Editing Guadalcanal campaign (section)

==Background==

===Strategic considerations===
[[File:Pacific Theater Areas;map1.JPG|thumb|upright=1.5|Japanese control of the western Pacific area between May and August 1942. Guadalcanal is located in the lower right center of the map.]]

On 7 December 1941, [[Attack on Pearl Harbor|Japanese forces attacked]] the [[United States Pacific Fleet]] at [[Naval Station Pearl Harbor|Pearl Harbor]], [[Territory of Hawaii|Hawaii]]. The attack killed almost 2,500 people and crippled much of the U.S. [[battleship]] fleet, precipitating formal declarations of war between the two nations the next day. The initial goals of the Japanese leadership were to neutralize the [[United States Navy|U.S. Navy]], seize territories rich in natural resources, and establish strategic military bases with which to defend Japan's empire in the Pacific Ocean and Asia. Initially, Japanese forces captured the Philippines, Thailand, [[British Malaya|Malaya]], Singapore, Burma, the [[Dutch East Indies]], [[Wake Island]], [[Gilbert Islands]], [[New Britain]] and [[Guam]]. The U.S. was joined in the war against Japan by several of the [[Allies of World War II|Allied powers]], including the [[British Empire]] and the [[Dutch government-in-exile]], both of which had also been attacked by Japan.<ref>Murray pp. 169–195</ref>

The Japanese made two attempts to continue their offensive and extend their outer defensive perimeter in the south and central Pacific to a point at which they could threaten Australia, Hawaii, and the U.S. west coast. The first offensive was thwarted in the naval [[Battle of the Coral Sea]], which was a tactical stalemate but a strategic Allied victory in retrospect. It was the Allies' first major victory against the Japanese and significantly reduced the offensive capability of Japan's carrier forces. However, the battle did not temper Japan's audacious offensive military posture for several crucial months, with Japanese forces attempting a failed attack on [[Port Moresby]] over the [[Kokoda Track campaign|Kokoda track]]. The second major Japanese offensive was stopped at the [[Battle of Midway]]. Both sides suffered significant losses in carrier aircraft and aircrew during these engagements. Crucially, while the Americans were able to reconstitute their naval air strength in relatively short order, the Japanese ultimately proved unable to do so.<ref name=":0">{{Cite book |last=Toll |first=Ian |title=The Conquering Tide: War in the Pacific Islands, 1942-1944 |date=2015 |publisher=W. W. Norton & Company |isbn=978-0-393-35320-4 |edition=1st |location=United States of America |pages=138}}</ref> These strategic victories allowed the Allies to transition to a more offensive stance in the Pacific theater, and attempt to seize the strategic initiative from Japan.<ref>Murray p. 196</ref>

The Allies chose the Solomon Islands (a [[protectorate]] of the United Kingdom), specifically the southern islands of [[Guadalcanal]], [[Tulagi]] and [[Florida Island]], as their first target, designated Task One (codename ''Pestilence''), with the initial objectives of<ref name="auto">Dyer v. 1, p. 261</ref><ref>Loxton, p. 3</ref> occupying the [[Santa Cruz Islands]] (codename ''Huddle''), Tulagi (codename ''Watchtower''), and "adjacent positions".<ref>Dyer, v. 1, p. 261</ref> Guadalcanal (codename ''Cactus''), which eventually became the focus of the operation, was not even mentioned in the early directive, and only later took on the operation name ''Watchtower''.<ref name="auto"/> Tulagi, although small, had a large natural harbor that was ideal for a float-plane base; Florida Island also had to be taken, as it dominated Tulagi. Guadalcanal, much larger than the other two islands and located to the south across the soon-to-be-named [[Iron Bottom Sound|Ironbottom Sound]], was added when it was discovered the Japanese were constructing an airbase there.<ref>{{cite web |title=Battle of Guadalcanal World War II |url=https://www.britannica.com/event/Battle-of-Guadalcanal |publisher=Encyclopaedia Britannica Inc. |access-date=23 August 2007}}</ref>

