Editing Battle of Waterloo (section)

==Prelude==
{{main|Waterloo Campaign}}
[[File:Strategic Situation of Western Europe 1815.jpg|thumb|left|upright=1.35|The strategic situation in Western Europe in 1815: 250,000 Frenchmen faced about 850,000 allied soldiers on four fronts. In addition, Napoleon was forced to leave 20,000 men in Western France to reduce a royalist insurrection.]]
{{Napoleon series}}
[[File:Sir Arthur Wellesley, 1st Duke of Wellington.jpg|thumb|upright|[[Arthur Wellesley, 1st Duke of Wellington]], commander of the Anglo-allied army, who had gained notable successes against the French in the [[Peninsular War]]]]
[[File:Blücher (nach Gebauer).jpg|thumb|upright|[[Gebhard Leberecht von Blücher]] commanded the Prussian army, one of the Coalition armies that defeated Napoleon at the [[Battle of Leipzig]]]]

On 13 March 1815, six days before [[Napoleon|Napoleon I]] reached [[Paris]], the powers at the [[Congress of Vienna]] [[s:Declaration at the Congress of Vienna|declared him an outlaw]].{{sfn|''Brown University Library''}} Four days later, the [[United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland|United Kingdom]], [[Russian Empire|Russia]], [[Austrian Empire|Austria]], and [[Kingdom of Prussia|Prussia]] mobilised armies to defeat Napoleon.{{sfn|Hamilton-Williams|1993|p=59}} Critically outnumbered, Napoleon knew that once his attempts at dissuading one or more members of the [[Seventh Coalition]] from invading France had failed, his only chance of remaining in power was to attack before the coalition mobilised.{{sfn|Chandler|1966|pp=1016, 1017, 1093}}

Had Napoleon succeeded in destroying the existing coalition forces south of Brussels before they were reinforced, he might have been able to drive the British back to the sea and knock the Prussians out of the war. Crucially, this would have bought him time to recruit and train more men before turning his armies against the Austrians and Russians.{{sfn|Siborne|1895|pp=320–323}}<ref>{{cite web |title=The campaign of 1815: a study – A fundamental choice: a defensive or offensive war |url=https://www.waterloo-campaign.nl/bestanden/files/preambles/plannen.nap.pdf |archive-url=https://ghostarchive.org/archive/20221009/https://www.waterloo-campaign.nl/bestanden/files/preambles/plannen.nap.pdf |archive-date=9 October 2022 |url-status=live |publisher=Waterloo Campaign NL |access-date=8 April 2020}}</ref>

An additional consideration for Napoleon was that a French victory might cause French-speaking sympathisers in [[Provisional Government of Belgium (1814–1815)|Belgium]] to launch a friendly revolution. Also, coalition troops in Belgium were largely second line, as many units were of dubious quality and loyalty.{{sfn|Chandler|1966|pp=1016, 1017}}{{sfn|Cornwell|2015|p=16}}

The initial dispositions of Wellington, the British commander, were intended to counter the threat of Napoleon enveloping the Coalition armies by moving through [[Mons, Belgium|Mons]] to the south-west of Brussels.{{sfn|Siborne<!--W-->|1895|p=82}} This would have pushed Wellington closer to the Prussian forces, led by [[Gebhard Leberecht von Blücher]], but might have cut Wellington's communications with his base at [[Ostend]]. In order to delay Wellington's deployment, Napoleon spread false intelligence which suggested that Wellington's supply chain from the channel ports would be cut.{{sfn|Hofschröer|2005|pp=136–160}}

