Editing Battle of Midway (section)

==Background==
[[File:Japanese expansion april 1942.svg|thumb|upright=1.5|left|The extent of Japanese military expansion in the Pacific, April 1942]]

After expanding the war in the Pacific to include western colonies, the [[Empire of Japan|Japanese Empire]] quickly attained its initial strategic goals of [[Battle of Hong Kong|British Hong Kong]], the [[Philippines campaign (1941–1942)|Philippines]], [[Japanese invasion of Malaya|British Malaya]], [[Battle of Singapore|Singapore]], and the [[Dutch East Indies campaign|Dutch East Indies]], the latter of whose oil resources were particularly important to Japan. Because of this, preliminary planning for the second phase of operations commenced as early as January 1942.

Because of strategic disagreements between the [[Imperial Japanese Army|Imperial Army]] (IJA) and [[Imperial Japanese Navy|Imperial Navy]] (IJN), and infighting between the Navy's [[Imperial General Headquarters]] and Admiral [[Yamamoto Isoroku|Isoroku Yamamoto's]] [[Combined Fleet]], a follow-up strategy was not formed until April 1942.<ref>{{Harvnb|Prange|Goldstein|Dillon|1982|pp=13–15, 21–23}}; {{Harvnb|Willmott|1983|pp=39–49}}; {{Harvnb|Parshall|Tully|2005|pp=22–38}}</ref> Yamamoto finally won the bureaucratic struggle with a thinly veiled threat to resign, after which his plan was adopted.<ref>{{Harvnb|Parshall|Tully|2005|p=33}}; {{Harvnb|Prange|Goldstein|Dillon|1982|p=23}}</ref> Yamamoto's primary strategic goal was the elimination of America's carrier forces, which he regarded as the principal threat to the overall [[Pacific War|Pacific campaign]]. This concern was acutely heightened by the [[Doolittle Raid]] on 18 April 1942, in which 16 [[United States Army Air Forces]] (USAAF) [[North American B-25 Mitchell|B-25 Mitchell]] bombers launched from {{USS|Hornet|CV-8|6}} bombed targets in Tokyo and several other Japanese cities. The raid, while militarily insignificant, was a shock to the Japanese and highlighted a gap in the defenses around the [[Japanese archipelago|Japanese home islands]] as well as the vulnerability of Japanese territory to American bombers.<ref>{{Harvnb|Prange|Goldstein|Dillon|1982|pp=22–26}}</ref>

This, and other [[Marshalls–Gilberts raids|successful hit-and-run raids]] by American carriers in the South Pacific, showed that they were still a threat, although seemingly reluctant to be drawn into all-out battle.<ref>{{Harvnb|Parshall|Tully|2005|pp=31–32}}</ref> Yamamoto reasoned that another air attack on [[Naval Station Pearl Harbor]] would induce all of the American fleet to sail out to fight, including the carriers. However, considering the increased strength of American land-based airpower on the [[Hawaiian Islands]] since the 7 December 1941 attack, he judged that it was too risky to attack Pearl Harbor directly.<ref>{{Harvnb|Parshall|Tully|2005|p=33}}</ref>

Instead, Yamamoto selected [[Midway Atoll|Midway]], a tiny [[atoll]] at the extreme northwest end of the Hawaiian Island chain, approximately {{cvt|1300|mi|nmi km|lk=off|abbr=off}} from [[Oahu]]. Midway was outside the effective range of almost all the American aircraft stationed on the main Hawaiian Islands. It was not especially important in the larger scheme of Japan's intentions, but the Japanese felt the Americans would consider Midway a vital outpost of Pearl Harbor and would be compelled to defend it vigorously.<ref>{{Harvnb|Willmott|1983|pp=66–67}}; {{Harvnb|Parshall|Tully|2005|pp=33–34}}</ref> The U.S. did consider Midway vital: after the battle, the establishment of a [[United States Navy submarine bases#Closed bases|U.S. submarine base]] on [[Naval Air Facility Midway Island]] allowed [[submarine]]s operating from Pearl Harbor to refuel and re-provision, extending their radius of operations by {{cvt|1200|mi}}. In addition to serving as a seaplane base, Midway's airstrips were a [[Forward operating base|forward staging point]] for bomber attacks on [[Wake Island#World War II|Wake Island]].<ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.fws.gov/refuge/Midway_Atoll/preserving_the_past/After_the_Battle_of_Midway.html |title=After the Battle of Midway |publisher=Midway Atoll National Wildlife Refuge |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090115090812/http://www.fws.gov/midway/postwar.html |archive-date=15 January 2009}}</ref>

===Yamamoto's plan===
[[File:Midway Atoll.jpg|thumb|[[Midway Atoll]], several months before the battle. Eastern Island (with the airfield) is in the foreground, and the larger Sand Island is in the background to the west.]]

