Editing Battle of the Nile (section)

==Background==
[[Napoleon Bonaparte]]'s [[Italian campaigns of the French Revolutionary Wars|victories in northern Italy]] over the [[Austrian Empire]] helped secure victory for the French in the [[War of the First Coalition]] in 1797, and Great Britain remained the only major European power still at war with the [[French First Republic|French Republic]].<ref name="SM224">[[#Reference-Maffeo|Maffeo, p. 224]]</ref> The [[French Directory]] investigated a number of strategic options to counter British opposition, including projected invasions of Ireland and Britain and the expansion of the [[French Navy]] to challenge the [[Royal Navy]] at sea.<ref name="WJ113">[[#Reference-James|James, p. 113]]</ref> Despite significant efforts, British control of [[Northern Europe]]an waters rendered these ambitions impractical in the short term,<ref name="PP116">[[#Reference-Padfield|Padfield, p. 116]]</ref> and the Royal Navy remained firmly in control of the [[Atlantic Ocean]]. However, the French navy was dominant in the Mediterranean, following the withdrawal of the British fleet after the outbreak of war between Britain and Spain in 1796.<ref name="JK36">[[#Reference-Keegan|Keegan, p. 36]]</ref> This allowed Bonaparte to propose an [[Napoleonic Campaign in Egypt|invasion of Egypt]] as an alternative to confronting Britain directly, believing that the British would be too distracted by an imminent [[Irish Rebellion of 1798|Irish uprising]] to intervene in the Mediterranean.<ref name="JHR141">[[#Reference-Rose|Rose, p. 141]]</ref>

Bonaparte believed that, by establishing a permanent presence in [[Egypt Eyalet|Egypt]] (nominally part of the neutral [[Ottoman Empire]]), the French would obtain a staging point for future operations against [[British India]], possibly by means of an alliance with the [[Tipu Sultan]] of [[Seringapatam]], that might successfully drive the British out of the war.<ref name="RLA7">[[#Reference-Adkins|Adkins, p. 7]]</ref> The campaign would sever the chain of communication that connected Britain with India, an essential part of the [[British Empire]] whose trade generated the wealth that Britain required to prosecute the war successfully.<ref name="SM230">[[#Reference-Maffeo|Maffeo, p. 230]]</ref> The French Directory agreed with Bonaparte's plans, although a major factor in their decision was a desire to see the politically ambitious Bonaparte and the fiercely loyal veterans of his Italian campaigns travel as far from France as possible.<ref name="NR457">[[#Reference-Rodger|Rodger, p. 457]]</ref> During the spring of 1798, Bonaparte assembled more than 35,000 soldiers in Mediterranean France and Italy and developed a powerful fleet at [[Toulon]]. He also formed the ''[[Commission des Sciences et des Arts]]'', a body of scientists and engineers intended to establish a French colony in Egypt.<ref name="JC17">[[#Reference-Cole|Cole, p. 17]]</ref> Napoleon kept the destination of the expedition top secret—most of the army's officers did not know of its target, and Bonaparte did not publicly reveal his goal until the first stage of the expedition was complete.<ref name="JC11">[[#Reference-Cole|Cole, p. 11]]</ref>

===Mediterranean campaign===
{{further|Mediterranean campaign of 1798}}

[[File:HoratioNelson1.jpg|thumb|upright|''Rear-Admiral Sir Horatio Nelson'', [[Lemuel Francis Abbott]], 1800, [[National Maritime Museum]]. Visible on his cocked hat is the [[aigrette]] presented by the Ottoman Sultan as a reward for the victory at the Nile|alt=Portrait of a man in an ornate naval uniform festooned with medals and awards.]]

