Editing Egyptian Armed Forces (section)

==History==
===Nineteenth century===
The modern Egyptian military was established by [[Muhammad Ali of Egypt|Muhammad Ali]] during his consolidation of power in Egypt, which significantly reduced Ottoman influence and contributed to [[Ottoman Egypt|Egypt]] becoming an autonomous vassal of the [[Ottoman Empire]] and effectively a de facto independent state.

In the early 19th century, [[Muhammad Ali of Egypt]] undertook comprehensive military reforms aimed at establishing a centralized, European-style army capable of securing his territorial ambitions and consolidating his authority over Egypt and beyond. Though his initial campaigns, such as those in Arabia and Greece, were formally conducted on behalf of the [[Ottoman Empire]], Muhammad Ali progressively distanced himself from the [[Sublime Porte]] and expanded Egypt’s military power through independent campaigns.

Central to his military project was the reorganization of the Egyptian army along modern lines. Recruits were placed under strict discipline and surveillance within newly constructed barracks, subject to multiple daily roll calls and corporal punishment, including the use of the [[bastinado]] and [[whipping]].<ref>Khaled Fahmy, ''All the Pasha's Men: Mehmed Ali, his Army and the Making of Modern Egypt'' (Cambridge, 1997), 119–147.</ref> Military regulations and codes of conduct were developed to ensure obedience and uniform discipline, while new administrative practices introduced standardized record-keeping, personal identification numbers for soldiers, and hierarchical unit structures. These measures facilitated internal control, particularly in deterring desertion during forced marches or redeployment.<ref>Fahmy, 142–144.</ref>

Initially, Muhammad Ali relied on [[Bedouin]] groups to monitor troops at training camps, but tensions soon arose, prompting a shift toward a system of internment and self-contained oversight within military facilities.<ref>Fahmy, 123–124.</ref> His reforms extended to logistical administration, including the centralization of salaries, distinctions between officers and enlisted men, and the formalization of career military service.
[[File:Egypt under Muhammad Ali Dynasty map en.png|thumb|left|Map of Egypt under Muhammad Ali Dynasty]]
These internal reforms laid the foundation for a series of expansionist campaigns. In 1811, Muhammad Ali launched a campaign into the Arabian Peninsula to suppress the [[First Saudi State]], recapturing the [[Hejaz]] region and eventually defeating the [[House of Saud]] after a prolonged campaign led by his sons, [[Tusun Pasha]] and [[Ibrahim Pasha of Egypt|Ibrahim Pasha]].<ref>Henry Dodwell, ''The Founder of Modern Egypt'' (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967), 43–48.</ref> This was followed by the [[Turco-Egyptian conquest of Sudan (1820–1824)|Turco-Egyptian conquest of Sudan]] (1820–1824), in which Egyptian forces subdued fragmented tribal entities, establishing Egyptian authority in the region and creating a new source of conscripts and slaves for the Egyptian army, including the formation of the ''Gihadiya'' foot regiments.<ref>Emanuel Beška, "Muhammad Ali’s Conquest of Sudan (1820–1824)," Asian and African Studies, Vol. 28, No. 1 (2019), pp. 30–56.</ref>

Muhammad Ali also participated in the suppression of the [[Greek War of Independence]] on behalf of the Ottomans, deploying a large expeditionary force under Ibrahim Pasha. Despite early advances, the Egyptian navy was decisively defeated at the [[Battle of Navarino]] (1827) by a coalition of European powers, costing Egypt its fleet and forcing withdrawal.<ref>Dodwell, 71.</ref>

From 1831 to 1840, Muhammad Ali engaged in two major wars against the Ottoman Empire, seeking to annex [[Syria]] and eventually challenge Ottoman sovereignty. His forces captured much of the Levant and advanced into Anatolia, winning major victories such as the [[Battle of Konya]] (1832) and [[Battle of Nezib]] (1839).<ref>Afaf Lutfi al-Sayyid Marsot, ''Egypt in the Reign of Muhammad Ali'' (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983).</ref> However, sustained pressure from the European powers led to diplomatic intervention and the signing of the [[Convention of London (1840)]]. Under its terms, Muhammad Ali was forced to relinquish control of most of his conquests in exchange for recognition of hereditary rule over Egypt and [[Sudan]], thus laying the groundwork for Egypt's de facto autonomy within the Ottoman Empire.<ref>Morroe Berger, ''Military Elites and Social Change: Egypt Since Napoleon'' (Princeton: Center for International Studies, 1960), 11.</ref>

