Editing Bombing of Dresden (section)

==Background==
{{further|Vistula–Oder Offensive}}
[[File:Dresden photochrom2.jpg|thumb|Colourised photograph of Dresden during the 1890s with [[Dresden Frauenkirche]], [[Augustus Bridge]], and the {{lang |de |[[Dresden Cathedral|Katholische Hofkirche]]}} visible]]
[[File:Dresden-blickvomrathausturm1910.jpg|thumb|The {{lang |de |Altstadt}} ({{lit |old town}}) in 1910 from the town hall]]
Early in 1945, the German offensive known as the [[Battle of the Bulge]] had been exhausted, as was the [[Luftwaffe]]'s failed [[Operation Bodenplatte|New Year's Day attack]]. The [[Red Army]] had launched its [[Silesian Offensives]] into pre-war German territory. The [[German Army (Wehrmacht)|German army]] was retreating on all fronts, but still resisting. On 8 February 1945, the Red Army crossed the [[Oder River]], with positions just {{cvt|70|km}} from [[Berlin]].{{sfn|Taylor|2005|p=262}} A special British Joint Intelligence Subcommittee report, ''German Strategy and Capacity to Resist'', prepared for [[Winston Churchill]]'s eyes only, predicted that Germany might collapse as early as mid-April if the Soviets overran its eastern defences. Alternatively, the report warned that the Germans might hold out until November if they could prevent the Soviets from taking [[Silesia]]. Despite the post-war assessment, there were serious doubts in Allied intelligence as to how well the war was going for them, with fears of a "Nazi [[redoubt]]" being established, or of the Russian advance faltering.{{sfn|Overy|2013|p=391}} Hence, any assistance to the Soviets on the [[Eastern Front (World War II)|Eastern Front]] could shorten the war.{{sfn|Davis|2006|p=491}}

A large scale aerial attack on Berlin and other eastern cities was examined under the code name [[Operation Thunderclap]] in mid-1944, but was shelved on 16 August.{{sfn|Taylor|2005|p=207}} This was later reexamined, and the decision made to pursue a more limited operation.{{sfn|Longmate|1983|p=332}} The Soviet Army continued its push towards the Reich despite severe losses, which they sought to minimize in the final phase of the war. On 5 January 1945, two [[North American B-25 Mitchell]] bombers dropped 300,000 leaflets over Dresden with the "Appeal of 50 German generals to the German army and people".{{citation needed|date=June 2021}}

On 22 January 1945, the RAF director of bomber operations, [[Air Commodore]] [[Sydney Bufton]], sent [[Deputy Chief of the Air Staff (United Kingdom)|Deputy Chief of the Air Staff]] Air Marshal Sir [[Norman Bottomley]] a [[Minutes|minute]] suggesting that if Thunderclap was timed so that it appeared to be a coordinated air attack to aid the current Soviet offensive, then the effect of the bombing on German morale would be increased.{{sfn|Addison|Crang|2006|p=21}} On 25 January, the Joint Intelligence Committee supported the idea, as [[Ultra (cryptography)|Ultra]]-based intelligence had indicated that dozens of German [[Division (military)|divisions]] deployed in the west were moving to reinforce the Eastern Front, and that [[interdiction]] of these troop movements should be a "high priority".{{sfn|Taylor|2005|p=209}} Air Chief Marshal Sir [[Arthur Harris]], [[Air Officer Commanding|AOC-in-C]] [[RAF Bomber Command|Bomber Command]], nicknamed "Bomber Harris", was known as an ardent supporter of [[area bombing]];<ref>{{Cite news|url=https://www.bbc.co.uk/history/historic_figures/harris_sir_arthur_bomber.shtml|title=Sir Arthur 'Bomber' Harris (1892–1984)|work=Historic Figures|publisher=BBC|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080116211800/http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/historic_figures/harris_sir_arthur_bomber.shtml|archive-date=16 January 2008}}</ref> when asked for his view, he proposed a simultaneous attack on [[Chemnitz]], [[Leipzig]] and Dresden.{{sfn|Longmate|1983|p=332}} That evening Churchill asked the [[Secretary of State for Air]], Sir [[Archibald Sinclair, 1st Viscount Thurso|Archibald Sinclair]], what plans had been drawn up to carry out these proposals. Marshal of the Royal Air Force Sir [[Charles Portal]], the [[Chief of the Air Staff (United Kingdom)|Chief of the Air Staff]], answered: "We should use available effort in one big attack on Berlin and attacks on Dresden, Leipzig, and Chemnitz, or any other cities where a severe blitz will not only cause confusion in the evacuation from the East, but will also hamper the movement of troops from the West."{{sfn|Longmate|1983|p=332}} He mentioned that aircraft diverted to such raids should not be taken away from the current primary tasks of [[Oil Campaign of World War II|destroying oil production facilities]], [[List of jet aircraft of World War II|jet aircraft]] factories, and [[Submarine pen|submarine yards]].{{sfn|Longmate|1983|p=332}}{{sfn|Taylor|2005|pp=209–211}}

