Editing Economy of Honduras (section)

==Economic history==
[[File:Honduras econ 1983.jpg|thumb|550px|An economic activity map of Honduras, 1983.]]
The colonial economy in Honduras was primarily oriented around mining.<ref>{{Citation |last=Bulmer-Thomas |first=Victor |title=Honduras since 1930 |date=1990 |work=The Cambridge History of Latin America: Volume 7: Latin America since 1930: Mexico, Central America and the Caribbean |volume=7 |pages=283–316 |editor-last=Bethell |editor-first=Leslie |url=https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/abs/cambridge-history-of-latin-america/honduras-since-1930/6043F407372F0871099EF7270BD74AFB |publisher=Cambridge University Press |doi=10.1017/chol9780521245180.007 |isbn=978-0-521-24518-0}}</ref>

After Honduras achieved independence from [[Spain]] in the early 19th century, its economic growth became closely related to its ability to develop attractive export products. During much of the 19th century, the Honduran economy languished; traditional cattle raising and [[subsistence agriculture]] produced no suitable major export. In the latter part of the century, economic activity quickened with the development of large-scale, [[precious metal]] [[mining]]. The most important mines were in the mountains near the capital of [[Tegucigalpa]] and were owned by the [[Rosario Mining Company|New York and Honduras Rosario Mining Company]] (NYHRMC).

[[Silver]] was the principal metal extracted, accounting for about 55% of exports in the 1880s. [[Mining]] income stimulated commercial and ancillary enterprises, built infrastructure, and reduced monetary restraints on trade. There were few other beneficial economic effects, however, because the [[mining industry]] was never well integrated into the rest of the Honduran economy. The foreign mining companies employed a small [[workforce]], provided little or no government revenue, and relied mostly on imported mining equipment.

=== 20th century ===
Honduras's international economic activity surged in the early 20th century. Between 1913 and 1929, its agricultural exports rose from $3&nbsp;million ($2&nbsp;million from bananas) to $25&nbsp;million ($21&nbsp;million from bananas). These "golden" exports were supported by more than $40&nbsp;million of specialized banana company investment in the Honduran infrastructure and were safeguarded by US pressure on the national government when the companies felt threatened.

The overall performance of the Honduran economy remained closely tied to [[banana]] prices and production from the 1920s until after the mid-century because other forms of commercial export agriculture were slow to emerge. In addition, until drastically reduced in the mid-1950s, the workforce associated with banana cultivation represented a significant proportion of the wage earners in the country. Just before the banana industry's largest strike in 1954, approximately 35,000 workers held jobs on the banana plantations of the [[United Fruit Company]] (later United Brands Company, then Chiquita Brands International) or the [[Standard Fruit Company]] (later brought by Castle and Cook, then [[Dole Food Company]]).

After 1950 Honduran governments encouraged agricultural modernization and export diversification by spending heavily on transportation and communications infrastructure, agricultural credit, and technical assistance. During the 1950s—as a result of these improvements and the strong international export prices—[[beef]], [[cotton]], and [[coffee]] became significant export products for the first time. Honduran [[sugar]], [[Lumber|timber]], and [[tobacco]] also were exported, and by 1960 bananas had declined to a more modest share (45 percent) of total exports. During the 1960s, industrial growth was stimulated by the establishment of the [[Central American Common Market]] (CACM—see Appendix B).

As a result of the reduction of regional [[trade barriers]] and the construction of a high [[common external tariff]], some Honduran manufactured products, such as soaps, sold successfully in other Central American countries. Because of the greater size and relative efficiency of the Salvadoran and Guatemalan industrial sectors, however, Honduras bought far more manufactured products from its neighbors than it sold to them. After the 1969 [[Soccer War]] with [[El Salvador]], Honduras effectively withdrew from the CACM. Favorable bilateral trade arrangements between Honduras and the other former CACM partners were subsequently negotiated, however.

