Editing Battle of Wagram (section)

== Prelude ==
=== Context ===
[[File:Strategic Situation of Europe 1809.jpg|thumb|right|250px|The strategic situation in Europe in 1809]]
In 1809, the [[First French Empire]] held a dominant position on the European continent. Resounding victories during the 1805 to 1807 wars against the [[War of the Third Coalition|Third]] and [[War of the Fourth Coalition|Fourth]] coalitions had ensured almost undisputed continental hegemony, to such an extent that no other European power could challenge the might of Napoleon's empire. However, despite having defeated [[Austrian Empire|Austria]], forced [[Russian Empire|Russia]] into an uneasy alliance and reduced [[Prussia]] to the rank of a second-rate power, Napoleon did not manage to force the [[United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland|United Kingdom]] to make peace. With the British in complete control of the seas, Napoleon thus opted for an [[Economic warfare|economic war]], imposing the [[Continental System]] against the British Isles, in a bid to dry up vital British commercial relations with the continent. To ensure the effectiveness of the Continental System, he sought to force [[Kingdom of Portugal|Portugal]], a traditional British trading partner, to observe it; when diplomatic means failed in 1808, Napoleon had the country occupied, forcing the ruling dynasty of [[House of Braganza|Braganza]] to flee the country and seek refuge in its main colony, [[Brazil]]. In a move that would prove to be both uninspired and ill-handled, Napoleon also overstepped his power and decided to change the ruling dynasty of [[Kingdom of Spain|Spain]], replacing King [[Charles IV of Spain|Charles IV]] with his own brother, [[Joseph Bonaparte|Joseph]], who became King José I of Spain. The new king was, however, not well received by the population and much of the country's ruling elite who felt that Napoleon was imposing on them, which triggered a bloody [[guerrilla warfare|guerrilla war]] throughout the country.{{sfn|Castle|1990|p=7}}{{sfn|Rothenberg|1995|p=39–61}} The French position in the peninsula was rendered untenable after the [[Battle of Bailen]], a rare and resounding defeat for the French forces and an event that greatly encouraged the Austrian war party.{{sfn|Chandler|1998|p=663}} With Napoleon forced to intervene personally and commit increasingly significant forces to the Spanish, the French military position in central Europe was severely weakened. In addition, Franco-Russian relations had deteriorated and, although the two countries remained allies on paper, it was unlikely that Russia would commit itself seriously to fighting France's enemies on the continent.{{sfn|Castle|1990|p=7}}

France's main adversary in central Europe was the Austrian Empire. Defeated at [[Battle of Ulm|Ulm]] and [[Battle of Austerlitz|Austerlitz]] in 1805 and forced to conclude the humiliating [[Peace of Pressburg (1805)|Peace of Pressburg]], Austria still possessed a formidable army which, in the years following Austerlitz, had undergone major reforms. By 1809, the state was almost bankrupt and acutely aware that it could not retain its status as a great power if it did not manage to regain some of its former influence in Germany and Italy. Encouraged by Napoleon's peninsular imbroglio, British subsidies and the promise of a military intervention in northern Europe, the Austrians decided that the European political context of 1808 and 1809 offered their best chance to retake lost provinces. In order to win the war against the French, Vienna was counting on massive nationalist, anti-French uprisings throughout Germany and hoping that an early success might convince Prussia to join the new coalition, while calculating that Russia would most likely not interfere in support of the French. Austrian military preparations were accelerated in 1808 and early 1809, with operations set to occur in several war theatres, including the main one in [[Kingdom of Bavaria|Bavaria]] and sideshows in Italy, [[Dalmatia]], [[Kingdom of Westphalia|Westphalia]], [[County of Tyrol|Tyrol]] and [[Duchy of Warsaw|Poland]].{{sfn|Castle|1990|p=7}}{{sfn|Rothenberg|1995|pp=61–66}} In stark contrast to 1805, by 1809 Austria had managed to reform its military and build a relatively modern and overall redoubtable army, placed in the hands of their best commander, [[Archduke Charles of Austria]], brother of Emperor [[Francis I of Austria]].{{sfn|Chandler|1998|pp=665-666}}

