Editing Eternalism (philosophy of time) (section)

==The present==

In classical philosophy, time is divided into three distinct regions: the "[[past]]", the "[[present]]", and the "[[future]]". Using that representational model, the past is generally seen as being immutably fixed, and the future as at least partly undefined. As time passes, the moment that was once the present becomes part of the past, and part of the future, in turn, becomes the new present. In this way time is said to pass, with a distinct present moment moving forward into the future and leaving the past behind. One view of this type, [[Presentism (philosophy of time)|presentism]], argues that only the present exists. The present does not travel forward through an environment of time, moving from a real point in the past and toward a real point in the future. Instead, it merely changes. The past and future do not exist and are only concepts used to describe the real, isolated, and changing present. This conventional model presents a number of difficult philosophical problems and may be difficult to reconcile with currently accepted scientific theories such as the [[theory of relativity]].<ref name="SEP-time">{{citation|last1=Markosian |first1=Ned |author-link=Ned Markosian |title=Time |year=2014 |encyclopedia=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |edition=Fall 2016 |editor=Edward N. Zalta |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2016/entries/time/ |access-date=November 18, 2017}}</ref>

[[File:BarAndRing.svg|thumb|right|180px|The [[Ladder paradox#Bar and ring paradox|bar and ring paradox]] is an example of the [[relativity of simultaneity]]. Both ends of the bar pass through the ring simultaneously in the rest frame of the ring (left), but the ends of the bar pass one after the other in the rest frame of the bar (right).]]
It can be argued that [[special relativity]] eliminates the concept of absolute simultaneity and a universal present: according to the [[relativity of simultaneity]], observers in different [[Frame of reference|frames of reference]] can have different measurements of whether a given pair of events happened at the same time or at different times, with there being no physical basis for preferring one frame's judgments over those of another. However, there are events that may be non-simultaneous in all frames of reference: when one event is within the [[light cone]] of another—its causal past or causal future—then observers in all frames of reference show that one event preceded the other. The causal past and causal future are consistent within all frames of reference, but any other time is "elsewhere", and within it there is no present, past, or future. There is no physical basis for a set of events that represents the present.<ref name="Savitt">{{citation|last1=Savitt|first1=Steven F.|title=There's No Time Like the Present (in Minkowski Spacetime)|doi=10.1086/392846|journal=Philosophy of Science|volume=67|issue=S1|date=September 2000|pages=S563–S574|citeseerx=10.1.1.14.6140|s2cid=121275903}}</ref>

Many philosophers have argued that relativity implies eternalism.<ref>{{citation|author=Thomas M. Crisp|url=http://people.biola.edu/thomasc/thomasmcrisp/Vita_files/Presentism,%20Eternalism%20and%20Relativity%20Physics.pdf|title=Presentism, Eternalism, and Relativity Physics|work=Einstein, Relativity and Absolute Simultaneity|year=2007|editor1=William Lane Craig|editor2=Quentin Smith|at=footnote 1|access-date=2012-08-07|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110428024231/http://people.biola.edu/thomasc/thomasmcrisp/Vita_files/Presentism,%20Eternalism%20and%20Relativity%20Physics.pdf|archive-date=2011-04-28|url-status=dead}}</ref> Philosopher of science Dean Rickles says that, "the consensus among philosophers seems to be that special and general relativity are incompatible with presentism."<ref>{{citation|author=Dean Rickles|year=2008|title=Symmetry, Structure, and Spacetime|page=158|isbn=9780444531162|publisher=[[Elsevier]]}}</ref> Christian Wüthrich argues that supporters of presentism can salvage absolute simultaneity only if they reject either [[empiricism]] or relativity.<ref name="Wuthrich2010">{{cite book |first=Christian |last=Wüthrich |year=2010 |chapter=No Presentism in Quantum Gravity |title=Space, Time, and Spacetime: Physical and Philosophical Implications of Minkowski's Unification of Space and Time |editor= Vesselin Petkov|series=Fundamental Theories of Physics |publisher=Springer |isbn=9783642135378 |lccn=2010935080 |url= http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/5363/|pages=[https://books.google.com/books?id=t35AR6–F5QQC&pg=PA262 262–264]}}</ref> [[Dean Zimmerman (philosopher)|Dean Zimmerman]] and others argue for [[Absolute space and time|a single privileged frame]] whose judgments about length, time, and simultaneity are the ''true'' ones, even if there is no empirical way to distinguish this frame.<ref name="Zimmerman2011">{{cite book |first=Dean |last=Zimmerman |editor= C. Callender |year=2011 |title=The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Time |chapter=Presentism and the Space-Time Manifold |series=Oxford Handbooks in Philosophy |publisher=OUP Oxford |isbn=9780199298204 |lccn=2011283684 |url=http://fas-philosophy.rutgers.edu/zimmerman/Presentism%20and%20Rel.for.Web.2.pdf |at=pp.163-244 (PDF p.119)}}</ref><ref>{{citation|author=Yuri Balashov|title=Persistence and Spacetime|year=2010|publisher=Oxford University Press|page=222}}</ref> [[Hilary Putnam]] concluded in 1967 that it follows from special relativity that ″any future event ''X'' is already real″ and eternalism is the only view compatible with special relativity.<ref>{{citation|author=Hilary Putnam|title=Time and physical geometry|year=1967|publisher=The Journal of Philosophy|volume=64|issue=8|page=140-147}}</ref> The philosopher Mauro Dorato interprets Putnam's arguments differently and asserts that ″the opposition between presentism − only the presently existing
event exist − and eternalism − past present and future events are equally real − which is
somewhat presupposed in Putnam 1967, is misguided.″<ref>{{citation|author=Mauro Dorato|title=Putnam on Time and Special Relativity: A Long Journey from Ontology to Ethics|year=2006|publisher=European Journal of Analytic Philosophy|volume=4|issue=2|page=51-70}}</ref>