By June, Napoleon had raised a total army strength of about 300,000 men. The force at his disposal at Waterloo was less than one third that size, but the rank and file were mostly loyal and experienced soldiers.{{sfn|Herold|1967|pp=53, 58, 110}} Napoleon divided his army into a left wing commanded by [[Michel Ney|Marshal Ney]], a right wing commanded by [[Emmanuel, marquis de Grouchy|Marshal Grouchy]] and a reserve under his command (although all three elements remained close enough to support one another). Crossing the frontier near [[Charleroi]] before dawn on 15 June, the French [[Waterloo Campaign: Start of hostilities (15 June)|rapidly overran Coalition outposts]], securing Napoleon's "central position" between Wellington's and Blücher's armies. He hoped this would prevent them from combining, and he would be able to destroy first the Prussian army, then Wellington's.<ref>{{cite web |title=Battle of Waterloo – Opening moves |url=https://www.nam.ac.uk/explore/battle-waterloo |publisher=National Army Museum |access-date=17 April 2020 |archive-date=4 April 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200404113305/https://www.nam.ac.uk/explore/battle-waterloo |url-status=live }}</ref><ref name="Simner">{{cite book |last=Mark Simner |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=aQAnCgAAQBAJ |title=An Illustrated Introduction to the Battle of Waterloo – Quatre Bras and Ligny |year=2015 |publisher=Amberley Publishing Limited |isbn=978-1-4456-4667-1}}</ref><ref name="Hussey2017" /><ref>{{cite book |title=The Road to Waterloo: a concise history of the 1815 campaign |url=https://www.academia.edu/35009953 |last=Alasdair White |publisher=Academia |access-date=19 April 2020 |archive-date=22 August 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210822203454/https://www.academia.edu/35009953 |url-status=live }}</ref>

Only very late on the night of 15 June was Wellington certain that the Charleroi attack was the main French thrust. In the early hours of 16 June, at the [[Duchess of Richmond's ball]] in Brussels, he received a dispatch from the [[William II of the Netherlands|Prince of Orange]] and was shocked by the speed of Napoleon's advance. He hastily ordered his army to concentrate on [[Quatre Bras]], where the Prince of Orange, with the brigade of Prince [[Bernhard Carl of Saxe-Weimar-Eisenach|Bernhard of Saxe-Weimar]], was holding a tenuous position against the soldiers of Ney's left wing. Prince Bernhard and General [[Hendrik George de Perponcher Sedlnitsky|Perponcher]] were by all accounts better informed of the French advance than other allied officials and their later initiatives to hold the crossroads proved vital for the outcome. General [[Jean Victor de Constant Rebecque|Constant de Rebeque]], commander of one of the Dutch divisions, disobeyed Wellington's orders to march to his previous chosen concentration area around Nivelles, and decided to hold the crossroads and send urgent messages to the prince and Perponcher. This fact shows how little Wellington believed in a fast French advance towards Brussels. He did not believe in recent intelligence given to him by General Dörnberg, one of his intelligence officials warning him of numerous French outposts south of Charleroi as well as some reports sent by the intelligence of the Prussian 1st corps. Had these two generals obeyed his orders, Quatre-Bras in all probability would have fallen to the French giving them time to support Napoleon's attack on the Prussians in the Sombreffe area via the fast, cobbled road, and the history of the campaign would have been significantly different.<ref>Clayton, Tim. Waterloo(2014)e-book edition. Pags 137-140 </ref>{{sfn|Longford|1971|p=508}}

Ney's orders were to secure the crossroads of Quatre Bras so that he could later swing east and reinforce Napoleon if necessary. Ney found the crossroads lightly held by the Prince of Orange, who repelled Ney's initial attacks but was gradually driven back by overwhelming numbers of French troops in the [[Battle of Quatre Bras]]. First reinforcements, and then Wellington arrived. He took command and drove Ney back, securing the crossroads by early evening, too late to send help to the Prussians, who had already been defeated.<ref>{{Cite web |title=The Battle of Quatre Bras (June 16th 1815) |url=http://waterloobattletours.users.btopenworld.com/page14.html |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20061125023608/http://waterloobattletours.users.btopenworld.com/page14.html |url-status=dead |archive-date=25 November 2006 |publisher=Archive Org |access-date=17 April 2020}}</ref><ref name="Simner" /><ref name="Perr2013">{{Cite book |last=Bryan Perrett |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=b8o7BAAAQBAJ&pg=PA51 |title=Why the Germans Lost: The Rise and Fall of the Black Eagle |year=2013 |publisher=Pen and Sword |isbn=978-1-78159-197-0 |pages=51–}}</ref>