Bonaparte's armada sailed from Toulon on 19 May, making rapid progress through the [[Ligurian Sea]] and collecting more ships at [[Genoa]], before sailing southwards along the [[Sardinia]]n coast and passing [[Sicily]] on 7 June.<ref name="WLC353">[[#Reference-Clowes|Clowes, p. 353]]</ref> On 9 June, the fleet arrived off [[Malta]], then under the ownership of the [[Knights of St. John of Jerusalem]], ruled by [[List of Grand Masters of the Knights Hospitaller|Grand Master]] [[Ferdinand von Hompesch zu Bolheim]].<ref name="JC8">[[#Reference-Cole|Cole, p. 8]]</ref> Bonaparte demanded that his fleet be permitted entry to the fortified harbour of [[Valletta]]. When the Knights refused, the French general responded by ordering a [[French invasion of Malta|large scale invasion of the Maltese Islands]], overrunning the defenders after 24 hours of skirmishing.<ref name="RG21">[[#Reference-Gardiner|Gardiner, p. 21]]</ref> The Knights formally surrendered on 12 June and, in exchange for substantial financial compensation, handed the islands and all of their resources over to Bonaparte, including the extensive property of the [[Roman Catholic Church]] on Malta.<ref name="WJ151">[[#Reference-James|James, p. 151]]</ref> Within a week, Bonaparte had resupplied his ships, and on 19 June, his fleet departed for [[Alexandria]] in the direction of [[Crete]], leaving 4,000 men at Valletta under General [[Claude-Henri Belgrand de Vaubois|Claude-Henri Vaubois]] to ensure French control of the islands.<ref name="RLA13">[[#Reference-Adkins|Adkins, p. 13]]</ref>

While Bonaparte was sailing to Malta, the Royal Navy re-entered the Mediterranean for the first time in more than a year. Alarmed by reports of French preparations on the Mediterranean coast, [[George Spencer, 2nd Earl Spencer|Lord Spencer]] at the [[British Admiralty|Admiralty]] sent a message to Vice-Admiral [[John Jervis, 1st Earl of St Vincent|Earl St. Vincent]], commander of the Mediterranean Fleet based in the [[Tagus]], to despatch a squadron to investigate.<ref name="SM233">[[#Reference-Maffeo|Maffeo, p. 233]]</ref> This squadron, consisting of three [[Ship of the line|ships of the line]] and three [[frigates]], was entrusted to Rear-Admiral Sir Horatio Nelson.

Nelson was a highly experienced officer who had been blinded in one eye during [[Invasion of Corsica (1794)|fighting in Corsica in 1794]] and subsequently commended for his capture of two Spanish [[ships of the line]] at the [[Battle of Cape St. Vincent (1797)|Battle of Cape St. Vincent]] in February 1797. In July 1797, he lost an arm at the [[Battle of Santa Cruz de Tenerife (1797)|Battle of Santa Cruz de Tenerife]] and had been forced to return to Britain to recuperate.<ref name="PP109">[[#Reference-Padfield|Padfield, p. 109]]</ref> Returning to the fleet at the Tagus in late April 1798, he was ordered to collect the squadron stationed at [[Gibraltar]] and sail for the Ligurian Sea.<ref name="WJ148">[[#Reference-James|James, p. 148]]</ref> On 21 May, as Nelson's squadron approached Toulon, it was struck by a fierce gale and Nelson's flagship, {{HMS|Vanguard|1787|6}}, lost its topmasts and was almost wrecked on the Corsican coast.<ref name="JK44">[[#Reference-Keegan|Keegan, p. 44]]</ref> The remainder of the squadron was scattered. The ships of the line sheltered at [[San Pietro Island]] off Sardinia; the frigates were blown to the west and failed to return.<ref name="RLA9">[[#Reference-Adkins|Adkins, p. 9]]</ref>

