Editing Cross of Gold speech (section)

== Background ==
=== Monetary standards and the United States ===
In January 1791, at the request of Congress, [[United States Secretary of the Treasury|Secretary of the Treasury]] [[Alexander Hamilton]] issued a report on the currency.  At the time, there was no mint in the United States; foreign coins were used. Hamilton proposed a monetary system based on [[bimetallism]], in which the new currency would be equal to a given amount of gold, or a larger amount of silver; at the time a given weight of gold was worth about 15 times as much as the same amount of silver. Although Hamilton understood that adjustment might be needed from time to time as precious metal prices fluctuated, he believed that if the nation's unit of value were defined only by one of the two precious metals used for coins, the other would descend to the status of mere merchandise, unusable as a store of value. He also proposed the establishment of a [[mint (coin)|mint]], at which citizens could present gold or silver, and receive it back, struck into money.{{sfn|Taxay|pp=48–49}} On April 2, 1792, Congress passed the [[Mint Act of 1792]]. This legislation defined a unit of value for the new nation, to be known as a [[United States dollar|dollar]]. The new unit of currency was defined to be equal to {{convert|24.75|gr}} of gold, or alternatively, {{convert|371.25|gr}} of silver, establishing a ratio of value between gold and silver of 15:1. The legislation also established the [[United States Mint|Mint of the United States]].{{sfn|Coin World Almanac|p=455}}

In the early 19th century, the economic disruption caused by the [[Napoleonic Wars]] caused United States gold coins to be worth more as [[bullion]] than as money, and they vanished from circulation. Governmental response to this shortage was hampered by the fact that officials did not clearly understand what had happened.{{sfn|Lange|pp=42–43}} In 1830, Treasury Secretary [[Samuel D. Ingham]] proposed adjusting the ratio between gold and silver in US currency to 15.8:1, which had for some time been the ratio in Europe.{{sfn|Taxay|p=193}} It was not until 1834 that Congress acted, changing the gold/silver ratio to 16.002:1. This was close enough to the market value to make it uneconomic to export either US gold or silver coins.{{sfn|Lange|pp=42–43}} When silver prices rose relative to gold as a reaction to the [[California Gold Rush]], silver coinage was worth more than face value, and rapidly flowed overseas for melting. Despite vocal opposition led by [[Tennessee]] Representative (and future president) [[Andrew Johnson]], the precious metal content of smaller silver coins was reduced in 1853.{{sfn|Taxay|pp=217–221}}  Silver was now undervalued at the Mint; accordingly little was presented for striking into money.{{sfn|Jones|p=7}}

The [[Coinage Act of 1873]] eliminated the standard silver dollar. It also repealed the statutory provisions allowing silver bullion to be presented to the Mint and returned in the form of circulating money. In passing the Coinage Act, Congress eliminated bimetallism.{{sfn|Coin World Almanac|p=456}}  During the economic chaos of the [[Panic of 1873]], the price of silver dropped significantly, but the Mint would accept none for striking into legal tender.<!-- Note: the phrasing "legal tender" is to exclude the Trade dollar, which could be still be struck and was not legal tender then, but is way off track for this story. --> Silver producers complained, and many Americans came to believe that only through bimetallism could the nation achieve and maintain prosperity. They called for the return to pre-1873 laws, which would require the Mint to take all the silver offered it and return it, struck into silver dollars.{{sfn|Jones|p=7}} This would inflate the money supply, and, adherents argued, increase the nation's prosperity. Critics contended that the inflation which would follow the introduction of such a policy would harm workers, whose wages would not rise as fast as prices would, and the operation of [[Gresham's law]] would drive gold from circulation, effectively placing the United States on a silver standard.{{sfn|Jones|pp=7–13}}

=== Early attempts toward free silver ===
[[File:Richard P. Bland - Brady-Handy.jpg|thumb|left|upright|Representative [[Richard P. Bland]]]]

To advocates of what became known as free silver, the 1873 act became known as the "Crime of '73". Pro-silver forces, with congressional leaders such as [[Missouri]] Representative [[Richard P. Bland]], sought the passage of bills to allow depositors of silver bullion to receive it back in the form of coin. Such bills, sponsored by Bland, passed the [[United States House of Representatives|House of Representatives]] in 1876 and 1877, but both times failed in the [[United States Senate|Senate]]. A third attempt in early 1878 again passed the House, and eventually both houses after being amended in the Senate. The bill, as modified by amendments sponsored by [[Iowa]] Senator [[William B. Allison]], did not reverse the 1873 provisions, but required the [[United States Department of the Treasury|Treasury]] to purchase a minimum of $2 million of silver bullion per month; the profit, or [[seignorage]] from monetizing the silver was to be used to purchase more silver bullion. The silver would be struck into [[Morgan dollar|dollar coins]] to be circulated, or else stored and used as backing for [[Silver certificate (United States)|silver certificates]]. The [[Bland–Allison Act]] was vetoed by President [[Rutherford B. Hayes]], but was enacted by Congress over his veto on February 28, 1878.{{sfn|Taxay|pp=261–267}}

