Editing Battle of Jutland (section)

==Background and planning==

===German planning===
With 16 [[dreadnought]]-type battleships, compared with the Royal Navy's 28, the German [[High Seas Fleet]] stood little chance of winning a head-to-head clash. The Germans therefore adopted a [[Defeat in detail|divide-and-conquer strategy]]. They would stage raids into the North Sea and bombard the English coast, with the aim of luring out small British squadrons and pickets, which could then be destroyed by superior forces or submarines.
In January 1916, Admiral [[Hugo von Pohl|von Pohl]], commander of the German fleet, fell ill. He was replaced by Scheer, who believed that the fleet had been used too defensively, had better ships and men than the British, and ought to take the war to them.{{sfn|Tarrant|1995|p=49}}According to Scheer, the German [[naval strategy]] should be:

{{Blockquote|to damage the English fleet by offensive raids against the naval forces engaged in watching and blockading the [[German Bight]], as well as by [[naval mine|mine]]-laying on the British coast and [[submarine]] attack, whenever possible. After an equality of strength had been realised as a result of these operations, and all our forces had been made ready and concentrated, an attempt was to be made with our fleet to seek battle under circumstances unfavourable to the enemy.}}

[[File:Almirante Reinhard Scheer.jpg|thumb|upright|[[Reinhard Scheer]], German fleet commander]]

On 25 April 1916, a decision was made by the [[German Imperial Admiralty]] to halt indiscriminate attacks by submarines on merchant shipping. This followed protests from neutral countries, notably the United States, that their nationals had been the victims of attacks. Germany agreed that future attacks would only take place in accord with internationally agreed prize rules, which required an attacker to give a warning and allow the crews of vessels time to escape, and not to attack neutral vessels at all. Scheer believed that it would not be possible to continue attacks on these terms, which took away the advantage of secret approach by submarines and left them vulnerable to even relatively small guns on the target ships. Instead, he set about deploying the submarine fleet against military vessels.{{sfn|Tarrant|1995|p=55}}

It was hoped that, following a successful German submarine attack, fast British escorts, such as [[destroyer]]s, would be tied down by anti-submarine operations. If the Germans could catch the British in the expected locations, good prospects were thought to exist of at least partially redressing the balance of forces between the fleets. "After the British sortied in response to the raiding attack force", the Royal Navy's centuries-old instincts for aggressive action could be exploited to draw its weakened units towards the main German fleet under Scheer. The hope was that Scheer would thus be able to ambush a section of the British fleet and destroy it.{{sfn|Campbell|1998|p=2}}

====Submarine deployments====
A plan was devised to station submarines offshore from British naval bases, and then stage some action that would draw out the British ships to the waiting submarines. The battlecruiser {{SMS|Seydlitz}} had been damaged in a previous engagement, but was due to be repaired by mid-May, so an operation was scheduled for 17 May 1916. At the start of May, difficulties with condensers were discovered on ships of the third battleship squadron, so the operation was put back to 23 May. Ten submarines—{{SMU|U-24||2}}, {{SMU|U-32|Germany|2}}, {{SMU|U-43|Germany|2}}, {{SMU|U-44||2}}, {{SMU|UC-47||2}}, {{SMU|U-51||2}}, {{SMU|U-52||2}}, {{SMU|U-63|Germany|2}}, {{SMU|U-66||2}}, and {{SMU|U-70||2}}—were given orders first to patrol in the central [[North Sea]] between 17 and 22 May, and then to take up waiting positions. ''U-43'' and ''U-44'' were stationed in the [[Pentland Firth]], which the Grand Fleet was likely to cross when leaving [[Scapa Flow]], while the remainder proceeded to the [[Firth of Forth]], awaiting battlecruisers departing [[Rosyth Dockyard|Rosyth]]. Each boat had an allocated area, within which it could move around as necessary to avoid detection, but was instructed to keep within it. During the initial North Sea patrol the boats were instructed to sail only north–south so that any enemy who chanced to encounter one would believe it was departing or returning from operations on the west coast (which required them to pass around the north of Britain). Once at their final positions, the boats were under strict orders to avoid premature detection that might give away the operation. It was arranged that a coded signal would be transmitted to alert the submarines exactly when the operation commenced: "Take into account the enemy's forces may be putting to sea".{{sfn|Tarrant|1995|pp=56–57}}

