Editing Battle of the Bulge (section)

==Background==
After the [[Operation Cobra|breakout from Normandy]] at the end of July 1944 and the [[Allies of World War II|Allied]] [[Operation Dragoon|landings in southern France]] on 15 August 1944, the Allies advanced towards Germany more quickly than anticipated. The speed of the advance of the Allies caused several [[military logistics]] issues:
* Troops were fatigued by weeks of continuous combat and rapid movement
* Supply lines were stretched extremely thin
* Supplies were dangerously depleted.

By December 1944, [[General (United States)|General]] [[Dwight D. Eisenhower]] (the [[Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force|Supreme Allied Commander]] on the [[Western Front (World War II)|Western Front]]) and his staff decided to hold the [[Ardennes]] region primarily as a rest area for the [[U.S. First Army]], with limited Allied operational objectives in the area.

The Allies defended the Ardennes line very thinly, due to the favorable defensive terrain (a densely wooded highland with deep river valleys and a rather thin road network) and because they had intelligence that the [[Wehrmacht]] was using the area across the German border as a rest-and-refit area for its own troops.{{sfn|Fabianich|1947|p=3}}

===Allied supply issues===
The Allies faced major supply issues, due to the rate of their advance coupled with the initial lack of deep-water ports.{{sfn|Shirer|1990|pp=1088–1089}} Over-the-beach supply operations using the Normandy landing areas, and [[Landing Ship, Tank|direct landing ships]] on the beaches, were unable to meet operational needs. The only deep-water port the Allies had captured was [[Cherbourg-Octeville|Cherbourg]] on the northern shore of the [[Cotentin Peninsula|Cotentin peninsula]] and west of the original invasion beaches,{{sfn|Shirer|1990|pp=1088–1089}} but the Germans had thoroughly wrecked and mined the harbor before it could be taken. It took many months to rebuild its cargo-handling capability. The Allies captured the [[port of Antwerp]] intact in the first days of September, but it was not operational until 28 November. The estuary of the [[Schelde]] river that controlled access to the port had to be cleared of both German troops and [[naval mine]]s.{{sfn|Shirer|1990|p=1086}} These limitations led to differences between General Eisenhower and [[Field marshal (United Kingdom)|Field Marshal]] [[Bernard Montgomery]], commander of the Anglo-Canadian [[21st Army Group]], over whether Montgomery or [[Lieutenant general (United States)|Lieutenant General]] [[Omar Bradley]], commanding the [[Twelfth United States Army Group|U.S. 12th Army Group]], in the south would get priority access to supplies.{{sfn|Ryan|1995|p=68}} German forces [[Channel Ports#World War II|remained in control]] of several major ports on the [[English Channel]] coast into the autumn, while [[Siege of Dunkirk (1944–45)|Dunkirk remained under siege]] until the end of the war in May 1945.<ref>{{Cite web |title=A Brief History of the U.S. Army in World War II |url=https://history.army.mil/brochures/brief/overview.htm |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20071217070622/http://www.history.army.mil/brochures/brief/overview.htm |url-status=dead |archive-date=17 December 2007 |access-date=2022-10-21 |website=history.army.mil}}</ref>

The Allies' efforts to [[Transport Plan|destroy the French railway system]] prior to [[D-Day]] were successful. This destruction hampered the German response to the invasion, but it proved equally hampering to the Allies, as it took time to repair the rail network's tracks and bridges. A trucking system nicknamed the [[Red Ball Express]] brought supplies to front-line troops, but used up five times as much fuel to reach the front line near the Belgian border. By early October, the Allies had suspended major offensives to improve their supply lines and supply availability at the front.{{sfn|Shirer|1990|pp=1088–1089}}

Montgomery and Bradley both pressed for priority delivery of supplies to their respective armies so they could continue their individual lines of advance and maintain pressure on the Germans, while Eisenhower preferred a broad-front strategy. He gave some priority to Montgomery's northern forces. This had the short-term goal of opening the urgently needed port of Antwerp and the long-term goal of capturing the [[Ruhr|Ruhr area]], the biggest industrial area of Germany.{{sfn|Shirer|1990|pp=1088–1089}} With the Allies stalled, German {{lang|de|[[Generalfeldmarschall]]}} ('Field Marshal') [[Gerd von Rundstedt]] was able to reorganize the disrupted German armies into a coherent defensive force.{{sfn|Shirer|1990|pp=1088–1089}}