Implementation of the Bland–Allison Act did not end calls for free silver. The 1880s saw a steep decline in the prices of grain and other agricultural commodities. Silver advocates argued that this dropoff, which caused the price of grain to fall below its cost of production, was caused by the failure of the government to adequately increase the money supply, which had remained steady on a per capita basis. Advocates of the gold standard attributed the decline to advances in production and transportation. The late 19th century saw divergent views in economics as the ''[[laissez-faire]]'' orthodoxy was questioned by younger economists, and both sides found ample support for their views from theorists.{{sfn|Jones|pp=7–9}}

In 1890, the [[Sherman Silver Purchase Act]] greatly increased government purchases of silver. The government pledged to stand behind the silver dollars and [[Treasury (Coin) Note|treasury notes]] issued under the act by redeeming them in gold. Pursuant to this promise, government gold reserves dwindled over the following three years.{{sfn|Bensel|p=25}} Although the economic [[Panic of 1893]] had a number of causes, President [[Grover Cleveland]] believed the inflation caused by [[John Sherman|Sherman]]'s act to be a major factor, and called a special session of Congress to repeal it. Congress did so, but the debates showed bitter divides in both major parties between silver and gold factions. Cleveland tried to replenish the Treasury through issuance of bonds which could only be purchased with gold, with little effect but to increase the public debt, as the gold continued to be withdrawn in redemption for paper and silver currency. Many in the public saw the bonds as benefiting bankers, not the nation. The bankers did not want loans repaid in an inflated currency—the gold standard was deflationary, and as creditors, they preferred to be paid in such a currency, whereas debtors preferred to repay in inflated currency.{{sfn|Jones|pp=43–45}}

The effects of the [[Depression (economics)|depression]] which began in 1893, and which continued through 1896, ruined many Americans. Contemporary estimates were an unemployment rate as high as 25%. The task of relieving the jobless fell to churches and other charities, as well as to labor unions.{{sfn|Williams|pp=28–29}} Farmers went bankrupt; their farms were sold to pay their debts. Some of the impoverished died of disease or starvation; others killed themselves.{{sfn|Williams|pp=67–68}}

=== Bryan seeks the nomination ===
{{for|additional detail on the political career of William Jennings Bryan before and during the 1896 campaign|William Jennings Bryan presidential campaign, 1896}}

Among those who spoke against the repeal of the Sherman Silver Purchase Act was [[Nebraska]] Representative [[William Jennings Bryan]]. Known as an orator even then ("the Boy Orator of the [[Platte River|Platte]]"), Bryan had not always favored free silver out of conviction, stating in 1892 that he was for it because the people of Nebraska were for it.{{sfn|Cherny|pp=52–53}} By 1893, his views on silver had evolved, and on the floor of the House of Representatives, he delivered a riveting three-hour address against repeal of the Silver Purchase Act.{{sfn|Kazin|pp=38–40}} In his conclusion, Bryan reached back in history:

{{quote|When a crisis like the present arose and the national bank of his day sought to control the politics of the nation, God raised up an Andrew Jackson, who had the courage to grapple with that great enemy, and by overthrowing it, he made himself the idol of the people and reinstated the Democratic party in public confidence. What will the decision be today? The Democratic party has won the greatest success in its history. Standing upon this victory-crowned summit, will it turn its face to the rising or the setting sun? Will it choose blessings or cursings—life or death—which? Which?{{sfn|Jones|p=68}}}}

Despite the repeal of the act, economic conditions failed to improve. The year 1894 saw considerable labor unrest. President Cleveland sent federal troops to [[Illinois]] to end the [[Pullman Strike]]—workers at the [[Pullman Palace Car Company]], which made railroad cars, had struck after wages were cut. Railway employees had refused to handle Pullman cars in sympathy with the strikers; this action threatened to paralyze the nation's rail lines. The President's move was opposed by the Democratic [[Governor of Illinois]], [[John Altgeld]]. Angered by Cleveland's actions in the labor dispute, and by his uncompromising stand against silver, Altgeld began to organize Democrats against Cleveland's renomination in 1896. Although Altgeld and his adherents urged voters to distinguish between Cleveland and his party, the Democrats lost 113 seats in the House in the 1894 [[midterm election]]s, the greatest loss by a majority party in congressional history. The Republicans gained control of the House, as well as the Senate, which until 1913 was elected by the state legislatures rather than by the popular vote.{{sfn|Williams|pp=41–45}}  Among those defeated for Senate was Bryan in Nebraska.{{sfn|Kazin|pp=41–43}}

