Editing Attack on Pearl Harbor (section)

==Background==
{{Main|Prelude to the attack on Pearl Harbor}}

===Diplomacy===
[[File:Pearl Harbor looking southwest-Oct41.jpg|thumb|[[Pearl Harbor]] on October 30, 1941, a month prior to the attack, with [[Ford Island]] visible (in the center)]]
War between the [[Empire of Japan]] and the [[United States]] was seen as a possibility since the 1920s. Japan had been wary of American territorial and military expansion in the Pacific and Asia since the late 1890s, followed by the annexation of islands, such as [[Overthrow of the Hawaiian Kingdom|Hawaii]] and the [[Insular Government of the Philippine Islands|Philippines]], which they felt were close to or within their [[sphere of influence]].{{sfn|Worth|2014}}{{page needed|date=December 2021}}{{sfn|Bailey|Farber|2019}}{{page needed|date=December 2021}}<ref>{{Cite news |mode=cs2 |last=Burress |first=Charles |date=July 19, 2001 |title=Biased history helps feed U.S. fascination with Pearl Harbor |work=The Japan Times |url=https://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2001/07/19/commentary/world-commentary/biased-history-helps-feed-u-s-fascination-with-pearl-harbor/ |access-date=2021-02-28 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210812140356/https://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2001/07/19/commentary/world-commentary/biased-history-helps-feed-u-s-fascination-with-pearl-harbor/ |archive-date=August 12, 2021 |url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |mode=cs2 |title=United States Maritime Expansion across the Pacific during the 19th Century |website=Milestones: 1830–1860 |publisher=United States Department of State, Office of the Historian |url=https://history.state.gov/milestones/1830-1860/pacific-expansion |access-date=2021-02-28 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210321022956/https://history.state.gov/milestones/1830-1860/pacific-expansion |archive-date=March 21, 2021 |url-status=live}}</ref>

At the same time, Japanese strategic thinkers believed that Japan needed economic self-sufficiency in order to wage modern war. The experiences of World War I had taught the Japanese that modern wars would be protracted, require total mobilization and create vulnerabilities for [[trade embargo]]es and encirclement. As a consequence, Japan needed access to strategically important resources (e.g. iron, oil) that could not be extracted at sufficient levels in the home islands.{{sfn|Barnhart|1987|pp=17–49}}<ref>{{Cite book |last=Iriye |first=Akira |url=https://www.routledge.com/The-Origins-of-the-Second-World-War-in-Asia-and-the-Pacific/Iriye/p/book/9780582493490 |title=The Origins of the Second World War in Asia and the Pacific |date=1987 |publisher=Longman |isbn=978-0-582-49349-0 |pages=168–177 |language=en |access-date=July 21, 2023 |archive-date=July 21, 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230721172204/https://www.routledge.com/The-Origins-of-the-Second-World-War-in-Asia-and-the-Pacific/Iriye/p/book/9780582493490 |url-status=live }}</ref>

Although Japan had begun to take a hostile stance against the United States after the rejection of the [[Racial Equality Proposal]],<ref>{{Cite news |mode=cs2 |last1=Axelrod |first1=Josh |date=August 11, 2019 |title=A Century Later: The Treaty Of Versailles And Its Rejection Of Racial Equality |website=NPR |url=https://www.npr.org/sections/codeswitch/2019/08/11/742293305/a-century-later-the-treaty-of-versailles-and-its-rejection-of-racial-equality |access-date=2021-02-28 |archive-date=April 13, 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210413202236/https://www.npr.org/sections/codeswitch/2019/08/11/742293305/a-century-later-the-treaty-of-versailles-and-its-rejection-of-racial-equality |url-status=live}}</ref> the relationship between the two countries was cordial enough that they remained trading partners.{{sfn|Lauren|1978}}<ref name="PaW-94,96">{{Harvnb|Department of State|1943|pp=94, 96}}</ref> Tensions did not seriously grow until [[Japanese invasion of Manchuria|Japan's invasion of Manchuria in 1931]]. Over the next decade, Japan expanded into [[Republic of China (1912–1949)|China]], leading to the [[Second Sino-Japanese War]] in 1937. Japan spent considerable effort trying to isolate China and endeavored to secure enough independent resources to attain victory on the mainland. The "[[Nanshin-ron|Southern Operation]]" was designed to assist these efforts.{{sfn|Bailey|Farber|2019}}{{page needed|date=December 2021}}{{sfn|Barnhart|1987}}{{page needed|date=December 2021}} Nevertheless, Japan would still rely heavily on U.S. oil imports, including to Japanese forces in [[Manchukuo|Japan-occupied Manchuria]].<ref name=teaglejapan>{{cite web|url=https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1934v03/d649|title=Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs (Hornbeck) of a Conversation With the President of the Standard Oil Company of New Jersey (Walter C. Teagle)|author=Office of the Historian|publisher=U.S State Department|date=October 24, 1934|accessdate=January 18, 2025}}</ref> In a memorandum dated October 24, 1934, Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs [[Stanley K. Hornbeck]] discussed his meeting with [[ExxonMobil|Standard Oil New Jersey]] head [[Walter C. Teagle]] to U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt, and how Teagle was also uncooperative with U.S. recommendations and also given special treatment by the Japanese government, who made him and Standard Oil New Jersey less subjected to Japan's national business regulation policies than they did other companies.<ref name=teaglejapan /> Hornbeck noted in the memorandum that as a result of Teagle's business dealings with Japan, "petroleum products now imported into Japan is of American origin."<ref name=teaglejapan />