Field Marshal Montgomery's [[Operation Market Garden]] had achieved only some of its objectives, while its territorial gains left the Allied supply situation stretched further than before. In October, the [[First Canadian Army]] fought the [[Battle of the Scheldt]], opening the port of Antwerp to shipping. As a result, by the end of October, the supply situation had eased somewhat.{{citation needed|date=September 2020}}

===German plans===
Despite a lull along the front after the Scheldt battles, the German situation remained dire. While operations continued in the autumn, notably the [[Lorraine Campaign]], the [[Battle of Aachen]] and [[Battle of Hürtgen Forest|fighting in the Hürtgen Forest]], the strategic situation in the west had changed little. The Allies were [[Operation Queen|slowly pushing towards Germany]], but no decisive breakthrough was achieved. There were 96 Allied divisions at or near the front, with an estimated ten more divisions on the way from the United Kingdom. Additional Allied airborne units remained in England. The Germans could field a total of 55 understrength divisions.{{sfn|Cole|1964|p=1}}

[[Adolf Hitler]] first outlined his planned counter-offensive to his generals on 16 September 1944. The goal was to pierce the thinly held lines of the U.S. First Army between Monschau and Wasserbillig with {{lang|de|Generalfeldmarschall}} [[Walter Model]]'s [[Army Group B]] by the end of the first day, get the armor through the Ardennes by the end of the second day, reach the [[Meuse]] between [[Liège]] and Dinant by the third day, and seize Antwerp and the western bank of the Scheldt estuary by the fourth day.{{sfn|Cole|1964|pp=1–64}}{{sfn|von Luttichau|2000|pp=456–458}}

Hitler initially promised his generals a total of 18 infantry and 12 armored or mechanized divisions "for planning purposes."{{citation needed|date=November 2022}} The plan was to pull 13 infantry divisions, two parachute divisions and six armored divisions from the {{lang|de|[[Oberkommando der Wehrmacht]]}} strategic reserve.{{citation needed|date=November 2022}}

On the [[Eastern Front (World War II)|Eastern Front]], the Soviets' [[Operation Bagration]] during the summer had destroyed much of Germany's [[Army Group Center]] ({{lang|de|Heeresgruppe Mitte}}). By November, it was clear that Soviet forces were preparing for a winter offensive.{{sfn|Shirer|1990|p=1085}}

Meanwhile, the Allied air offensive of early 1944 had effectively grounded the [[Luftwaffe]], leaving the German Army with little battlefield intelligence and no way to interdict Allied supplies. The converse was equally damaging; daytime movement of German forces was rapidly noticed, and interdiction of supplies combined with the bombing of the [[Petrochemical industry in Romania|Romanian oil fields]] starved Germany of oil and gasoline. This fuel shortage intensified after the Soviets overran those fields in the course of their August 1944 [[Second Jassy–Kishinev Offensive|Jassy-Kishinev Offensive]].

One of the few advantages held by the German forces in November 1944 was that they were no longer defending all of Western Europe. Their front lines in the west had been considerably shortened by the Allied offensive and were much closer to the German heartland. This drastically reduced their supply problems despite Allied control of the air. Additionally, their extensive telephone and telegraph network meant that radios were no longer necessary for communications, which lessened the effectiveness of Allied [[Ultra (cryptography)|Ultra]] intercepts. Nevertheless, some 40–50 messages per day were decrypted by Ultra. They recorded the quadrupling of German fighter forces, and a term used in an intercepted Luftwaffe message ({{lang|de|Jägeraufmarsch}}, literally, 'Fighter Deployment') implied preparation for an offensive operation. Ultra also picked up communiqués regarding extensive rail and road movements in the region, as well as orders that movements should be made on time.{{sfn|Parker|1994|pp=122–123}}