[[File:SanPedroSula.jpg|thumb|300px|Downtown [[San Pedro Sula]] in 2004.]]
A political shift in the 1980s had strong and unexpected repercussions on the country's economic condition. Beginning in late 1979, as insurgency spread in neighboring countries, Honduran military leaders enthusiastically came to support [[United States]] policies in the region. This alignment resulted in financial support that benefited the civilian as well as the military ministries and agencies of Honduras. Honduran defense spending rose throughout the 1980s until it consumed 20 to 30 percent of the national budget. Before the military buildup began in fiscal year (FY) 1980, United States military assistance to Honduras was less than US$4&nbsp;million. Military aid more than doubled to reach just under US$9&nbsp;million by FY 1981, surged to more than $31&nbsp;million by FY 1982, and stood at $48.3&nbsp;million in FY 1983. Tiny Honduras soon became the tenth largest recipient of United States assistance aid; total economic and military aid rose to more than $200&nbsp;million in 1985 and remained at more than $100&nbsp;million for the rest of the 1980s.

The increasing dependence of the Honduran economy on foreign aid was aggravated by a severe, regionwide economic decline during the 1980s. Private investment plummeted in 1980, and [[capital flight]] for that year was $500&nbsp;million. To make matters worse, [[Economics of coffee|coffee prices]] plunged on the international market in the mid-1980s and remained low throughout the decade. In 1993 average annual per capita income remained depressingly low at about $580, and 75 percent of the population was poor by internationally defined standards.

Traditionally, Honduran economic hopes have been pinned on land and agricultural commodities. Despite those hopes, however, usable land has always been severely limited. Honduras's mostly mountainous terrain confines agriculturally exploitable land to narrow bands along the coasts and to some previously fertile but now largely depleted valleys. The country's once abundant forest resources have also been dramatically reduced, and Honduras has not derived economically significant income from mineral resources since the 19th century. Similarly, Honduras's industrial sector never was fully developed. The heady days of the CACM (mid to -late 1960s), which produced an industrial boom for [[El Salvador]] and [[Guatemala]], barely touched the Honduran economy except to increase its imports because of the comparative advantages enjoyed by the Salvadoran and Guatemalan economies and Honduras's inability to compete.

Bananas and coffee have also proven unreliable sources of income. Although bananas are less subject to the vagaries of international markets than coffee, natural disasters such as [[Hurricane Fifi–Orlene|Hurricane Fifi]] in 1974, drought, and disease have appeared with a regular, albeit random, frequency to take their economic toll through severely diminished [[harvests]]. Moreover, bananas are grown and marketed mostly by international corporations, which keep the bulk of wealth generated. Coffee exports, equally unreliable as a major source of economic support, surpassed bananas in the mid1970s as Honduras's leading export income earner, but international price declines coupled with huge fiscal deficits underlined the vulnerability of coffee as an economic base.

=== 1990s ===
{{Missing information|section|[[Effects of Hurricane Mitch in Honduras|the devastating effects of Hurricane Mitch on this nation]]. Didn't it cause a [[recession]] here in 1998?|date=September 2018}}
As Honduras entered the 1990s, it did have some factors working in its favor—relative peace and a stronger civilian government with less military interference in the politics and economy of the country than in past years. The country was hobbled, however, by horrendous foreign debt, could claim only diminished natural resources, and had one of the fastest-growing and urbanizing populations in the world. The government's daunting task then became how to create an economic base able to compensate for the withdrawal of much United States assistance without becoming solely dependent on traditional agricultural exports.

In the 1990s, bananas were booming again, particularly as new European trade agreements increased market size. Small banana producing cooperatives lined up in the 1990s to sell their land to the commercial giants, and the last banana-producing lands held by the government were privatized. Like most of Central America, Honduras in the 1990s began to woo foreign investors, mostly Asian clothing assembly firms, and it held high hopes for revenue to be generated by privatizing national industries. With one of the most strike-prone labor forces in Central America, debt-burdened and aging industrial assets, and a dramatically underdeveloped infrastructure, Honduras, however, has distinct economic disadvantages relative to its Central American and Caribbean neighbors, who compete with Honduras in the same export markets.

Honduran president [[Rafael Leonardo Callejas Romero]], elected in November 1989, enjoyed little success in the early part of his administration as he attempted to adhere to a standard economic [[austerity]] package prescribed by the [[International Monetary Fund|International Monetary Fund (IMF)]] and the [[World Bank]]. As the November 1993 presidential elections drew closer, the political fallout of austere economic measures made their implementation even less likely. Any hope for his party's winning the 1993 election was predicated on improving social programs, addressing employment needs, and appeasing a disgruntled, vocal public sector. However, reaching those goals required policies that moved away from balancing the budget, lowering [[inflation]], and reducing the deficit and external debt to attract investment and stimulate economic growth.