=== Opening campaign ===
By March 1809, war between Austria and France was imminent and the [[Habsburg dynasty|Habsburg]] army, 200,000 men strong, massed in the northwestern province of [[Kingdom of Bohemia|Bohemia]], near the frontier with the [[Confederation of the Rhine]], the French-dominated confederacy of German states. Austria hoped that Prussia would join the war and, by massing its main army in Bohemia, it signalled its intent to join up with the Prussians. However, by early April 1809, it became obvious that Prussia was not ready to commit, and the Austrians were forced to move their main army southwards, in a bid to launch their westward offensive along the [[Danube]]. Strategically, the decision was sound, since an offensive along the river valley allowed better protection for the Austrian capital. Nevertheless, the time-consuming manoeuvres to Bohemia and back cost the Austrians an entire month.{{sfn|Rothenberg|1995|pp=62–63}}<ref>Fierro, Palluel-Guillard, Tulard 131–137 and 586.</ref>
[[File:Eckmuhl April 15.jpg|thumb|250px|Opening moves: strategic situation on 15 April]]
On 9 April 1809, without any declaration of war, the main Austrian army crossed the [[Inn (river)|Inn River]] into [[Kingdom of Bavaria|Bavaria]], one of France's main allies, while secondary Austrian armies launched offensives of their own. Meanwhile, Napoleon was in Paris, conscious that the war was imminent but unaware that the Austrians were prepared for immediate offensive. Command of the French and allied army, styled ''[[Army of Germany (1809)|Armée d'Allemagne]]'', was in the hands of ''[[Marshal of the Empire|Maréchal]]'' [[Louis-Alexandre Berthier|Berthier]], a formidable officer when working as Napoleon's [[chief of staff]], but completely out of his depth as a commander by proxy.{{sfn|Rothenberg|1995|pp=65–82}}Furthermore, in order to remain in close contact with Paris by military telegraph and to avoid provoking the Austrians, Berthier was initially ordered to set up his headquarters near Strasbourg, hundreds of kilometres away from the front line, before moving to Germany as war broke out.{{sfn|Chandler|1998|p=670}} As a result, Berthier's response to Charles's invasion was timid and, after misinterpreting Napoleon's orders, he left two entire army corps in isolated positions. Consequently, during the first week of the campaign, Charles was able to advance virtually unmolested and take advantage of the poor French deployment. All changed from 17 April, when Napoleon arrived in person and began concentrating his available troops to meet the Austrian onslaught. Before Napoleon could concentrate his corps, Charles attacked [[Louis-Nicolas Davout|Davout]]'s isolated corps at [[Battle of Teugen-Hausen|Teugen-Hausen]] but the dogged French marshal repulsed the attackers. The tide of the campaign had turned but Napoleon misjudged the strategic situation, thinking that the force that had fought Davout was only a flank guard and that the main force lay before him; in reality it was the opposite. As the French took the offensive several actions ensued : [[Battle of Landshut (1809)|Landshut]], [[Battle of Abensberg|Abensberg]], [[Battle of Eckmühl|Eckmühl]] and [[Battle of Ratisbon|Ratisbon]], with the Austrians coming off worse each time and having their left wing cut off from the bulk of the army. In the end, however, Charles succeeded in avoiding a decisive defeat, preserving a combat-ready army which he directed north of the Danube, where he awaited Napoleon's next move.{{sfn|Rothenberg|1995|pp=65–82}}
[[File:Eckmuhl April 21.jpg|thumb|250px|Battles of Eckmühl and Ratisbon]]
Charles's retreat left Napoleon with two options: pursue the defeated Austrian army north of the Danube or occupy Vienna, which was now covered by a secondary enemy force and could not hope to hold out. Uncharacteristically, Napoleon, who had stated on a number of occasions that the purpose of any campaign is to destroy the main army of the enemy, opted for the latter course of action and entered the enemy capital on 12 May, only to find the city's strategic bridges over the Danube blown up. With the emperor poised for an immediate continuation of the offensive north of the river, this was a considerable setback. Meanwhile, Charles brought the bulk of his remaining force on the northern bank of the river, close to Vienna, which lured Napoleon into attacking them right away. Napoleon's rushed crossing of the river was made on fragile, hastily built pontoon bridges, over an increasingly swollen river. The French crossing resulted in the [[Battle of Aspern-Essling]], beginning on 21 May; the more numerous Austrian army faced only a fraction of the {{lang|fr|Grande Armée}}, as Napoleon was unable to bring through the bulk of his forces in time. Still, Charles's attempt to drive the outnumbered enemy back resulted in total failure, as the French led a skillful combined-arms defense, with their cavalry playing a vital role in keeping the Austrians at bay. Fighting resumed early on 22 May, when Napoleon began receiving some reinforcements and decided to attack. The French offensive was quite successful but Napoleon soon received alarming news that the main bridge had broken and consequently, no further reinforcements and ammunition could be brought from the southern bank, making a protracted battle impossible. This prompted the emperor to immediately stop his attack and order a phased retreat onto the large Danube island of Lobau. Given that the Austrians, with their superior numbers and overwhelming artillery firepower, were now intent upon seizing the opportunity to launch a counterattack of their own, retreat was most difficult. It took all the experience of the French commanders and the determination and self-sacrifice of the troops, including the [[Imperial Guard (Napoleon I)|Guard]], to fend off the ferocious Austrian onslaught but, by nightfall, the remains of the French forces were safely across the arm of the Danube, on the island of Lobau. Napoleon had suffered the first significant defeat of his career.{{sfn|Rothenberg|1995|pp=85–129}}{{sfn|Castle |1990|pp=29–55}}<ref>Fierro, Palluel-Guillard, Tulard 138–139 and 586.</ref>

