Editing Camp David Accords (section)

==Preceding diplomacy==

===Carter Initiative===
Carter's and Secretary of State [[Cyrus Vance]]'s exploratory meetings gave a basic plan for reinvigorating the peace process based on a [[Geneva Conference (1973)|Geneva Peace Conference]] and had presented three main objectives for Arab–Israeli peace: Arab recognition of Israel's right to exist in peace, Israel's withdrawal from occupied territories gained in the [[Six-Day War]] through negotiating efforts with neighboring Arab nations to ensure that Israel's security would not be threatened, and securing an undivided Jerusalem.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.cartercenter.org/news/documents/doc1482.html|title=Camp David Accords: Jimmy Carter Reflects 25 Years Later|website=cartercenter.org}}</ref>

The Camp David Accords were the result of 14 months of diplomatic efforts by Egypt, Israel, and the United States that began after Jimmy Carter became president.<ref name="Stein, Kenneth 1989, pp. 229-228">Stein, Kenneth. ''Heroic Diplomacy: Sadat, Kissinger, Carter, Begin, and the Quest for Arab–Israeli Peace''. Taylor & Francis, 1999, pp. 228–229</ref> The efforts initially focused on a comprehensive resolution of disputes between Israel and the Arab countries, gradually evolving into a search for a bilateral agreement between Israel and Egypt.<ref>"Stein, Kenneth 2000, pp. 229–228"</ref>

Upon assuming office on 20 January 1977, President Carter moved to rejuvenate the [[Middle East]] peace process that had stalled throughout the 1976 presidential [[Political campaign|campaign]] in the [[United States]]. Following the advice of a [[Brookings Institution]] report, Carter opted to replace the incremental, bilateral peace talks which had characterized [[Henry Kissinger]]'s [[shuttle diplomacy]] following the 1973 [[Yom Kippur War]] with a comprehensive, multilateral approach. The Yom Kippur War further complicated efforts to achieve the objectives written in [[United Nations Security Council Resolution 242]].

Israel's prime minister [[Yitzhak Rabin]] and his successor, [[Menachem Begin]], were both skeptical of an international conference.<ref name="Stein, Kenneth 1989, pp. 229-228" /> While Begin, who took office in May 1977, officially favored the reconvening of the conference, perhaps even more vocally than Rabin, and even accepted the Palestinian presence, in actuality the Israelis and the Egyptians were secretly formulating a framework for bilateral talks. Even earlier, Begin had not been opposed to returning the [[Sinai Peninsula|Sinai]], but a major future obstacle was his firm refusal to consider relinquishing control over the [[West Bank]].<ref>[[George Lenczowski]], ''American Presidents and the Middle East'', Duke University Press, 1990 p. 164. {{ISBN|978-0-8223-0972-7}}. From [[Zbigniew Brzezinski]], ''Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Advisor 1977–1981'', (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1983), p. 88.<blockquote>[Carter] outlined to Begin his program, which consisted of five points: (1) achieve a comprehensive peace affecting all of Israel's neighbors: (2) peace to be based on UN Resolution 242: (3) peace would involve open borders and free trade; (4) peace would call for Israeli withdrawal from occupied territories to secure borders; (5) a Palestinian entity (but not an independent nation) should be created.  Begin responded that he could accept all of these points except the Palestinian entity.</blockquote></ref>

===Participating parties===
[[File:Six Day War Territories.svg|thumb|upright|right|Territory held by Israel: {{legend|#ffffd0|before the [[Six-Day War]]}} {{legend|#f7d3aa|after the war}}]]
Carter visited the heads of government on whom he would have to rely to make any peace agreement feasible. By the end of his first year (1977) in office, Carter had met with [[Anwar El Sadat]] of [[Egypt]], [[Hussein of Jordan]], [[Hafez al-Assad]] of [[Syria]], and [[Yitzhak Rabin]] of [[Israel]]. The new Israeli prime minister [[Menachem Begin]] however, taking over the office from Yitzhak Rabin in June 1977, specifically demanded that the [[PLO]] would be excluded from peace talks.<ref name=Filiu2014/> Despite the fact that Jordan’s King Hussein supported Sadat's peace initiative, Hussein refused to take part in the peace talks; Menachem Begin offered Jordan little to gain and Hussein also feared he would isolate Jordan from the Arab world and provoke Syria and the [[Palestine Liberation Organization|PLO]] if he engaged in the peace talks as well.<ref name=olp>{{cite web|url=http://countrystudies.us/jordan/19.htm|title=Jordan – The Camp David Accords|website=countrystudies.us}}</ref> Hafez al-Assad, who had no interest in negotiating peace with Israel,<ref name=ldmm>''The Middle East: ten years after Camp David'', William B. Quandt, p. 9</ref> also refused to come to the United States.

