Editing Belief (section)

== Conceptions ==
Various conceptions of the essential features of beliefs have been proposed, but there is no consensus as to which is the right one. ''Representationalism'' is the traditionally dominant position. Its most popular version maintains that attitudes toward representations, which are typically associated with propositions, are mental attitudes that constitute beliefs. These attitudes are part of the internal constitution of the mind holding the attitude. This view contrasts with ''functionalism'', which defines beliefs not in terms of the internal constitution of the mind but in terms of the function or the causal role played by beliefs. According to ''dispositionalism'', beliefs are identified with dispositions to behave in certain ways. This view can be seen as a form of functionalism, defining beliefs in terms of the behavior they tend to cause. ''Interpretationism'' constitutes another conception, which has gained popularity in contemporary philosophy. It holds that the beliefs of an entity are in some sense dependent on or relative to someone's interpretation of this entity. ''Representationalism'' tends to be associated with mind-body-dualism. ''Naturalist'' considerations against this dualism are among the motivations for choosing one of the alternative conceptions.<ref name="Schwitzgebel"/>

=== Representationalism ===
Representationalism characterizes beliefs in terms of [[mental representation]]s. Representations are usually defined as objects with [[semantic properties]]{{mdash}}like having content, referring to something, or being true or false.<ref name="Schwitzgebel">{{cite web |last1=Schwitzgebel |first1=Eric |title=Belief |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/belief/ |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |date=2019 |access-date=22 June 2020 |archive-date=15 November 2019 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20191115080001/https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/belief/ |url-status=live }}</ref><ref name="Pitt">{{cite web |last1=Pitt |first1=David |title=Mental Representation |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/mental-representation/ |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=2 April 2021 |date=2020 |archive-date=6 August 2019 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190806134216/https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/mental-representation/ |url-status=live }}</ref> Beliefs form a special class of mental representations since they do not involve sensory qualities in order to represent something, unlike perceptions or episodic memories.<ref name="Borchert">{{cite book |last1=Borchert |first1=Donald |title=Macmillan Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2nd Edition |date=2006 |publisher=Macmillan |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/BORMEO |chapter=Belief |access-date=2 April 2021 |archive-date=12 January 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210112065913/https://philpapers.org/rec/BORMEO |url-status=live }}</ref> Because of this, it seems natural to construe beliefs as attitudes towards propositions, which also constitute non-sensory representations, i.e. as [[propositional attitudes]]. As [[mental attitude]]s, beliefs are characterized by both their content and their mode.<ref name="Borchert"/> The content of an attitude is what this attitude is directed at: its object. Propositional attitudes are directed at propositions.<ref>{{cite web |title=Philosophy of mind – Propositional attitudes |url=https://www.britannica.com/topic/philosophy-of-mind/Propositional-attitudes |website=Encyclopedia Britannica |access-date=2 April 2021 |language=en |archive-date=19 July 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200719083018/https://www.britannica.com/topic/philosophy-of-mind/Propositional-attitudes |url-status=live }}</ref><ref>{{cite web |last1=Oppy |first1=Graham |title=Propositional attitudes |url=https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/thematic/propositional-attitudes/v-1 |website=www.rep.routledge.com |access-date=2 April 2021 |language=en |archive-date=4 March 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210304193042/https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/thematic/propositional-attitudes/v-1 |url-status=live }}</ref><ref name="Pitt"/> Beliefs are usually distinguished from other propositional attitudes, like desires, by their mode or the way in which they are directed at propositions. The mode of beliefs has a mind-to-world [[direction of fit]]: beliefs try to represent the world as it is; they do not, unlike desires, involve an intention to change it.<ref name="Schwitzgebel"/><ref name="Borchert"/> For example, if Rahul believes that it will be sunny today, then he has a mental attitude towards the proposition "It will be sunny today" which affirms that this proposition is true. This is different from Sofía's desire that it will be sunny today, despite the fact that both Rahul and Sofía have attitudes toward the same proposition. The mind-to-world direction of fit of beliefs is sometimes expressed by saying that beliefs aim at truth.<ref>{{cite web |last1=Fassio |first1=Davide |title=Aim of Belief |url=https://iep.utm.edu/beli-aim/ |website=Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy |access-date=2 April 2021 |archive-date=11 February 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210211210202/https://iep.utm.edu/beli-aim/ |url-status=live }}</ref> This aim is also reflected in the tendency to [[Belief revision|revise one's belief]] upon receiving new evidence that an existing belief is false.<ref name="Schwitzgebel"/> Upon hearing a forecast of bad weather, Rahul is likely to change his mental attitude but Sofía is not.

