Editing Battlecruiser (section)

==Background==
The battlecruiser was developed by the [[Royal Navy]] in the first years of the 20th century as an evolution of the [[armoured cruiser]].<ref>Sondhaus, p. 199; Roberts, p. 13</ref> The first armoured cruisers had been built in the 1870s, as an attempt to give armour protection to ships fulfilling the typical [[cruiser]] roles of patrol, trade protection and power projection. However, the results were rarely satisfactory, as the weight of armour required for any meaningful protection usually meant that the ship became almost as slow as a battleship. As a result, navies preferred to build [[protected cruiser]]s with an armoured deck protecting their engines, or simply no armour at all.

In the 1890s, new [[Krupp armour|Krupp steel]] armour meant that it was now possible to give a cruiser side armour which would protect it against the [[Quick firing guns|quick-firing guns]] of enemy battleships and cruisers alike.<ref>Sumida, p. 19</ref> In 1896–97 France and Russia, who were regarded as likely allies in the event of war, started to build large, fast armoured cruisers taking advantage of this. In the event of a war between Britain and France or Russia, or both, these cruisers threatened to cause serious difficulties for the [[British Empire]]'s worldwide trade.<ref>Breyer, p. 47</ref>

Britain, which had concluded in 1892 that it needed twice as many cruisers as any potential enemy to adequately protect its empire's sea lanes, responded to the perceived threat by laying down its own large armoured cruisers. Between 1899 and 1905, it completed or laid down seven [[ship class|classes]] of this type, a total of 35 ships.<ref>Lambert 2002, pp. 20–22; Osborne, pp. 61–62</ref> This building program, in turn, prompted the French and Russians to increase their own construction. The [[Imperial German Navy]] began to build large armoured cruisers for use on their overseas stations, laying down eight between 1897 and 1906.<ref>Gardiner & Gray, p. 142; Osborne, pp. 62, 74</ref> In the period 1889–1896, the Royal Navy spent £7.3&nbsp;million on new large cruisers. From 1897 to 1904, it spent £26.9&nbsp;million.<ref>Sumida, p. 351, Table 9. Figures are for First-Class Cruisers and exclude armament.</ref> Many armoured cruisers of the new kind were just as large and expensive as the equivalent battleship.

[[File:HMS Shannon (1906).jpg|thumb|{{HMS|Shannon|1906|6}}, a ''Minotaur''-class armoured cruiser]]

The increasing size and power of the armoured cruiser led to suggestions in British naval circles that cruisers should displace battleships entirely. The battleship's main advantage was its 12-inch heavy guns, and heavier armour designed to protect from shells of similar size. However, for a few years after 1900 it seemed that those advantages were of little practical value. The [[torpedo]] now had a range of 2,000 yards, and it seemed unlikely that a battleship would engage within torpedo range. However, at ranges of more than 2,000 yards it became increasingly unlikely that the heavy guns of a battleship would score any hits, as the heavy guns relied on primitive aiming techniques. The secondary batteries of 6-inch quick-firing guns, firing more plentiful shells, were more likely to hit the enemy.<ref>Sumida, pp. 42–44</ref> As naval expert [[Fred T. Jane]] wrote in June 1902,<blockquote>Is there anything outside of 2,000 yards that the big gun in its hundreds of tons of medieval castle can affect, that its weight in 6-inch guns without the castle could not affect equally well? And inside 2,000, what, in these days of gyros, is there that the torpedo cannot effect with far more certainty?<ref>Quoted in Sumida, p. 44</ref></blockquote>

In 1904, Admiral [[John Fisher, 1st Baron Fisher|John "Jacky" Fisher]] became [[First Sea Lord]], the senior officer of the Royal Navy. He had for some time thought about the development of a new fast armoured ship. He was very fond of the "second-class battleship" {{HMS|Renown|1895|2}}, a faster, more lightly armoured battleship.<ref>Roberts, p. 15; Mackay, pp. 212–13</ref> As early as 1901, there is confusion in Fisher's writing about whether he saw the battleship or the cruiser as the model for future developments. This did not stop him from commissioning designs from [[naval architect]] W. H. Gard for an armoured cruiser with the heaviest possible armament for use with the fleet. The design Gard submitted was for a ship between {{convert|14000|-|15000|LT|t}}, capable of {{convert|25|kn|lk=in}}, armed with four 9.2-inch and twelve {{convert|7.5|in|mm|adj=on}} guns in twin [[gun turret]]s and protected with six inches of armour along her [[belt armour|belt]] and 9.2-inch turrets, {{convert|4|in|mm|0}} on her 7.5-inch turrets, 10 inches on her [[conning tower]] and up to {{convert|2.5|in|mm|0}} on her decks. However, mainstream British naval thinking between 1902 and 1904 was clearly in favour of heavily armoured battleships, rather than the fast ships that Fisher favoured.<ref>Breyer, p. 48</ref>

The Battle of Tsushima proved the effectiveness of heavy guns over intermediate ones and the need for a uniform main caliber on a ship for fire control. Even before this, the Royal Navy had begun to consider a shift away from the mixed-calibre armament of the 1890s [[pre-dreadnought]] to an "all-big-gun" design, and preliminary designs circulated for battleships with all 12-inch or all 10-inch guns and armoured cruisers with all 9.2-inch guns.<ref>Roberts, pp. 16–17</ref> In late 1904, not long after the Royal Navy had decided to use 12-inch guns for its next generation of battleships because of their superior performance at long range, Fisher began to argue that big-gun cruisers could replace battleships altogether. The continuing improvement of the torpedo meant that [[submarine]]s and [[destroyer]]s would be able to destroy battleships; this in Fisher's view heralded the end of the battleship or at least compromised the validity of heavy armour protection. Nevertheless, armoured cruisers would remain vital for commerce protection.<ref>Mackay, pp. 324–25; Roberts, pp. 17–18; Sumida, p. 52</ref>

{{Blockquote|Of what use is a battle fleet to a country called (A) at war with a country called (B) possessing no battleships, but having fast armoured cruisers and clouds of fast torpedo craft? What damage would (A's) battleships do to (B)? Would (B) wish for a few battleships or for more armoured cruisers? Would not (A) willingly exchange a few battleships for more fast armoured cruisers? In such a case, neither side wanting battleships is presumptive evidence that they are not of much value.|Fisher to [[William Palmer, 2nd Earl of Selborne|Lord Selborne]] ([[First Lord of the Admiralty]]), 20 October 1904<ref>quoted in Sumida, p. 52</ref>}}

Fisher's views were very controversial within the Royal Navy, and even given his position as First Sea Lord, he was not in a position to insist on his own approach. Thus he assembled a "Committee on Designs", consisting of a mixture of civilian and naval experts, to determine the approach to both battleship and armoured cruiser construction in the future. While the stated purpose of the committee was to investigate and report on future requirements of ships, Fisher and his associates had already made key decisions.<ref name=R19>Roberts, p. 19</ref> The terms of reference for the committee were for a battleship capable of {{convert|21|kn}} with 12-inch guns and no intermediate calibres, capable of docking in existing [[drydock]]s;<ref name="Breyer">Breyer, p. 115</ref> and a cruiser capable of {{convert|25.5|kn}}, also with 12-inch guns and no intermediate armament, armoured like {{HMS|Minotaur|1906|2}}, the most recent armoured cruiser, and also capable of using existing docks.<ref name=R19/>