On 7 June, following hasty repairs to his flagship, a fleet consisting of ten ships of the line and a [[fourth-rate]] joined Nelson off Toulon. The fleet, under the command of Captain [[Sir Thomas Troubridge, 1st Baronet|Thomas Troubridge]], had been sent by Earl St. Vincent to reinforce Nelson, with orders that he was to pursue and intercept the Toulon convoy.<ref name="SM241">[[#Reference-Maffeo|Maffeo, p. 241]]</ref> Although he now had enough ships to challenge the French fleet, Nelson suffered two great disadvantages: He had no intelligence regarding the destination of the French, and no frigates to scout ahead of his force.<ref name="WLC354">[[#Reference-Clowes|Clowes, p. 354]]</ref> Striking southwards in the hope of collecting information about French movements, Nelson's ships stopped at [[Elba]] and [[Naples]], where the British ambassador, [[William Hamilton (diplomat)|Sir William Hamilton]], reported that the French fleet had passed Sicily headed  in the direction of Malta.<ref name="RG29">[[#Reference-Gardiner|Gardiner, p. 29]]</ref> Despite pleas from Nelson and Hamilton, [[Ferdinand I of the Two Sicilies|King Ferdinand of Naples]] refused to lend his frigates to the British fleet, fearing French reprisals.<ref name="EB176">[[#Reference-Bradford|Bradford, p. 176]]</ref> On 22 June, a brig sailing from [[Dubrovnik|Ragusa]] brought Nelson the news that the French had sailed eastwards from Malta on 16 June.<ref name="NM254">[[#Reference-Mostert|Mostert, p. 254]]</ref> After conferring with his captains, the admiral decided that the French target must be Egypt and set off in pursuit.<ref name="JK55">[[#Reference-Keegan|Keegan, p. 55]]</ref> Incorrectly believing the French to be five days ahead rather than two, Nelson insisted on a direct route to Alexandria without deviation.<ref name="NR459">[[#Reference-Rodger|Rodger, p. 459]]</ref>

On the evening of 22 June, Nelson's fleet passed the French in the darkness, overtaking the slow invasion convoy without realising how close they were to their target.<ref name="SM258">[[#Reference-Maffeo|Maffeo, p. 258]]</ref> Making rapid time on a direct route, Nelson reached Alexandria on 28 June and discovered that the French were not there.<ref name="WJ154">[[#Reference-James|James, p. 154]]</ref> After a meeting with the suspicious Ottoman commander, Sayyid Muhammad Kurayyim, Nelson ordered the British fleet northwards, reaching the coast of [[Anatolia]] on 4 July and turning westwards back towards Sicily.<ref name="JK59">[[#Reference-Keegan|Keegan, p. 59]]</ref> Nelson had missed the French by less than a day—the scouts of the French fleet arrived off Alexandria in the evening of 29 June.<ref name="RG26">[[#Reference-Gardiner|Gardiner, p. 26]]</ref>

Concerned by his near encounter with Nelson, Bonaparte ordered an immediate invasion, his troops coming ashore in a poorly managed [[amphibious operation]] in which at least 20 drowned.<ref name="RLA17">[[#Reference-Adkins|Adkins, p. 17]]</ref> Marching along the coast, the French army stormed Alexandria and captured the city,<ref name="JC22">[[#Reference-Cole|Cole, p. 22]]</ref> after which Bonaparte led the main force of his army inland.<ref name="WLC356">[[#Reference-Clowes|Clowes, p. 356]]</ref> He instructed his naval commander, Vice-Admiral [[François-Paul Brueys D'Aigalliers]], to anchor in Alexandria harbour, but naval surveyors reported that the channel into the harbour was too shallow and narrow for the larger ships of the French fleet.<ref name="RLA21">[[#Reference-Adkins|Adkins, p. 21]]</ref> As a result, the French selected an alternative anchorage at [[Aboukir Bay]], {{convert|20|mi|km}} northeast of Alexandria.<ref name="NM257">[[#Reference-Mostert|Mostert, p. 257]]</ref>

Nelson's fleet reached [[Syracuse, Sicily|Syracuse]] in Sicily on 19 July and took on essential supplies.<ref name="WJ155">[[#Reference-James|James, p. 155]]</ref> There the admiral wrote letters describing the events of the previous months: "It is an old saying, 'the Devil's children have the Devil's luck.' I cannot find, or at this moment learn, beyond vague conjecture where the French fleet are gone to. All my ill fortune, hitherto, has proceeded from want of frigates."<ref name="RLA19">[[#Reference-Adkins|Adkins, p. 19]]</ref> Meanwhile, the French were securing Egypt by the [[Battle of the Pyramids]]. By 24 July, the British fleet was resupplied and, having determined that the French must be somewhere in the Eastern Mediterranean, Nelson sailed again in the direction of the [[Morea]].<ref name="SM265">[[#Reference-Maffeo|Maffeo, p. 265]]</ref>  On 28 July, at [[Koroni|Coron]], Nelson finally obtained intelligence describing the French attack on Egypt and turned south across the Mediterranean. His scouts, {{HMS|Alexander|1778|6}} and {{HMS|Swiftsure|1787|6}}, sighted the French transport fleet at Alexandria on the afternoon of 1 August.<ref name="WLC355">[[#Reference-Clowes|Clowes, p. 355]]</ref>

