Editing Balfour Declaration (section)

== Background ==

=== Early British support ===
[[File:Memorandum to Protestant Monarchs of Europe for the restoration of the Jews to Palestine, Colonial Times 1841.jpg|thumb|"Memorandum to the Protestant Powers of the North of Europe and America", published in the ''[[Colonial Times]]'' (Hobart, Tasmania, Australia), in 1841]]
Early British political support for an increased Jewish presence in the [[Palestine (region)|region of Palestine]] was based upon geopolitical calculations.{{sfn|Renton|2007|p=2}}{{efn|group=lower-roman|Renton described this as follows: "A crucial aspect of this depiction of the Declaration as a product of British benevolence, as opposed to realpolitik, was that the British had a natural and deep-rooted concern for the rights of Jews and specifically their national restoration, which was an ingrained part of British culture and history. Presented in this way, the Declaration was shown to be a natural, almost preordained event. Hence, Zionism was presented not just as the ''[[Telos (philosophy)|telos]]'' of Jewish history but also of British history. The tendency of nationalist and Zionist histories to develop towards a single point of destiny and redemption allowed for, indeed required, such an explanation. The myth of British 'proto-Zionism', which has had such a longstanding influence on the historiography of the Balfour Declaration, was thus produced, so as to serve the needs of Zionist propagandists working for the British Government."{{sfn|Renton|2007|p=85}}}} This support began in the early 1840s{{sfn|Schölch|1992|p=44}} and was led by [[Henry John Temple, 3rd Viscount Palmerston|Lord Palmerston]], following the [[Egyptian–Ottoman War (1831–33)|occupation of Syria]] and [[Peasants' revolt in Palestine|Palestine]] by [[separatism|separatist]] Ottoman governor [[Muhammad Ali of Egypt]].{{sfn|Stein|1961|pp=5–9}}{{sfn|Liebreich|2004|pp=8–9}} French influence had grown in Palestine and the wider Middle East, and its role as protector of the [[Catholic church|Catholic]] communities [[Règlement Organique (Mount Lebanon)|began to grow]], just as Russian influence had grown as protector of the [[Eastern Orthodox Church|Eastern Orthodox]] in the same regions. This left Britain without a [[sphere of influence]],{{sfn|Stein|1961|pp=5–9}} and thus a need to find or create their own regional "protégés".{{sfn|Schölch|1992|p=41}} These political considerations were supported by a sympathetic evangelical Christian sentiment towards the "[[Christian Zionism|restoration of the Jews]]" to Palestine among elements of the mid-19th-century British political elite – most notably [[Anthony Ashley-Cooper, 7th Earl of Shaftesbury|Lord Shaftesbury]].{{efn|group=lower-roman|Donald Lewis writes: "It is the contention of this work that only by understanding [Christian philosemitism and Christian Zionism] can one make sense of the religious and cultural influences that worked together to create a climate of opinion among the political elite in Britain that was well disposed to the Balfour Declaration."{{sfn|Lewis|2014|p=10}}}} The British Foreign Office actively encouraged Jewish emigration to Palestine, exemplified by [[Charles Henry Churchill]]'s 1841–1842 exhortations to [[Moses Montefiore]], the leader of the British Jewish community.{{sfn|Friedman|1973|p=xxxii}}{{efn|group=qt|Montefiore was the wealthiest British Jew, and leader of the [[Board of Deputies of British Jews]]. Charles Henry Churchill's first letter, in 1841, intended to catalyse an interest in Jewish emigration to Palestine: "Supposing that you and your colleagues should at once and earnestly interest yourselves upon this important subject of the recovery of your ancient country, it appears to me (forming my opinions upon the present attitude of affairs in the Turkish Empire) that it could only be as subjects of the Porte that you could commence to regain a footing in Palestine."{{sfn|Friedman|1973|p=xxxii}}}}

Such efforts were premature,{{sfn|Friedman|1973|p=xxxii}} and did not succeed;{{efn|group=lower-roman|With respect to European schemes to encourage Protestant, Catholic and Jewish immigration to Palestine, Schölch notes that "But of the many colonization projects and enterprises, only two had any success: the settlements of [[Templers (religious believers)|Templars]] since 1868 and those of Jewish immigrants since 1882."{{sfn|Schölch|1992|p=51}}}} only 24,000 Jews were living in Palestine on the eve of the emergence of [[Zionism]] within the world's Jewish communities in the last two decades of the 19th century.{{sfn|Cleveland|Bunton|2016|p=229}} With the geopolitical shakeup occasioned by the outbreak of the [[First World War]], the earlier calculations, which had lapsed for some time, led to a renewal of strategic assessments and political bargaining over the Middle and Far East.{{sfn|Liebreich|2004|pp=8–9}}

==== British anti-Semitism ====
Although other factors played their part, [[Jonathan Schneer]] says that stereotypical thinking by British officials about Jews also played a role in the decision to issue the Declaration. Robert Cecil, Hugh O’Bierne and Sir Mark Sykes all held an unrealistic view of "world Jewry", the former writing "I do not think it is possible to exaggerate the international power of the Jews." Zionist representatives saw advantage in encouraging such views.{{sfn|Schneer|2010|p=343}}<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://foreignpolicy.com/2010/09/08/how-anti-semitism-helped-create-israel-2/|title=How Anti-Semitism Helped Create Israel|first=Jonathan|last=Schneer|date=8 September 2010 |ref=none}}</ref> James Renton concurs, writing that the British foreign policy elite, including Prime Minister David Lloyd George and Foreign Secretary A.J. Balfour, believed that Jews possessed real and significant power that could be of use to them in the war.<ref>{{Cite news|last=Renton|first=James|date=26 October 2017|url=https://www.haaretz.com/opinion/2017-10-26/ty-article/the-balfour-declarations-racism-and-why-it-still-matters/0000017f-dba4-db22-a17f-ffb5fdd10000|title=The Balfour Declaration's Deep anti-Semitism and Racism - and Why It Still Matters|newspaper=Haaretz}}</ref>

