Editing Battle of Mogadishu (1993) (section)

==Background==
{{Main|Somali Civil War|1992 famine in Somalia|United Nations Operation in Somalia I}}

Throughout the 1980s the [[Somali Rebellion]] escalated, eventually culminating in the full outbreak of the [[Somali Civil War]] and the collapse of the regime of President [[Siad Barre]] at the start of 1991. [[Food security|Food shortages]] began in mid-1990, the final year of Siad Barre's rule.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Compagnon |first=Daniel |date=1992-11-01 |title=Political Decay in Somalia: From Personal Rule to Warlordism |url= |journal=Refuge: Canada's Journal on Refugees |pages=8–13 |doi=10.25071/1920-7336.21676 |issn=1920-7336 |doi-access=free}}</ref> By early 1991, the formal economy collapsed as rebel groups toppled the [[Somali Democratic Republic]].<ref>{{Cite book |last1=Andersen |first1=L. |url= |title=Fragile States and Insecure People?: Violence, Security, and Statehood in the Twenty-First Century |last2=Møller |first2=B. |last3=Stepputat |first3=F. |date=2007-08-06 |publisher=Springer |isbn=978-0-230-60557-2 |pages=88–89 |language=en}}</ref> A severe drought hit southern Somalia in 1991–1992,<ref name=":02">{{Cite book |last=Hilaire |first=Max |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=RcnaCQAAQBAJ&pg=PA219 |title=Waging Peace: The United Nations Security Council and Transnational Armed Conflicts |date=2015 |publisher=Logos Verlag Berlin GmbH |isbn=978-3-8325-4000-5 |pages=219 |language=en}}</ref><ref>{{Cite book |last=Poole |first=Walter S. |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=wixyAAAAMAAJ |title=The Effort to Save Somalia, August 1992-March 1994 |date=2005 |publisher=Joint History Office, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff |isbn=978-0-16-075594-1 |pages=6 |language=en}}</ref> while the civil war disrupted traditional coping mechanisms as law enforcement disintegrated. This led to the emergence of the [[1992 famine in Somalia|1992 famine]], the primary cause of which was the war's devastation of infrastructure and farmland in the inter-riverine regions.<ref>{{Cite book |last=De Waal |first=Alex |title=Famine crimes: politics & the disaster relief industry in Africa |date=2006 |publisher=Indiana University Press |isbn=978-0-85255-810-2 |edition= |series=African issues |location=Oxford |pages=166}}</ref><ref>{{Cite book |last=Herbst |first=Jeffrey Ira |title=Learning from Somalia: the lessons of armed humanitarian intervention |last2=Clarke |first2=Walter |date=1997 |publisher=Westview Press |isbn=978-0-8133-2793-8 |location=Boulder, Colo |pages=124-125}}</ref>

The main rebel faction that had toppled the regime was the [[United Somali Congress]] (USC),<ref name="Battersby">{{cite book |last=Battersby |first=Paul |title=Globalization and human security |author2=Joseph M. Siracusa |publisher=Rowman & Littlefield |year=2009 |isbn=978-0-7425-5653-9 |location=Lanham, Md. |page=151}}</ref> which divided into two armed factions: one led by [[Ali Mahdi Muhammad]], who later became president; and the other by General [[Mohamed Farrah Aidid]], which became known as the [[Somali National Alliance]] (SNA).<ref name="Clancy">{{cite book |last=Clancy |first=Tom |url=https://archive.org/details/isbn_9780425198926/page/234 |title=Battle Ready: Study in Command Commander Series |author2=Tony Zinni |author3=Tony Koltz |publisher=Penguin |year=2005 |isbn=978-0-425-19892-6 |pages=[https://archive.org/details/isbn_9780425198926/page/234 234–236] |authorlink=Tom Clancy}}</ref> After losing control of Mogadishu, remnants of former President Barres forces created the [[Somali National Front]] (SNF) and withdrew south into the nations [[breadbasket]].{{sfn|Drysdale|1994|p=57}} Serious damage was inflicted in Somalia's agricultural regions during fighting between the SNF and Aidid's forces, before the latter drove the SNF far into the south of the country.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Clarke |first=Walter S. |title=Learning from Somalia: The Lessons of Armed Humanitarian Intervention |last2=Herbst |first2=Jeffery |date=2018 |publisher=Routledge |isbn=978-0-8133-2793-8 |location=Boulder |pages=124-125}}</ref>

=== UNOSOM and UNITAF ===
{{Main|Unified Task Force}}
In early 1992, as relief agencies initiated operations to respond to the humanitarian crisis, they encountered growing obstacles in delivering aid to the impacted affected inter-riverine region. The disintegration of Somali law enforcement paved the way for armed looters and criminals to steal food from storage sites and supply routes. Many thieves at Mogadishu's sea and airport, the main supply hub, were linked to the rebel forces of [[Ali Mahdi Muhammad|Ali Mahdi]] and [[Mohamed Farrah Aidid|Mohamed Farah Aidid]] but were effectively [[Demobilization|demobilized]] following the rout of the SNF. With militia leaders lacking funds and Barre's forces no longer presenting a unifying threat and, Aidid and Mahdi increasingly lost control over many young fighters, as did clan elders. As a result, many resorted to food theft for survival and income. In response to this deteriorating security situation, [[United Nations Operation in Somalia I|UNOSOM I]] was established in April 1992 under the leadership of [[Mohamed Sahnoun]] to help facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid.{{Sfn|Drysdale|1994|p=41-42}} In May 1992 the first UN aid shipment arrived in Mogadishu.''{{sfn|Peterson|2000|p=44}}''