===Sadat Initiative===
[[File:Camp David, Menachem Begin, Anwar Sadat, 1978.jpg|right|thumb|250px|[[Anwar Sadat]], [[Jimmy Carter]] and [[Menachem Begin]] (left to right), at [[Camp David]], 1978]]

Sadat first spoke about the possibility of peace with Israel in February 1971; Egypt was the initiator of many moves in the 1970s.{{sfn|Quandt|1988|p=2}} On 9 November 1977, he startled the world by announcing his intention to go to [[Jerusalem]] and speak before the [[Knesset]]. Shortly afterward, the Israeli government cordially invited him to address the Knesset in a message passed to Sadat via the US ambassador to Egypt. Ten days after his speech, Sadat arrived for the groundbreaking three-day visit, which launched the first peace process between Israel and an Arab state. As would be the case with later Israeli–Arab peace initiatives, Washington was taken by surprise; the White House and State Department were particularly concerned that Sadat was merely reaching out to reacquire Sinai as quickly as possible, putting aside the Palestinian problem. Considered as a man with strong political convictions who kept his eye on the main objective, Sadat had no ideological base, which made him politically inconsistent.<ref>Stein 1999, p. 7.</ref> The Sadat visit came about after he delivered a speech in Egypt stating that he would travel anywhere, "even Jerusalem," to discuss peace.<ref>Feron, James. [https://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9E0CE3DC1E30F93AA35750C0A964958260&sec=&spon=&pagewanted=2 "Menachem Begin, Guerrilla Leader Who Became Peacemaker."] ''[[The New York Times]]''.  9 March 1992.  15 February 2009.</ref> That speech led the Begin government to declare that, if Israel thought that Sadat would accept an invitation, Israel would invite him. In Sadat's [[Knesset]] speech he talked about his views on peace, the status of [[Israeli occupied territories|Israel's occupied territories]], and the Palestinian refugee problem. This tactic went against the intentions of both the West and the East, which were to revive the [[Geneva Conference (1973)|Geneva Conference]].

The gesture stemmed from an eagerness to enlist the help of the NATO countries in improving the ailing Egyptian economy, a belief that Egypt should begin to focus more on its own interests than on the interests of the Arab world, and a hope that an agreement with Israel would catalyze similar agreements between Israel and her other Arab neighbors and help solve the Palestinian problem. Prime Minister Begin's response to Sadat's initiative, though not what Sadat or Carter had hoped, demonstrated a willingness to engage the Egyptian leader. Like Sadat, Begin also saw many reasons why bilateral talks would be in his country's best interests. It would afford Israel the opportunity to negotiate only with Egypt instead of with a larger [[Arab]] delegation that might try to use its size to make unwelcome or unacceptable demands. Israel felt Egypt could help protect Israel from other Arabs and Eastern communists. In addition, the commencement of direct negotiations between leaders&nbsp;– summit diplomacy&nbsp;– would distinguish Egypt from her Arab neighbors. Carter's people apparently had no inkling of the secret talks in Morocco between Dayan and Sadat's representative, Hassan Tuhami, that paved the way for Sadat's initiative. Indeed, in a sense Egypt and Israel were ganging up to push Carter off his Geneva track. The basic message of Sadat's speech at the [[Knesset]] were the request for the implementation of [[U.N. Resolution 242|Resolutions 242]] and [[United Nations Security Council Resolution 338|338]]. Sadat's visit was the first step to negotiations such as the preliminary Cairo Conference in December 1977.{{citation needed|date=September 2020}}

===Searching a negotiation modus===
{{more citations needed|section|date=September 2017}}<!--4 CN tags and one paragraph without references-->
[[File:Begin Brzezinski Camp David Chess.jpg|thumb|Begin and Brzezinski playing [[chess]] at Camp David]]
[[File:Sadat and Begin and their delegations at Camp David, September 17, 1978 (10729645586).jpg|thumb|250px|A 1978 meeting at [[Camp David]] with (seated, l-r) [[Aharon Barak]], [[Menachem Begin]], [[Anwar Sadat]], and [[Ezer Weizman]].]]

A mechanism had yet to be created for Israel and Egypt to pursue the talks begun by Sadat and Begin in Jerusalem.<ref name="Forward.com">{{Cite web|url=https://forward.com/opinion/13212/how-jimmy-carter-almost-derailed-peace-with-egypt-01709/|title=How Jimmy Carter Almost Derailed Peace With Egypt|date=24 April 2008|website=The Forward}}</ref> The Egyptian president suggested to Begin that Israel place a secret representative in the American embassy in Cairo. With American "cover," the true identity of the Israeli, who would liaise between the Egyptian and Israeli leaders, would be known only to the American ambassador in Cairo.<ref name="Forward.com"/>

Carter's acceptance of the proposed liaison scheme would have signaled American backing for Sadat's unprecedented peace initiative, but Carter rejected the proposal. However, Carter could not thwart the Israeli–Egyptian peace push. Within days Israeli journalists were allowed into Cairo, breaking a symbolic barrier, and from there the peace process quickly gained momentum. An Israeli–Egyptian working summit was scheduled for 25 December in Ismailiya, near the [[Suez Canal]].<ref>{{cite web|url=http://peacenow.org/entries/archive3705|title=Americans for Peace Now: Archives|website=peacenow.org}}</ref>