Callejas inherited an economic mess. The economy had deteriorated rapidly, starting in 1989, as the [[United States Agency for International Development]] (AID) pointedly interrupted disbursements of its grants to Honduras to signal displeasure with the economic policies of the old government and to push the new government to make economic reforms. Nondisbursal of those funds greatly exacerbated the country's economic problems. Funds from the multilateral lending institutions, which eventually would help fill the gap left by the reduction of United States aid, were still under negotiation in 1989 and would be conditioned first on payment of arrears on the country's enormous external debt.

Between 1983 and 1985, the government of Honduras—pumped up by massive infusions of external borrowing—had introduced expensive, high-tech infrastructure projects. The construction of roads and dams, financed mostly by multilateral loans and grants, was intended to generate employment to compensate for the impact of the regionwide recession. In reality, the development projects served to swell the ranks of public-sector employment and line the pockets of a small elite. The projects never sparked private-sector investment or created substantial private employment. Instead, per capita income continued to fall as Honduras's external debt doubled. Even greater injections of foreign assistance between 1985 and 1988 kept the economy afloat, but it soon became clear that the successive governments had been borrowing time as well as money.

Foreign aid between 1985 and 1989 represented about 4.6 percent of the [[gross domestic product (GDP)]]. About 44 percent of the government's fiscal shortfall was financed through cash from foreign sources. Side effects of the cash infusion were that the national currency, the lempira became overvalued and the number of exports dropped. A booming public sector, with its enhanced ability to import, was enough to keep the economy showing growth, based on private consumption and government spending. But the government did little to address the historical, underlying structural problems of the economy—its overdependence on too few traditional commodities and lack of investment. Unemployment mushroomed, and private investment withered.

By 1989 president Callejas's broad economic goal led a return of Honduran economic growth to 1960–80 levels. During the decades of the 1960s and 1970s, the country's economy, spurred mostly by erratically fluctuating traditional agricultural commodities, nevertheless averaged real annual growth of between 4 and 5 percent. At the end of the 1980s, however, Callejas had few remaining vehicles with which to pull the country out of the deep regionwide recession of the 1980s. Real growth between 1989 and 1993 translated to mostly negative or small positive per capita changes in the GDP for a population that was growing at close to 4 percent annually.

President Callejas attempted to adhere to conditions of desperately needed new loans. Cutting the size of the public sector workforce, lowering the deficit, and enhancing revenues from taxes—as mandated by the multilateral lending institutions—were consistently his biggest stumbling blocks. Despite his all-out effort to reduce the public-sector deficit, the overall ratio of fiscal deficit to the GDP in 1990 showed little change from that in 1989. The total public-sector deficit actually grew to 8.6 percent of the GDP, or nearly L1&nbsp;billion, in 1991.

The 1993 deficit expanded to 10.6 percent of GDP. The Honduran government's medium-term economic objectives, as dictated by the IMF, were to have generated real GDP growth of 3.5 percent by 1992 and 4 percent by 1993. In fact, GDP growth was 3.3 percent in 1991, 5.6 percent in 1992, and an estimated 3.7 percent in 1993. The economy had operated so long on an ad hoc basis that it lacked the tools to implement coherent economic objectives. Solving the most immediate crisis frequently took precedence over long-term goals.

=== Inflation ===
By 1991 President Callejas had achieved modest success in controlling inflation. Overall inflation for 1990 had reached 36.4 percent—not the hyperinflation experienced by some Latin American counties—but still the highest annual rate for Honduras in forty years. The Honduran government and the IMF had set an inflation target of 12 percent for 1992 and 8 percent for 1993. The actual figures were 8.8 percent in 1992 and an estimated 10.7 percent for 1993. Hondurans had been accustomed to low inflation (3.4 percent in 1985, rising to 4.5 percent by the end of 1986), partly because pegging the lempira to the dollar-linked Honduras's inflation rate to inflation rates in developed countries. But the expectation for low inflation made the reality of high inflation that much worse and created additional pressures on the government for action when inflation soared in 1990.<ref>{{cite web | url=http://countrystudies.us/honduras/62.htm | title=Growth and Structure of the Economy | publisher=countrystudies.us | access-date=11 April 2019}}</ref>