During August 1992, U.S. President [[George H. W. Bush|George H.W. Bush]] launched [[Operation Provide Relief]], deploying U.S. military transport aircraft to support the UN relief effort in Somalia.<ref name="Clancy" /> That same month, UNOSOM I head [[Mohamed Sahnoun|Mohammed Sahnoun]] secured [[Somali National Alliance]] approval for 500 peacekeepers, with further deployments requiring the groups consent. However, UN Secretary-General [[Boutros Boutros-Ghali|Boutros Ghali]] unilaterally announced an expansion to 3,500 troops days later, undermining the local support Sahnoun had built. Overruled by UN headquarters, he failed to delay the deployment.''<ref>{{Cite book |last=Hill |first=Stephen M. |url=https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1057/9780230502963_4.pdf?pdf=core |title=United Nations Disarmament Processes in Intra-State Conflict. |date=2005 |publisher=Palgrave Macmillan |isbn=978-0-333-94716-6 |pages=93–94 |doi=10.1057/9780230502963_4 |oclc=885487671 |access-date=2023-03-29 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240522140102/https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1057/9780230502963_4.pdf?pdf=core |archive-date=2024-05-22 |url-status=live}}</ref>'' The large-scale intervention in late 1992 fueled nationalist opposition, bolstering Aidid's SNA, which denounced the UN's perceived colonial approach.<ref name=":16">{{Cite book |last1=Maynes |first1=C. William (Charles William) |url=http://archive.org/details/unitedstatesfore00char |title=U.S. Foreign policy and the United Nations system |last2=Williamson |first2=Richard S. |last3=American Assembly |date=1996 |publisher=New York : W.W. Norton |others=Internet Archive |isbn=978-0-393-03907-8 |pages=65}}</ref> By November 1992, largely owing to the mediation efforts of [[Mohamed Sahnoun]], aid was flowing through the Mogadishu port unimpeded, with theft and banditry on the routes to famine zones averaging around 20%.{{Sfn|Drysdale|1994|p=4-5}} That same month, Sahnoun was replaced by [[Ismat T. Kittani]], who took a confrontational approach, deploying UNOSOM troops into politically sensitive areas and triggering a security crisis with local factions. Kittani claimed 80% of aid shipments were looted, a figure later echoed by the UN Secretariat and the U.S. State Department to justify expanding intervention, though many top UN officials and aid workers disputed the figure.{{Sfn|de Waal|1997|p=181}} In the view of some top UNOSOM I commanders, the scope of the famine was being exaggerated in order to justify using Somalia as an experiment,<ref name=":42">{{Cite book |last=Huband |first=Mark |title=The Skull Beneath the Skin: Africa after the Cold War |publisher=Westview |isbn=978-0813341125 |pages=294}}</ref> as the UN Secretariat believed Somalia represented an ideal candidate for a test case of a UN operation of expanded size and mandate.{{Sfn|de Waal|1997|p=179}}

On 9 December 1992, American troops began landing on the [[Coastline of Somalia|Somali coastline]] at [[Mogadishu]] under [[Unified Task Force|UNITAF]] (Operation Restore Hope). A total 17,800 [[United States Marine Corps|US Marines]] and 10,000 [[United States Army|US Army]] infantry were deployed.{{Sfn|Drysdale|1994|pp=86-89}} The [[1992 famine in Somalia|famine in Somalia]] was already concluding as the troops began landing.{{Sfn|de Waal|1997|p=185}} The [[United States]] had various motives for military involvement in Somalia. The [[United States Armed Forces|US armed forces]] wanted to prove its capability to conduct major '[[Military operations other than war|Operations Other Than War]]', while the [[United States Department of State|US State Department]] wanted to set a precedent for humanitarian military intervention in the post-[[Cold War]] era.{{Sfn|de Waal|1997|p=179}} The United Nations' intervention, backed by [[U.S. Marines]], has been credited with helping end the famine in Somalia, though the starvation had been improving in the worst-affected areas before troops arrived<ref name=":5">{{cite web |title=A Wrong Turn In Somalia – An Ill-Conceived Copter Raid Turned Many Somalis Against U.S. Forces, 1998, Mark Bowden, The Philadelphia Inquirer |url=https://archive.seattletimes.com/archive/?date=19980209&slug=2733458}}</ref>{{sfn|Drysdale|1994}} and had the effect of speeding the conclusion of the crisis by about a month.<ref name=":03">{{Cite book |last=Seybolt |first=Taylor B. |url=https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2018-10/sipri08seybolt.pdf |title=Humanitarian military intervention: the conditions for success and failure |date=2012 |publisher=Sipri, Stockholm International Peace Research Inst |isbn=978-0-19-955105-7 |edition=Repr |location=Solna, Sweden |pages=56–57}}</ref> In 1994, the Washington-based Refugee Policy Group NGO estimated that of the approximately 100,000 lives that were saved as a result of international assistance, 10,000 had been after the deployment of US troops.<ref name="Trth">{{cite book|last=Maren|first=Michael|title=The Road to Hell|year=2009|publisher=Simon and Schuster|isbn=978-1439188415|page=214|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=c7yXjjdx53QC}}</ref>

===Mission shift and increasing tensions===
On 3 March 1993, [[United Nations Secretary-General]] [[Boutros Boutros-Ghali]] submitted to the [[U.N. Security Council]] his recommendations for shifting from [[UNITAF]] to [[UNOSOM II]]. He said that since Resolution 794's adoption in December 1992, UNITAF had deployed 37,000 personnel over forty percent of southern and central Somalia. He said the force's presence and operations had improved Somalia's security situation and the delivery of humanitarian assistance. There was still no effective government, police, or national army, resulting in serious security threats to U.N. personnel. To that end, the Security Council authorized UNOSOM II to establish a secure environment throughout Somalia, to achieve national reconciliation so as to create a democratic state.<ref name="Clancy"/><ref>[https://www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/unosom2p.htm United Nations Operation in Somalia II]. UN.org (31 August 1996). Retrieved on 1 May 2014.</ref>