There are different ways of conceiving how mental representations are realized in the mind. One form of this is the ''[[language of thought hypothesis]]'', which claims that mental representations have a language-like structure, sometimes referred to as "mentalese".<ref>{{cite web |last1=Katz |first1=Matthew |title=Language of Thought Hypothesis |url=https://iep.utm.edu/lot-hypo/ |website=Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy |access-date=31 March 2021 |archive-date=28 February 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210228211147/https://iep.utm.edu/lot-hypo/ |url-status=live }}</ref><ref name="Craig">{{cite book |last1=Craig |first1=Edward |title=Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy |date=1996 |publisher=Routledge |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/BEAREO |chapter= |access-date=2 April 2021 |archive-date=16 January 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210116111145/https://philpapers.org/rec/BEAREO |url-status=live }}</ref> Just like regular language, this involves simple elements that are combined in various ways according to syntactic rules to form more complex elements that act as bearers of meaning.<ref name="Schwitzgebel"/><ref name="Craig"/> On this conception, holding a belief would involve storing such a complex element in one's mind. Different beliefs are separated from each other in that they correspond to different elements stored in the mind. A more holistic alternative to the "language of thought hypothesis" is the ''map-conception'', which uses an analogy of maps to elucidate the nature of beliefs.<ref name="Schwitzgebel"/><ref name="Craig"/> According to this view, the belief system of a mind should be conceived of not as a set of many individual sentences but as a map encoding the information contained in these sentences.<ref name="Schwitzgebel"/><ref name="Craig"/> For example, the fact that Brussels is halfway between Paris and Amsterdam can be expressed both linguistically as a sentence and in a map through its internal geometrical relations.

=== Functionalism ===
[[Functionalism (philosophy of mind)|Functionalism]] contrasts with representationalism in that it defines beliefs not in terms of the internal constitution of the mind but in terms of the function or the causal role played by them.<ref name="Levin">{{cite web |last1=Levin |first1=Janet |title=Functionalism |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/functionalism/ |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=2 April 2021 |date=2018 |archive-date=18 April 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210418140903/http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/functionalism/ |url-status=live }}</ref><ref name="Polger">{{cite web |last1=Polger |first1=Thomas W. |title=Functionalism |url=https://iep.utm.edu/functism/ |website=Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy |access-date=2 April 2021 |archive-date=19 May 2019 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190519120233/https://www.iep.utm.edu/functism/ |url-status=live }}</ref> This view is often combined with the idea that the same belief can be realized in various ways and that it does not matter how it is realized as long as it plays the causal role characteristic to it.<ref name="Schwitzgebel"/><ref>{{cite web |last1=Bickle |first1=John |title=Multiple Realizability |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/multiple-realizability/ |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=2 April 2021 |date=2020 |archive-date=16 March 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210316094454/https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/multiple-realizability/ |url-status=live }}</ref> As an analogy, a [[hard drive]] is defined in a functionalist manner: it performs the function of storing and retrieving digital data. This function can be realized in many different ways: being made of plastic or steel, or using magnetism or laser.<ref name="Schwitzgebel"/> Functionalists hold that something similar is true for beliefs (or mental states in general).<ref name="Levin"/><ref name="Polger"/> Among the roles relevant to beliefs is their relation to perceptions and to actions: perceptions usually cause beliefs and beliefs cause actions.<ref name="Schwitzgebel"/> For example, seeing that a traffic light has switched to red is usually associated with a belief that the light is red, which in turn causes the driver to bring the car to a halt. Functionalists use such characteristics to define beliefs: whatever is caused by perceptions in a certain way and also causes behavior in a certain way is called a belief. This is not just true for humans but may include animals, hypothetical aliens or even computers.<ref name="Schwitzgebel"/><ref name="Levin"/> From this perspective, it would make sense to ascribe the belief that a traffic light is red to a [[self-driving car]] behaving just like a human driver.