=== Early Zionism ===
{{further|Zionism}}

Zionism arose in the late 19th century in reaction to anti-Semitic and exclusionary nationalist movements in Europe.{{sfn|Cohen|1989|pp=29–31}}{{efn|group=lower-roman|LeVine and Mossberg describe this as follows: "The parents of Zionism were not Judaism and tradition, but anti-Semitism and nationalism. The ideals of the French Revolution spread slowly across Europe, finally reaching the Pale of Settlement in the Russian Empire and helping to set off the Haskalah, or Jewish Enlightenment. This engendered a permanent split in the Jewish world, between those who held to a halachic or religious-centric vision of their identity and those who adopted in part the racial rhetoric of the time and made the Jewish people into a nation. This was helped along by the wave of pogroms in Eastern Europe that set two million Jews to flight; most wound up in America, but some chose Palestine. A driving force behind this was the Hovevei Zion movement, which worked from 1882 to develop a Hebrew identity that was distinct from Judaism as a religion."{{sfn|LeVine|Mossberg|2014|p=211}}}}{{efn|group=lower-roman|name=Gelvin2014|Gelvin wrote: "The fact that Palestinian nationalism developed later than Zionism and indeed in response to it does not in any way diminish the legitimacy of Palestinian nationalism or make it less valid than Zionism. All nationalisms arise in opposition to some 'other'. Why else would there be the need to specify who you are? And all nationalisms are defined by what they oppose. As we have seen, Zionism itself arose in reaction to anti-Semitic and exclusionary nationalist movements in Europe. It would be perverse to judge Zionism as somehow less valid than European anti-Semitism or those nationalisms. Furthermore, Zionism itself was also defined by its opposition to the indigenous Palestinian inhabitants of the region. Both the 'conquest of land' and the 'conquest of labor' slogans that became central to the dominant strain of Zionism in the Yishuv originated as a result of the Zionist confrontation with the Palestinian 'other'."{{sfn|Gelvin|2014|p=93}}}} [[Romantic nationalism]] in [[Central Europe|Central]] and [[Eastern Europe]] had helped to set off the [[Haskalah]], or "Jewish Enlightenment", creating a split in the Jewish community between those who saw Judaism as their religion and those who saw it as their ethnicity or nation.{{sfn|Cohen|1989|pp=29–31}}{{sfn|LeVine|Mossberg|2014|p=211}} The 1881–1884 [[anti-Jewish pogroms in the Russian Empire]] encouraged the growth of the latter identity, resulting in the formation of the [[Hovevei Zion]] pioneer organizations, the publication of [[Leon Pinsker]]'s ''[[Autoemancipation]]'', and the first major wave of Jewish immigration to Palestine – retrospectively named the "[[First Aliyah]]".{{sfn|Rhett|2015|p=106}}{{sfn|Cohen|1989|pp=31–32}}{{sfn|LeVine|Mossberg|2014|p=211}}

[[File:The "Basel Program" at the First Zionist Congress in 1897.jpg|thumb|left|The "[[Basel program]]" approved at the 1897 [[First Zionist Congress]]. The first line states: "Zionism seeks to establish a home (''Heimstätte'') for the Jewish people in Palestine secured under public law"]]

In 1896, [[Theodor Herzl]], a Jewish journalist living in [[Austria-Hungary]], published the foundational text of political Zionism, ''[[Der Judenstaat]]'' ("The Jews' State" or "The State of the Jews"), in which he asserted that the only solution to the "[[Jewish Question]]" in Europe, including growing anti-Semitism, was the establishment of a state for the Jews.{{sfn|Cohen|1989|pp=34–35}}{{sfn|Rhett|2015|pp=107–108}} A year later, Herzl founded the [[World Zionist Organization|Zionist Organization]], which at its [[First Zionist Congress|first congress]] called for the establishment of "a home for the Jewish people in Palestine secured under public law". Proposed measures to attain that goal included the promotion of Jewish settlement there, the organisation of Jews in the [[Jewish Diaspora|diaspora]], the strengthening of Jewish feeling and consciousness, and preparatory steps to attain necessary governmental grants.{{sfn|Rhett|2015|pp=107–108}} Herzl died in 1904, 44 years before the establishment of [[State of Israel]], the Jewish state that he proposed, without having gained the political standing required to carry out his agenda.{{sfn|Cleveland|Bunton|2016|p=229}}