At the [[Conference on National Reconciliation in Somalia]], held on 15 March 1993, in [[Addis Ababa]], [[Transitional Government of Ethiopia|Ethiopia]], all 15 Somali parties agreed to the terms set out to restore peace.<ref name="Clancy"/> Major disagreements between the UN and the [[Somali National Alliance]] began soon after the establishment of UNOSOM II, centering on the perceived true nature of the operations political mandate. In May 1993, relations between the SNA and UNOSOM rapidly deteriorated, resulting in the SNA engaging in "anti-UNOSOM propaganda" broadcasts from [[Radio Mogadishu]].<ref name=":04">{{Cite report |url=https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/189847 |title=Report of the Commission of Inquiry Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 885 (1994) to Investigate Armed Attacks on UNOSOM II Personnel Which Led to Casualties Among Them |author=UN Secretary-General |date=1 June 1994 |language=en |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220808203834/https://tind-customer-undl.s3.amazonaws.com/ce7dc2ef-9f39-4d27-ac51-8b5484f1ec37?response-content-disposition=attachment%3B%20filename%2A%3DUTF-8%27%27S_1994_653-EN.pdf&response-content-type=application%2Fpdf&X-Amz-Algorithm=AWS4-HMAC-SHA256&X-Amz-Expires=86400&X-Amz-Credential=AKIAXL7W7Q3XFWDGQKBB%2F20220808%2Feu-west-1%2Fs3%2Faws4_request&X-Amz-SignedHeaders=host&X-Amz-Date=20220808T203834Z&X-Amz-Signature=43ed65cdbf97860aa0b1879c87a9c713da9cd23ec94035a340d94a6bb5a08595 |archive-date=8 August 2022}}</ref>

=== UNOSOM offensive and Mogadishu insurgency ===
[[File:Pictures from an armed convoy trip in Mogadishu.jpg|thumb|Mogadishu skyline from a UNOSOM convoy]]
On [[June 1993 attack on Pakistani military in Somalia|5 June 1993]], SNA fighters and Somali citizens at Radio Mogadishu attacked the Pakistani force that was inspecting an arms cache located at the station, out of fear that the United Nations forces had been sent to shut down the SNA's broadcast infrastructure. Radio was the most popular medium for news in Somalia, and consequently control of the airwaves was considered vital to both the SNA and UNOSOM. Radio Mogadishu was a highly popular station with the residents of Mogadishu,<ref name=":24">{{Cite book |last=Hirsch |first=John L. |url=https://www.worldcat.org/oclc/32200261 |title=Somalia and Operation Restore Hope : reflections on peacemaking and peacekeeping |date=1995 |others=Robert B. Oakley |isbn=1-878379-41-0|publisher=United States Institute of Peace Press |location=Washington, D.C. |pages=115–121 |oclc=32200261}}</ref> and rumors that the United Nations was planning to seize or destroy it had been abound for days before 5 June. On May 31, 1993, Aidid's political rivals met with the top UNOSOM official and attempted to convince him to take over Radio Mogadishu, a meeting Aidid was made well aware of.{{sfn|Drysdale|1994|pages=180–195}} According to the 1994 United Nations Inquiry in the events leading up to the Battle of Mogadishu:<blockquote>"Opinions differ, even among UNOSOM officials, on whether the weapons inspections of 5 June 1993 was genuine or was merely a cover-up for reconnaissance and subsequent seizure of Radio Mogadishu."<ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Secretary-General |first1=Un |date=1994-06-01 |title=UN Commission of Inquiry Established under Security Council Resolution 885 to Investigate Armed Attacks on UNOSOM II (1994) |url=https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/189847 |journal=United Nations |language=en |pages=22}}</ref></blockquote> The attack marked a seminal moment in the UNOSOM II operation. The Pakistani forces suffered 24 dead and 57 wounded, as well as one wounded Italian and three wounded U.S. soldiers.<ref>{{Cite news |last=Lorch |first=Donatella |date=8 June 1993 |title=U.N. Moves Troops to Somali City And Vows Punishment for Attack |language=en-US |work=The New York Times |url=https://www.nytimes.com/1993/06/08/world/un-moves-troops-to-somali-city-and-vows-punishment-for-attack.html |access-date=16 March 2022 |issn=0362-4331}}</ref> On 6 June 1993, the [[United Nations Security Council|Security Council]] passed [[United Nations Security Council Resolution 837|Resolution 837]], a call for the arrest and prosecution of the persons responsible.<ref>Security Council, Resolution 837, United Nations Doc. Nr. S/RES/837 (1993)</ref> Though Resolution 837 did not name Aidid, it held the Somali National Alliance responsible. The hunt for Aidid became a major focus of the U.N. intervention through the Battle of Mogadishu.<ref name=":24" />{{sfn|Drysdale|1994|pages=180–195}} [[Admiral (United States)|Admiral]] [[Jonathan Howe]] issued a $25,000 [[Warrant (law)|warrant]] for information leading to Aidid's arrest, while UNOSOM forces began attacking targets all over Mogadishu in hopes of finding him.<ref name="Lester H p.28">Brune, Lester H. (1999) ''The United States and Post-Cold War Interventions: Bush and Clinton in Somalia, Haiti and Bosnia, 1992–1998'', Regina Books, {{ISBN|0941690903}}, p. 28</ref> Professor [[Ioan Lewis|Ioan M. Lewis]] asserts that the UN made an unwise choice to resort to military force, which led to substantial Somali casualties, rather than attempting to politically isolate Aidid and launch an independent legal inquiry.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Economides |first=Spyros |title=United Nations Interventionism, 1991-2004 |publisher=[[Cambridge University Press]] |year=2007 |isbn=9780511491221 |pages=128–138}}</ref>