===Drafting the offensive===
Hitler felt that his mobile reserves allowed him to mount one major offensive. Although he realized nothing significant could be accomplished in the Eastern Front, he still believed an offensive against the Western Allies, whom he considered militarily inferior to the Red Army, would have some chances of success.{{sfn|Weinberg|1964}} Hitler believed he could split the Allied forces and compel the Americans and British to settle for a separate peace, independent of the Soviet Union.{{sfn|Shirer|1990|p=1091}} Success in the west would give the Germans time to design and produce more advanced weapons (such as [[jet aircraft]], new [[U-boat]] designs and [[super-heavy tank]]s) and permit the concentration of forces in the east. After the war ended, this assessment was generally viewed as unrealistic, given Allied air superiority throughout Europe and their ability to continually disrupt German offensive operations.{{sfn|Shirer|1990|p=1092}}

Hitler's plan called for a [[Blitzkrieg]] attack through the weakly defended Ardennes, mirroring the successful German offensive there during the [[Battle of France]] in 1940, and aimed at splitting the armies along the U.S.-British lines and capturing Antwerp.{{sfn|Cole|1964|p=17}} The plan banked on unfavorable weather, including heavy fog and low-lying clouds, which would minimize the Allied air advantage.{{sfn|Shirer|1990|p=1090}} Hitler originally set the offensive for late November, before the anticipated start of the [[Vistula–Oder offensive|Russian winter offensive]]. The disputes between Montgomery and Bradley were well known, and Hitler hoped he could exploit this disunity. If the attack were to succeed in capturing Antwerp, four complete armies would be trapped without supplies behind German lines.{{sfn|Cole|1964|p=19}}

Several senior German military officers, including {{lang|de|Generalfeldmarschalls}} Model and von Rundstedt, expressed concern as to whether the goals of the offensive could be realized. Model and von Rundstedt both believed aiming for Antwerp was too ambitious, given Germany's scarce resources in late 1944. At the same time, they felt that maintaining a purely defensive posture (as had been the case since Normandy) would only delay defeat, not avert it. They thus developed alternative, less ambitious plans that did not aim to cross the [[Meuse River]] (in German and Dutch: Maas); Model's being {{lang|de|[[Operation Herbstnebel (Northwest Europe)|Unternehmen Herbstnebel]]}} ('Operation Autumn Mist') and von Rundstedt's {{lang|de|[[Fall Martin]]}} ('Plan Martin'). The two field marshals combined their plans to present a joint "small solution" to Hitler.{{efn|The Ardennes offensive was also named Rundstedt-Offensive, but von Rundstedt strongly objected "to the fact that this stupid operation in the Ardennes is sometimes called the 'Rundstedt-Offensive'. This is a complete misnomer. I had nothing to do with it. It came to me as an order complete to the last detail. Hitler had even written on the plan in his own handwriting 'not to be altered'".{{sfn|Jablonsky|1994|p=194}}}}{{efn|{{lang|de|Wacht am Rhein}} was renamed {{lang|de|Herbstnebel}} after the operation was given the go-ahead in early December, although its original name remains much better known.<ref>{{harvnb|Elstob|2003|p=33}}; {{harvnb|Mitcham|2006|p=38}}; {{harvnb|Newton|2006|pp=329–334}}; {{harvnb|Parker|1991|pp=95–100}}.</ref>}} When they offered their alternative plans, Hitler would not listen. Rundstedt later testified that while he recognized the merit of Hitler's operational plan, he saw from the very first that "all, absolutely all conditions for the possible success of such an offensive were lacking."{{sfn|Cole|1964|p=24}}

Model, commander of German Army Group B ({{lang|de|Heeresgruppe B}}), and von Rundstedt, overall commander of the German [[OB West|Army Command in the West]] ({{lang|de|OB West}}), were put in charge of carrying out the operation.