Zionist leader [[Chaim Weizmann]], later President of the World Zionist Organisation and first [[President of Israel]], moved from Switzerland to the UK in 1904 and met [[Arthur Balfour]] – who had just launched his [[1906 United Kingdom general election|1905–1906 election campaign]] after resigning as Prime Minister{{sfn|Weizmann|1949|pp=93–109}} – in a session arranged by [[Charles Dreyfus]], his Jewish constituency representative.{{efn|group=lower-roman|name=Defries|Defries wrote: "Balfour had, at the least, acquiesced in Chamberlain's earlier efforts to assist the Jews in finding a territory to establish a Jewish settlement. According to his biographer he was interested enough in Zionism at the end of 1905 to allow his Jewish constituency party chairman, Charles Dreyfus, to organise a meeting with Weizmann. It is possible that he was intrigued by the rejection by the Zionist Congress of the 'Uganda' offer. It is unlikely that Balfour was 'converted' to Zionism by this encounter despite this view being propounded by Weizmann and endorsed by Balfour's biographer. Balfour had just resigned as prime minister when he met Weizmann."{{sfn|Defries|2014|p=51}}}} Earlier that year, Balfour had successfully driven the [[Aliens Act 1905|Aliens Act]] through Parliament with impassioned speeches regarding the need to restrict the wave of immigration into Britain from Jews fleeing the Russian Empire.{{sfn|Klug|2012|pp=199–210}}<ref>[[Hansard]], [https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/commons/1905/may/02/aliens-bill-1 Aliens Bill]: HC Deb 02 May 1905 vol 145 cc768-808; and [https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/commons/1905/jul/10/aliens-bill Aliens Bill], HC Deb 10 July 1905 vol 149 cc110-62</ref> During this meeting, he asked what Weizmann's objections had been to the 1903 [[Uganda Scheme]] that Herzl had supported to provide a portion of [[British East Africa]] to the Jewish people as a homeland. The scheme, which had been proposed to Herzl by [[Joseph Chamberlain]], [[Secretary of State for the Colonies|Colonial Secretary]] in Balfour's Cabinet, following his trip to East Africa earlier in the year,{{efn|group=lower-roman|Rovner wrote: "In the spring of 1903 the fastidiously dressed sixty-six-year-old secretary was fresh from a trip to British possessions in Africa&nbsp;... Whatever the genesis of the idea, Chamberlain received Herzl in his office just weeks after the Kishinev pogroms. He fixed Herzl in his monocle and offered his help. "I have seen a land for you on my travels," Chamberlain told him, "and that's Uganda. It's not on the coast, but farther inland the climate becomes excellent even for Europeans… [a]nd I thought to myself that would be a land for Dr. Herzl." "{{sfn|Rovner|2014|pp=51–52}}}} had been subsequently voted down following Herzl's death by the Seventh Zionist Congress in 1905{{efn|group=lower-roman|Rovner wrote: "On the afternoon of the fourth day of the Congress a weary Nordau brought three resolutions before the delegates: (1) that the Zionist Organization direct all future settlement efforts solely to Palestine; (2) that the Zionist Organization thank the British government for its offer of an autonomous territory in East Africa; and (3) that only those Jews who declare their allegiance to the Basel Program may become members of the Zionist Organization." Zangwill objected… When Nordau insisted on the Congress's right to pass the resolutions regardless, Zangwill was outraged. "You will be charged before the bar of history," he challenged Nordau… From approximately 1:30&nbsp;p.m. on Sunday, July&nbsp;30, 1905, a Zionist would henceforth be defined as someone who adhered to the Basel Program and the only "authentic interpretation" of that program restricted settlement activity exclusively to Palestine. Zangwill and his supporters could not accept Nordau's "authentic interpretation" which they believed would lead to an abandonment of the Jewish masses and of Herzl's vision. One territorialist claimed that Ussishkin's voting bloc had in fact "buried political Zionism"."{{sfn|Rovner|2014|p=81}}}} after two years of heated debate in the Zionist Organization.{{sfn|Rovner|2014|pp=51–81}} Weizmann responded that he believed the English are to London as the Jews are to [[Jerusalem]].{{efn|group=qt|According to Weizmann's memoir, the conversation went as follows: "Mr. Balfour, supposing I was to offer you Paris instead of London, would you take it?" He sat up, looked at me, and answered: "But Dr. Weizmann, we have London." "That is true," I said, "but we had Jerusalem when London was a marsh." He ... said two things which I remember vividly. The first was: "Are there many Jews who think like you?" I answered: "I believe I speak the mind of millions of Jews whom you will never see and who cannot speak for themselves." ... To this he said: "If that is so you will one day be a force." Shortly before I withdrew, Balfour said: "It is curious. The Jews I meet are quite different." I answered: "Mr. Balfour, you meet the wrong kind of Jews".{{sfn|Weizmann|1949|p=111}}}}

In January 1914 Weizmann first met [[Edmond James de Rothschild|Baron Edmond de Rothschild]], a member of the [[Rothschild banking family of France|French branch of the Rothschild family]] and a leading proponent of the Zionist movement,{{sfn|Lewis|2009|pp=73–74}} in relation to a project to build a Hebrew university in Jerusalem.{{sfn|Lewis|2009|pp=73–74}} The Baron was not part of the World Zionist Organization, but had funded the [[Moshava|Jewish agricultural colonies]] of the First Aliyah and transferred them to the [[Jewish Colonization Association]] in 1899.{{sfn|Penslar|2007|pp=138–139}} This connection was to bear fruit later that year when the Baron's son, [[James de Rothschild (politician)|James de{{nbsp}}Rothschild]], requested a meeting with Weizmann on 25{{nbsp}}November 1914, to enlist him in influencing those deemed to be receptive within the British government to the Zionist agenda in Palestine.{{efn|group=qt|Weizmann's notes of the meeting described that: "[James] thought that the Palestinian aspirations of the Jews will find a very favourable response in Government circles, which would support a project like that, both from a humanitarian and an English political point of view. The formation of a strong Jewish community in Palestine would be considered as a valuable political asset. He therefore thought that the demands which only amount to asking for an encouragement of colonization of Jews in Palestine are too modest and would not appeal sufficiently strongly to Statesmen. One should ask for something which is more than that and which tends towards the formation of a Jewish State."{{sfn|Gutwein|2016|pp=120–130}} Gutwein interpreted this discussion as follows: "James's recommendation that the Zionists should not stop at the demand for settlement of Jews in Palestine, but radicalize their demands for a Jewish state, reflected the political contrast between the reformists, who were prepared to support settlement of Jews in Palestine as part of the reorganization of the Ottoman Empire, and the radicals, who viewed a Jewish state as a means of partitioning it. Although James contended that the demand for a Jewish state would help in gaining the British statesmen's support, in view of Asquith's and Grey's opposition to this demand, it seems that the inaccuracy if not the misleading tenor of James's advice was meant to enlist Weizmann, and through him the Zionist movement, to assist the radicals and Lloyd George."{{sfn|Gutwein|2016|pp=120–130}}}}{{sfn|Schneer|2010|pp=129–130|ps=: "Baron James urged him&nbsp;..."}} Through James's wife [[Dorothy de Rothschild|Dorothy]], Weizmann was to meet [[Rózsika Rothschild]], who introduced him to the [[Rothschild banking family of England|English branch of the family]]{{snd}}in particular her husband [[Charles Rothschild|Charles]] and his older brother [[Walter Rothschild, 2nd Baron Rothschild|Walter]], a [[zoology|zoologist]] and former [[Member of Parliament (United Kingdom)|Member of Parliament]] (MP).{{sfn|Schneer|2010|p=130}} Their father, [[Nathan Rothschild, 1st Baron Rothschild]], head of the English branch of the family, had a guarded attitude towards Zionism, but he died in March 1915 and his title was inherited by Walter.{{sfn|Schneer|2010|p=130}}{{sfn|Cooper|2015|p=148}}&nbsp;

Prior to the declaration, about 8,000 of Britain's 300,000 Jews belonged to a Zionist organisation.{{sfn|Stein|1961|pp=66–67}}{{sfn|Schneer|2010|p=110}} Globally, as of 1913 – the latest known date prior to the declaration – the equivalent figure was approximately 1%.{{sfn|Fromkin|1990|p=294}}

