Editing Foundationalism (section)

==History==
Foundationalism was initiated by French [[Early modern philosophy|early modern philosopher]] [[René Descartes]].<ref name=GF2001>Grenz & Franke 2001, p. 31</ref> In his ''[[Meditations on First Philosophy|Meditations]]'', Descartes challenged the contemporary principles of philosophy by arguing that everything he knew he learnt from or through his senses. He used various arguments to challenge the reliability of the senses, citing previous errors and the possibilities that he was dreaming or being deceived by an [[Evil Demon]] which rendered all of his beliefs about the external world false.<ref>{{cite encyclopedia | url=http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/descartes/#HowDoOurMinKno | title=René Descartes | encyclopedia=Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy | date=3 December 2008 | access-date=28 March 2013 | author=Hatfield, Gary}}</ref> Descartes attempted to establish the secure foundations for knowledge to avoid [[scepticism]]. He contrasted the information provided by senses, which is unclear and uncertain, with the truths of [[geometry]], which are clear and distinct. Geometrical truths are also certain and indubitable; Descartes thus attempted to find truths which were clear and distinct because they would be indubitably true and a suitable foundation for knowledge.<ref>{{cite encyclopedia | url=http://www.iep.utm.edu/descarte/#H3 | title=René Descartes (1596—1650): Overview | encyclopedia=Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy | date=13 September 2008 | access-date=28 March 2013 | author=Skirry, Justin}}</ref> His method was to question all of his beliefs until he reached something clear and distinct that was indubitably true. The result was his ''[[cogito ergo sum]]'' – 'I think therefore I am', or the belief that he was thinking – as his indubitable belief suitable as a foundation for knowledge.<ref name=GF2001/> This resolved Descartes' problem of the Evil Demon. Even if his beliefs about the external world were false, his beliefs about what he was experiencing were still indubitably true, even if those perceptions do not relate to anything in the world.<ref>{{cite web | url=http://www.iep.utm.edu/introspe/#SH1a | title=Introspection | publisher=internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy | date=18 November 2005 | access-date=28 March 2013 | author=Kind, Amy}}</ref>

Several other philosophers of the early modern period, including [[John Locke]], [[G. W. Leibniz]], [[George Berkeley]], [[David Hume]], and [[Thomas Reid]], accepted foundationalism as well.<ref name=SEP/> [[Baruch Spinoza]] was interpreted as [[metaphysical]] foundationalist by [[G. W. F. Hegel]], a proponent of [[coherentism]].<ref>[[James Kreines]], ''Reason in the World: Hegel's Metaphysics and Its Philosophical Appeal'', Oxford University Press, 2015, p. 25: "Spinoza's foundationalism (Hegel argues) threatens to eliminate all determinate reality, leaving only one indeterminate substance."</ref> [[Immanuel Kant]]'s foundationalism rests on his theory of [[Category (Kant)|categories]].<ref>[[Tom Rockmore]], ''On Foundationalism: A Strategy for Metaphysical Realism'', Rowman & Littlefield, 2004, p. 65.</ref>

In [[late modern philosophy]], foundationalism was defended by [[J. G. Fichte]] in his book ''[[Foundations of the Science of Knowledge|Grundlage der gesamten Wissenschaftslehre]]'' (1794/1795),<ref>[[Frederick C. Beiser]], ''German Idealism: The Struggle Against Subjectivism, 1781–1801'', Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2002, p. 236.</ref> [[Wilhelm Windelband]] in his book ''Über die Gewißheit<!--[sic]--> der Erkenntniss.'' (1873),<ref>[[Frederick C. Beiser]] (2014), ''The Genesis of Neo-Kantianism, 1796–1880'' (Oxford: Oxford University Press), p. 517.</ref> and [[Gottlob Frege]] in his book ''[[The Foundations of Arithmetic|Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik]]'' (1884).<ref>[[Tom Rockmore]], ''On Foundationalism: A Strategy for Metaphysical Realism'', Rowman & Littlefield, 2004, p. 111.</ref>

In [[contemporary philosophy]], foundationalism has been defended by [[Edmund Husserl]],<ref>[[Barry Smith (ontologist)|Barry Smith]] and David Woodruff Smith, eds., ''The Cambridge Companion to Husserl'', Cambridge University Press, p. 292.</ref> [[Bertrand Russell]]<ref>Carlo Cellucci, ''Rethinking Knowledge: The Heuristic View'', Springer, 2017, p. 32.</ref> and [[John McDowell]].<ref>John McDowell, ''Mind and World''. Harvard University Press, 1994, p. 29.</ref><ref name=Gibson>Roger F. Gibson, "McDowell's Direct Realism and Platonic Naturalism", ''Philosophical Issues'' Vol. 7, ''Perception'' (1996), pp. 275–281.</ref>