Starting in December 1937, events such as the Japanese attack on [[USS Panay incident|USS ''Panay'']], the [[John Moore Allison|Allison incident]], and the [[Nanking Massacre]] swung Western public opinion sharply against Japan. The United States unsuccessfully proposed a joint action with the United Kingdom to blockade Japan.<ref>{{Harvnb|Gruhl|2007|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=ow5Wlmu9MPQC&pg=PA39 39]}}</ref> In 1938, following an appeal by President Roosevelt, American companies stopped providing Japan with implements of war.<ref>{{Harvnb|Gruhl|2007|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=ow5Wlmu9MPQC&pg=PA40 40]}}</ref>

In 1940, [[Japanese invasion of French Indochina|Japan invaded French Indochina]], attempting to stymie the flow of supplies reaching China. The United States halted shipments of airplanes, parts, [[machine tool]]s, and [[Avgas|aviation gasoline]] to Japan, which the latter perceived as an unfriendly act.{{refn|After it was announced in September that iron and steel scrap export would also be prohibited, Japanese Ambassador Horinouchi protested to Secretary Hull on October 8, 1940, warning this might be considered an "unfriendly act".<ref name="PaW-96">{{Harvnb|Department of State|1943|p=96}}</ref>|group=nb}} The United States did not stop oil exports, however, partly because of the prevailing sentiment in Washington that given Japanese dependence on American oil, such an action was likely to be considered an extreme provocation.{{sfn|Worth|2014}}{{page needed|date=December 2021}}<ref name="PaW-94">{{Harvnb|Department of State|1943|p=94}}</ref>

In mid-1940, President [[Franklin D. Roosevelt]] moved the Pacific Fleet from [[San Diego]] to Hawaii.<ref>{{cite news |mode=cs2 |last=Belair |first=Felix Jr. |date=June 23, 1940 |title=Shift of Our Fleet to Atlantic Studied |newspaper=The New York Times |url=https://timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1940/06/23/113094328.pdf |url-access=subscription |access-date=March 28, 2018 }}. "Except for the Atlantic Battle Squadron, the entire fleet is now in the Pacific, based at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii."</ref> He also ordered a military buildup in the [[Commonwealth of the Philippines|Philippines]], taking both actions in the hope of discouraging Japanese aggression in the Far East. Because the Japanese high command was mistakenly certain any attack on the [[List of former European colonies#Asia-Pacific|United Kingdom's Southeast Asian colonies]], including Singapore,<ref>{{Cite news |mode=cs2 |last=Harper |first=Tim |date=August 7, 2009 |title=Japan's Gigantic Second World War Gamble |newspaper=The Guardian |issn=0261-3077 |url=https://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/sep/07/japan-imperialism-militarism |access-date=December 7, 2016 |url-status=live |archive-date=August 24, 2019 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190824111258/https://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/sep/07/japan-imperialism-militarism}}</ref> would bring the United States into the war, a devastating preventive strike appeared to be the only way to prevent American naval interference.{{sfn|Evans|Peattie|1997}}{{page needed|date=December 2021}} An [[Philippines campaign (1941–1942)|invasion of the Philippines]] was also considered necessary by Japanese war planners. The American [[War Plan Orange]] had envisioned defending the Philippines with an elite force of 40,000 men; this option was never implemented due to opposition from [[Douglas MacArthur#Field Marshal of the Philippine Army|Douglas MacArthur]], who felt he would need a force ten times that size.{{citation needed|date=August 2019}} By 1941, American planners expected to have to abandon the Philippines at the outbreak of war. Late that year, Admiral [[Thomas C. Hart]], commander of the [[United States Asiatic Fleet]], was given orders to that effect.{{sfn|Miller|2007|p=63}}

The United States finally ceased oil exports to Japan in July 1941, following the seizure of French Indochina<ref>[https://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USA/USA-P-Strategy/Strategy-5.html Chapter V: The Decision for War] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130525064812/https://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USA/USA-P-Strategy/Strategy-5.html|date=May 25, 2013}} Morton, Louis. ''Strategy and Command: The First Two Years'' 1961</ref> after the [[Fall of France]], in part because of new American restrictions on domestic oil consumption.<ref name="PaW-125">{{Harvnb|Department of State|1943|p=125}}</ref> Because of this decision, Japan proceeded with [[Dutch East Indies campaign|plans to take the oil-rich Dutch East Indies]].{{refn|This was mainly a Japanese Navy preference; the Japanese Army would have chosen to attack the Soviet Union.{{sfn|Evans|Peattie|1997}}{{page needed|date=December 2021}}{{sfn|Hayashi|1959}}{{page needed|date=December 2021}}|group=nb}} On August 17, Roosevelt warned Japan that America was prepared to take opposing steps if "neighboring countries" were attacked.{{sfn|Matloff|Snell|1980|p=69}}