=== Ottoman Palestine ===
{{further|Ottoman Syria|History of Palestine#Restoration of Ottoman control}}
{{Annotated image 4|
| caption=Published in 1732, this map by Ottoman geographer [[Kâtip Çelebi]] (1609–57) shows the term {{lang|ar|ارض فلسطين}} (''ʾarḍ Filasṭīn'', "Land of Palestine") extending vertically down the length of the [[Jordan River]].{{sfn|Tamari|2017|p=29}}
| image=Houghton Typ 794.34.475 - Kâtip Çelebi, Kitab-ı cihannüma.jpg
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The year 1916 marked four centuries since Palestine had [[Ottoman–Mamluk War (1516–17)|become part of the Ottoman Empire]], also known as the Turkish Empire.{{sfn|Cleveland|Bunton|2016|p=38}} For most of this period, the Jewish population represented a small minority, approximately 3% of the total, with Muslims representing the largest segment of the population, and Christians the second.{{sfn|Quigley|1990|p=10}}{{sfn|Friedman|1973|p=282}}<ref>{{harvnb|Della Pergola|2001|p=5}} and {{harvnb|Bachi|1974|p=5}}</ref>{{efn|group=lower-roman|Yonathan Mendel writes: The exact percentage of Jews in Palestine prior to the rise of Zionism and waves of [[aliyah]] is unknown. However, it probably ranged from 2 to 5 per cent. According to Ottoman records, a total population of 462,465 resided in 1878 in what is today Israel/Palestine. Of this number, 403,795 (87 per cent) were Muslim, 43,659 (10 per cent) were Christian and 15,011 (3 per cent) were Jewish (quoted in Alan Dowty, Israel/Palestine, Cambridge: Polity, 2008, p. 13). See also Mark Tessler, A History of the Israeli–Palestinian Conflict (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1994), pp. 43 and 124.{{sfn|Mendel|2014|p=188}}}}

Ottoman government in [[Constantinople]] began to apply restrictions on Jewish immigration to Palestine in late 1882, in response to the start of the [[First Aliyah]] earlier that year.{{sfn|Friedman|1997|pp=39–40}} Although this immigration was creating a certain amount of tension with the local population, mainly among the merchant and [[Ayan (class)|notable]] classes, in 1901 the [[Sublime Porte]] (the Ottoman central government) gave Jews the same rights as Arabs to buy land in Palestine and the percentage of Jews in the population rose to 7% by 1914.{{sfn|Tessler|2009|p=144}} At the same time, with growing distrust of the [[Young Turks]] (Turkish nationalists who had [[Young Turk Revolution|taken control of the Empire]] in 1908) and the [[Second Aliyah]], [[Arab nationalism]] and [[Palestinian nationalism]] was on the rise; and in Palestine anti-Zionism was a characteristic that unified these forces.{{sfn|Tessler|2009|p=144}}{{sfn|Neff|1995|pp=159–164}} Historians do not know whether these strengthening forces would still have ultimately resulted in conflict in the absence of the Balfour Declaration.{{efn|group=lower-roman|Schneer noted that: "The Balfour Declaration was not, in and of itself, the source of trouble in a land that previously had been more or less at peace, but nor was it a mere signpost on a road heading undivertibly toward a cliff. No one can say what the course of events in Palestine might have been without it. What did come was the product of forces and factors entirely unforeseen."{{sfn|Schneer|2010|p=14}}}}

=== First World War ===
{{further|Timeline of World War I}}

==== 1914–16: Initial Zionist–British Government discussions ====

In July 1914 war broke out in Europe between the [[Triple Entente]] (Britain, France, and the [[Russian Empire]]) and the [[Central Powers]] (Germany, Austria-Hungary, and, later that year, the [[Ottoman Empire]]).{{sfn|Schneer|2010|p=32}}

The [[Cabinet of the United Kingdom|British Cabinet]] first discussed Palestine at a meeting on 9{{nbsp}}November 1914, four days after Britain's declaration of war on the Ottoman Empire, of which the [[Mutasarrifate of Jerusalem]]{{snd}}often referred to as Palestine{{sfn|Büssow|2011|p=5}}{{snd}}was a component. At the meeting [[David Lloyd George]], then [[Chancellor of the Exchequer]], "referred to the ultimate destiny of Palestine".{{sfn|Reid|2011|p=115}} The Chancellor, whose law firm Lloyd George, Roberts and Co had been engaged a decade before by the [[Zionist Federation of Great Britain and Ireland]] to work on the [[Uganda Scheme]],{{sfn|Defries|2014|p=44}} was to become Prime Minister by the time of the declaration, and was ultimately responsible for it.{{sfn|Lewis|2009|pp=115–119}}

[[File:Future of Palestine Herbert Samuel memorandum 1915 CAB 37 123 43.jpg|thumb|left|Herbert Samuel's Cabinet memorandum, ''[[The Future of Palestine]]'', as published in the British Cabinet papers (CAB 37/123/43), as at 21{{nbsp}}January 1915]]