In mid-June 1993, American [[Lockheed AC-130|AC-130]] gunships began striking SNA targets across the capital and an [[insurgency]] began growing against UNOSOM forces. When Somali insurgents and UNOSOM forces skirmished, it proved to be costly to each—especially for the Somali, who were usually outgunned by heavy weaponry.{{Sfn|Drysdale|1994|pp=192–193}} Through the rest of June the insurgency escalated, resulting in growing losses on both sides,{{Sfn|Drysdale|1994|p=195}} in one instance a crowd of [[June 1993 UN killings of Somali protestors|protestors were machine gunned by UNOSOM troops]] resulting in the death of at least 20 civilians.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Meir |first=Karl |date=1993-06-13 |title=UN killings inflame Somali crisis: 20 demonstrators shot dead in Pakistani 'revenge' |url=https://www.independent.co.uk/news/un-killings-inflame-somali-crisis-20-demonstrators-shot-dead-in-pakistani-revenge-1491496.html |access-date=2022-09-22 |website=[[The Independent]] |language=en}}</ref><ref name=":110">{{Cite web |last=Simon |first=Roger |date=15 October 1993 |title=A little-known massacre explains Somali hatred |url=https://www.baltimoresun.com/news/bs-xpm-1993-10-15-1993288151-story.html |url-access=subscription |access-date=2022-09-21 |website=Baltimore Sun}}</ref> A week after the start of the offensive, U.S. intelligence claimed Aidid's command was badly weakened, SNA [[morale]] had collapsed, and most of its arsenal was destroyed. Officials estimated only 300 fighter's loyal to Aidid opposed UNOSOM, driven by cash or the drug khat.<ref name=":41">{{Cite news |last=Richburg |first=Keith |date=18 October 1993 |title=A SOMALI VIEW: 'I AM THE WINNER' |url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1993/10/18/a-somali-view-i-am-the-winner/d27d3887-5298-41a2-8ce3-af199a7e8298/ |url-access=subscription |newspaper=[[Washington Post]]}}</ref> Instead each major armed confrontation with UN forces was noted to have the effect of inadvertently increasing Aidid's stature with the Somali public.<ref name=":82">{{Cite journal |last=Maren |first=Michael |date=1996 |title=Somalia: Whose Failure? |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/45317578 |journal=Current History |volume=95 |issue=601 |pages=201–205 |doi=10.1525/curh.1996.95.601.201 |issn=0011-3530 |jstor=45317578}}</ref> The UNOSOM offensive backfired politically, alienating many Somalis, boosting support for Aidid, and drawing international criticism. In response, many UNOSOM II contingents pushed for diplomacy with the SNA,<ref name=":252">{{Cite book |last=Wheeler |first=Nicholas J. |url=https://academic.oup.com/book/276 |title=Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in International Society |publisher=Oxford University Press |year=2002 |isbn=9780191600302 |chapter=From Famine Relief to 'Humanitarian War': The US and UN Intervention in Somalia}}</ref> while relief agencies began distancing themselves from the UN.<ref>{{Cite news |last=Press |first=Robert M. |date=15 June 1993 |title=Relief Agencies in Somalia Back Away from Close UN Ties |url=https://www.csmonitor.com/1993/0615/15072.html |access-date=2023-10-08 |work=Christian Science Monitor |issn=0882-7729}}</ref> Former Under-Secretary-General of the UN, Ramesh Thakur, observed that, "The scale, intensity, and frequency of the [[use of force]] by UNOSOM after June 1993 bore little resemblance to the [[rhetoric]] and expectations of when it was established, nor any recognizable relationship by then to a [[Peacekeeping|peacekeeping operation]] as defined in the UN [[lexicon]]."<ref name=":112">{{Cite journal |last=Thakur |first=Ramesh |date=1994 |title=From Peacekeeping to Peace Enforcement: The UN Operation in Somalia |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/161981 |journal=The Journal of Modern African Studies |volume=32 |issue=3 |pages=387–410 |doi=10.1017/S0022278X00015159 |issn=0022-278X |jstor=161981 |s2cid=154768424}}</ref>