Churchill was not satisfied with this answer and on 26 January pressed Sinclair for a plan of operations: "I asked [last night] whether Berlin, and no doubt other large cities in east Germany, should not now be considered especially attractive targets ... Pray, report to me tomorrow what is going to be done".{{sfn|Taylor|2005|p=212}}

In response to Churchill's inquiry, Sinclair approached Bottomley, who asked Harris to undertake attacks on Berlin, Dresden, Leipzig, and Chemnitz as soon as moonlight and weather permitted, "with the particular object of exploiting the confused conditions which are likely to exist in the above-mentioned cities during the successful Russian advance".{{sfn|Taylor|2005|p=212}} This allowed Sinclair to inform Churchill on 27 January of the Air Staff's agreement that, "subject to the overriding claims" on other targets under the [[Pointblank Directive]], strikes against communications in these cities to disrupt civilian evacuation from the east and troop movement from the west would be made.{{sfn|Longmate|1983|pp=332,333}}{{sfn|Taylor|2005|pp=212–3}}

On 31 January, Bottomley sent Portal a message saying a heavy attack on Dresden and other cities "will cause great confusion in civilian evacuation from the east and hamper movement of reinforcements from other fronts".{{sfn|Addison|Crang|2006|loc=Chapter by Sebastian Cox "The Dresden Raids: Why and How", p. 26}} British historian [[Frederick Taylor (historian)|Frederick Taylor]] mentions a further memo sent to the [[Chiefs of Staff Committee]] by Air Marshal Sir [[Douglas Evill]] on 1 February, in which Evill states interfering with mass civilian movements was a key factor in the decision to bomb the city centre. Attacking main railway junctions, telephone systems, city administration and utilities would result in "chaos". Britain had ostensibly learned this after the [[Coventry Blitz]], when loss of this crucial infrastructure had supposedly longer-lasting effects than attacks on war plants.{{sfn|Taylor|2005|p=215}}

During the [[Yalta Conference]] on 4 February, the Deputy Chief of the Soviet General Staff, General [[Aleksei Antonov]], raised the issue of hampering the reinforcement of German troops from the western front by paralyzing the junctions of Berlin and Leipzig with aerial bombardment. In response, Portal, who was in Yalta, asked Bottomley to send him a list of objectives to discuss with the Soviets. Bottomley's list included oil plants, tank and aircraft factories and the cities of Berlin and Dresden.{{sfn|Taylor|2005|pp=217–220}}{{sfn|Addison|Crang|2006|pp=27, 28}} However, according to [[Richard Overy]], the discussion with the Soviet Chief of Staff, Aleksei Antonov, recorded in the minutes, only mentions the bombing of Berlin and Leipzig.{{sfn|Overy|2013}} The bombing of Dresden was a Western plan, but the Soviets were told in advance about the operation.{{sfn|Overy|2013}}

===Military and industrial profile===
[[File:1945-02-15GerWW2BattlefrontAtlas reworked.jpg|thumb|European front lines during Dresden raids. {{legend|white|German controlled territory}}{{legend|#f2ad9e|Allied territory}}{{legend|#a30f0f|Recent Allied advances}}{{legend|#cdcfce|Neutral}}]]
According to the RAF at the time, Dresden was Germany's seventh-largest city and the largest remaining unbombed, built-up area.{{sfn|Ross|2003|p=180}} Taylor writes that an official 1942 guide to the city described it as "one of the foremost industrial locations of the [[Nazi Germany|Reich]]" and in 1944 the [[German Army High Command]]'s Weapons Office listed 127 medium-to-large factories and workshops that were supplying the army with [[materiel]]<!--Not a spelling mistake. This is from the French and used for military material. -->.{{sfn|Taylor|2005|p=169}} Nonetheless, according to some historians, the contribution of Dresden to the German war effort may not have been as significant as the planners thought.{{sfn|Addison|Crang|2006|loc=Chapter by [[Sonke Neitzel]] "The City Under Attack" p. 76}}

