Editing Eisenhower Doctrine (section)

==Background==
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In the global political context, the doctrine was made in response to the possibility of a generalized war, threatened due to the Soviet Union's latent threat becoming involved in [[Egypt]] after the [[Suez Crisis]].<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Lahav|first=Pnina|title=The Suez Crisis of 1956 and Its Aftermath: A Comparative Study of Constitutions, Use of Force, Diplomacy and International Relations|url=https://scholarship.law.bu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1199&context=faculty_scholarship|journal=Boston University Law Review}}</ref> Coupled with the power vacuum left by the decline of British and French power in the region after the U.S. protested against the conduct of their allies during the Suez War, Eisenhower thought that the strong position needed to better the situation was further complicated by the positions taken by [[President of Egypt|Egyptian president]] Gamal Abdel Nasser, who was rapidly building a power base and using it to play the Soviets and Americans against each other, taking a position of "positive neutrality" and accepting aid from the Soviets.<ref>Peter L.  Hahn, "Securing the Middle East: The Eisenhower Doctrine of 1957." ''Presidential Studies Quarterly'' 36.1 (2006): 38–47.</ref>

On the regional level, the doctrine's intent was to provide the independent Arab regimes with an alternative to Nasser's political control, strengthening them while isolating communist influence through Nasser's isolation. It largely failed on that front, with Nasser's power quickly rising by 1959 to when he could shape the leadership outcomes in neighboring Arab countries such as [[First Republic of Iraq|Iraq]] and [[Saudi Arabia]]; in the meantime, his relationship with the Soviets deteriorated, allowing the U.S. to switch to a policy of accommodation.

The administration also saw the Middle East as being critical for future foreign policy regarding the U.S. and its allies. The region contains a large percentage of the world's oil reserves needed by the allies. Eisenhower's protests against longtime allies—[[United Kingdom|Britain]] and [[French Fourth Republic|France]]—during the Suez Crisis lead to the collapse of British and French influence in the Middle East, spawning fears of Soviet domination made more credible by Nasser's increasingly pro-Soviet disposition. The Eisenhower Doctrine was a backflip against the previous policy; the U.S. now had the burden of military action in the Middle East to itself.

The doctrine was not successfully applied in that year's [[Syrian Crisis of 1957|crisis in Syria]] but was instead invoked in the [[1958 Lebanon crisis|Lebanon crisis]] the following year, when the U.S. intervened in response to a request by that country's then [[President of Lebanon|President]] [[Camille Chamoun]].