The positions of the Allied armies stretched from southern France all the way north to the Netherlands. German planning for the counteroffensive rested on the premise that a successful strike against thinly manned stretches of the line would halt Allied advances on the entire Western Front.{{sfn|Whitlock|2010}}

===Operation names===
The Wehrmacht's code name for the offensive was {{lang|de|Unternehmen Wacht am Rhein}} ('Operation Watch on the Rhine'), after the German patriotic hymn {{lang|de|[[Die Wacht am Rhein]]}}, a name that deceptively implied the Germans would be adopting a defensive posture along the Western Front. The Germans also referred to it as {{lang|de|Ardennenoffensive}} ('Ardennes Offensive') and Rundstedt-Offensive, both names being generally used nowadays in modern Germany.{{citation needed|date=March 2020}} The French (and Belgian) name for the operation is {{lang|fr|Bataille des Ardennes}}, 'Battle of the Ardennes'. The battle was militarily defined by the Allies as the Ardennes Counteroffensive, which included the German drive and the American effort to contain and later defeat it. The phrase 'Battle of the Bulge' was coined by contemporary press to describe the way the Allied front line bulged inward on wartime news maps.{{sfn|Cirillo|1995|p=4}}{{sfn|Stanton|2006|}}

While the Ardennes Counteroffensive is the correct term in Allied military language, the official Ardennes-Alsace campaign reached beyond the Ardennes battle region, and the most popular description in English speaking countries remains simply 'Battle of the Bulge'.

===Planning===
{{Main|Wehrmacht forces for the Ardennes Offensive}}
{{See also|Battle of the Bulge order of battle}}
{{Wikisource|The Ardennes: Battle of the Bulge/Chapter II|Planning the Counteroffensive}}
{{Wikisource|The Ardennes: Battle of the Bulge/Chapter III|Troops and Terrain}}
{{Wikisource|The Ardennes: Battle of the Bulge/Chapter IV|Preparations}}
{{blockquote|quote= There is a popular impression that the chief trouble in the Ardennes is the lack of good roads. As anyone on the ground will agree, the Ardennes has a fairly good road system. It is not the lack of roads as much as the lack of almost anything else on which to move that matters.|source=Theodore Draper{{sfn|Draper|1946|p=84|loc=Chapter VI}} }}

The OKW decided by mid-September, at Hitler's insistence, that the offensive would be mounted in the Ardennes, as was done in 1940. In 1940 German forces had passed through the Ardennes in three days before engaging the enemy, but the 1944 plan called for battle in the forest itself. The main forces were to advance westward to the Meuse River, then turn northwest for Antwerp and [[Brussels]]. The close terrain of the Ardennes would make rapid movement difficult, though open ground beyond the Meuse offered the prospect of a successful dash to the coast.

Four armies were selected for the operation. Adolf Hitler personally selected for the counter-offensive on the northern shoulder of the western front the best troops available and officers he trusted. The lead role in the attack was given to the [[6th Panzer Army]], commanded by SS {{lang|de|Oberstgruppenführer}} [[Sepp Dietrich]]. It included the most experienced formation of the [[Waffen-SS]]: the [[1st SS Panzer Division Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler]]. It also contained the [[12th SS Panzer Division Hitlerjugend]]. They were given priority for supply and equipment and assigned the shortest route to the primary objective of the offensive, Antwerp,{{sfn|Cole|1964|pp=1–64}} starting from the northernmost point on the intended battlefront, nearest the important road network hub of [[Monschau]].{{sfn|Cole|1964|p=86}}

The [[5th Panzer Army|Fifth Panzer Army]] under General [[Hasso von Manteuffel]] was assigned to the middle sector with the objective of capturing Brussels. The [[7th Army (Wehrmacht)|Seventh Army]], under General [[Erich Brandenberger]], was assigned to the southernmost sector, near the Luxembourgish city of [[Echternach]], with the task of protecting the flank. This Army was made up of only four infantry divisions, with no large-scale armored formations to use as a spearhead unit. As a result, they made little progress throughout the battle.

[[File:German Wacht Am Rhein Offensive Plan.png|thumb|upright=1.6|left|The German plan]]

In an indirect, secondary role, the [[15th Army (Wehrmacht)|Fifteenth Army]], under General [[Gustav-Adolf von Zangen]], recently brought back up to strength and re-equipped after heavy fighting during Operation Market Garden, was located just north of the Ardennes battlefield and tasked with holding U.S. forces in place, with the possibility of launching its own attack given favorable conditions.