Dispositionalism is sometimes seen as a specific form of functionalism.<ref name="Schwitzgebel"/> It defines beliefs only concerning their role as causes of behavior or as [[dispositions]] to behave in a certain way.<ref name="Quilty-Dunn">{{cite journal |last1=Quilty-Dunn |first1=Jake |last2=Mandelbaum |first2=Eric |title=Against dispositionalism: belief in cognitive science |journal=Philosophical Studies |date=1 September 2018 |volume=175 |issue=9 |pages=2353–2372 |doi=10.1007/s11098-017-0962-x |language=en |issn=1573-0883 |doi-access=free }}</ref><ref name="Audi">{{cite book |last1=Audi |first1=Robert |title=The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy |publisher=Cambridge University Press |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/AUDTCD-2 |chapter=Belief |year=1999 |access-date=2 April 2021 |archive-date=14 April 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210414132344/https://philpapers.org/rec/AUDTCD-2 |url-status=live }}</ref> For example, a belief that there is a pie in the pantry is associated with the disposition to affirm this when asked and to go to the pantry when hungry.<ref name="Borchert"/> While it is uncontroversial that beliefs shape our behavior, the thesis that beliefs can be defined exclusively through their role in producing behavior has been contested.<ref name="Schwitzgebel"/><ref name="Quilty-Dunn"/> The problem arises because the mechanisms shaping our behavior seem to be too complex to single out the general contribution of one particular belief for any possible situation.<ref name="Borchert"/> For example, one may decide not to affirm that there is a pie in the pantry when asked because one wants to keep it secret. Or one might not eat the pie despite being hungry, because one also believes that it is poisoned.<ref name="Borchert"/> Due to this complexity, we are unable to define even a belief as simple as this one in terms of the behavioral dispositions for which it could be responsible.<ref name="Schwitzgebel"/>

=== Interpretationism ===
According to interpretationism, the beliefs of an entity are in some sense dependent on, or relative to, someone's interpretation of this entity.<ref name="Schwitzgebel"/><ref name="Child1"/> [[Daniel Dennett]] is an important defender of such a position. He holds that we ascribe beliefs to entities in order to predict how they will behave. Entities with simple behavioral patterns can be described using physical laws or in terms of their function. Dennett refers to these forms of explanation as the "physical stance" and the "design stance". These stances are contrasted with the [[intentional stance]], which is applied to entities with a more complex behavior by ascribing beliefs and desires to these entities.<ref>{{cite book |last1=Dennett |first1=Daniel |title=The Intentional Stance |date=1989 |publisher=The MIT Press |isbn=978-0262040938 |url= https://mitpress.mit.edu/books/intentional-stance |language=en |access-date=2 April 2021 |archive-date=15 April 2021 |archive-url= https://web.archive.org/web/20210415044716/https://mitpress.mit.edu/books/intentional-stance |url-status= live }}</ref><ref>{{cite journal |last1= Dennett |first1= Daniel C. |title=Précis of ''The Intentional Stance'' |journal=Behavioral and Brain Sciences |date=1988 |volume=11 |issue=3 |pages=495–505 |doi= 10.1017/S0140525X00058611 |doi-broken-date= 1 November 2024 |citeseerx=10.1.1.1026.2283 |s2cid=145750868}}</ref> For example, we can predict that a chess player will move her queen to f7 if we ascribe to her the desire to win the game and the belief that this move will achieve that. The same procedure can also be applied to predicting how a chess computer will behave. The entity has the belief in question if this belief can be used to predict its behavior.<ref name="Schwitzgebel"/> Having a belief is relative to an interpretation since there may be different equally good ways of ascribing beliefs to predict behavior.<ref name="Schwitzgebel"/> So there may be another interpretation that predicts the move of the queen to f7 that does not involve the belief that this move will win the game. Another version of interpretationism is due to [[Donald Davidson (philosopher)|Donald Davidson]],<ref name="Child1"/> who uses the thought experiment of [[radical interpretation]], in which the goal is to make sense of the behavior and language of another person from scratch without any knowledge of this person's language.<ref name="Schwitzgebel"/> This process involves ascribing beliefs and desires to the speaker. The speaker really has these beliefs if this project can be successful in principle.<ref name="Schwitzgebel"/>