Weizmann's political efforts picked up speed,{{efn|group=qt|name=Weiz1|From Weizmann's memoirs: "The entry of Turkey into the fray and the remarks made by the Premier in his Guildhall speech were an additional impulse towards proceeding with the reconnoitring work at a higher speed&nbsp;... An opportunity offered itself to discuss the Jewish problems with Mr. C.&nbsp;P. Scott (Editor of the Manchester Guardian)… Mr.&nbsp;Scott, who has, I believe, given the whole problem a very careful and sympathetic attention, was good enough to promise that he would talk to Mr.&nbsp;Lloyd George on the subject&nbsp;... As it happened, Mr.&nbsp;Lloyd George, having several engagements for the week suggested that I should see Mr.&nbsp;Herbert Samuel, and an interview took place at his office. [Footnote: 10&nbsp;Dec. 1914]"{{sfn|Weizmann|1983|p=122}}}} and on 10{{nbsp}}December 1914 he met with [[Herbert Samuel]], a British Cabinet member and a secular Jew who had studied Zionism;{{sfn|Huneidi|2001|pp=79–81}} Samuel believed Weizmann's demands were too modest.{{efn|group=qt|Weizmann's memoirs: "He believed that my demands were too modest, that big things would have to be done in Palestine; he himself would move and would expect Jewry to move immediately the military situation was cleared up&nbsp;... The Jews would have to bring sacrifices and he was prepared to do so. At this point I ventured to ask in which way the plans of Mr.&nbsp;Samuel were more ambitious than mine. Mr.&nbsp;Samuel preferred not to enter into a discussion of his plans, as he would like to keep them 'liquid', but he suggested that the Jews would have to build railways, harbours, a university, a network of schools, etc.&nbsp;... He also thinks that perhaps the Temple may be rebuilt, as a symbol of Jewish unity, of course, in a modernised form."{{sfn|Weizmann|1983|p=122b}}}} Two days later, Weizmann met Balfour again, for the first time since their initial meeting in 1905; Balfour had been out of government ever since his electoral defeat in 1906, but remained a senior member of the [[Conservative Party (UK)|Conservative Party]] in their role as [[Her Majesty's Most Loyal Opposition (United Kingdom)|Official Opposition]].{{efn|group=qt|Again from Weizmann's memoirs: "On the suggestion of Baron James, I went to see Sir Philip Magnus with whom I had a lengthy conversation, and he expressed his willingness to cooperate, provided that great discretion was used&nbsp;... I asked Sir Philip his opinion of the advisability of seeing Mr.&nbsp;Balfour, and he thought that an interview with Mr.&nbsp;Balfour would be of very great interest and value&nbsp;... At one of my visits to London I wrote to Mr.&nbsp;Balfour and got an appointment with him on Saturday the same week at 12&nbsp;o'clock in his house.[Footnote: 12&nbsp;Dec. 1914] I spoke to him practically in the same strain as I did to Mr.&nbsp;Samuel, but the whole turn of our conversation was more academic than practical."{{sfn|Weizmann|1983|p=126}}}}

A month later, Samuel circulated a memorandum entitled ''[[The Future of Palestine]]'' to his Cabinet colleagues. The memorandum stated: "I am assured that the solution of the problem of Palestine which would be much the most welcome to the leaders and supporters of the Zionist movement throughout the world would be the annexation of the country to the British Empire".{{sfn|Kamel|2015|p=106}} Samuel discussed a copy of his memorandum with Nathan Rothschild in February 1915, a month before the latter's death.{{sfn|Cooper|2015|p=148}} It was the first time in an official record that enlisting the support of Jews as a war measure had been proposed.{{sfn|Huneidi|2001|p=83}}

Many further discussions followed, including the initial meetings in 1915–16 between Lloyd George, who had been appointed [[Minister of Munitions]] in May 1915,{{sfn|Billauer|2013|p=21}} and Weizmann, who was appointed as a scientific advisor to the ministry in September 1915.{{sfn|Lieshout|2016|p=198}}{{sfn|Billauer|2013|p=21}} Seventeen years later, in his ''War Memoirs'', Lloyd George described these meetings as being the "fount and origin" of the declaration; historians have rejected this claim.{{efn|group=qt|Weizmann had been asked to produce a [[Acetone–butanol–ethanol fermentation|new process for the production of acetone]] in order to reduce the cost of [[cordite]] production;{{sfn|Lewis|2009|pp=115–119}} the popular suggestion that this role influenced the decision to release the declaration has been described as "fanciful",{{sfn|Defries|2014|p=50}} a "legend", a "myth",{{sfn|Cohen|2014|p=47}} and "a product of [Lloyd George's] imagination".{{sfn|Lewis|2009|p=115}} From Lloyd George's ''War Memoirs'', which created this myth: "But by the spring of 1915 the position in the American acetone market had become extremely delicate&nbsp;... In the survey we made of all the various prospective requirements, it soon became clear that the supplies of wood alcohol for the manufacture of acetone would prove quite insufficient to meet the increasing demands, particularly in 1916&nbsp;... While I was casting about for some solution of the difficulty, I ran against the late C.&nbsp;P. Scott, Editor of the Manchester Guardian&nbsp;... I took his word about Professor Weizmann and invited him to London to see me&nbsp;... He could produce acetone by a fermentation process on a laboratory scale, but it would require some time before he could guarantee successful production on a manufacturing scale. In a few weeks' time he came to me and said: "The problem is solved."... When our difficulties were solved through Dr.&nbsp;Weizmann's genius I said to him: 'You have rendered great service to the State, and I should like to ask the Prime Minister to recommend you to His Majesty for some honour.' He said: 'There is nothing I want for myself.' 'But is there nothing we can do as a recognition of your valuable assistance to the country?' I asked. &nbsp;He replied: 'Yes, I would like you to do something for my people.' He then explained his aspirations as to the repatriation of the Jews to the sacred land they had made famous. That was the fount and origin of the famous declaration about the National Home for Jews in Palestine. As soon as I became Prime Minister I talked the whole matter over with Mr.&nbsp;Balfour, who was then Foreign Secretary. As a scientist he was immensely interested when I told him of Dr.&nbsp;Weizmann's achievement. We were anxious at that time to gather Jewish support in neutral countries, notably in America. Dr.&nbsp;Weizmann was brought into direct contact with the Foreign Secretary. This was the beginning of an association, the outcome of which, after long examination, was the famous Balfour Declaration&nbsp;..."{{sfn|Lloyd George|1933|p=50}}}}