Under Muhammad Ali’s successors, the military remained central to the state but faced constraints. During the reign of [[Abbas I of Egypt|Abbas I]] and [[Sa'id of Egypt|Sa'id Pasha]], modernization slowed, although limited reforms were introduced, including early railway construction and the beginning of land and labor reforms.<ref name="Debs42">{{cite book |last=Debs |first=Richard A. |title=Islamic Law and Civil Code: The Law of Property in Egypt |year=2010 |publisher=Columbia University Press |isbn=978-0-231-15044-6 |page=42}}</ref><ref name="Tignor222">{{cite book |last=Tignor |first=Robert L. |title=Egypt: A Short History |year=2011 |publisher=Princeton University Press |isbn=978-0-691-15307-0 |page=222}}</ref>
[[File:Anglo-egyptian war.jpg|thumb|right|Egyptian soldiers during the [[Anglo-Egyptian War]].]]
The most ambitious military and infrastructural expansions occurred under [[Ismail Pasha]], who restructured the military academies, supported public works, and briefly pursued naval modernization, ordering ironclads and expanding the military's logistical capabilities.<ref name="Tignor223">{{cite book |last=Tignor |first=Robert L. |title=Egypt: A Short History |year=2011 |publisher=Princeton University Press |isbn=978-0-691-15307-0 |page=223}}</ref> Egypt’s military also played a role in territorial expansion, particularly in Sudan and Darfur.<ref>{{Cite news |title=Royal Geographical Society |work=The Times of London |date=11 November 1874}}</ref> However, this coincided with fiscal mismanagement and rising foreign debt, leading to increasing European oversight, culminating in the sale of Egyptian shares in the [[Suez Canal Company]] to Britain in 1879.

Dissatisfaction with foreign influence, combined with longstanding grievances among Egyptian officers, culminated in the [[Urabi Revolt]] (1881–1882), led by [[Ahmed ‘Urabi]]. Originally sparked by resentment against favoritism toward officers of Turkish origin, the movement evolved into a broader nationalist uprising. Despite initial military resistance, Urabi’s forces were ultimately defeated by the [[British Army]] at the [[Battle of Tel-el-Kebir]], leading to the de facto British occupation of Egypt.<ref>{{cite book |last=Cleveland |first=William |title=A History of the Modern Middle East |year=2013 |publisher=Westview Press |page=92}}</ref> Though nominally autonomous, Egypt effectively became a British protectorate until the [[Unilateral Declaration of Egyptian Independence|unliateral declaration of independence]] in 1922.

===Twentieth century===
[[File:ModernEgypt, Opening of Luxor-Aswan rail line, Album-2-BAL-00000606-0008.jpg|thumb|Egyptian infantry form [[honor guard]], 1926]]
By 1914, the Egyptian military functioned largely as a native home-defence and colonial garrison force. It was organized and equipped under British supervision and staffed primarily with British officers. Its structure included infantry battalions, mounted infantry, camel corps units, support services, and irregular militia components.<ref>{{cite book |last1=Wheal |first1=Elizabeth-Anne |last2=Pope |first2=Steven |date=1997 |title=The Macmillan Dictionary of The First World War |publisher=Macmillan |pages=147–148 |isbn=978-0-333-68909-7}}</ref><ref>{{cite web |url=https://www.ottoman-uniforms.com/1883-till-1914-army-of-egypt-infantry/ |title=1883 till 1914 Army of Egypt Infantry |last=Flaherty |first=Chris |website=Ottoman Uniforms |access-date=29 October 2018 |archive-date=29 October 2018 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20181029191536/https://www.ottoman-uniforms.com/1883-till-1914-army-of-egypt-infantry/ |url-status=dead }}</ref>

The 1922 declaration of Egyptian independence formally ended the British protectorate but still left Egypt’s sovereignty constrained, particularly in military affairs. Britain retained control over Egypt’s defense, foreign relations, and Sudan, effectively limiting Egypt’s autonomy and perpetuating British military presence and influence. Although the declaration ended the legal fiction of Ottoman rule and met some nationalist demands, it failed to satisfy broader aspirations for full sovereignty. The resulting frustrations over continued British dominance, especially regarding the military, fueled further nationalist opposition and anti-British sentiment.<ref name="King">{{cite book |last=King |first=Joan Wucher |title=Historical Dictionary of Egypt |series=Books of Lasting Value |year=1989 |orig-year=First published 1984 |publisher=[[AUC Press|American University in Cairo Press]] |isbn=978-977-424-213-7 |pages=259–260}}</ref><ref>{{Cite book |last=Elkins |first=Caroline |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=3icqEAAAQBAJ |title=Legacy of Violence: A History of the British Empire |date=2022 |publisher=Knopf Doubleday |isbn=978-0-593-32008-2 |pages=147 |language=en}}</ref>

The [[Egyptian Air Force]] was initially established in 1930 as the Egyptian Army Air Force and formally inaugurated in 1932. In 1937, it was separated from army command and reorganized as an independent service under the name Royal Egyptian Air Force, becoming the third branch of the Egyptian military after the army and navy.<ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.geocities.com/acrawford0/Egypt.html |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20091021080301/http://geocities.com/acrawford0/Egypt.html |archive-date=21 October 2009 |title=Royal Egyptian Air Force Gladiators |website=www.webcitation.org |access-date=19 April 2020}}</ref>