Interpretationism can be combined with eliminativism and instrumentalism about beliefs. Eliminativists hold that, strictly speaking, there are no beliefs. Instrumentalists agree with eliminativists but add that belief-ascriptions are useful nonetheless.<ref name="Schwitzgebel"/> This usefulness can be explained in terms of interpretationism: belief-ascriptions help us in predicting how entities will behave. It has been argued that interpretationism can also be understood in a more realistic sense: that entities really have the beliefs ascribed to them and that these beliefs participate in the causal network.<ref name="Child4">{{cite book |last1=Child |first1=William |title=Causality, Interpretation, and the Mind |publisher=Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press |url= https://philpapers.org/rec/CHICIA |chapter=4. Causalism and Interpretationism: The Problem of Compatibility |year= 1994 |access-date= 2 April 2021 |archive-date= 5 May 2016 |archive-url= https://web.archive.org/web/20160505023634/http://philpapers.org/rec/CHICIA |url-status=live }}</ref> But, for this to be possible, it may be necessary to define interpretationism as a methodology and not as an [[ontological]] outlook on beliefs.<ref name="Child1">{{cite book |last1=Child |first1=William |title=Causality, Interpretation, and the Mind |publisher=Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press |url= https://philpapers.org/rec/CHICIA |chapter= 1. Interpretationism |year= 1994 |access-date=2 April 2021 |archive-date=5 May 2016 |archive-url= https://web.archive.org/web/20160505023634/http://philpapers.org/rec/CHICIA |url-status=live }}</ref>

=== Origins ===
Biologist [[Lewis Wolpert]] discusses the importance of [[causality|causal]] beliefs and associates the making and use of [[tool]]s with the origin of human beliefs.<ref>
{{cite book
 |last1                = Wolpert
 |first1               = Lewis
 |author-link1         = Lewis Wolpert
 |date                 = 3 February 2011
 |orig-date            = 2006
 |chapter              = Belief
 |title                = Six Impossible Things Before Breakfast: The Evolutionary Origins of Belief
 |url                  = https://books.google.com/books?id=Zu-Z0ttQj3oC
 |publication-place    = London
 |publisher            = Faber & Faber
 |edition              = reprint
 |isbn                 = 9780571266722
 |access-date          = 22 December 2023
 |quote                = Causal beliefs are a fundamental characteristic of humans; animals, by contrast, [...] have very few causal beliefs. Beliefs come from a wide variety of sources that include the individual's experiences, the influence of authority, and the interpretation of events. At their core, beliefs establish a cause-and-effect relationship between events [...] From an evolutionary point of view, beliefs should help the individual survive, and I will argue that they had their origin in tool making and use.
}} 
</ref>

=== Historical ===
In the context of [[Ancient Greek philosophy|Ancient Greek thought]], three related concepts were identified regarding the concept of belief: ''[[Pistis#Pistis in rhetoric|pistis]]{{Broken anchor|date=2024-09-28|bot=User:Cewbot/log/20201008/configuration|target_link=Pistis#Pistis in rhetoric|reason= The anchor (Pistis in rhetoric) [[Special:Diff/894307820|has been deleted]].}},'' ''[[doxa]],'' and ''[[dogma]].'' Simplified, ''Pistis'' refers to "[[Trust (social science)|trust]]" and "confidence," ''doxa'' refers to "[[opinion]]" and "acceptance," and ''dogma'' refers to the [[Philosophical theory|positions]] of a philosopher or of a [[Philosophical movement|philosophical school]] such as [[Stoicism]].