===Bloody Monday raid===
On 12 July 1993, a house where a meeting of clan elders was taking place was attacked by US [[Bell AH-1 Cobra|AH-1 Cobra]] helicopters in what became known to the Somalis as [[Abdi House raid|Bloody Monday]].<ref name=":172">{{Cite journal |last=Berdal |first=Mats |date=2000 |title=Lessons not learned: The use of force in 'peace operations' in the 1990s |url=http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13533310008413863 |journal=International Peacekeeping |language=en |volume=7 |issue=4 |pages=55–74 |doi=10.1080/13533310008413863 |issn=1353-3312 |s2cid=145387135 |hdl-access=free |hdl=11250/99737}}</ref> UNOSOM claimed that they had launched a successful raid on a [[Somali National Alliance]] command and control center where hardliners had been gathered, an account that is widely disputed by Somalis, foreign journalists and human rights organizations.{{sfn|Brune|1999|p=31}}<ref name=":334">{{Cite book |url=https://www.amnesty.org/en/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/afr520031995en.pdf |title=SOMALIA: Building human rights in the disintegrated state |date=November 1995 |publisher=[[Amnesty International]] |pages=}}</ref><ref name=":132">{{Cite book |url=https://www.hrw.org/reports//pdfs/s/somalia/somalia954.pdf |title=SOMALIA FACES THE FUTURE - HUMAN RIGHTS IN A FRAGMENTED SOCIETY |date=April 1995 |publisher=[[Human Rights Watch]] |pages=98–101}}</ref><ref name="The Globe and Mail">{{Cite news |last= |first= |date=23 July 1993 |title=UN, U.S. accused of abuses in Somalia |work=The Globe and Mail |pages=A6}}</ref><ref name=":582">{{Cite book |last=Binet |first=Laurence |url=https://www.msf.org/sites/default/files/2019-04/MSF%20Speaking%20Out%20Somalia%201991-1993.pdf |title=Somalia 1991-1993: Civil War, Famine Alert and a UN "Military-Humanitarian" Intervention |publisher=[[Médecins Sans Frontières]] |year=2013 |pages=191–192}}</ref> UNOSOM II head [[Jonathan Howe|Johnathan Howe]] alleged that evidence to back UN claims could not be provided because the cameras recording the raid had jammed.{{Sfn|de Waal|1997|p=188}} The footage recorded of the incident by a Somali cameraman was considered so disturbing that [[CNN]] deemed it too graphic to show on air to the American public.<ref name=":0">{{Cite book |last=Peterson |first=S. |title=Me against my brother: at war in Somalia, Sudan, and Rwanda: a journalist reports from the battlefields of Africa |date=2000 |publisher=Routledge |isbn=0415921988 |location=New York |pages=3–166 |oclc=43287853}}</ref>{{sfn|Drysdale|1994}}[[Human Rights Watch]] observed that UNOSOM had produced no evidence to substantiate its claims about the raid.<ref name=":26">{{Cite web |date=April 1995 |title=Somalia Faces the Future: Human Rights in a Fragmented Society |url=https://www.hrw.org/legacy/reports/1995/somalia/ |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220305121119/https://www.hrw.org/legacy/reports/1995/somalia/ |archive-date=5 March 2022 |access-date=18 March 2019 |website=www.hrw.org}}</ref> According to Dr. Sebastian Kaempf, the [[Abdi House raid]] represented the single most important event during UNOSOM II, as the consequences of the attack proved disastrous for UNOSOM interests in Somalia.<ref name=":92">{{Cite journal |last=Kaempf |first=Sebastian |date=2012 |title=US warfare in Somalia and the trade-off between casualty-aversion and civilian protection |url=http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09592318.2012.661608 |journal=Small Wars & Insurgencies |language=en |volume=23 |issue=3 |pages=388–413 |doi=10.1080/09592318.2012.661608 |issn=0959-2318 |s2cid=143382088}}</ref> Notable groups and organizations such as the [[Vatican City|Vatican]], the [[Organisation of African Unity]], [[World Vision International|World Vision]], [[Médecins Sans Frontières|Doctors Without Borders]], [[Human Rights Watch]] and [[Amnesty International]] called for UNOSOM to review it policies and course.<ref name=":122">{{Cite news |last=News Wire Services |first=M. |date=13 July 1993 |title=AFRICAN NATIONS ASK FOR REVIEW OF U.N. ROLE IN SOMALIA |url=https://infoweb.newsbank.com/apps/news/document-view?p=NewsBank&docref=news/0EB71B6C00A72916 |work=The Mercury News |pages=3A}}</ref><ref name=":113">{{Cite journal |last=Thakur |first=Ramesh |date=1994 |title=From Peacekeeping to Peace Enforcement: The UN Operation in Somalia |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/161981 |journal=The Journal of Modern African Studies |volume=32 |issue=3 |pages=387–410 |doi=10.1017/S0022278X00015159 |issn=0022-278X |jstor=161981 |s2cid=154768424}}</ref><ref name=":333">{{Cite book |url=https://www.amnesty.org/en/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/afr520031995en.pdf |title=SOMALIA: Building human rights in the disintegrated state |date=November 1995 |publisher=[[Amnesty International]] |pages=6}}</ref><ref name=":133">{{Cite book |url=https://www.hrw.org/reports//pdfs/s/somalia/somalia954.pdf |title=SOMALIA FACES THE FUTURE - HUMAN RIGHTS IN A FRAGMENTED SOCIETY |date=April 1995 |publisher=[[Human Rights Watch]] |pages=98–101}}</ref><ref name="Aldinger">{{Cite news |last=Aldinger |first=Charles |date=14 July 1993 |title=U.N.'S 'PACIFYING' ACTIONS RAISE DISTURBING QUESTIONS |url=https://infoweb.newsbank.com/apps/news/document-view?p=NewsBank&docref=news/0EADEDFD21A69B01 |work=Pittsburgh Post-Gazette}}</ref>[[File:Sign at anti American protest in Mogadishu depicting the Abdi House raid or "Bloody Monday".png|thumb|A sign at an anti-UNOSOM protest in Mogadishu depicting [[Abdi House raid|Bloody Monday]]]]According to the [[International Committee of the Red Cross|Red Cross]], there were 215 Somalis casualties, although in the aftermath of the attack they were able to survey the dead and injured at only two of the hospitals in Mogadishu.<ref name=":6">{{Cite news |last=Richburg |first=Keith B. |date=16 July 1993 |title=U.N. Helicopter Assailt in Somalia Targeted Aideed's Top Commanders |url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1993/07/16/un-helicopter-assault-in-somalia-targeted-aideeds-top-commanders/7791ba94-0a09-453d-b216-5d2ddc373385/ |access-date=14 March 2022 |newspaper=The Washington Post |language=en-US |issn=0190-8286}}</ref> [[Human Rights Watch]] declared that the attack "looked like mass murder" and an American reporter who was present on the scene said that the raid was far deadlier than U.S. and U.N. officials acknowledged.<ref name=":26" /><ref name=":6" /> An SNA official reported 73 were killed including many prominent clan elders, a charge UNOSOM denied.<ref name=":1">{{Cite news |last=Megas |first=Natalia |date=6 January 2019 |title=Did the U.S. Cover Up a Civilian Massacre Before Black Hawk Down? |url=https://www.thedailybeast.com/did-the-us-cover-up-a-civilian-massacre-before-black-hawk-down |access-date=17 May 2020 |work=The Daily Beast |language=en}}</ref><ref name=":6" /> Bowden noted that every eyewitness he interviewed placed the number of dead at 70 or more and that former ambassador and U.S. special envoy to Somalia [[Robert B. Oakley]] accepted this figure. He further noted that many of those interviewed, including non-Somali aid workers, would say that many of those killed in the attack had been well-respected moderates opposed to Aidid.{{sfn|Bowden|2010|page=355}} Regardless of the meeting's true intent, the attack is generally considered as the most significant of the many incidents that occurred in 1993 that caused many Somalis to turn against UNOSOM II, especially the U.S. contingent.<ref name=":5" /><ref name=":1" /><ref name=":31">{{Cite web |date=15 October 1993 |title=A little-known massacre explains Somalian hatred |url=https://www.baltimoresun.com/news/bs-xpm-1993-10-15-1993288151-story.html |access-date=14 March 2022 |website=Baltimore Sun |language=en}}</ref><ref name=":32">{{Cite news |last=Richburg |first=Keith B. |date=10 September 1993 |title=U.S. Helicopters Fire on Somalis |url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1993/09/10/us-helicopters-fire-on-somalis/bf79ed24-8b12-400b-a0a2-43b160067a54/ |access-date=16 March 2022 |newspaper=The Washington Post |language=en-US |issn=0190-8286}}</ref>