===Aboukir Bay===
When [[Alexandria harbour]] had proved inadequate for his fleet, Brueys had gathered his captains and discussed their options. Bonaparte had ordered the fleet to anchor in Aboukir Bay, a shallow and exposed anchorage, but had supplemented the orders with the suggestion that, if Aboukir Bay was too dangerous, Brueys could sail north to [[Corfu]], leaving only the transports and a handful of lighter warships at Alexandria.<ref name="JHR142">[[#Reference-Rose|Rose, p. 142]]</ref> Brueys refused, in the belief that his squadron could provide essential support to the French army on shore, and called his captains aboard his 120-gun flagship {{ship|French ship|Orient|1791|2}} to discuss their response should Nelson discover the fleet in its anchorage. Despite vocal opposition from [[Contre-amiral]] [[Armand Blanquet]],<ref name="EB199">[[#Reference-Bradford|Bradford, p. 199]]</ref>  who insisted that the fleet would be best able to respond in open water, the rest of the captains agreed that anchoring in a [[line of battle]] inside the bay presented the strongest tactic for confronting Nelson.<ref name="WJ159">[[#Reference-James|James, p. 159]]</ref> It is possible that Bonaparte envisaged Aboukir Bay as a temporary anchorage: on 27 July, he expressed the expectation that Brueys had already transferred his ships to Alexandria, and three days later, he issued orders for the fleet to make for Corfu in preparation for naval operations against the Ottoman territories in the Balkans,<ref name="JHR143">[[#Reference-Rose|Rose, p. 143]]</ref> although [[Bedouin]] [[Irregular military|partisans]]<ref name="EB192">[[#Reference-Bradford|Bradford, p. 192]]</ref> intercepted and killed the courier carrying the instructions.
[[File:François-Paul Brueys d'Aigalliers.jpg|thumb|upright|left|François-Paul Brueys d'Aigalliers<br />artist unknown, [[Palace of Versailles]]|alt=A man in an ornate naval uniform with long grey hair stands on a ship's quarterdeck.]]
Aboukir Bay is a coastal indentation {{convert|16|nmi|km}} across, stretching from the village of [[Abu Qir]] in the west to the town of [[Rosetta]] to the east, where one of the mouths of the [[River Nile]] empties into the Mediterranean.<ref name="SM268">[[#Reference-Maffeo|Maffeo, p.&nbsp;268–269]]</ref> In 1798, the bay was protected at its western end by extensive rocky [[shoal]]s which ran {{convert|3|mi|km}} into the bay from a [[promontory]] guarded by Aboukir Castle. A small fort situated on [[Nelson's Island|an island]] among the rocks protected the shoals.<ref name="WLC357">[[#Reference-Clowes|Clowes, p. 357]]</ref> The fort was garrisoned by French soldiers and armed with at least four cannon and two heavy [[mortar (weapon)|mortars]].<ref name="WJ160">[[#Reference-James|James, p. 160]]</ref> Brueys had augmented the fort with his [[bomb vessel]]s and [[gunboat]]s, anchored among the rocks to the west of the island in a position to give support to the head of the French line. Further shoals ran unevenly to the south of the island and extended across the bay in a rough semicircle approximately {{convert|1650|yd|m}} from the shore.<ref name="WLC358">[[#Reference-Clowes|Clowes, p. 358]]</ref> These shoals were too shallow to permit the passage of larger warships, and so Brueys ordered his thirteen ships of the line to form up in a line of battle following the northeastern edge of the shoals to the south of the island, a position that allowed the ships to disembark supplies from their port sides while covering the landings with their starboard batteries.<ref name="RG31">[[#Reference-Gardiner|Gardiner, p. 31]]</ref> Orders were issued for each ship to attach strong cables to the bow and stern of their neighbours, which would effectively turn the line into a long battery forming a theoretically impregnable barrier.<ref name="OW66">[[#Reference-Warner|Warner, p. 66]]</ref> Brueys positioned a second, inner line of four frigates approximately {{convert|350|yd|m}} west of the main line, roughly halfway between the line and the shoal. The van of the French line was led by {{ship|French ship|Guerrier|1754|2}}, positioned {{convert|2400|yd|m}} southeast of Aboukir Island and about {{convert|1000|yd|m}} from the edge of the shoals that surrounded the island.<ref name="WJ160"/> The line stretched southeast, with the centre bowed seawards away from the shoal. The French ships were spaced at intervals of {{convert|160|yd|m}} and the whole line was {{convert|2850|yd|m}} long,<ref name="WLC359">[[#Reference-Clowes|Clowes, p. 359]]</ref> with the flagship ''Orient'' at the centre and two large 80-gun ships anchored on either side.<ref name="NM260">[[#Reference-Mostert|Mostert, p. 260]]</ref> The rear division of the line was under the command of Contre-amiral [[Pierre-Charles Villeneuve]] in {{ship|French ship|Guillaume Tell|1795|2}}.<ref name="WJ160"/>