=== Towards another battle ===
{{cquote|Should another battle be unavoidable, I will strike one more blow against the French, though you may rest assured that I shall risk nothing or as little as possible.|20|20|[[Archduke Charles, duke of Teschen|Archduke Charles]], writing to his uncle and mentor, [[Prince Albert of Saxony, Duke of Teschen|Prince Albert, Duke of Teschen]].{{sfn|Rothenberg|1995|p=152}}}}

[[File:Johann Peter Krafft 003.jpg|thumb|A triumphant [[Archduke Charles of Austria-Teschen]] led the Austrians to victory at the [[Battle of Aspern-Essling]].]]
The [[Battle of Aspern-Essling]] was costly for both sides. It resulted in some 53,000 casualties, almost equally divided between the two armies. For the [[Austrian Empire|Austrians]], Aspern-Essling was a costly victory. Crucially, it improved the overall morale of the troops as it proved that, despite their early string of defeats, the army could fight extremely well and win battles against formidable enemies. However, in the weeks following the battle, [[Archduke Charles of Austria-Teschen|Archduke Charles]] became increasingly skeptical about his chances of winning the war. His analysis of the battle revealed that he had been unable to capitalise on his numerical superiority and had thus failed to achieve more than a tactical victory.{{sfn|Rothenberg|1995|pp=127–129}}{{sfn|Castle|1990|pp=54–55}}{{ref label|Aspern-Essling|Note 1|1}} Also of great significance, despite Austrian attempts to trumpet their victory against Napoleon, its political consequences remained limited: there were no signs of a general uprising in [[Confederation of the Rhine|Germany]], [[Prussia]] was still unwilling to enter the war and the [[United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland|United Kingdom]] was not ready to launch its promised land expedition in northern Europe, while [[Russian Empire|Russia]], France's ally since 1807, was becoming increasingly aggressive against the Austrian forces in [[Galicia (Eastern Europe)|Galicia]]. Thus, Charles's skepticism stemmed from the realisation that none of the strategic prerequisites for an Austrian victory in this war had materialised. He came to believe that his country's best option was to open negotiations with Napoleon but, despite his warning that "the first battle lost is a death sentence for the monarchy", his brother, [[Francis I of Austria|Emperor Francis]] repeatedly refused to consider the option.{{sfn|Rothenberg|1995|p=145}}

Although a [[generalissimus]], with supreme authority over the entire Austrian army, Charles's position was constantly undermined by his imperial brother and the war party at the court, who were corresponding directly on military matters with his [[chief of staff]], ''[[General Major]]'' [[Maximilian von Wimpffen|Wimpffen]] and some of the corps commanders. The constant flow of information from the front maintained a bellicose atmosphere in the high political circles and an erroneously optimistic opinion about Austria's military situation, which hindered Charles's best attempts to get his brother to sue for peace.{{sfn|Rothenberg|1995|pp=143–148}}

It thus became clear to the Archduke that another battle would be forthcoming, although he still nourished hopes that Napoleon himself might make peace overtures. Although morale among the rank and file remained fair following Aspern-Essling, the atmosphere among the Austrian senior commanders was particularly rotten and Charles's insufficiently assiduous preparations for another battle further sapped their confidence in him. One of the senior generals, [[Johann von Hiller]], commander of VI Korps was overtly critical of Charles's strategy and resigned on 4 July, on the eve of the battle of Wagram, giving health reasons as a pretext.{{ref label|Hiller-Klenau|Note 2|2}} Archduke Charles did make considerable efforts to rebuild his army and, despite the slow arrival of reinforcements, by the end of June, it was close to full strength again. Overall, Archduke Charles was well aware that he did not possess the means necessary to lead any offensive actions, so he promptly dismissed suggestions to run any major operations against the French base on [[Lobau]] island. A plan to march to Pressburg, cross the [[Danube]] and launch operations against the enemy's rear from there was also dismissed as strategically unsound after ''General Major'' Wimpffen noted that such a plan would leave [[Bohemia]], the richest province still under the Austrian Empire's control, open to a French invasion.{{sfn|Rothenberg|1995|pp=143–148}} By the end of June, Archduke Charles was still hoping that Napoleon might opt to negotiate, a misapprehension that the latter encouraged through a series of ruses. In the event that a battle would indeed occur, Charles planned to remain on the defensive and thus his actions depended on the moves of the enemy. A member of the [[House of Habsburg]], Archduke Charles saw the army as an invaluable tool, meant to protect the existence of the Monarchy. He was thus a cautious commander, never willing to risk it all in order to obtain a decisive victory, a commitment that he reiterated towards the end of June, when he wrote to his uncle and mentor, [[Prince Albert of Saxony, Duke of Teschen]], stating that, should another battle be unavoidable, he would "strike one more blow against the French" but "risk nothing or as little as possible". Although he reckoned that Austria would need a major victory in order to turn the tide of the war, he believed that another battle against Napoleon would have doubtful results.{{sfn|Rothenberg|1995|pp=143–148}}