Meanwhile, on 16 June, Napoleon attacked and defeated Blücher at the [[Battle of Ligny]], using part of the reserve and the right wing of his army. The Prussian centre gave way under heavy French assaults, but the flanks held their ground. [[Waterloo Campaign: Ligny through Wavre to Waterloo|The Prussian retreat from Ligny]] went uninterrupted and seemingly unnoticed by the French. The bulk of their rearguard units held their positions until about midnight, and some elements did not move out until the following morning, ignored by the French.{{sfn|Chesney|1874|p=144}}<ref>{{Cite journal |title=Becke's Waterloo Logistics |url=https://www.academia.edu/36063281 |last=Stephen Summerfield |journal=Ken Trotman Publishing |date=January 2018 |publisher=Academia |access-date=17 April 2020 |archive-date=22 August 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210822203456/https://www.academia.edu/36063281 |url-status=live }}</ref>

Crucially, the Prussians did not retreat to the east, along their own lines of communication. Instead, they, too, fell back northwards parallel to Wellington's line of march, still within supporting distance and in communication with him throughout. The Prussians rallied on [[Friedrich Wilhelm Freiherr von Bülow|Bülow]]'s IV Corps, which had not been engaged at Ligny and was in a strong position south of [[Wavre]].{{sfn|Chesney|1874|pp=144–145}}

With the Prussian retreat from Ligny, Wellington's position at Quatre Bras was untenable. The next day he withdrew northwards, to a defensive position that he had reconnoitred the previous year—the low [[ridge]] of Mont-Saint-Jean, south of the village of [[Waterloo, Belgium|Waterloo]] and the [[Sonian Forest]].{{sfn|Longford|1971|p=527}}

Napoleon, with the reserves, made a late start on 17 June and joined Ney at Quatre Bras at 13:00 to attack Wellington's army but found the position empty. The French pursued Wellington's retreating army to Waterloo; however, due to bad weather, mud and the head start that Napoleon's tardy advance had allowed Wellington, there was no substantial engagement, apart from a cavalry [[action at Genappe]].<ref>{{cite web |title=Waterloo – A damned near-run thing. The nearest run thing you ever saw in your life. |url=https://www.history.co.uk/history-of-the-battle-of-waterloo/waterloo |publisher=AETN UK |access-date=8 April 2020 |archive-date=24 September 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200924221219/https://www.history.co.uk/history-of-the-battle-of-waterloo/waterloo |url-status=live }}</ref><ref name="Mikaberidze2020">{{cite book |last=Mikaberidze |first=Alexander |title=The Napoleonic Wars: A Global History |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=DSvJDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA858 |publisher=[[Oxford University Press]] |year=2020 |pages=608– |isbn=978-0-19-939406-7}}</ref>

Before leaving Ligny, Napoleon had ordered Grouchy, who commanded the right wing, to follow the retreating Prussians with 33,000 men. A late start, uncertainty about the direction the Prussians had taken, and the vagueness of the orders given to him meant that Grouchy was too late to prevent the Prussian army reaching Wavre, from where it could march to support Wellington. More importantly, the heavily outnumbered Prussian rearguard was able to use the River Dyle to fight a savage and prolonged action to delay Grouchy. Napoleon would get this information from Grouchy on the early morning of 18 June at a nearby farmhouse, La Caillou, where he was staying for the night; he responded to the message in mid-day.<ref name="Waloo">{{cite book |last=Battle of Waterloo |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=l2oUAAAAQAAJ |title=The battle of Waterloo, containing the series of accounts published by authority, British and foreign pp.=45 |year=1815}}</ref>{{sfn|Hofschröer|2005|p=64}}<ref name="Mikaberidze2020" />{{sfn|Cornwell|2015|p=122}}

As 17 June drew to a close, Wellington's army had arrived at its position at Waterloo, with the main body of Napoleon's army in pursuit. Blücher's army was gathering in and around Wavre, around {{convert|8|mi}} to the east of the town. Early the next morning, Wellington received an assurance from Blücher that the Prussian army would support him. He decided to hold his ground and give battle.<ref name="Watl1815">{{cite book |last=Battle of Waterloo |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=SDwIAAAAQAAJ&pg=PR6 |title=A short detail of the battle of Waterloo |year=1815 |page=13}}</ref><ref name="Mikaberidze2020" />