For the offensive to be successful, four criteria were deemed critical: the attack had to be a complete surprise; the weather conditions had to be poor to neutralize Allied [[air superiority]] and the damage it could inflict on the German offensive and its supply lines;{{sfn|Parker|1994|p=118}} the progress had to be rapid—the Meuse River, halfway to Antwerp, had to be reached by day 4; and Allied fuel supplies would have to be captured intact along the way because the combined Wehrmacht forces were short on fuel. The General Staff estimated they only had enough fuel to cover one third to one half of the ground to Antwerp in heavy combat conditions.

The plan originally called for just under 45 divisions, including a dozen [[panzer division|panzer]] and {{lang|de|[[Panzergrenadier]]}} divisions forming the [[armored spearhead]] and various infantry units to form a defensive line as the battle unfolded. By this time the German Army suffered from an acute manpower shortage, and the force had been reduced to around 30 divisions. Although it retained most of its armor, there were not enough infantry units because of the defensive needs in the East. These 30 newly rebuilt divisions used some of the last reserves of the German Army. Among them were {{lang|de|[[Volksgrenadier]]}} ('People's Grenadier') units formed from a mix of battle-hardened veterans and recruits formerly regarded as too young, too old or too frail to fight. Training time, equipment and supplies were inadequate during the preparations. German fuel supplies were precarious—those materials and supplies that could not be directly transported by rail had to be horse-drawn to conserve fuel, and the mechanized and panzer divisions would depend heavily on captured fuel. As a result, the start of the offensive was delayed from 27 November until 16 December.{{citation needed | date = August 2010}}

Before the offensive the Allies were virtually blind to German troop movement. During the [[liberation of France]], the extensive network of the [[French Resistance]] had provided valuable intelligence about German dispositions. Once they reached the German border, this source dried up. In France, orders had been relayed within the German army using radio messages enciphered by the [[Enigma machine]], and these could be picked up and decrypted by Allied code-breakers headquartered at [[Bletchley Park]], to give the intelligence known as Ultra. In Germany such orders were typically transmitted using telephone and [[teleprinter]], and a special [[radio silence]] order was imposed on all matters concerning the upcoming offensive.{{sfn|MacDonald|1984|p=40}} The major crackdown in the Wehrmacht after the [[20 July plot]] to assassinate Hitler resulted in much tighter security and fewer leaks. The foggy autumn weather also prevented Allied reconnaissance aircraft from correctly assessing the ground situation. German units assembling in the area were even issued charcoal instead of wood for cooking fires to cut down on smoke and reduce chances of Allied observers deducing a troop buildup was underway.{{sfn|Cole|1964|p=21}}

For these reasons Allied High Command considered the Ardennes a quiet sector, relying on assessments from their intelligence services that the Germans were unable to launch any major offensive operations this late in the war. What little intelligence they had led the Allies to believe precisely what the Germans wanted them to believe-–that preparations were being carried out only for defensive, not offensive, operations. The Allies relied too much on Ultra, not human reconnaissance. In fact, because of the Germans' efforts, the Allies were led to believe that a new defensive army was being formed around [[Düsseldorf]] in the northern Rhineland, possibly to defend against British attack. This was done by increasing the number of [[flak]] ({{lang|de|Flugabwehrkanonen}}, i.e., anti-aircraft cannons) in the area and the artificial multiplication of radio transmissions in the area. All of this meant that the attack, when it came, completely surprised the Allied forces. Remarkably, the U.S. First Army intelligence chief, U.S. Third Army intelligence chief Colonel [[Oscar Koch]], and SHAEF intelligence officer Brigadier General [[Kenneth Strong]] all correctly predicted the German offensive capability and intention to strike the U.S. VIII Corps area. These predictions were largely dismissed by the U.S. 12th Army Group.{{sfn|Dougherty|2002}} Strong had informed [[Walter Bedell Smith|Bedell Smith]] in December of his suspicions. Bedell Smith sent Strong to warn Lieutenant General Omar Bradley, the commander of the 12th Army Group, of the danger. Bradley's response was succinct: "Let them come."{{sfn|Pogue|1954|pp=362–366}} Historian Patrick K. O'Donnell writes that on 8 December 1944 U.S. Rangers at great cost took Hill 400 during the Battle of the Hürtgen Forest. The next day GIs who relieved the Rangers reported a considerable movement of German troops inside the Ardennes in the enemy's rear, but that no one in the chain of command connected the dots.{{sfn|O'Donnell|2012}}{{page needed|date=July 2021}}