==== 1915–16: Prior British commitments over Palestine ====
{{Main|McMahon–Hussein correspondence|Sykes–Picot Agreement}}
{{multiple image
| total_width=450|height1=120|height2=120|height3=120
| image2 = 1918 British Government Map illustrating Territorial Negotiations between H.M.G. and King Hussein.png
| width2 = 225
| caption2 = Map from FO 371/4368 (Nov. 1918) showing Palestine in the "Arab" area{{sfn|Kattan|2009|p=xxxiv (Map 2), and p.109}}
| image1 = Conflicting British Government interpretations of the Hussein McMahon correspondence of 1915, showing interpretations from 1918 and 1922.png
| width1 = 225
| caption1 = Excerpts from CAB 24/68/86 (Nov. 1918) and the [[Churchill White Paper]] (June 1922)
| footer = The Cabinet document states that Palestine was included in the McMahon pledge to the Arabs, whereas the White Paper states that it "has always been regarded" as being excluded.{{sfn|Posner|1987|p=144}}{{efn|group=lower-roman|Kedourie described the White Paper's 1922 statement as: "... the untruth that the government had 'always' regarded McMahon's reservation as covering the vilayet of Beirut and the sanjaq of Jerusalem, since in fact this argument was no older than Young's memorandum of November 1920"{{sfn|Kedourie|1976|p=246}}}}
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In late 1915 the [[List of diplomats of the United Kingdom to Egypt|British High Commissioner to Egypt]], [[Henry McMahon]], [[McMahon–Hussein correspondence|exchanged ten letters]] with [[Hussein bin Ali, Sharif of Mecca]], in which he promised Hussein to recognize Arab independence "in the limits and boundaries proposed by the Sherif of Mecca" in return for Hussein launching a revolt against the Ottoman Empire. The pledge excluded "portions of [[Syria]]" lying to the west of "the districts of Damascus, [[Homs]], [[Hama]] and [[Aleppo]]".{{sfn|Huneidi|2001|p=65}}{{efn|group=qt|See [[:File:McMahon–Hussein Letter 25 October 1915.jpg|the original 25 October 1915 letter here]]. [[George Antonius]]&nbsp;– who had been the first to publish the correspondence in full&nbsp;– described this letter as "by far the most important in the whole correspondence, and may perhaps be regarded as the most important international document in the history of the Arab national movement&nbsp;... is still invoked as the main piece of evidence on which the Arabs accuse Great Britain of having broken faith with them."{{sfn|Antonius|1938|p=169}}}} In the decades after the war, the extent of this coastal exclusion was hotly disputed{{sfn|Huneidi|2001|pp=65–70}} since Palestine lay to the southwest of [[Damascus]] and was not explicitly mentioned.{{sfn|Huneidi|2001|p=65}}
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| caption=Palestine in the [[Sykes–Picot Agreement]] map under "international administration", with [[Haifa Bay]], [[Acre, Israel|Acre]] and [[Haifa]] as a British enclave, and excluding the area from [[Hebron]] south{{efn|group=qt|In a 27&nbsp;February 1916 letter, prior to his departure to Russia, Sykes wrote to Samuel: "I read [[The Future of Palestine|[your 1915] memorandum]] and have committed it to memory."{{sfn|Kamel|2015|p=109}} With respect to the borders, Sykes explained: "By excluding Hebron and the East of the Jordan there is less to discuss with the Moslems, as the Mosque of Omar then becomes the only matter of vital importance to discuss with them and further does away with any contact with the bedouins, who never cross the river except on business. I imagine that the principal object of Zionism is the realization of the ideal of an existing centre of nationality rather than boundaries or extent of territory."{{sfn|Sanders|1984|p=347}}}}
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The [[Arab Revolt]] was launched on June{{nbsp}}5th, 1916,{{sfn|Kattan|2009|p=103}} on the basis of the ''quid pro quo'' agreement in the correspondence.{{sfn|Kattan|2009|p=101}} However, less than three weeks earlier the governments of the United Kingdom, France, and Russia [[secret treaty|secretly concluded]] the [[Sykes–Picot Agreement]], which Balfour described later as a "wholly new method" for dividing the region, after the 1915 agreement "seems to have been forgotten".{{efn|group=qt|In his August 1919 memo Balfour noted, "In 1915 it was the Sherif of Mecca to whom the task of delimitation was to have been confided, nor were any restrictions placed upon his discretion in this matter, except certain reservations intended to protect French interests in Western Syria and Cilicia. In 1916 all this seems to have been forgotten. The Sykes–Picot Agreement made no reference to the Sherif of Mecca, and, so far as our five documents are concerned, he has never been heard of since. A wholly new method was adopted by France and England, who made with each other in the Sykes–Picot Agreement the rough and ready territorial arrangements already described—arrangements which the Allied and Associated Powers have so far neither explicitly accepted nor explicitly replaced."<ref name="Balfour1919" />}}

This Anglo-French treaty was negotiated in late 1915 and early 1916 between Sir [[Mark Sykes]] and [[François Georges-Picot]], with the primary arrangements being set out in draft form in a joint memorandum on 5 January 1916.{{sfn|Kedourie|2013|p=66}}{{sfn|Dockrill|Lowe|2002|pp=539–543, full memorandum}} Sykes was a British Conservative [[Kingston upon Hull Central (UK Parliament constituency)|MP]] who had risen to a position of significant influence on Britain's Middle East policy, beginning with his seat on the 1915 [[De Bunsen Committee]] and his initiative to create the [[Arab Bureau]].{{sfn|Ulrichsen|Ulrichsen|2014|pp=155–156}} Picot was a French diplomat and former [[Consul (representative)#Consular rank|consul-general]] in Beirut.{{sfn|Ulrichsen|Ulrichsen|2014|pp=155–156}} Their agreement defined the proposed spheres of influence and control in Western Asia should the Triple Entente succeed in defeating the Ottoman Empire during World War{{nbsp}}I,{{sfn|Schneer|2010|pp=75–86}}<ref name="Khouri">{{harvnb|Khouri|1985|pp=8–10}}</ref> dividing many Arab territories into British- and French-administered areas. In Palestine, internationalisation was proposed,{{sfn|Schneer|2010|pp=75–86}}<ref name="Khouri" /> with the form of administration to be confirmed after consultation with both Russia and Hussein;{{sfn|Schneer|2010|pp=75–86}} the January draft noted Christian and Muslim interests, and that "members of the Jewish community throughout the world have a conscientious and sentimental interest in the future of the country."{{sfn|Dockrill|Lowe|2002|pp=539–543, full memorandum}}{{sfn|Kedourie|2013|p=81}}{{efn|group=qt|Sykes had discussed the matter with Picot, suggesting the creation of an Arab Sultanate of Palestine under French and British protection; he was reprimanded by Grey, Buchanan should tell Sykes 'to obliterate from his memory that Mr Samuel's Cabinet memorandum made any mention of a British protectorate and that I told Mr Samuel at the time that a British protectorate was quite out of the question and Sir M. Sykes should never mention the subject without making this clear'.{{sfn|Lieshout|2016|p= 196}}}}