The raid exposed deep rifts and created dissension amongst the UNOSOM II coalition, which consequently began fraying the cohesion and unity of the operation.<ref name=":40">{{Cite book |last=Simons |first=Geoff |title=Un Malaise : Power, Problems and Realpolitik. |date=2016 |publisher=Palgrave Macmillan Limited |isbn=978-1-349-24297-9 |location=London |oclc=1085224318}}</ref><ref>{{Cite news |last=Cowell |first=Alan |date=16 July 1993 |title=ITALY, IN U.N. RIFT, THREATENS RECALL OF SOMALIA TROOPS |url=https://www.nytimes.com/1993/07/16/world/italy-in-un-rift-threatens-recall-of-somalia-troops.html |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150526091743/https://www.nytimes.com/1993/07/16/world/italy-in-un-rift-threatens-recall-of-somalia-troops.html |archive-date=26 May 2015 |work=[[The New York Times]]}}</ref><ref name=":102">{{Cite news |date=19 July 1993 |title=Somali Warlord Calls for Battle Against UN |work=[[Montreal Gazette]] |pages=A10 |agency=[[Associated Press]]}}</ref> The head of the UNOSOM II Justice Division would criticize the raid in a memo to head of UNOSOM.<ref name=":43">{{Cite news |date=7 August 1993 |title=U.N. raid on villa criticized |work=[[Las Vegas Review-Journal]] |pages=12a |agency=[[Associated Press]]}}</ref> Further criticism of the raid came from numerous contributing states,<ref name=":38">{{Cite news |last=Kiley |first=Sam |date=15 July 1993 |title=Mogadishu guerrillas expose failure of 'high-tech toy' tactics |work=[[The Times]] |pages=12}}</ref> most notably the Italian contingent, who threatened to pull out of the whole operation citing concerns that the escalation was indicative that relief role of UNOSOM II had been overtaken by an American-led war.<ref name=":272">{{Cite web |date=1993-07-12 |title=Talk, don't shoot, in Somalia: Waving the stick at warlords is |url=https://www.independent.co.uk/voices/talk-don-t-shoot-in-somalia-waving-the-stick-at-warlords-is-failing-say-karl-maier-and-richard-dowden-1484643.html |access-date=2022-04-16 |website=The Independent |language=en}}</ref><ref name=":322">{{Cite news |date=16 July 1993 |title=Long among most obliging allies, Italy challenges Washington, UN: Somali crisis prompts call for greater say in world order |work=The Globe and Mail}}</ref><ref>{{Cite news |last=Pick |first=Hella |date=17 July 1993 |title=Three strikes; UN operation in Bosnia, Somalia and Iraq in shambles |work=The Gazette}}</ref><ref>{{Cite news |last=Masland |first=Tom |date=24 July 1993 |title=WHY PEACEKEEPING ISN'T WORKING: UN BUNGLING LETS A WARLORD STAY ON THE LOOSE. THE MESS IN MOGADISHU IS A TEAM EFFORT |work=Vancouver Sun}}</ref> Italy, which had ruled [[Italian Somaliland|Somalia as a colonial territory]] for half a century, believed that the unprecedented attack threatened to widen the civil war and turn the Somalis against UNOSOM.<ref name=":52">{{Cite news |last=Bernstein |first=Richard |date=15 July 1993 |title=Italian General Who Refused Order in Somalia Is Removed |url=https://www.nytimes.com/1993/07/15/world/italian-general-who-refused-order-in-somalia-is-removed.html |access-date=12 March 2022 |work=The New York Times |language=en-US |issn=0362-4331}}</ref><ref>{{Cite news |last=Kennedy |first=Frances |date=22 July 1993 |title=Opinion In Somalia, Machiavelli Vs. Rambo |url=https://www.nytimes.com/1993/07/22/opinion/in-somalia-machiavelli-vs-rambo.html |access-date=17 March 2022 |work=The New York Times |language=en |issn=0362-4331}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |date=1993-07-16 |title=UN tries to clear up Somalia mess: The row with Italy over operations |url=https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/un-tries-to-clear-up-somalia-mess-the-row-with-italy-over-operations-in-mogadishu-is-casting-a-shadow-across-the-future-of-peacekeeping-1485354.html |access-date=2022-04-16 |website=The Independent |language=en}}</ref> Intense diplomatic efforts were made in order to avert a major split in UNOSOM II.<ref name=":102" /> Several UNOSOM contingents, ceased their participation in operations against [[Mohamed Farrah Aidid|Aidid]] upon receiving orders from their governments, weakening the already fragile command authority. Additionally, many humanitarian efforts came to a halt, and numerous NGOs expressed their disapproval of UNOSOM.<ref name=":192">{{Cite book |last1=Oakley |first1=Robert B. |author-link1=Robert B. Oakley |title=TWO PERSPECTIVES ON INTERVENTIONS AND HUMANITARIAN OPERATIONS |year=1997 |pages=15}}</ref> The strike caused an outcry among UN civilian staffers and disenchantment over the direction of UNOSOM II for employees of the humanitarian section.<ref name=":142">{{Cite news |last1=Richburg |first1=Keith B. |author-link1=Keith Richburg |date=5 August 1993 |title=U.N. REPORT CRITICIZES MILITARY TACTICS OF SOMALIA PEACE KEEPERS |url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1993/08/05/un-report-criticizes-military-tactics-of-somalia-peace-keepers/fbf9a6bb-f8cf-4eee-a30e-c91d5e9e89fc/ |access-date=14 March 2022 |newspaper=[[The Washington Post]] |language=en-US |issn=0190-8286}}</ref><ref name=":62">{{Cite news |last=Cowell |first=Alan |date=16 July 1993 |title=ITALY, IN U.N. RIFT, THREATENS RECALL OF SOMALIA TROOPS |url=https://www.nytimes.com/1993/07/16/world/italy-in-un-rift-threatens-recall-of-somalia-troops.html |access-date=12 March 2022 |work=The New York Times |language=en-US |issn=0362-4331}}</ref><ref name="war on aideed">{{Cite news |last=Richburg |first=Keith B. |date=6 December 1993 |title=IN WAR ON AIDEED, U.N. BATTLED ITSELF |url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1993/12/06/in-war-on-aideed-un-battled-itself/a42feae5-4aff-4cd1-b680-8ee67c586a47/ |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220806013245/https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1993/12/06/in-war-on-aideed-un-battled-itself/a42feae5-4aff-4cd1-b680-8ee67c586a47/ |archive-date=6 August 2022 |access-date=12 March 2022 |newspaper=Washington Post |language=en-US |issn=0190-8286}}</ref> Several UN officials resigned in protest, including the top UNOSOM II Justice Division official, [[Ann Wright]].<ref name="war on aideed" /><ref name=":142" /> Many of those who stayed would comment to reporters that the UN had relinquished its [[moral authority]] in its war against Aidid.<ref name="war on aideed" /> The dissension in the U.N. ranks with the Italians and others over what had occurred on July 12, 1993, led to a significant lull in UNOSOM operations in Mogadishu until the August 8, 1993 killings of American soldiers.<ref name=":142" />