During [[World War I]], Egypt’s strategic importance increased significantly due to the threat posed by Ottoman incursions across the Sinai. Although such offensives were ultimately repulsed, Egyptian forces remained focused primarily on internal security and regional garrison duties, especially in Sudan. By 1917, approximately 15,000 Egyptian volunteers were serving in the regular military, while over 98,000 Egyptians served in logistical capacities through the Egyptian Labour Corps and Egyptian Camel Transport Corps.<ref name="Falls365">{{cite book |last=Falls |first=Cyril |title=Military Operations Egypt and Palestine: From June 1917 to the End of the War |year=1930 |publisher=HM Stationery Office |pages=365}}</ref><ref name="Falls367">{{cite book |last=Falls |first=Cyril |title=Military Operations Egypt and Palestine: From June 1917 to the End of the War |year=1930 |publisher=HM Stationery Office |pages=367}}</ref>

In the interwar period, although military service was technically compulsory, the armed forces remained limited in size and scope. By 1939, the total strength was modest, and British oversight remained extensive. Under the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936, Britain retained the right to station troops in Egypt for the protection of the Suez Canal and continued to exert influence over training and operations.<ref name="Metz1990">{{cite book |editor=Metz, Helen Chapin |title=Egypt: A Country Study |publisher=Library of Congress |year=1990 |page=295}}</ref>
[[File:ModernEgypt, Farouk I in Military Uniform, DHP13655-10-17 01.jpg|thumb|left|[[King Farouk I]] inspecting soldiers in 1942]]
At the onset of the [[World War II]], Egypt's military capacity remained limited. Following the Italian invasion of western Egypt in 1940, Egypt broke relations with the [[Axis powers]] and increasingly aligned itself with British military operations. While Egypt's forces were not the primary combatants, they contributed to British-led operations, including in the [[Western Desert campaign]]. Axis forces under General [[Erwin Rommel]] made temporary advances into Egyptian territory before being repelled at the [[Second Battle of El Alamein]].

By the late 1940s, internal dissatisfaction with military leadership was growing. Many younger officers, particularly those educated in Britain, became disillusioned with the entrenched senior command, which was perceived as corrupt and incompetent, accusations heightened by Egypt's poor performance in the [[1948 Arab–Israeli War]]. Although a partial purge of the senior officer corps was carried out in 1950, many of the dismissed officers were later reinstated by royal decree, further fueling discontent within the ranks.<ref>{{cite web|author=Alta F. Fowler|title=No. 997 Memorandum by Alta F. Fowler of the Office of Near Eastern Affairs to the Officer in Charge of Egypt and Anglo-Egyptian Sudan Affairs |work=Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, The Near and Middle East, Volume IX, Part 2 |url=https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v09p2/d997 |date=July 28, 1952 |location=Washington DC}}</ref>

In an effort to assert greater independence and reduce British influence, King Farouk dismissed the British Military Mission in 1950 and invited former German [[Wehrmacht]] officers, including Generals [[Wilhelm Fahrmbacher]] and [[Oskar Munzel]], to serve as advisors to the Egyptian military establishment. These advisors remained in the country until 1958.<ref>{{cite book|last=Gerolymatos|first=Andre|title=Castles Made of Sand: A Century of Anglo-American Espionage and Intervention in the Middle East|publisher=Thomas Martin Books/St. Martin's Press|location=New York|date=2010|pages=135, 142}}</ref>

[[File:Free Officers, 1953.jpg|thumb|The [[Free Officers movement (Egypt)|Free Officers]] in 1953, a year after toppling the monarchy]]
The Egyptian military’s failure in the [[1948 Arab–Israeli War]] was a catalyst for the formation of the [[Free Officers Movement (Egypt)|Free Officers]] led by [[Muhammad Naguib]] and [[Gamal Abdel Nasser]]. In the [[Egyptian coup d'état of 1952]], they overthrew King Farouk and initiated sweeping reforms within the military and state. 

One of the early achievements of the new regime was the signing of the [[Anglo–Egyptian Agreement of 1954]], which mandated the phased withdrawal of British forces from the Suez Canal zone. The agreement allowed for continued British access to the base under specific circumstances and stipulated complete withdrawal by June 1956.<ref>{{cite web |title=Exchange of Notes between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Egyptian Government regarding the Suez Canal Base |url=https://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/UNTS/Volume%20210/0210.pdf |website=United Nations Treaty Series |access-date=5 April 2025 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210220000000/https://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/UNTS/Volume%20210/0210.pdf |archive-date=20 February 2021}}</ref><ref>{{cite book |last=Butler |first=J. R. M. |title=Grand Strategy, Volume II: September 1939 – June 1941 |publisher=Her Majesty's Stationery Office |year=2002 |page=112}}</ref>