Typical of Japanese naval planning during World War II, Yamamoto's battle plan for taking Midway (named Operation MI) was exceedingly complex.<ref>{{Harvnb|Prange|Goldstein|Dillon|1982|pp=375–379}}; {{Harvnb|Willmott|1983|pp=110–117}}; {{Harvnb|Parshall|Tully|2005|p=52}}</ref> It required the careful coordination of multiple battle groups over hundreds of miles of open sea. His design was also predicated on optimistic intelligence suggesting that {{USS|Enterprise|CV-6|6}} and USS ''Hornet'', forming [[Task Force 16]], were the only carriers available to the [[United States Pacific Fleet|Pacific Fleet]]. During the [[Battle of the Coral Sea]] one month earlier, {{USS|Lexington|CV-2|6}} had been sunk and {{USS|Yorktown|CV-5|6}} suffered so much damage that the Japanese believed she too had been lost.<ref>{{Harvnb|Parshall|Tully|2005|p=63}}</ref> However, following hasty repairs at Pearl Harbor, ''Yorktown'' sortied and ultimately played a critical role in the discovery and eventual destruction of the Japanese fleet carriers at Midway. Finally, much of Yamamoto's planning, coinciding with the general feeling among the Japanese leadership at the time, was based on a gross misjudgment of American morale which was believed to be debilitated from the string of Japanese victories in the preceding months.<ref>{{Harvnb|Parshall|Tully|2005|p=50}}</ref>

Yamamoto felt deception would be required to lure the U.S. fleet into a fatally compromised situation.<ref>{{Harvnb|Parshall|Tully|2005|p=53}}, derived from Japanese War History Series (''Senshi Sōsho''), Volume 43 ('Middowei Kaisen'), p. 118.</ref> To this end, he dispersed his forces so that their full extent (particularly his [[battleship]]s) would be concealed from the Americans prior to battle. Critically, Yamamoto's supporting battleships and cruisers trailed Vice Admiral [[Chūichi Nagumo]]'s carrier force by several hundred miles. They were intended to come up and destroy whatever elements of the American fleet might come to Midway's defense once Nagumo's carriers had weakened them sufficiently for a daylight gun battle.<ref name="Tully, pp. 51, 55">{{Harvnb|Parshall|Tully|2005|pp=51, 55}}</ref> This tactic was doctrine in most major navies of the time.<ref>{{Harvnb|Parshall|Tully|2005|pp=43–45}}, derived from ''[[Senshi Sōsho]]'', p. 196.</ref>

What Yamamoto did not know was that the U.S. had broken parts of the main Japanese naval code (dubbed [[JN-25]] by the Americans), divulging many details of his plan. His emphasis on dispersal also meant none of his formations were in a position to support the others.<ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.combinedfleet.com/guadoil1.htm |title=Oil and Japanese Strategy in the Solomons: A Postulate |website=combinedfleet.com |access-date=17 October 2017 |archive-date=14 August 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210814183126/http://www.combinedfleet.com/guadoil1.htm |url-status=live}}</ref> For instance, although Nagumo's carriers were expected to carry out strikes against Midway and bear the brunt of American counterattacks, the only warships in his fleet larger than the screening force of twelve destroyers were two {{sclass|Kongō|battlecruiser|0}} [[fast battleship]]s, two heavy cruisers, and one light cruiser. By contrast, Yamamoto and Kondo had between them two light carriers, five battleships, four heavy cruisers, and two light cruisers, none of which saw action at Midway.<ref name="Tully, pp. 51, 55" />

The light carriers of the trailing forces and Yamamoto's three battleships were unable to keep pace with the carriers of the ''[[Kidō Butai]]'' (機動部隊, "Mobile Strike Force") and so could not sail in company with them. The ''Kidō Butai'' would sail into range at best speed so as to increase the chance of surprise and would not have ships spread out across the ocean guiding the USN toward it. If the other parts of the invasion force needed more defense, the ''Kidō Butai'' would make best speed to defend them. Hence the slower ships could not be with the ''Kidō Butai''. The distance between Yamamoto and Kondo's forces and Nagumo's carriers had grave implications during the battle. The invaluable reconnaissance capability of the [[scout plane]]s carried by the cruisers and carriers, and the additional anti-aircraft capability of the cruisers and the other two battleships of the ''Kongō''-class in the trailing forces, were unavailable to help Nagumo.<ref>{{Harvnb|Parshall|Tully|2005|pp=55–56}}</ref>

===Aleutian invasion===
{{Main|Aleutian Islands campaign}}
To obtain support from the IJA for the Midway operation, the IJN agreed to support their [[Aleutian Islands campaign|invasion of the United States]] through the [[Aleutian Islands]] of [[Attu Island|Attu]] and [[Kiska]], part of the [[Territory of Alaska|Alaska Territory]]. The IJA occupied these islands to place the Japanese home islands out of range of U.S. land-based bombers in Alaska. Most Americans feared that the occupied islands would be used as bases for Japanese bombers to attack strategic targets and population centers along the [[West Coast of the United States|U.S. West Coast]].

The Japanese operations in the Aleutians (Operation AL) removed yet more ships that could otherwise have augmented the force striking Midway. Whereas many earlier historical accounts considered [[Aleutian_Islands_campaign#Japanese_attack|the Aleutians operation]] as a feint to draw American forces away, according to the original Japanese battle plan, AL was intended to be launched simultaneously with the attack on Midway. A one-day delay in the sailing of Nagumo's task force resulted in Operation AL beginning a day before the Midway attack.<ref>{{Harvnb|Parshall|Tully|2005|pp=43–45}}, derived from ''Senshi Sōsho'', pp. 119–121.</ref>