Editing Doolittle Raid (section)

==Background==
[[File:Map showing Doolittle Raid targets and landing fields.jpg|thumb|left|Doolittle Raid targets and landing fields]]
President [[Franklin D. Roosevelt]] spoke to the [[Joint Chiefs of Staff]] in a meeting at the [[White House]] on 21 December 1941 and said that Japan should be bombed as soon as possible to boost public morale after Pearl Harbor.{{sfn|Glines|1988|p=10}} Doolittle recounted in his autobiography that the raid was intended to bolster American morale and to cause the Japanese to begin doubting their leadership: "An attack on the Japanese homeland would cause confusion in the minds of the Japanese people and sow doubt about the reliability of their leaders.&nbsp;... Americans badly needed a morale boost."{{sfn|Doolittle|Glines|1991|pp=1–2}}

The concept for the attack came from Navy Captain [[Francis S. Low]], Assistant Chief of Staff for antisubmarine warfare. He reported to Admiral [[Ernest J. King]] on 10 January 1942 that he thought that twin-engined Army bombers could be launched from an aircraft carrier, after observing several at [[Naval Station Norfolk Chambers Field]] in [[Norfolk, Virginia|Norfolk]], where the runway was painted with the outline of a carrier deck for landing practice.{{sfn|Glines|1988|p=13}} Doolittle, a famous military test pilot, civilian aviator, and aeronautical engineer before the war, was assigned to Army Air Forces Headquarters to plan the raid. The aircraft to be used would need a cruising range of {{convert|2400|nmi|km}} with a {{convert|2000|lb|kg|adj=on}} bomb load, so Doolittle selected the B-25B Mitchell to carry out the mission. The range of the Mitchell was about 1,300 miles, so the bombers had to be modified to hold nearly twice the normal fuel reserves. Doolittle also considered the [[Martin B-26 Marauder]], [[Douglas B-18 Bolo]], and [[Douglas B-23 Dragon]],{{sfn|Glines|1988|p=19}} but the B-26 had questionable takeoff characteristics from a carrier deck and the B-23's wingspan was nearly 50-percent greater than the B-25's, reducing the number that could be taken aboard a carrier and posing risks to the ship's superstructure. The B-18 was one of the final two types that Doolittle considered, and he rejected it for the same reason.{{sfn|Glines|1988|pp=19–20}} The B-25 had yet to see combat,{{refn|group=note |The first bombing mission by B-25s preceded the Doolittle Raid by only 12 days. On 6 April 1942, six Mitchells bombed [[Gasmata]], [[New Britain]]. This was followed on 12 and 13 April by two days of attacks against [[Cebu City]] and [[Davao City|Davao]] in the Philippines. All of these were conducted by the [[3d Operations Group|3rd Bomb Group]], which staged 10 Mitchells through [[Darwin, Australia]] to [[Mindanao]].}}{{sfn|Martin|Stephenson|2008|pp=174, 182–183}} but tests indicated that it could fulfill the mission's requirements.

Doolittle's first report on the plan suggested that the bombers might land in [[Vladivostok]], shortening the flight by {{convert|600|nmi|km}} on the basis of turning over the B-25s as [[Lend-Lease]].{{sfn|Glines|1988|p=27}} Negotiations with the Soviet Union were fruitless for permission to land because it had signed a [[Soviet–Japanese Neutrality Pact|neutrality pact with Japan]] in April 1941.{{sfn|Doolittle|1942}} China's [[Chiang Kai-shek]] agreed to the landing sites in China despite the concern of Japanese reprisals. Five possible airfields were selected. These sites would serve as refueling stops, allowing the crews to fly to [[Chongqing]].{{sfn|Chun|2006|p=32}} Bombers attacking defended targets often relied on a fighter escort to defend them from enemy fighters, but accompanying fighters were not possible.