The [[Air Force Historical Research Agency|US Air Force Historical Division]] wrote a report, which remained [[Classified information|classified]] until December 1978,{{sfn|Ross|2003|p=184}} in response to international concern about the bombing. It said that there were 110 factories and 50,000 workers in the city supporting the German war effort at the time of the raid.<ref>{{harvnb|Angell|1953}}: Cites "Dresden, Germany, City Area, Economic Reports", Vol. No. 2, Headquarters [[U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey]], 10 July 1945; and "OSS" London, No. B-1799/4, 3 March 1945.</ref> According to the report, there were aircraft components factories; a [[poison gas]] factory (Chemische Fabrik Goye and Company); an [[anti-aircraft]] and [[field gun]] factory (Lehman); an optical goods factory ([[Zeiss Ikon]] AG); and factories producing electrical and X-ray apparatus ({{interlanguage link|Koch & Sterzel|de}} AG); gears and differentials (Saxoniswerke); and electric gauges (Gebrüder Bassler). The report also mentioned barracks, hutted camps, and a [[munitions]] storage depot.<ref>{{harvnb|Angell|1953}}: Cites "Interpretation Report No. K. 4171, Dresden, 22 March 1945", Supporting Document No. 3.</ref>

The USAF report also states that two of Dresden's traffic routes were of military importance: north-south from Germany to [[Czechoslovakia]], and east–west along the [[central European uplands]].<ref name=ChambersUSAFHD>{{harvnb|Angell|1953}}: Cites [[Chambers Encyclopedia]], New York, 1950, Vol. IV, p. 636,</ref> The city was at the junction of the [[Berlin]]-[[Prague]]-[[Vienna]] railway line, as well as the [[Munich]]-[[Breslau]], and [[Hamburg]]-[[Leipzig]] lines.<ref name=ChambersUSAFHD/> Colonel Harold E. Cook, a US [[Prisoner of war|POW]] held in the [[Friedrichstadt (Dresden)|Friedrichstadt]] marshaling yard the night before the attacks, later said that "I saw with my own eyes that Dresden was an armed camp: thousands of German troops, tanks and artillery and miles of freight cars loaded with supplies supporting and transporting German [[Military logistics|logistics]] towards the east to meet the Russians".{{sfn|Miller|2006b|p=435}}

An RAF memo issued to airmen on the night of the attack gave some reasoning for the raid:

{{blockquote|Dresden, the seventh largest city in Germany and not much smaller than [[Manchester]] is also the largest unbombed builtup area the enemy has got. In the midst of winter with [[refugee]]s pouring westward and troops to be rested, roofs are at a premium, not only to give shelter to workers, refugees, and troops alike, but to house the administrative services displaced from other areas. At one time well known for its [[Porcelain|china]], Dresden has developed into an industrial city of first-class importance ... The intentions of the attack are to hit the enemy where he will feel it most, behind an already partially collapsed front, to prevent the use of the city in the way of further advance, and incidentally to show the Russians when they arrive what [[RAF Bomber Command|Bomber Command]] can do.{{sfn|Ross|2003|p=180}}{{sfn|Longmate|1983|p=333}} }}

In the raid, major industrial areas in the suburbs, which stretched for miles, were not targeted.{{sfn|McKee|1983|p=62}} According to historian [[Donald L. Miller|Donald Miller]], "the economic disruption would have been far greater had Bomber Command targeted the suburban areas where most of Dresden's manufacturing might was concentrated".{{sfn|Miller|2006a|p=437}}

In his biography of Attlee and Churchill, Leo McKinstry wrote:<ref>Leo McKinstry, "Attlee and Churchill: Allies in War, Adversaries in Peace", Atlantic Books, 2019, Ch 22.</ref>
{{blockquote |text=When Churchill arrived at Yalta on 4 February 1945, the first question that Stalin put to him was: 'Why haven't you bombed Dresden?' His enquiry reflected the importance that the Soviet Union attached to an attack on the city, following intelligence reports that Germany was moving large numbers of troops towards the [[Siege of Breslau|Breslau Front]]. Churchill assured Stalin that an Allied attack was imminent.}}