The [[Imperial Japanese Navy]] (IJN) had [[Invasion of Tulagi (May 1942)|occupied Tulagi]] in May 1942 and had constructed a seaplane base nearby. Allied concern grew when, in early July, the IJN began constructing a large airfield at [[Lunga Point]] on nearby Guadalcanal. From such a base, Japanese long-range bombers could threaten the sea lines of communication and maritime trade & transportation routes from the west coast of the Americas to the populous east coast of Australia. By August, the Japanese had about 900 naval troops on Tulagi and nearby islands, and 2,800 personnel (including 2,200 [[Korean people|Korean]] forced laborers and trustees, as well as Japanese construction specialists) on Guadalcanal. These bases were meant to protect Japan's major naval base at [[Rabaul]], threaten Allied supply and communication lines, and establish a staging area for a planned offensive against [[Fiji]], [[New Caledonia]] and [[Samoa]] (''[[Operation FS]]''). The Japanese planned to deploy 45 [[fighter aircraft|fighters]] and 60 [[bomber]]s to Guadalcanal. In the overall strategy for 1942, these aircraft would provide ground-based air cover for Japanese naval forces advancing farther into the South Pacific.<ref>Alexander, p. 72; Frank, pp. 23–31, 129, 628; Smith, p. 5; Bullard, p. 119; Lundstrom, p. 39. The Japanese aircraft assigned to Guadalcanal were to come from the 26th Air Flotilla, then located at bases in the Central Pacific (Bullard, p. 127)</ref>

The Allied plan to [[Solomon Islands campaign|invade the southern Solomons]] was conceived by U.S. [[Admiral]] [[Ernest J. King|Ernest King]], Commander in Chief, [[United States Fleet]]. He proposed the offensive in order to deny the use of the islands to the Japanese as bases from which the [[materiel|supply]] routes between the United States and Australia could be threatened, and to use them as starting points for further Allied offensives in the South Pacific. With U.S. President [[Franklin D. Roosevelt]]'s tacit consent, King also advocated for an invasion of Guadalcanal. Due to the Roosevelt administration's support for Great Britain's proposal that priority be given to [[Europe first|defeating Germany before Japan]], Allied commanders in Pacific theater had to compete for personnel and resources with the [[European theatre of World War II|European theater]].<ref>''See'' Morison, ''Breaking the Bismarcks Barrier'' pp. 3–5.</ref>

An early obstacle was the desire of both the U.S. Army and the Roosevelt administration to initiate offensive action in Europe prior to a large-scale operation in the Pacific.<ref>Dyer v. 1, p. 259</ref> In addition, it was initially unclear who would command the campaign: Tulagi lay in the area under the command of General [[Douglas MacArthur]], whereas the Santa Cruz Islands lay in Admiral [[Chester W. Nimitz]]'s [[Pacific Ocean Areas|Pacific Ocean Area]], which would also supply almost all Allied offensive forces that would be staged, supplied and covered from that area.<ref name="auto1">Dyer v. 1, pp. 259–260</ref> Both problems were overcome, and the Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army, General [[George C. Marshall]], gave the operation his full support, despite MacArthur's command being unable to directly assist in the operation and the U.S. Navy taking full operational responsibility.<ref>Dyer v. 1, p. 260</ref><ref name=Bowen>{{cite web |access-date=10 January 2018 |url=http://www.pacificwar.org.au/GermanyFirst/GermanyFirst.html |title=Despite Pearl Harbor, America adopts a 'Germany First' strategy |work=America Fights Back |last=Bowen |first=James |series=The Pacific War from Pearl Harbor to Guadalcanal |publisher=Pacific War Historical Society |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20101127103404/http://www.pacificwar.org.au/GermanyFirst/GermanyFirst.html |archive-date=November 27, 2010}}</ref> As a result, and in order to preserve the unity of command, the boundary between MacArthur's [[South West Pacific Area (command)|South West Pacific Area]] and Nimitz's Pacific Ocean Area was shifted {{convert|60|mi|km}} to {{convert|360|mi|km}} to the west, effective from 1 August 1942.<ref name="auto1"/>