In 1956, the Egyptian Armed Forces were thrust into a major international conflict during the [[Suez Crisis]], also known as the Tripartite Aggression.<ref name="Ross2004">{{Cite book |last=Ross |first=Stewart |title=Causes and Consequences of the Arab–Israeli Conflict |url=https://archive.org/details/causesconsequenc0000ross_w6z0/page/76/mode/2up |date=2004 |url-access=registration |publisher=Evans Brothers |isbn=978-0-2375-2585-9 |pages=76ff}}</ref><ref name="Isacoff2006">{{Cite book |last=Isacoff |first=Jonathan B. |title=Writing the Arab–Israeli Conflict: Pragmatism and Historical Inquiry |date=2006 |publisher=Lexington Books |isbn=978-0-7391-1273-1 |pages=79ff}}</ref><ref name="Caplan1983">{{Cite book |last=Caplan |first=Neil |title=Futile Diplomacy: Operation Alpha and the Failure of Anglo-American Coercive Diplomacy in the Arab–Israeli Conflict, 1954–1956 |date=1983 |publisher=Psychology Press |isbn=978-0-7146-4757-9 |pages=15}}</ref> The crisis erupted after President [[Gamal Abdel Nasser]] revoked the concession of the Anglo-French owned [[Suez Canal Company]] and transferred canal operation to the state-owned [[Suez Canal Authority]], prompting a coordinated military response from [[Israel]], the [[United Kingdom]], and [[France]]. On 29 October, Israeli forces invaded the [[Sinai Peninsula]], followed days later by Anglo-French landings in the Canal Zone. The stated aim was to separate the combatants and secure freedom of navigation through the canal, but the operation was widely perceived as a ploy to topple Nasser and restore Western control over the vital waterway.

In the early 1950s, particularly after the [[1952 Egyptian revolution|revolution of 1952]], politics rather than military competence was the main criterion for promotion.{{sfn|Varble|2003|p=17}} Field Marshal Abdel Hakim Amer in particular was a purely political appointment, whose approach would lead to large-scale problems during the Suez War. Promotions were often based on loyalty rather than merit, and a rigid divide between officers and enlisted men contributed to widespread dysfunction.{{sfn|Varble|2003|p=17}}{{sfn|Varble|2003|p=18}} Although some Egyptian defensive positions, such as at Abu Agelia and Mitla Pass, were organized and offered resistance, the Israeli forces quickly seized the initiative and routed Egyptian positions across the Sinai.{{sfn|Tsouras|1994|p=127}} Nasser ordered a general withdrawal from the peninsula, which allowed Israeli troops to advance rapidly toward the Suez Canal.

The invasion was soon halted under intense international pressure. The [[United States]],{{sfn|Tsouras|1994|p=127}} [[Soviet Union]], and [[United Nations]] condemned the attack, forcing a ceasefire by 7 November. Although Egypt suffered tactical defeats, the crisis ultimately elevated Nasser’s stature in the Arab world and signaled the decline of British and French influence in the Middle East.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Abernathy |first=David |title=The Dynamics of Global Dominance: European Overseas Empires, 1415–1980 |date=2000 |publisher=Yale University Press |isbn=9780300093148 |page=CXXXIX}}</ref><ref name="Economist2006">{{cite news |title=An affair to remember |date=27 June 2006 |url=https://www.economist.com/node/7218678 |access-date=3 September 2014 |newspaper=The Economist}}</ref> The Egyptian Armed Forces emerged from the conflict with considerable reputational damage, having revealed deep structural weaknesses, but the political outcome was widely seen as a strategic victory for Egypt. 
[[File:Egyptian army in sanaa 1962.jpg|thumb|left|An Egyptian armored column in Yemen, 1962]]
During the [[North Yemen Civil War]] that began in 1962, the Egyptian Armed Forces undertook one of their most extensive foreign deployments, dispatching tens of thousands of troops in support of republican forces against the royalists backed by Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Israel.<ref name=sandler977>Sandler, Stanley. ''Ground Warfare: The International Encyclopedia''. Vol. 1 (2002): p. 977. "Egypt immediately began sending military supplies and troops to assist the Republicans... On the royalist side Jordan and Saudi Arabia were furnishing military aid, and Britain lent diplomatic support. In addition to Egyptian aid, the Soviet Union supplied 24 MiG-19s to the republicans."</ref><ref name="ben1987">{{cite book |last1=Beit-Hallahmi |first1=Benjamin |title=The Israeli connection: who Israel arms and why |date=1987 |publisher=Pantheon Books |location=New York |isbn=978-0394559223 |page=[https://archive.org/details/israeliconnectio00beit/page/17 17] |edition=1st |url=https://archive.org/details/israeliconnectio00beit |url-access=registration |access-date=28 September 2019}}</ref> Authorized by President [[Gamal Abdel Nasser]], the campaign involved sustained aerial and ground operations with Soviet support. Within months of the initial deployment in 1962, Nasser recognized that the campaign would demand far more than anticipated and sought a face-saving exit strategy, but the scope of engagement continued to escalate.<ref>{{Cite news|url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2015/03/28/how-yemen-was-once-egypts-vietnam/|title=How Yemen was once Egypt's Vietnam|newspaper=Washington Post}}</ref>

