Editing Free-rider problem (section)

==Incentive==
The underlying incentive which generates the free-rider problem can be explained{{weasel inline|date=August 2021}} via the application of the [[prisoner's dilemma]]<ref>Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, "Free Rider Problem", section 1: "The Logic of Collective Action". [https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/free-rider/#LogColAct]</ref> within the context of contributing to a public good. Suppose two people were to split a contribution to a public service (such as for a fire station) with society benefiting from their contribution. According to the prisoner's dilemma, certain conclusions can be drawn from the results of this scenario:
* If both parties donate, they both do so out of pocket, and society benefits.
* If one party doesn't pay (in the hopes that someone else will), they become a free-rider, and the other will have to cover the cost.
* If the other party also decides to become a free-rider and not pay either, then society receives no benefit.

This demonstrates{{disputed inline|date=August 2021}} that the free-rider problem is generated by individuals' willingness to let others pay when they themselves can receive the benefit at zero cost.<ref>Hardin, R. (2003). The Free Rider Problem (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy) [https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/free-rider/#:~:text=The%20free%20rider%20problem%20is,one%20can%20receive%20it%20without]</ref> This is reinforced by the economic theory of [[Rational choice theory|rational choice]], which states that people make choices which they infer will provide them with the greatest benefit. Therefore, if a service or resource is offered for free, then a consumer will not pay for it.<ref>Albanese, R & Van Felet, D (1985) Rational Behaviour in Groups: The Free-Riding Tendency. The academy of Management Review, 10 (2), 244</ref>