Editing Biological warfare (section)

== Overview ==
A biological attack could conceivably result in large numbers of [[civilian casualties]] and cause severe disruption to [[economic]] and societal infrastructure.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Koblentz|first=Gregory|date=2003|title=Pathogens as Weapons: The International Security Implications of Biological Warfare|url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/4137478|journal=International Security|volume=28|issue=3|pages=84–122|doi=10.1162/016228803773100084|jstor=4137478|s2cid=57570499|issn=0162-2889|hdl=1721.1/28498|hdl-access=free}}</ref>

A nation or group that can pose a credible threat of mass casualty has the ability to alter the terms under which other nations or groups interact with it. When indexed to weapon mass and cost of development and storage, biological weapons possess destructive potential and loss of life far in excess of nuclear, chemical or conventional weapons. Accordingly, biological agents are potentially useful as strategic deterrents, in addition to their utility as offensive weapons on the battlefield.<ref>[http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/0/7/3/6/4/p73644_index.html] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110430190200/http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/0/7/3/6/4/p73644_index.html|date=30 April 2011}}</ref>

As a tactical weapon for military use, a significant problem with biological warfare is that it would take days to be effective, and therefore might not immediately stop an opposing force. Some biological agents ([[smallpox]], [[pneumonic plague]]) have the capability of person-to-person [[Transmission (medicine)|transmission]] via [[Bioaerosol|aerosolized]] [[respiratory droplet]]s. This feature can be undesirable, as the agent(s) may be transmitted by this mechanism to unintended populations, including neutral or even friendly forces. Worse still, such a weapon could "escape" the laboratory where it was developed, even if there was no intent to use it – for example by infecting a researcher who then transmits it to the outside world before realizing that they were infected. Several cases are known of researchers becoming infected and dying of [[Ebola]],<ref>{{Cite journal | pmid=17087059 | year=2006 | last1=Borisevich | first1=I. V. | title=Hemorrhagic (Marburg, Ebola, Lassa, and Bolivian) fevers: Epidemiology, clinical pictures, and treatment | journal=Voprosy Virusologi | volume=51 | issue=5 | pages=8–16 | last2=Markin | first2=V. A. | last3=Firsova | first3=I. V. | last4 =Evseey | first4=A. A. | last5=Khamitov | first5= R. A. | last6=Maksimov | first6=V. A.}}</ref><ref>[Akinfeyeva L. A., Aksyonova O. I., Vasilyevich I. V., et al. A case of Ebola hemorrhagic fever. Infektsionnye Bolezni (Moscow). 2005;3(1):85–88 [Russian].]</ref> which they had been working with in the lab (though nobody else was infected in those cases) – while there is no evidence that their work was directed towards biological warfare, it demonstrates the potential for accidental infection even of careful researchers fully aware of the dangers. While containment of biological warfare is less of a concern for certain criminal or terrorist organizations, it remains a significant concern for the military and civilian populations of virtually all nations.