Because the Ardennes was considered a quiet sector, considerations of [[economy of force]] led it to be used as a training ground for new units and a rest area for units that had seen hard fighting. The U.S. units deployed in the Ardennes thus were a mixture of inexperienced troops (such as the [[99th Infantry Division (United States)|99th]] and [[106th Infantry Division (United States)|106th "Golden Lions" Divisions]]), and battle-hardened troops sent to that sector to recuperate (the [[28th Infantry Division (United States)|28th Infantry Division]]).

Two major [[special operations]] were planned for the offensive. By October it was decided that [[Otto Skorzeny]], the German SS-commando who [[Gran Sasso raid|had rescued]] the former Italian dictator [[Benito Mussolini]], was to lead a task force of English-speaking German soldiers in [[Operation Greif]]. These soldiers were to be dressed in American and British uniforms and wear [[dog tag (identifier)|dog tags]] taken from corpses and prisoners of war. Their job was to go behind American lines and change signposts, misdirect traffic, generally cause disruption and seize bridges across the Meuse River. By late November another ambitious special operation was added: Col. [[Friedrich August von der Heydte]] was to lead a {{lang|de|[[Fallschirmjäger (Nazi Germany)|Fallschirmjäger]]-[[Kampfgruppe]]}} (paratrooper combat group) in [[Operation Stösser]], a night-time paratroop drop behind the Allied lines aimed at capturing a vital road junction near [[Malmedy]].{{sfn|MacDonald|1984|pp=86–89}}{{sfn|Toland|1999|pp=16, 19}}

German intelligence had set 20 December as the expected date for the start of the [[Vistula–Oder Offensive|upcoming Soviet offensive]], aimed at crushing what was left of German resistance on the Eastern Front and thereby opening the way to Berlin. It was hoped that Soviet leader [[Joseph Stalin|Stalin]] would delay the start of the operation once the German assault in the Ardennes had begun and wait for the outcome before continuing.

After the [[20 July Plot|20 July 1944 attempt to assassinate Hitler]], and the close advance of the Red Army which would seize the site on 27 January 1945, Hitler and his staff had been forced to abandon the {{lang|de|[[Wolfsschanze]]}} headquarters in [[East Prussia]], in which they had coordinated much of the fighting on the Eastern Front. After a brief visit to Berlin, Hitler traveled on his {{lang|de|[[Führersonderzug]]}} ('Special Train of the Führer') to [[Giessen]] on 11 December, taking up residence in the [[Adlerhorst]] (eyrie) command complex, co-located with OB West's base at Kransberg Castle. Believing in omens and the successes of his early war campaigns that had been planned at Kransberg, Hitler had chosen the site from which he had overseen the successful 1940 campaign against France and the Low Countries.

Von Rundstedt set up his operational headquarters near [[Limburg an der Lahn|Limburg]], close enough for the generals and Panzer Corps commanders who were to lead the attack to visit Adlerhorst on 11 December, traveling there in an SS-operated bus convoy. With the castle acting as overflow accommodation, the main party was settled into the Adlerhorst's Haus 2 command bunker, including Gen. [[Alfred Jodl]], Gen. [[Wilhelm Keitel]], Gen. [[Günther Blumentritt|Blumentritt]], von Manteuffel and Dietrich.

In a personal conversation on 13 December between Walter Model and [[Friedrich August Freiherr von der Heydte|Friedrich von der Heydte]], who was put in charge of Operation Stösser, von der Heydte gave Operation Stösser less than a 10% chance of succeeding. Model told him it was necessary to make the attempt: "It must be done because this offensive is the last chance to conclude the war favorably."{{sfn|Parker|2004|p=132}}