Editing Battle of Blenheim (section)

==Background==
[[File:John Churchill Marlborough porträtterad av Adriaen van der Werff (1659-1722).jpg|thumb|left|upright|Portrait of the Duke of Marlborough by [[Adriaen van der Werff]] (December 1704) [[Uffizi]]]]

By 1704, the [[War of the Spanish Succession]] was in its fourth year. The previous year had been one of successes for France and her allies, most particularly on the [[Danube]], where Marshal [[Claude-Louis-Hector de Villars]] and [[Maximilian II Emanuel, Elector of Bavaria]], had created a direct threat to [[Vienna]], the [[Habsburg monarchy|Habsburg]] capital.{{sfn|Chandler|2003|p=124}} Vienna had been saved by dissension between the two commanders, leading to Villars being replaced by the less dynamic Marshal [[Ferdinand de Marsin]]. Nevertheless, the threat was still real: [[Francis II Rákóczi|Rákóczi]]'s Hungarian revolt was threatening the Empire's eastern approaches, and Marshal [[Louis Joseph, Duke of Vendôme]]'s forces threatened an invasion from northern Italy.{{sfn|Lynn|2013|p=285}} In the courts of [[Versailles]] and [[Madrid]], Vienna's fall was confidently anticipated, an event which would almost certainly have led to the collapse of the [[Treaty of The Hague (1701)|reconstituted Grand Alliance]].{{sfn|Chandler|2003|p=125}}

To isolate the Danube from any Allied intervention, Marshal [[François de Neufville, duc de Villeroi]]'s 46,000 troops were expected to pin the 70,000 Dutch and British troops around [[Maastricht]] in the [[Low Countries]], while General [[Robert Jean Antoine de Franquetot de Coigny]] protected [[Alsace]] against surprise with a further corps.{{sfn|Chandler|2003|p=124}} The only forces immediately available for Vienna's defence were the imperial army under [[Louis William, Margrave of Baden-Baden|Margrave Louis William of Baden]] of 36,000 men stationed in the [[Lines of Stollhofen]] to watch Marshal [[Camille d'Hostun, duc de Tallard]], at [[Strasbourg]]; and 10,000 men under [[Prince Eugene of Savoy]] south of [[Ulm]].{{sfn|Tucker|2009|pp=693–694}}{{sfn|Tucker|2015|p=200}}

Various Allied statesmen, including the Imperial Austrian Ambassador in London, [[John Wenceslau Wratislaw von Mitrowitz|Count Wratislaw]], and the [[Duke of Marlborough]] realised the implications of the situation on the Danube.{{sfn|Chandler|2003|p=127}} To maintain secrecy, Marlborough kept his plans hidden from both the [[Dutch States General]] and the [[Parliament of England]]. In the Dutch Republic, only a select few – [[Grand Pensionary]] [[Anthonie Heinsius]], [[Simon van Slingelandt]], [[:nl:Jacob Hop|Jacob Hop]], and [[:nl:François Fagel (1659-1746)|François Fagel]] – were privy to his strategy from the outset. In England, Marlborough confided only in [[Sidney Godolphin, 1st Earl of Godolphin|Sidney Godolphin]], [[Anne, Queen of Great Britain|Queen Anne]], and [[Prince George of Denmark|her husband]].{{sfn|Nimwegen|1995|p=135}} Marlborough, realising the only way to reinforce the Austrians was by the use of secrecy and guile, pretended to move his troops to the [[Moselle]] – a plan approved of by the Dutch States General – but once there, he would move further and link up with Austrian forces in southern Germany.{{sfn|Chandler|2003|p=127}}{{efn|Historians have often argued that Marlborough kept his plans secret from the Dutch Republic because he believed they would never allow him to weaken the army in the Low Countries. However, this is not entirely correct. Marlborough could not undertake any action without consultation with the Dutch,{{sfn|Nimwegen|2020|pp=270–272}} because without them, the army's logistics system would have simply collapsed.{{sfn|Ostwald|2000|p=664}} Intensive consultations preceded the campaign and the four most important Dutch politicians knew of Marlborough's secret plan to link up with Austrian forces from the start.{{sfn|Nimwegen|1995|p=135}}}}

The Dutch diplomat and [[Field deputies (Dutch Republic)|field deputy]] [[Adolf Hendrik van Rechteren, Lord of Almelo|Van Rechteren-Almelo]] would come to play an important role. He made sure that on their 450-kilometre-long march, the Allies would nowhere be denied passage by local rulers, nor would they need to look for provisions, horsefeed or new boots. He also saw to it that sufficient stopovers were arranged along the way to ensure that the Allies arrived at their destination in good condition. This was of paramount importance, for the success of the operation depended on a quick elimination of the Bavarian elector. However, it was not possible to make the logistical arrangements in advance that would have been indispensable to supply the Allied army south of the Danube. For this, the Allies should have had access to the [[free imperial cities]] of Ulm and [[Augsburg]], but the Bavarian elector had taken these two cities. This could have become a problem for Marlborough had the Elector avoided a battle and instead entrenched himself south of the Danube. Had Villeroy then managed to take advantage of the weakening of Allied forces in the Netherlands by recapturing [[Liège]] and besieging Maastricht, it would have validated the concerns of some of his Dutch adversaries, who were against any major weakening of the forces in the [[Spanish Netherlands]].{{sfn|Nimwegen|2020|pp=270–272}}