Prior to this point, no active negotiations with Zionists had taken place, but Sykes had been aware of Zionism, was in contact with [[Moses Gaster]] – a former President of the English Zionist Federation{{sfn|Halpern|1987|pp=48, 133}} – and may have seen Samuel's 1915 memorandum.{{sfn|Kedourie|2013|p=81}}{{sfn|Rosen|1988|p=61}} On 3 March, while Sykes and Picot were still in Petrograd, [[Lucien Wolf]] (secretary of the Foreign Conjoint Committee, set up by Jewish organizations to further the interests of foreign Jews) submitted to the Foreign Office, the draft of an assurance (formula) that could be issued by the allies in support of Jewish aspirations:

<blockquote>In the event of Palestine coming within the spheres of influence of Great Britain or France at the close of the war, the governments of those powers will not fail to take account of the historic interest that country possesses for the Jewish community. The Jewish population will be secured in the enjoyment of civil and religious liberty, equal political rights with the rest of the population, reasonable facilities for immigration and colonisation, and such municipal privileges in the towns and colonies inhabited by them as may be shown to be necessary.</blockquote>

On 11 March, telegrams{{efn|The full text of the telegram to Sazonov may be found in Jeffries{{sfn|Jeffries|1939|pages=112–114}}}} were sent in Grey's name to Britain's Russian and French ambassadors for transmission to Russian and French authorities, including the formula, as well as:

<blockquote>The scheme might be made far more attractive to the majority of Jews if it held out to them the prospect that when in course of time the Jewish colonists in Palestine grow strong enough to cope with the Arab population they may be allowed to take the management of the internal affairs of Palestine (with the exception of Jerusalem and the holy places) into their own hands.</blockquote>

Sykes, having seen the telegram, had discussions with Picot and proposed (making reference to Samuel's memorandum{{efn|In ascertaining what Zionists will accept and what refuse I am guided by your telegram coupled with my memory of Mr Samuel's memorandum to the Cabinet in March 1915.  Telegram say international regime unacceptable memorandum says French dominion equally unacceptable.  As against this [? French omitted] [If Picot represents them correctly] would never consent to England having temporary or provisional charge of Palestine; not even if we offered Cyprus as a gift and appointed French Governor for Jerusalem Bethlehem Nazareth and Jaffa. They seem hardly normal on this subject and any reference seems to excite memories of all grievances from Joan of Arc to Fashoda}}) the creation of an Arab Sultanate under French and British protection, some means of administering the holy places along with the establishment of a company to purchase land for Jewish colonists, who would then become citizens with equal rights to Arabs.{{efn|group=qt|Sykes was reprimanded by Grey, Buchanan should tell Sykes 'to obliterate from his memory that Mr Samuel's Cabinet memorandum made any mention of a British protectorate and that I told Mr Samuel at the time that a British protectorate was quite out of the question and Sir M. Sykes should never mention the subject without making this clear'.{{sfn|Lieshout|2016|p= 196}}}}

Shortly after returning from Petrograd, Sykes briefed Samuel, who then briefed a meeting of Gaster, Weizmann and Sokolow. Gaster recorded in his diary on 16 April 1916: "We are offered French-English condominium in Palest[ine]. Arab Prince to conciliate Arab sentiment and as part of the Constitution a Charter to Zionists for which England would stand guarantee and which would stand by us in every case of friction&nbsp;... It practically comes to a complete realisation of our Zionist programme. However, we insisted on: national character of Charter, freedom of immigration and internal autonomy, and at the same time full rights of citizenship to [illegible] and Jews in Palestine."{{sfn|Friedman|1973|pp=119–120}} In Sykes's mind, the agreement which bore his name was outdated even before it was signed – in March 1916, he wrote in a private letter: "to my mind the Zionists are now the key of the situation".{{efn|group=lower-roman|On his return from Petrograd, following his reprimand, Sykes wrote to Sir Arthur Nicholson "I am afraid from your telegram that I have caused you some uneasiness in regard to Picot & Palestine. But I can assure you no harm has been done, P is in the highest spirits over his new Castle in Armenia, and S[azonow] is apparently delighted to get out of having to take over any more Armenians than he can help. To my mind the Zionists are now the key of the situation-the problem is how are they to be satisfied?...." The full text of this letter may be found at<ref>{{cite journal|title=Sir Mark Sykes and Palestine 1915–16|last=Kedourie|first=Elie |year=1970|journal=Middle Eastern Studies|volume=6|issue=3|pages=340–345|jstor=4282341|doi=10.1080/00263207008700157| issn=0026-3206 }}</ref>}}{{sfn|Dockrill|Lowe|2001|pp=228–229}} In the event, neither the French nor the Russians were enthusiastic about the proposed formulation and eventually on 4 July, Wolf was informed that "the present moment is inopportune for making any announcement."{{sfn|Lieshout|2016|p=189}}

These wartime initiatives, inclusive of the declaration, are frequently considered together by historians because of the potential, real or imagined, for incompatibility between them, particularly in regard to the disposition of Palestine.{{sfn|Shlaim|2005|pp=251–270}} In the words of Professor [[Albert Hourani]], founder of the Middle East Centre at [[St Antony's College, Oxford]]: "The argument about the interpretation of these agreements is one which is impossible to end, because they were intended to bear more than one interpretation."{{sfn|Hourani|1981|p=211}}

==== 1916–17: Change in British Government ====

In terms of British politics, the declaration resulted from the coming into power of [[Lloyd George ministry|Lloyd George and his Cabinet]], which had replaced the [[Asquith coalition ministry|H. H. Asquith led-Cabinet]] in December 1916. Whilst both Prime Ministers were [[Liberal Party (UK)|Liberals]] and both governments were [[Coalition government|wartime coalitions]], Lloyd George and Balfour, appointed as his Foreign Secretary, favoured a post-war partition of the Ottoman Empire as a major British war aim, whereas Asquith and his Foreign Secretary, [[Edward Grey, 1st Viscount Grey of Fallodon|Sir Edward Grey]], had favoured its reform.{{sfn|Gutwein|2016|pp=117–152}}{{sfn|Mathew|2013|pp=231–250}}