[[Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff|Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief]] [[William D. Leahy]] established two goals for 1942–1943: first, that Guadalcanal would be taken, in conjunction with an [[New Guinea campaign|Allied offensive in New Guinea]] under MacArthur; and second, that the [[Admiralty Islands]] and [[Bismarck Archipelago]], including the major Japanese base at Rabaul, would be captured as well. The directive held that the eventual goal was the American reconquest of the Philippines, from which American forces had been evicted in early 1942.<ref>Morison, ''The Struggle for Guadalcanal'' p. 12; Frank, pp. 15–16; Miller, ''Cartwheel'', p. 5.</ref> The U.S. [[Joint Chiefs of Staff]] created the South Pacific theater, with Vice Admiral [[Robert L. Ghormley]] taking command on 19 June, to direct the offensive in the Solomons. Nimitz, based at Pearl Harbor, was designated as overall Allied commander-in-chief for Allied forces in the Pacific.<ref>Murray, pp. 199–200; Jersey, p. 85; and Lundstrom, p. 5.</ref>

===Task force===
{{Further|Battle of Guadalcanal order of battle|Guadalcanal naval order of battle}}
[[File:GuadHendersonJuly1942.gif|thumb|upright=1.3|The airfield at [[Lunga Point]] on Guadalcanal under construction by Japanese and conscripted Korean laborers in July 1942]]

In preparation for the offensive in the Pacific in May 1942, U.S. Marine [[Major general (United States)|Major General]] [[Alexander Vandegrift]] was ordered to move his [[1st Marine Division]] from the United States to New Zealand. Other Allied land, naval and air units were sent to establish or reinforce bases in Fiji, Samoa, [[New Hebrides]] and New Caledonia.<ref>Loxton, p. 5; Miller, p. 11.</ref>

The island of [[Espiritu Santo]], in the New Hebrides, was selected as the headquarters and primary staging ground for the offensive, codenamed ''Operation Watchtower'', with the commencement date set for 7 August. At first, only the seizure of Tulagi and the Santa Cruz Islands was planned, omitting a landing on Guadalcanal. After Allied reconnaissance discovered Japanese airfield construction efforts on Guadalcanal, its capture was added to the plan, and planned landings on the Santa Cruz islands were (eventually) abandoned.<ref>Frank pp. 35–37, 53</ref> The Japanese were aware, via [[signals intelligence]], of the large-scale movement of Allied forces in the South Pacific Area, but concluded that the Allies were reinforcing either Australia or Port Moresby on the southern coast of New Guinea.<ref>Bullard p. 122</ref>

The ''Watchtower'' force, numbering 75 warships and transports (including vessels from the U.S. and Australia), assembled near Fiji on 26 July and conducted a single rehearsal landing prior to leaving for Guadalcanal on 31 July.<ref>Morison, ''The Struggle for Guadalcanal'' p. 15; McGee, pp. 20–21.</ref> The commander of the Allied expeditionary force was U.S. [[Vice Admiral]] [[Frank Jack Fletcher|Frank Fletcher]], Commander of [[Task Force 16]] (whose flag was on the [[aircraft carrier]] {{USS|Saratoga|CV-3|6}}). Commanding the amphibious forces was U.S. [[Rear Admiral]] [[Richmond K. Turner]]. Vandegrift led the 16,000 Allied (primarily U.S. Marine) infantry earmarked for the amphibious landings.<ref>Frank pp. 57, 619–621</ref> The troops sent to Guadalcanal were fresh from military training, armed with legacy bolt-action [[M1903 Springfield]] rifles and a meager 10-day supply of ammunition. Because of the need to get the troops into battle quickly, the Allied planners had reduced their supplies from 90 days to only 60. The men of the 1st Marine Division began referring to the coming battle as "Operation Shoestring".<ref>Ken Burns: ''[[The War (miniseries)|The War]]'', Episode 1</ref>