Fewer than 5,000 troops were initially deployed in October 1962, rising to 15,000 by December, 36,000 by late 1963, and 50,000 by late 1964. The peak came in late 1965, with approximately 55,000 personnel divided across 13 infantry regiments, an artillery division, a tank division from the [[Egyptian Armoured Corps]], and multiple Special Forces and airborne regiments. Egyptian field commanders reported logistical constraints, notably the absence of reliable topographical maps during the early phase of operations.<ref>{{Cite news | issue = Jan–Feb, 2004 | last = Aboul-Enein | first = Youssef | title = The Egyptian–Yemen War: Egyptian Perspectives on Guerrilla Warfare | work = Infantry Magazine | access-date = 5 August 2016 | date = 2004-01-01 | url = https://www.idmarch.org/document/Gamal+Abdel+Nasser/1aFl0-show/The+Egyptian-Yemen+War%29%3A+Egyptian+Perspectives+on+Guerrilla+Warfare+By+Lt.+Cdr.+Youssef+Aboul-Enein+Lt.+Cdr.+Youssef+Aboul-Enein+is+currently+serving+in+the+U.S.+Navy+as+the+country+director+for+North+Africa+and }}</ref> The prolonged and resource-intensive conflict strained Egypt’s military capabilities and readiness, contributing to its strategic vulnerability ahead of Israel's [[Six-Day War|invasion in 1967 ]].<ref name=sandler977/><ref name="ben1987"/>

In the period leading up to the [[Six-Day War]] in 1967, the Egyptian Armed Forces were organized into four regional military commands, Suez, Sinai, the Nile Delta, and the Nile Valley up to the border with [[Sudan]], while the remaining 75 percent of Egypt’s territory fell under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Frontier Corps.<ref>John Keegan, ''World Armies'', Second Edition, MacMillan, 1983, p. 165 {{ISBN|978-0-333-34079-0}}</ref> Tensions escalated in May 1967 when President [[Gamal Abdel Nasser]] announced the closure of the [[Straits of Tiran]] to Israeli shipping, an action Israel interpreted as a [[casus belli]] and responded to by mobilizing its forces.{{sfn|Dupuy|1978|p=228}}

In response, Egypt deployed three battalions of commandos to [[Amman]] in coordination with [[Jordan]] on 3 June. According to historian [[Trevor N. Dupuy]], drawing on the memoirs of King [[Hussein of Jordan]], Nasser’s intent was not to initiate a war but to achieve political and rhetorical leverage.{{sfn|Dupuy|1978|pp=229–230}} Nevertheless, Israel proceeded with military action on 5 June.

At the time, the Egyptian Army had seven divisions positioned in the Sinai, two armored and five infantry, under the newly established Sinai Front Command, led by General Abdel Mohsin Murtagi, who had recently returned from Yemen.{{sfn|Tsouras|1994|p=191}}<ref>Dupuy (1978) lists the 2nd, 3rd, 7th Infantry Division, 6th Mechanised, 20th Palestinian, and 4th Armoured, plus an armoured task force. Dupuy, 239–240.</ref> In the weeks before the outbreak of hostilities, Field Marshal [[Abdel Hakim Amer]] implemented wide-ranging changes to the command structure, replacing both the commanders and chiefs of staff in six of the seven divisions. Scholars such as [[Kenneth Pollack]] argue that these changes aimed to enhance operational effectiveness by placing veterans of the Yemeni conflict in key leadership roles.{{sfn|Pollack|2002|p=60}}