Two days after taking office, Lloyd George told [[Sir William Robertson, 1st Baronet|General Robertson]], the [[Chief of the General Staff (United Kingdom)|Chief of the Imperial General Staff]], that he wanted a major victory, preferably the capture of Jerusalem, to impress British public opinion,{{sfn| Woodward | 1998 | pp=119–120}} and immediately consulted his War Cabinet about a "further campaign into Palestine when El Arish had been secured."{{sfn| Woodfin|2012 | pp=47–49}} Subsequent pressure from Lloyd George, over the reservations of Robertson, resulted in the recapture of the [[Sinai Peninsula|Sinai]] for [[Khedivate of Egypt|British-controlled Egypt]], and, with the [[Battle of Magdhaba|capture of El Arish]] in December 1916 [[Battle of Rafa|and Rafah]] in January 1917, the arrival of British forces at the southern borders of the Ottoman Empire.{{sfn| Woodfin|2012 | pp=47–49}} Following two unsuccessful [[Second Battle of Gaza|attempts to capture Gaza]] between 26 March and 19 April, a six-month [[stalemate in Southern Palestine]] began;{{sfn|Grainger|2006|pp=81–108}} the [[Sinai and Palestine Campaign]] would not make any progress into Palestine until 31{{nbsp}}October 1917.{{sfn|Grainger|2006|pp=109–114}}

==== 1917: British-Zionist formal negotiations ====

Following the change in government, Sykes was promoted into the War Cabinet Secretariat with responsibility for Middle Eastern affairs. In January 1917, despite having previously built a relationship with Moses Gaster,{{efn|group=lower-roman|In most narratives, including that of Schneer, Gaster's role in bringing about the declaration has been dealt with dismissively. Attempt have been made by scholars, including James Renton, to rehabilitate his role.{{sfn|Renton|2004|p= 149}}}} he began looking to meet other Zionist leaders; by the end of the month he had been introduced to Weizmann and his associate [[Nahum Sokolow]], a journalist and executive of the World Zionist Organization who had moved to Britain at the beginning of the war.{{efn|group=lower-roman|Sykes was introduced to Weizmann and Sokolow via [[James Aratoon Malcolm]], a [[Armenians in the United Kingdom|British Armenian]] businessman, and [[L. J. Greenberg]], the editor of the [[Jewish Chronicle]].{{sfn|Gutwein|2016|pp=117–152}}}}

On 7{{nbsp}}February 1917, Sykes, claiming to be acting in a private capacity, entered into substantive discussions with the Zionist leadership.{{efn|group=qt|[[Nahum Sokolow]] described the meeting in 1919 as follows: "The 7th of February 1917, constitutes a turning-point in the history&nbsp;... At the commencement of the year 1917 Sir Mark Sykes entered into closer relations with Dr. Weizmann and the author, and the discussions held with the latter led to the meeting of February&nbsp;7th, 1917, which marks the commencement of official negotiations. Besides Sir Mark Sykes, the following took part in this meeting: Lord Rothschild, Mr.&nbsp;Herbert Bentwich, Mr.&nbsp;Joseph Cowen, Dr.&nbsp;M. Gaster (at whose house the meeting took place), Mr. James de Rothschild, Mr. Harry Sacher, Right Hon. Herbert Samuel, M.P., Dr.&nbsp;Chaim Weizmann, and the author. The deliberations yielded a favourable result, and it was resolved to continue the work."{{sfn|Sokolow|1919|p=52}}}} The previous British correspondence with "the Arabs" was discussed at the meeting; Sokolow's notes record Sykes's description that "The Arabs professed that language must be the measure [by which control of Palestine should be determined] and [by that measure] could claim all Syria and Palestine. Still the Arabs could be managed, particularly if they received Jewish support in other matters."{{sfn|Schneer|2010|p=198}}{{sfn|Stein|1961|p=373; Stein cites Sokolow's notes in the [[Central Zionist Archives]]}}{{efn|group=qt|Sykes had also informed the Zionists he was meeting Picot the following day and Sokolow was nominated by Rothschild to join the meeting which duly took place at Sykes's house. Sokolow was able to present the Zionists case and express his desire for a British protectorate although Picot declined to be drawn on this point. The day after that, Sokolow and Picot met alone at the French embassy, on this occasion Picot said "He personally would see that the facts about Zionism were communicated to the proper quarters and he would do his best to win for the movement whatever sympathies were necessary to be won so far as compatible with the French standpoint on this question."{{sfn|Schneer|2010|p=200}}}} At this point the Zionists were still unaware of the [[Sykes–Picot Agreement]], although they had their suspicions.{{sfn|Schneer|2010|p=198}} One of Sykes's goals was the mobilization of Zionism to the cause of British suzerainty in Palestine, so as to have arguments to put to France in support of that objective.{{sfn|Schneer|2010|pp=198–200}}

==== Late 1917: Progress of the wider war ====
[[File:World War I Palestine campaign, Military situation immediately prior to the release of the Balfour Declaration.jpg|thumb|Military situation at 18:00 on 1 Nov 1917, immediately prior to the release of the Balfour Declaration.]]
During the period of the British War Cabinet discussions leading up to the declaration, the war had reached a period of stalemate. On the [[Western Front (World War I)|Western Front]] the tide would first turn in favour of the Central Powers in [[German spring offensive|spring 1918]],{{sfn|Zieger|2001|pp=97–98}} before decisively [[Second Battle of the Marne|turning in favour of the Allies]] from July 1918 onwards.{{sfn|Zieger|2001|pp=97–98}} Although the United States declared war on Germany in the spring of 1917, it did not suffer its first casualties until 2 November 1917,{{sfn|Zieger|2001|p=91}} at which point President [[Presidency of Woodrow Wilson|Woodrow Wilson]] still hoped to avoid dispatching large contingents of troops into the war.{{sfn|Zieger|2001|p=58}} The Russian forces were known to be distracted by the ongoing [[Russian Revolution]] and the growing support for the [[Bolshevik]] faction, but [[Alexander Kerensky]]'s [[Russian Provisional Government|Provisional Government]] had remained in the war; Russia only withdrew after the final stage of the revolution [[October Revolution|on 7{{nbsp}}November 1917]].{{sfn|Zieger|2001|pp=188–189}}