A significant increase in attacks on UNOSOM II troops followed 12 July 1993, and American forces in Mogadishu began being deliberately targeted by Somali factions.<ref name=":93">{{Cite journal |last=Kaempf |first=Sebastian |date=2012 |title=US warfare in Somalia and the trade-off between casualty-aversion and civilian protection |url=http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09592318.2012.661608 |journal=Small Wars & Insurgencies |language=en |volume=23 |issue=3 |pages=388–413 |doi=10.1080/09592318.2012.661608 |issn=0959-2318 |s2cid=143382088}}</ref><ref name=":254">{{Cite book |last=Wheeler |first=Nicholas J. |url=https://academic.oup.com/book/276 |title=Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in International Society |publisher=Oxford University Press |year=2002 |isbn=9780191600302 |chapter=From Famine Relief to 'Humanitarian War': The US and UN Intervention in Somalia}}</ref> Night patrols were halted entirely due to Mogadishu becoming to dangerous for foreign troops.{{Sfn|Pouligny|2006|p=186}} In the view of [[Robert B. Oakley]], "Before July 12th, the U.S. would have been attacked only because of association with the UN, but the U.S. was never singled out until after July 12th".<ref name=":10" /> In the view of [[Black Hawk Down (book)|''Black Hawk Down'']] author [[Mark Bowden]] argued that the raid marked a serious escalation of the conflict in Somalia and was "a monumental misjudgment" and "tragic mistake".<ref name=":5" /><ref>{{Cite web |date=2008-12-06 |title=Hoover Institution – Policy Review – African Atrocities and the 'Rest of the World' |url=http://www.hoover.org:80/publications/policyreview/3487886.html |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20081206014644/http://www.hoover.org:80/publications/policyreview/3487886.html |archive-date=6 December 2008 |access-date=2022-08-05}}</ref> The events of [[Bloody Monday raid|Bloody Monday]] led Aidid to make the decision to specifically target American soldiers for the first time and resulted in the 8 August killings of U.S. troops that pushed [[President Clinton]] to send in extra troops to capture him.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Wheeler |first=Nicholas J. |url=https://www.worldcat.org/oclc/43885035 |title=Saving strangers : humanitarian intervention in international society |date=2000 |publisher=Oxford University Press |isbn=0-19-829621-5 |location=Oxford |oclc=43885035}}</ref>

===The August killings and the deployment of Task Force Ranger===
[[File:75th Ranger Regiment Bravo Company 3rd Battalion Somalia 1993.jpg|thumb|Bravo Company, 3rd Battalion of the [[75th Ranger Regiment]] in Somalia, 1993|alt=Soldiers training in desert]]
In the three weeks following the events of Bloody Monday there was a large lull in UNOSOM operations in Mogadishu, as the city had become incredibly hostile to foreign troops. Then on 8 August, in an area of the city that had been considered "relatively safe to travel in", the [[Somali National Alliance|SNA]] detonated a bomb against a U.S. military [[Humvee]], killing four soldiers. A total of only three American soldiers had died in the intervention, marking the 8 August incident as the largest single killing of U.S. troops in Somalia so far.<ref>{{Cite news |last=Richburg |first=Keith B. |date=9 August 1993 |title=4 U.S. Soldiers Killed in Somalia  |language=en-US |newspaper=The Washington Post |url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1993/08/09/4-us-soldiers-killed-in-somalia/99a72b8a-54f6-4f17-947f-3ace82f2b0d8/ |access-date=17 March 2022 |issn=0190-8286}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |date=9 August 1993 |title=4 U.S. Soldiers Killed in Somalia : Africa: Clinton pledges 'appropriate action.' Men die when vehicle hits land mine in area dominated by supporters of warlord Mohammed Farah Aidid. |url=https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1993-08-09-mn-22019-story.html |access-date=17 March 2022 |website=Los Angeles Times |language=en-US}}</ref>[[File:Black Hawk Down Rangers return to base after mission.jpg|thumb|Chalk Four Ranger returns to base after a mission in Somalia, 1993.|alt=Group of soldiers]]Two weeks later another bomb injured seven more.{{sfn|Bowden|2010|page=114}} In response, U.S. President [[Bill Clinton]] approved the proposal to deploy a task force composed of elite [[special forces]] units, including 400 [[U.S. Army Rangers]] and [[Delta Force]] operators.<ref>Brune, Lester H. (1999) ''The United States and Post-Cold War Interventions: Bush and Clinton in Somalia, Haiti and Bosnia, 1992–1998'', Regina Books, {{ISBN|0941690903}}, p. 31</ref>

On 22 August 1993, the unit deployed to Somalia under the command of [[Major General (United States)|Major General]] [[William F. Garrison]], commander of the special multi-disciplinary [[Joint Special Operations Command]] (JSOC) at the time.<ref>{{Cite web|last=Trevithick|first=Joseph|title=These Secret Helicopters Were Flown By A Shadowy Unit During The Battle of Mogadishu|url=https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/28177/these-secret-helicopters-were-flown-by-a-shadowy-unit-during-the-battle-of-mogadishu|access-date=13 January 2021|website=The Drive|date=23 May 2019|language=en}}</ref>