Bryan had long planned to run for president. Although he would only be 36 years old in 1896—one year above the constitutional minimum—he believed the silver question could carry him not only to the nomination, but to the presidency.{{sfn|Kazin|pp=42–44}} He traveled widely, speaking to audiences across the nation. His speeches impressed many; even some of his opponents later conceded that Bryan was the most compelling speaker they had ever heard. Bryan's speeches evolved over time; in December 1894, in a speech in Congress, he first used a phrase from which would come the conclusion to his most famous address: as originally stated, it was "I will not help to crucify mankind upon a cross of gold."{{sfn|Williams|pp=67–71}}{{sfn|Kazin|pp=46–48}}

A myth has arisen that Bryan was an unknown prior to 1896. This was not the case; Bryan was well known as an orator on the tariff and silver questions. [[Albert Shaw (journalist)|Albert Shaw]], editor of ''The Review of Reviews'', stated that after Bryan's nomination, many easterners professed not to have heard of him but: "If, indeed, they had not heard of Mr. Bryan before, they had failed to follow closely the course of American politics in the past eight years. As a Democratic member of the Ways and Means Committee through two Congresses, Mr. Bryan was by all odds the ablest and strongest orator on the Democratic side of the House. His subsequent canvass [campaign] for the United States senatorship in Nebraska was noteworthy and conspicuous on many accounts."{{sfn|Barnes|p=380}}

In the aftermath of the 1894 election, the silver forces, led by Altgeld and others, began an attempt to take over the machinery of the Democratic Party. Historian Stanley Jones, in his study of the 1896 election, suggests that western Democrats would have opposed Cleveland even if the party had held its congressional majority in 1894; with the disastrous defeat, they believed the party would be wiped out in the West if it did not support silver.{{sfn|Jones|p=49}} Bryan biographer Paulo E. Coletta wrote, "during this year [July 1894 – June 1895] of calamities, disintegration and revolution, each crisis aided Bryan because it caused division within his party and permitted him to contest for its mastery as it slipped from Cleveland's fingers."{{sfn|Coletta|p=100}}

In early 1896, with the economy still poor, there was widespread discontent with the two existing major political parties. Some people, for the most part Democrats, joined the far-left [[People's Party (United States)|Populist Party]]. Many Republicans in the western states, dismayed by the strong allegiance of eastern Republicans to the gold standard, considered forming their own party. When the Republicans in June 1896 nominated former [[Ohio]] Governor [[William McKinley]] for president and passed at his request a platform strongly supporting "sound money" (the gold standard unless modified by international agreement), a number of "Silver Republicans" walked out of [[1896 Republican National Convention|the convention]].{{sfn|Kazin|p=52}} The leader of those who left was [[Colorado]] Senator [[Henry M. Teller]]; he was immediately spoken of as a possible candidate for the Democratic nomination.{{sfn|Williams|p=74}}

Bryan believed that he could, if nominated, unite the disaffected behind a strong silver campaign.{{sfn|Kazin|p=52}} However, part of his strategy was to remain inconspicuous until the last possible moment at the convention. He sent letters to national convention delegates, urging them to support silver, and enclosing copies of his photograph, writings, and speeches. Jones points out that though Bryan's speaking engagements were not deemed political by the standards of 1896, by modern measurements he was far more active in campaigning for the nomination than most of the better-known candidates.{{sfn|Jones|pp=184–185}}

Historian James A. Barnes, in his historical journal article pointing out myths that have arisen about Bryan's candidacy and campaign, stated that Bryan's efforts bore fruit even before the convention:

{{quote|By April, 1896, many individuals were quietly working for Bryan's nomination. Circulars were being distributed in Illinois, and admirers in Nebraska, North Carolina, Mississippi, Louisiana, Texas, Arkansas, and other states were urging his selection among their friends. It was not in any concerted or open action, however, that Bryan had his strength; it was in the friendly predisposition of the mass of the delegates that he had hopes.{{sfn|Barnes|p=381}}}}

=== Selection of delegates ===

The [[1896 Democratic National Convention]] followed events unique in post-Civil War American history. One after another, state conventions to elect delegates to the national convention in Chicago repudiated an incumbent elected president of their party, who had not declared whether he would be a candidate for renomination.  According to Barnes:

{{quote|The people of the South and the West had for years been convinced of the enormity of the "crime of 1873", and they had long since come to regard silver as the sword that would cut the [[Gordian knot]] of privilege. Consciousness of grievances of years and not of months was reflected in the decisive action of the state Democratic conventions in the spring and early summer of 1896.{{sfn|Barnes|p=374}}}}

Many state conventions elected delegates pledged to support bimetallism in the party platform. [[Bourbon Democrats|Gold Democrats]] were successful in a few states in the Northeast, but had little luck elsewhere. Speakers in some states cursed Cleveland; the [[South Carolina]] convention denounced him. Cleveland issued a statement urging Democratic voters to support gold—the next convention to be held, in Illinois, unanimously supported silver; the keynote speaker prayed for divine forgiveness for Cleveland's 1892 nomination. Gold and silver factions in some states, such as Bryan's Nebraska, sent rival delegations to the convention.{{sfn|Williams|pp=72–74}}