[[File:Lannes mortally wounded at Essling (E. Boutigny).jpg|thumb|left|Napoleon with ''[[Marshal of the Empire|Maréchal]]'' [[Jean Lannes]]. One of the Emperor's personal friends, Lannes was severely wounded while leading his men at Aspern-Essling. He died in extreme pain, nine days after the battle.]]
Meanwhile, having retreated to the island of Lobau after the battle of Aspern-Essling, Napoleon knew that he had failed in his attempt to cross the [[Danube]] and was so astonished by the severity of the setback that he remained in unaccustomed inaction for 36 hours.{{sfn|Chandler|1998|p=706}} After recovering his usual drive, his immediate concern was to improve the dire situation of his army, which was in very bad shape and virtually trapped on Lobau island, after the Danube had swollen. With his usual tireless activity, he supervised the transformation of [[Lobau]] island into a huge army base. The French built temporary campaign hospitals for his 20,000 wounded, as well as warehouses and barracks, which sheltered a numerous permanent military garrison. As soon as a secure bridge was built, the Emperor had the wounded and a part of the troops transferred to the mainland, but maintained IV Corps on the island. He did not intend to abandon this position, as he was planning to use it as a springboard for his upcoming crossing. His next task was to rebuild the army. Casualties had been roughly equal to those of the enemy, but, with fewer troops engaged, some of Napoleon's battalions needed rebuilding from scratch. Losses in officers in particular had been extremely high and proved difficult to replace. ''[[Marshal of the Empire|Maréchal]]'' [[Jean Lannes]], one of Napoleon's ablest commanders and a personal friend, had been mortally wounded in action and died nine days after the battle.{{sfn|Rothenberg|1995|pp=127–129}}{{ref label|Lannes|Note 3|3}} Another irreplaceable loss was [[Louis-Vincent-Joseph Le Blond de Saint-Hilaire]], who had been created a Marshal of the Empire just a month before, in recognition of his brilliant conduct during the earlier campaign, but received a mortal wound during the battle and died before the coveted baton could arrive from Paris.{{sfn|Chandler|1998|p=692}} [[Jean-Louis-Brigitte Espagne]], another famous general was killed in action at the head of his ''cuirassiers''{{ref label|Slain commanders|Note 4|4}} and the commander in chief of the artillery, [[Nicolas-Marie Songis des Courbons]], became severely ill and had to leave his command a few weeks after the battle. Despite all these setbacks, the army and its officers retained total confidence in Napoleon's ability to lead them to victory and morale remained high. Evidence of this came a couple of days before the newly planned crossing of the Danube, when Napoleon's most senior Corps commander, ''Maréchal'' [[André Masséna]] fell from his horse and badly injured his foot, rendering him unable to ride for some time. In sheer contrast with Hiller's gesture, Masséna, although in significant pain, made arrangements to lead his men in battle from a [[Phaeton (carriage)|phaeton]] and vowed to retain his command, much to the Emperor's relief.{{sfn|Rothenberg|1995|pp=131–143}}

Napoleon reckoned that he would need careful planning and superior forces, before he could attempt another crossing of the Danube. In order to achieve that, he needed to secure his island-base at Lobau. Following the Emperor's orders, the commander of the {{lang|fr|[[Grande Armée]]}} artillery, General Songis and his successor, General [[Jean Ambroise Baston de Lariboisière|Lariboisière]], installed a massive 124-gun battery on the island. They also carefully scouted the shores and small islands of the [[Danube]] and installed batteries in strategic positions, in a bid to cover [[Vienna]], but above all with the aim of keeping the enemy guessing about the exact location of the upcoming crossing. The French also needed reliable bridges. Starting work on 1 June, General [[Henri Gatien Bertrand|Bertrand]] led vast military engineering works that resulted in the building of two strong bridges from the south bank to Lobau island. These were to be used to transfer supplies and troops onto the island. Bertrand secured these bridges against any floating barges that the Austrians might have launched to destroy them, by building palisades upstream. In order to cross from the island to the northern bank, a series of pivoting bridges and [[landing craft]] were also built. The French also captured a Danube flotilla and built additional patrol ships, which meant that they were, by the end of June, in almost complete control of the river, allowing Napoleon to write in the Army Bulletin of 2 July that "the Danube no longer exists for the French army".{{sfn|Rothenberg|1995|pp=131–143}}