In deploying his ships in this way, Brueys hoped that the British would be forced by the shoals to attack his strong centre and rear, allowing his van to use the prevailing northeasterly wind to counterattack the British once they were engaged.<ref name="PP120">[[#Reference-Padfield|Padfield, p. 120]]</ref> However, he had made a serious misjudgement: he had left enough room between ''Guerrier'' and the shoals for an enemy ship to cut across the head of the French line and proceed between the shoals and the French ships, allowing the unsupported vanguard to be caught in a crossfire by two divisions of enemy ships.<ref name="RLA24"/>  Compounding this error, the French only prepared their ships for battle on their starboard (seaward) sides, from which they expected the attack would have to come; their landward port sides were unprepared.<ref>George A. Henty, ''At Aboukir and Acre: A Story of Napoleon's Invasion of Egypt'', Fireship Press, 2008, p. 295.</ref>
The port side gun ports were closed, and the decks on that side were uncleared, with various stored items blocking access to the guns.<ref>R.G. Grant, ''Battle at Sea: 3,000 Years of Naval Warfare'', DK Publications, 2011, p. 180.</ref>  Brueys' dispositions had a second significant flaw: The 160-yard gaps between ships were large enough for a British ship to push through and break the French line.<ref name="RG13">[[#Reference-Gardiner|Gardiner, p. 13]]</ref> Furthermore, not all of the French captains had followed Brueys' orders to attach cables to their neighbours' bow and stern, which would have prevented such a manoeuvre.<ref name="JK63">[[#Reference-Keegan|Keegan, p. 63]]</ref> The problem was exacerbated by orders to only anchor at the bow, which allowed the ships to swing with the wind and widened the gaps. It also created areas within the French line not covered by the broadside of any ship. British vessels could anchor in those spaces and engage the French without reply. In addition, the deployment of Brueys' fleet prevented the rear from effectively supporting the van due to the prevailing winds.<ref name="WLC372">[[#Reference-Clowes|Clowes, p. 372]]</ref>

A more pressing problem for Brueys was a lack of food and water for the fleet: Bonaparte had unloaded almost all of the provisions carried aboard and no supplies were reaching the ships from the shore. To remedy this, Brueys sent foraging parties of 25 men from each ship along the coast to requisition food, dig wells, and collect water.<ref name="OW66"/> Constant attacks by Bedouin partisans, however, required escorts of heavily armed guards for each party. Hence, up to a third of the fleet's sailors were away from their ships at any one time.<ref name="NM261">[[#Reference-Mostert|Mostert, p. 261]]</ref> Brueys wrote a letter describing the situation to [[List of Naval Ministers of France|Minister of Marine]] [[Étienne Eustache Bruix]], reporting that "Our crews are weak, both in number and quality. Our rigging, in general, out of repair, and I am sure it requires no little courage to undertake the management of a fleet furnished with such tools."<ref name="RLA22">[[#Reference-Adkins|Adkins, p. 22]]</ref>