Additionally, ''UB-27'' was sent out on 20 May with instructions to work its way into the Firth of Forth past [[Isle of May|May Island]]. ''U-46'' was ordered to patrol the coast of [[Sunderland, Tyne and Wear|Sunderland]], which had been chosen for the diversionary attack, but because of engine problems it was unable to leave port and ''U-47'' was diverted to this task. On 13 May, ''U-72'' was sent to lay mines in the Firth of Forth; on the 23rd, ''U-74'' departed to lay mines in the [[Moray Firth]]; and on the 24th, ''U-75'' was dispatched similarly west of the [[Orkney Islands]]. ''UB-21'' and ''UB-22'' were sent to patrol the Humber, where (incorrect) reports had suggested the presence of British warships. ''U-22'', ''U-46'' and ''U-67'' were positioned north of [[Terschelling]] to protect against intervention by British light forces stationed at [[Harwich]].{{sfn|Tarrant|1995|pp=57–58}}

On 22 May 1916, it was discovered that ''Seydlitz'' was still not watertight after repairs and would not now be ready until the 29th. The ambush submarines were now on station and experiencing difficulties of their own: visibility near the coast was frequently poor due to fog, and sea conditions were either so calm the slightest ripple, as from the periscope, could give away their position, or so rough as to make it very hard to keep the vessel at a steady depth. The British had become aware of unusual submarine activity, and had begun counter-patrols that forced the submarines out of position. ''UB-27'' passed [[Bell Rock Lighthouse|Bell Rock]] on the night of 23 May on its way into the Firth of Forth as planned, but was halted by engine trouble. After repairs it continued to approach, following behind merchant vessels, and reached [[Largo Bay]] on 25 May. There the boat became entangled in nets that fouled one of the propellers, forcing it to abandon the operation and return home. ''U-74'' was detected by four [[Trawlers of the Royal Navy|armed trawlers]] on 27 May and sunk {{cvt|25|mi|nmi km}} south-east of [[Peterhead]]. ''U-75'' laid its mines off the Orkney Islands, which, although they played no part in the battle, were responsible later for sinking the cruiser {{HMS|Hampshire|1903|2}} carrying [[Herbert Kitchener|Lord Kitchener]], the [[Secretary of State for War]] on 5 June, killing him and all but 12 of the crew. ''U-72'' was forced to abandon its mission without laying any mines when an oil leak meant it was leaving a visible surface trail astern.{{sfn|Tarrant|1995|pp=58–60}}

====Zeppelins====

[[File:Carte Skagerrak-Kattegat2.png|thumb|The throat of the [[Skagerrak]], the strategic gateway to the Baltic and North Atlantic, waters off Jutland, Norway and Sweden]]
The Germans maintained a fleet of [[Zeppelin]]s that they used for aerial reconnaissance and occasional bombing raids. The planned raid on Sunderland intended to use Zeppelins to watch out for the British fleet approaching from the north, which might otherwise surprise the raiders.
By 28 May, strong north-easterly winds meant that it would not be possible to send out the Zeppelins, so the raid again had to be postponed. The submarines could only stay on station until 1 June before their supplies would be exhausted and they had to return, so a decision had to be made quickly about the raid. It was decided to use an alternative plan, abandoning the attack on Sunderland but instead sending a patrol of battlecruisers to the [[Skagerrak]], where it was likely they would encounter merchant ships carrying British cargo and British cruiser patrols. It was felt this could be done without air support, because the action would now be much closer to Germany, relying instead on cruiser and torpedo boat patrols for reconnaissance.{{sfn|Jellicoe|2018|p=97}}