The force consisted of:
* B Company, 3rd Battalion, [[75th Ranger Regiment]] under the command of [[Captain (United States O-3)|Captain]] [[Michael D. Steele]];
* C Squadron, [[1st Special Forces Operational Detachment-Delta]] (1st SFOD-D) under the command of Lt Col [[Gary L. Harrell]];<ref>Gal Perl Finkel, [http://www.jpost.com/Opinion/A-new-strategy-against-ISIS-483521 A New Strategy Against ISIS], [[The Jerusalem Post]], 7 March 2017.</ref>
* A deployment package of 16 helicopters and personnel from the 1st Battalion, [[160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment]] (160th SOAR), which included [[Sikorsky UH-60 Black Hawk|MH-60 Black Hawks]] and [[MD Helicopters MH-6 Little Bird|AH/MH-6 Little Birds]];
* [[Navy SEAL]]s from the [[Naval Special Warfare Development Group]] (DEVGRU);
* [[United States Air Force Pararescue|Air Force Pararescuemen]] and [[United States Air Force Combat Control Team|Combat Controllers]] from the [[24th Special Tactics Squadron]].<ref>{{cite web |url=http://shadowspear.com/special-operations-news/rangers_honor_fallen_brothers_of.html |first=Tracy A |last=Bailey |title=Rangers Honor Fallen Brothers of Operation Gothic Serpent |publisher=ShadowSpear Special Operations |date=6 October 2008 |access-date=13 October 2008 |url-status = dead|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20100304072529/http://shadowspear.com/special-operations-news/rangers_honor_fallen_brothers_of.html |archive-date=4 March 2010 }}</ref>

===Escalation of insurgency and September Black Hawk shootdown===
As American casualties started to mount in Somalia, domestic backlash in the United States grew. [[Bipartisanship|Bipartisan]] support from the [[United States Senate|US senate]] began to build for a withdrawal. By August 1993, it was evident to the [[Presidency of Bill Clinton|Clinton administration]] that a strategy shift was necessary to retain domestic support for US involvement in Somalia. This shift was signaled by [[United States Secretary of Defense|Defense Secretary]] [[Les Aspin]] in his 27 August speech, advocating for a decreased military focus in UNOSOM II and urging the UN and the [[Organisation of African Unity|OAU]] to resume negotiations with all parties. Both the [[United States Secretary of State|US Secretary of State]] and the [[National security advisor|National Security Advisor]] pushed for a shift towards [[diplomacy]].<ref name=":253">{{Cite book |last=Wheeler |first=Nicholas J. |url=https://academic.oup.com/book/276 |title=Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in International Society |publisher=Oxford University Press |year=2002 |isbn=9780191600302 |chapter=From Famine Relief to 'Humanitarian War': The US and UN Intervention in Somalia}}</ref> Certain US officials advocated for a more aggressive response, among them was Ambassador Robert R. Gosende from the [[United States Department of State|State Department]]. Gosende had written a cable recommending the deployment of thousands of additional troops and urged the abandonment of all diplomatic engagements with the SNA. Contrarily, General [[Joseph P. Hoar]], who was at the helm of [[United States Central Command|CENTCOM]], expressed sharp disagreement with Gosende's approach. In a confidential memo, General Hoar articulated his belief that if more American troops were needed, then control of Mogadishu was already lost.{{Sfn|Peterson|2000|p=109}}<ref name=":253" />

During September, tensions escalated after incidents where UNOSOM troops fired on civilian demonstrators.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Brauman |first=Rony |author-link=Rony Brauman |date=September 1993 |title=Somalia: A Humanitarian Crime |url=https://msf-crash.org/en/war-and-humanitarianism/somalia-humanitarian-crime |access-date=2025-02-14 |website=msf-crash.org |publisher=[[Doctors Without Borders]] |language=en |quote=in September 1993, when during the repression of demonstrations dozens of civilians were cut down by the machine guns of international peacekeeping troops, the UN continued to pursue a tension-filled strategy}}</ref> That month, Somali insurgent used RPGs to attack U.S. Army Black Hawk helicopters, damaging at least one that managed to return to base. Then, at 2 a.m. on 25 September—a week before the Battle of Mogadishu—the SNA used an RPG to shoot down a Black Hawk (callsign Courage 53) while it was on patrol.<ref name=":7">{{Cite news |agency=Reuters |date=25 September 1993 |title=3 Killed as U.S. Chopper Is Shot Down in Somalia |language=en-US |work=The New York Times |url=https://www.nytimes.com/1993/09/25/world/3-killed-as-us-chopper-is-shot-down-in-somalia.html |access-date=17 March 2022 |issn=0362-4331}}</ref><ref name=":8">{{Cite news |last=Lorch |first=Donatella |date=26 September 1993 |title=Hunted Somali General Lashes Out |language=en-US |work=The New York Times |url=https://www.nytimes.com/1993/09/26/world/hunted-somali-general-lashes-out.html |access-date=17 March 2022 |issn=0362-4331}}</ref> The pilots were able to fly their burning aircraft away from Aideed's turf to the more UNOSOM-friendly port of Mogadishu and make a crash landing. The pilot and co-pilot survived, but three crew members were killed. A shootout ensued as peacekeepers fought to the helicopter.<ref name=":8" /> The event was a propaganda victory for the [[Somali National Alliance|SNA]].{{sfn|Bowden|2010|page=133}}<ref>{{cite book |last=Chun |first=Clayton K.S. |title=Gothic Serpent: Black Hawk Down, Mogadishu 1993. Osprey Raid Series #31 |publisher=[[Osprey Publishing]] |year=2012 |page=32}}</ref><ref name=":9">{{Cite news |last=Richburg |first=Keith |date=26 September 1993 |title=3 GIs Killed as Somalis Down Helicopter|url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1993/09/26/3-gis-killed-as-somalis-down-helicopter/70f8e493-6e8f-44b3-b760-7a2e00e0df17/ |newspaper=The Washington Post}}</ref> The chief UNOSOM II spokesman in Mogadishu, U.S. Army Maj. David Stockwell, referred to the downing as "a very lucky shot."<ref name=":9" />