On the morning of 5 June, Israel launched a coordinated military offensive, targeting Egyptian airbases and achieving a substantial degradation of Egypt’s air power early in the conflict. Ground forces soon advanced into the [[Sinai Peninsula]], where Egyptian units faced mounting pressure across several fronts. Amid the deteriorating situation, Field Marshal Amer issued an order for a general withdrawal to the Suez Canal.{{sfn|Dupuy|1978|pp=267–269}} The execution of this withdrawal, conducted under fire and without coherent coordination, contributed to considerable disruption among Egyptian forces, who sustained further losses during the retreat.{{cn|date=April 2025}}
[[File:Egyptianbridge.jpg|thumb|left|Egyptian military vehicles crossing the [[Suez Canal]] over one of the bridgeheads during [[Operation Badr (1973)|Operation Badr]].]]
In July 1972, President [[Anwar Sadat]] expelled [[Soviet Armed Forces]] advisors from Egypt.<ref>{{cite journal|author=Colonel E.V. Badolato|title=A Clash of Cultures: The Expulsion of Soviet Military Advisors from Egypt|journal=Naval War College Review|volume=37|issue=2|date=March–April 1984|pages=69–81|jstor=44642308}}</ref> On 6 October 1973, during the [[Yom Kippur]] holiday, which coincided with the 10th day of [[Ramadan]], [[Egypt]] and [[Syria]] launched a surprise offensive to recover occupied territory, initiating the [[October War]].{{sfnp|el-Gamasy|1993|p=181}} In the Sinai, Egyptian forces crossed the Suez Canal as part of [[Operation Badr (1973)|Operation Badr]] and established positions on the eastern bank, which it held throughout the conflict.{{sfnp|Rabinovich|2004|p=467}} On 14 October, Egyptian forces advanced deeper into the peninsula to relieve pressure on the Syrian front; however, the Israelis halted this offensive after three days. Seizing the initiative, Israeli forces crossed the canal through a single crossing point at [[Abu Sultan Air Base|Deversoir]],{{sfnp|Rabinovich|2004|p=393}} cleared during the [[Battle of the Chinese Farm]], and proceeded to advance north toward [[Ismailia]] and [[Port Said]] to isolate the Egyptian Second Army, south toward Suez to isolate the Third Army, and westward towards [[Cairo]] but were held at Nefalia.{{sfnmp|Herzog|1975|1pp=236–237|Pollack|2002|2p=122}} They encountered fierce resistance on all fronts and Israel suffered a major setback northwards at the [[Battle of Ismailia]].<ref>[https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a324335.pdf] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200126235235/https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a324335.pdf|date=2020-01-26}} "The experience represents one of the most humiliating failures in Israeli modern history .. Analysis reveals there were three main factors that led to this stunning defeat."</ref> A UN-brokered ceasefire took effect on 22 October, only to collapse soon after amid mutual accusations of violations. When hostilities resumed, Israel managed to achieve a breakthrough southward, effectively threatening the Third Army’s supply lines, but was ultimately unable to capture [[Battle of Suez|Suez]] despite multiple attempts.<ref>{{Cite web | last1 = Spencer | first1 = John |last2=Geroux |first2= Jayson |date=2022-01-13 |title=Urban Warfare Project Case Study #4: Battle of Suez City. |url=https://mwi.westpoint.edu/urban-warfare-project-case-study-4-battle-of-suez-city/ |access-date=2024-09-28 |website=Modern War Institute |language=en-US}}</ref> A second ceasefire on 25 October ended the fighting.{{sfnmp|Hammad|2002|1pp=237–276|Gawrych|1996|2p=60}}
[[File:An Egyptian ranger battalion stands in formation during Operation Desert Shield 2.JPEG|thumb|right|Egyptian soldiers in the [[Gulf War]]]]
When Sadat and the Israelis concluded the [[Camp David Accords]] in September 1978, part of the ''quid pro quo'' for Egypt’s acceptance of peace was the provision of substantial U.S. military assistance. Today, the U.S. provides an annual assistance package often quoted at a [[Real versus nominal value (economics)|nominal]] $1.3&nbsp;billion to the Egyptian Armed Forces.<ref>Robert Springborg, "Learning from Failure," 2010, 103; {{cite news|title=Scenesetter: President Mubarak's visit to Washington (09CAIRO874)|date=2009-05-19|publisher=US Department of State (cable)}}</ref> This level is second only to that provided to [[Israel]].<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.couriermail.com.au/ipad/nation-locked-in-a-deadly-stalemate/story-fn6ck51p-1225997761161|title=Nation locked in a deadly stalemate|work=The Courier-Mail|author=David Costello|date=February 1, 2011|access-date=2011-02-11}}</ref>

Scholars such as [[Kenneth Pollack]], DeAtkine, and Robert Springborg have proposed multiple explanations for the challenges that Arab (and Egyptian) armies encountered in conflicts with Israel from 1948 through the 1970s and beyond. In particular, they suggest that from 1948 onward, junior officers often exhibited limited willingness to manoeuvre, innovate, or act independently.{{sfn|Pollack|2002|p=146}} Ground forces units reportedly struggled with manipulation of information and insufficient attention to intelligence gathering and unbiased analysis. Observers note that elements from two Egyptian divisions sent to [[Saudi Arabia]] in 1990–91, accompanied by U.S. personnel during the 1991 Gulf War, frequently reported intense combat despite facing minimal or no resistance, whether or not U.S. military personnel or journalists were present.{{sfn|Pollack|2002|p=144}} Later studies, such as those by Springborg, indicate that these patterns continued within the Egyptian Armed Forces into the twenty-first century.<ref>Springborg, Robert. "Learning from failure: Egypt." The Routledge Handbook of Civil-Military Relations. London: Routledge (2013): 93–109.</ref>