Orders for the alternative plan were issued on 28 May, although it was still hoped that last-minute improvements in the weather would allow the original plan to go ahead. The German fleet assembled in the [[Jade (river)|Jade River]] and at [[Wilhelmshaven]] and was instructed to raise steam and be ready for action from midnight on 28 May.{{sfn|Tarrant|1995|p=61}} By 14:00 on 30 May, the wind was still too strong and the final decision was made to use the alternative plan. The coded signal "31 May G.G.2490" was transmitted to the ships of the fleet to inform them the Skagerrak attack would start on 31 May. The pre-arranged signal to the waiting submarines was transmitted throughout the day from the E-Dienst radio station at [[Bruges]], and the U-boat tender ''Arcona'' anchored at [[Emden]]. Only two of the waiting submarines, ''U-66'' and ''U-32'', received the order.{{sfn|Tarrant|1995|pp=62, 60, 65}}

===British response===
Unfortunately for the German plan, the British had obtained a copy of the main German codebook from the light cruiser {{SMS|Magdeburg||6}}, which had been boarded by the [[Imperial Russian Navy|Russian Navy]] after the ship ran aground in Russian [[territorial waters]] in 1914. German naval radio communications could therefore often be quickly deciphered, and the British Admiralty usually knew about German activities.

The [[British Admiralty]]'s [[Room 40]] maintained [[direction finding]] and interception of German naval signals. It had intercepted and decrypted a German signal on 28 May that provided "ample evidence that the German fleet was stirring in the North Sea".{{sfn|Stille|2010|p=56}} Further signals were intercepted, and although they were not decrypted it was clear that a major operation was likely. At 11:00 on 30 May, Jellicoe was warned that the German fleet seemed prepared to sail the following morning. By 17:00, the Admiralty had intercepted the signal from Scheer, "31 May G.G.2490", making it clear something significant was imminent.{{sfn|Tarrant|1995|pp=63–64}}

Not knowing the Germans' objective, Jellicoe and his staff decided to position the fleet to head off any attempt by the Germans to enter the North Atlantic or the [[Baltic Sea|Baltic]] through the Skagerrak, by taking up a position off Norway where they could potentially cut off any German raid into the shipping lanes of the Atlantic or prevent the Germans from heading into the Baltic. A position further west was unnecessary, as that area of the North Sea could be patrolled by air.{{citation needed|date = May 2012}}

[[File:John Jellicoe, Admiral of the Fleet.jpg|thumb|upright|[[John Jellicoe, 1st Earl Jellicoe|John Jellicoe]], British fleet commander]]
Consequently, Admiral Jellicoe led the sixteen dreadnought battleships of the 1st and 4th Battle Squadrons of the Grand Fleet and three battlecruisers of the 3rd Battlecruiser Squadron eastwards out of Scapa Flow at 22:30 on 30 May. He was to meet the 2nd Battle Squadron of eight dreadnought battleships commanded by Vice-Admiral [[Martyn Jerram]] coming from [[Cromarty]]. Beatty's force of six ships of the 1st and 2nd Battlecruiser Squadrons plus the [[5th Battle Squadron (United Kingdom)#Battle of Jutland|5th Battle Squadron]] of four fast battleships left the Firth of Forth at around the same time;{{sfn|Gordon |1996 |pp=63–65}} Jellicoe intended to rendezvous with him {{cvt|90|mi|nmi km}} west of the mouth of the Skagerrak off the coast of Jutland and wait for the Germans to appear or for their intentions to become clear. The planned position would give him the widest range of responses to likely German moves.{{sfn|Tarrant|1995|p=64}} Hipper's raiding force did not leave the [[Jade Estuary|Outer Jade Roads]] until 01:00 on 31 May, heading west of Heligoland Island following a cleared channel through the minefields, heading north at {{convert|16|kn|lk=in}}. The main German fleet of sixteen dreadnought battleships of 1st and 3rd Battle Squadrons left the Jade at 02:30, being joined off Heligoland at 04:00 by the six pre-dreadnoughts of the 2nd Battle Squadron coming from the Elbe River.{{citation needed|date=May 2025}}