Macro-idealism is the thesis that concrete reality is wholly grounded in macro-level mentality: that is, in mentality associated with macroscopic (middle-sized) entities such as [[human]]s and perhaps non-human animals. Cosmic idealism is the thesis that concrete reality is wholly grounded in cosmic mentality: that is, in mentality associated with the [[cosmos]] as a whole or with a single cosmic entity (such as the universe or a deity).<ref name=":1" /> </blockquote>Guyer et al. also distinguish between forms of idealism which are grounded in [[substance theory]] (often found in the Anglophone idealisms of the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries) and forms of idealism which focus on activities or dynamic [[process]]es (favored in post-Kantian German philosophy).<ref>Guyer, 2023, p. 12.</ref>