=== Twenty-first century ===
[[File:CENTCOM Partner Nations Attend Static Display At Bright Star 2023.webp|thumb|Egyptian soldiers march during [[Exercise Bright Star#Bright Star 23|Bright Star 23]] static display]]
During the [[2011 Egyptian revolution]], the Egyptian Army was deployed to restore order in major cities. On 31 January 2011, Israeli media reported that the 9th, 2nd, and 7th Divisions were ordered into [[Cairo]].<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.mako.co.il/news-specials/egypt/Article-64af2c4c648dd21004.htm|title=צפו: סיור וירטואלי במוקדי המהפכה|date=30 January 2011|access-date=27 August 2016}}</ref> Subsequently, on 3 July 2013, the Armed Forces removed President [[Mohamed Morsi]] from office following mass protests demanding his resignation, an action widely described as a [[2013 Egyptian coup d'état|coup d’état]].<ref>{{cite news|title=Coup topples Egypt's Morsy; deposed president under 'house arrest'|url=https://edition.cnn.com/2013/07/03/world/meast/egypt-protests|first=Ben|last=Wedeman|work=CNN|date=4 July 2013|access-date=8 April 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160304090828/http://edition.cnn.com/2013/07/03/world/meast/egypt-protests|archive-date=4 March 2016|url-status=live}}</ref> In the days that followed, several violent incidents occurred, including the [[Republican Guard headquarters clashes]] on 8 July 2013, which resulted in the deaths of 61 protesters.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.hrw.org/news/2014/08/12/egypt-raba-killings-likely-crimes-against-humanity|title=Egypt: Rab'a Killings Likely Crimes against Humanity|date=12 August 2014|website=Human Rights Watch}}</ref> On 14 August 2013, security forces, including the army and police, carried out the dispersal of pro-Morsi sit-ins at Rabaa and Nahda Squares, resulting in large-scale casualties. Estimates of the death toll vary, with some reports stating over 2,600 fatalities.<ref>{{Cite news|url=http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2013/08/201381522364486906.html |title=Egypt's Brotherhood to hold 'march of anger' |publisher=Al Jazeera |date=16 August 2013 |access-date=18 August 2013 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130816123944/http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2013/08/201381522364486906.html |archive-date=16 August 2013 |url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{Cite news|url=http://www.worldbulletin.net/?aType=haber&ArticleID=115257 |title=NSF spokesman quits over Rabaa, Nahda massacres |work=World Bulletin |date=14 August 2013 |access-date=18 August 2013 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20131002092241/http://www.worldbulletin.net/?aType=haber&ArticleID=115257 |archive-date=2 October 2013 |url-status=usurped }}</ref> The events of 14 August 2013 are considered the deadliest day in Egypt since the 2011 revolution.<ref>{{cite news|title=Scores dead in Egypt after security forces launch assault on protesters' camp |first=Abigail |last=Hauslohner |author2=Sharaf al-Hourani |date=14 August 2013 |newspaper=The Washington Post|access-date=14 August 2013 |url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/egyptian-security-forces-move-against-protesters-camps/2013/08/14/bc079750-04a7-11e3-9259-e2aafe5a5f84_story.html |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130815001337/http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/egyptian-security-forces-move-against-protesters-camps/2013/08/14/bc079750-04a7-11e3-9259-e2aafe5a5f84_story.html |archive-date=15 August 2013 |url-status=live}}</ref> The international response included widespread condemnation from foreign governments and human rights organizations.<ref>{{Cite news|url=http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2013/08/201381505130985967.html|title=Global condemnation of Egypt crackdown|publisher=Al Jazeera|date=15 August 2013|access-date=7 September 2013|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130825125046/http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2013/08/201381505130985967.html|archive-date=25 August 2013|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{Cite news|url=http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/64/79105/Egypt/Politics-/Most-world-states-condemn-Egypts-violence-.aspx|title=Most world states condemn Egypt's violence|newspaper=Al-Ahram|date=15 August 2013|access-date=7 September 2013|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130823002801/http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/64/79105/Egypt/Politics-/Most-world-states-condemn-Egypts-violence-.aspx|archive-date=23 August 2013|url-status=live}}</ref>

Since the [[2013 Egyptian coup d'etat]], the Egyptian Armed Forces has maintained a prominent role within the state, enjoying a high degree of institutional autonomy and influence across multiple sectors.<ref name="NYT 2011">{{cite news|last=Cambanis|first=Thanassis|title=Succession Gives Army a Stiff Test in Egypt|url=https://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/12/world/middleeast/12egypt.html?_r=1&ref=global-home&pagewanted=all|access-date=11 September 2010|newspaper=[[The New York Times]]|date=11 September 2010}}</ref> The military also holds a substantial presence in the economy, participating in areas such as infrastructure, housing, consumer goods, and tourism,<ref name="NYT 2011" /> and possesses large real estate holdings. Information regarding its budget, leadership, and force size remains largely undisclosed and is considered classified.<ref name="NYT 2011" /> 
[[File:Bright Star 18 Combined Arms Live Fire Exercise rehearsal 180916-Z-IX878-0026.jpg|thumb|right|An Egyptian [[M1 Abrams]] tank]]
Estimates of the military's economic reach vary; journalist Joshua Hammer reported that the armed forces may control up to 40% of the Egyptian economy,<ref>[http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2011/aug/18/egypt-who-calls-shots/ Egypt: Who Calls the Shots?] Joshua Hammer | nybooks.com | 18 August 2011</ref> though such figures have been criticized for lacking empirical foundations and for rarely being grounded in systematic analysis.<ref name=carniege>{{cite web | url=https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2019/11/owners-of-the-republic-an-anatomy-of-egypts-military-economy?lang=en&center=middle-east | title=Owners of the Republic: An Anatomy of Egypt’s Military Economy | website=Carnegie Endowment for International Peace | date=November 2019 | access-date=April 4, 2025 }}</ref> These estimates often fail to distinguish between different forms of military economic engagement, such as the annual output of goods and services versus ownership of physical assets.<ref name=carniege/> They also tend to conflate three distinct domains of economic involvement: formally registered military-owned enterprises under the [[Ministry of Military Production (Egypt)|Ministry of Military Production]], the [[Arab Organization for Industrialization]], and other affiliated agencies whose actual production is significantly more modest than often portrayed; a wider group of public and private sector entities led or influenced by retired military officers, whose revenues do not belong to the armed forces; and regulatory privileges that generate income through licensing, leasing, tolls, and partnerships with national and international firms.<ref name=carniege/> 

In 2016, President [[Abdel Fattah el-Sisi]] and military officials estimated that the formal military economy accounted for between 1% and 2% of Egypt’s [[GDP]], likely encompassing the combined output of military agencies and revenues from public works. According to [[Yezid Sayigh]], senior fellow at the [[The Malcolm H. Kerr Carnegie Middle East Center|Carnegie Middle East Center]], this estimate is likely closer to the actual scale of the military's formal economic activity.<ref name=carniege/> While the military has expanded its access to extra-budgetary resources and assumed a growing role in state capital expenditure since 2013, analysts argue that its economic footprint is generally smaller, less efficient, and less productive than widely believed, though still of considerable significance.<ref name=carniege/>
[[File:USS Delbert D. Black (DDG 119), top, is underway with the Egyptian navy ships ENS Gamal Adbel Nasser (L 1010) and ENS Al-Galala (FFG 1002) in the Mediterranean Sea.jpg|thumb|left|Egyptian [[Mistral class]] [[ENS Gamal Abdel Nasser]] (middle) sails alongside [[ENS Al-Galala]] (bottom) and American [[USS Delbert D. Black]] (top) and in the Mediterranean Sea, August 29, 2022, during joint operations to enhance regional maritime security.]]
By 2018, analysts observed no overt signs of institutional fragmentation within the Armed Forces. According to Hussein and Martino, the military's entrenched dominance in political and security affairs may be attributed to a combination of factors: its expansive economic interests, long-standing national legitimacy reinforced by its role in welfare and development programs, and a conscription-based recruitment system that facilitates cross-class integration within the armed services.{{sfn|Hussein|Martino|2019}}

In 2019, it was reported that the Egyptian Armed Forces had begun a broad modernization effort under President [[Abdel Fattah el-Sisi]], following a long period of operational stagnation, since the 1970s.<ref name="modernizationcarniege">{{cite web |url=https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2019/02/the-egyptian-military-a-slumbering-giant-awakes?lang=en&center=middle-east |title=The Egyptian Military: A Slumbering Giant Awakes |website=Carnegie Endowment for International Peace |date=February 2019 |access-date=2025-04-04}}</ref> This initiative has included a notable increase in military procurement, with purchases from France, Russia, and Germany that have added new fighter aircraft, naval vessels, submarines, and surveillance systems to Egypt’s inventory.<ref name="modernizationcarniege"/> These acquisitions have supplemented longstanding military assistance from the United States and reflect a shift toward a more diversified supply strategy.<ref name="modernizationcarniege"/> Parallel efforts have focused on doctrinal and structural reforms, including greater emphasis on interoperability, air mobility, maritime operations, and special forces.<ref name="modernizationcarniege"/> Joint exercises with both regional and international partners have also expanded during this period.<ref name="modernizationcarniege"/> However, the modernization program faces ongoing structural obstacles, such as entrenched command hierarchies, insufficient training regimes, and limited investment in logistical sustainment.<ref name="modernizationcarniege"/> Despite these limitations, the current scope of reform is regarded as the most extensive military overhaul in Egypt in decades.<ref name="modernizationcarniege"/>

In March 2021, [[Human Rights Watch]] published a report alleging that the Egyptian Armed Forces had committed violations of international law during operations in North Sinai, including the demolition of more than 12,300 residential and commercial structures and the clearance of approximately 6,000 hectares of farmland since 2013.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/03/17/egypt-massive-sinai-demolitions-likely-war-crimes|title=Egypt: Massive Sinai Demolitions Likely War Crimes|date=17 March 2021|accessdate=17 March 2021|publisher=Human Rights Watch}}</ref>