Japan and the United States engaged in negotiations during 1941, attempting to improve relations. In the course of these negotiations, Japan offered to withdraw from most of China and Indochina after making peace with the Nationalist government. It also proposed to adopt an independent interpretation of the [[Tripartite Pact]] and to refrain from trade discrimination, provided all other nations reciprocated. Washington rejected these proposals. Japanese Prime Minister [[Fumimaro Konoe|Konoe]] then offered to meet with Roosevelt, but Roosevelt insisted on reaching an agreement before any meeting.{{sfn|Matloff|Snell|1980}}{{page needed|date=December 2021}}<ref>{{Harvnb|Morton|1962|loc=[http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USA/USA-P-Strategy/Strategy-4.html ch. IV: The Fatal Turn]}}</ref> The American ambassador to Japan repeatedly urged Roosevelt to accept the meeting, warning that it was the only way to preserve the conciliatory Konoe government and peace in the Pacific.{{sfn|Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack – "Review of the Diplomatic Conversations"|1946|p=[http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/pha/congress/app-d.html#314 314]}} However, his recommendation was not acted upon. The Konoe government collapsed the following month when the Japanese military rejected a withdrawal of all troops from China.<ref name="Chapter V: The Decision for War">{{Harvnb|Morton|1962|loc=[http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USA/USA-P-Strategy/Strategy-5.html ch. V: The Decision for War]}}</ref>

Japan's final proposal, delivered on November 20, offered to withdraw from southern Indochina and to refrain from attacks in Southeast Asia, so long as the United States, United Kingdom, and Netherlands supplied {{convert|1|e6USgal|e6L|abbr=off|sp=us|spell=in}} of aviation fuel, lifted their sanctions against Japan, and ceased aid to China.<ref>{{Cite web |website=www.cv6.org |title=Battle Order Number One: Nov. 28, 1941 |url=http://www.cv6.org/1941/btlord1/btlord1.htm |access-date=March 2, 2020 |archive-date=March 2, 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200302183032/http://www.cv6.org/1941/btlord1/btlord1.htm |url-status=live}}</ref><ref name="Chapter V: The Decision for War"/> The American counter-proposal of November 26 (November 27 in Japan), the [[Hull note]], required Japan to completely evacuate China without conditions and conclude non-aggression pacts with Pacific powers. On November 26 in Japan, the day before the note's delivery, the Japanese task force left port for [[Pearl Harbor]].<ref>{{cite book | title=Beyond Pearl Harbor: A Pacific History | publisher=University Press of Kansas | author=Bailey, Beth L. | year=2019 | pages=74 | isbn=9780700628131}}</ref>

The Japanese intended the attack as a [[Preventive war|preventive action]] to keep the [[United States Pacific Fleet]] from interfering with their planned military actions in [[Southeast Asia]] against overseas territories of the [[United Kingdom]], the [[Netherlands]], and the United States. Over the course of seven hours, there were coordinated Japanese attacks on the American-held [[Philippines campaign (1941–1942)|Philippines]], [[Battle of Guam (1941)|Guam]], and [[Battle of Wake Island|Wake Island]] and on the [[British Empire]] in [[Japanese invasion of Malaya|Malaya]], [[Battle of Singapore#Outbreak of war|Singapore]], and [[Battle of Hong Kong|Hong Kong]].<ref name=Gill85/> From the Japanese point of view, it was seen as a preemptive strike "before the oil gauge ran empty."{{sfn|Worth|2014}}{{page needed|date=December 2021}}

===Military planning===
[[File:Japanese attack plan at Pearl Harbor, Japan, 1941.jpg|thumb|The [[Empire of Japan]]'s 1941 attack plan on [[Pearl Harbor]]]]
Preliminary planning for an attack on Pearl Harbor to protect the move into the "Southern Resource Area", the Japanese term for the Dutch East Indies and Southeast Asia generally, began early in 1941 under the auspices of Admiral [[Isoroku Yamamoto]], then commanding Japan's [[Combined Fleet]].<ref name=Gailey1997p68>{{Harvnb|Gailey|1997|p=68}}</ref><ref>[https://www.gilderlehrman.org/history-resources/spotlight-primary-source/japanese-announcement-attack-pearl-harbor-1941 ''Japanese announcement of the attack at Pearl Harbor, 1941.''], "History Resources", The Gilder Lehrman Institute of American History, New York (USA), retrieved 18. Dezember 2023.</ref> He won assent to formal planning and training for an attack from the [[Imperial Japanese Navy General Staff]] only after much contention with Naval Headquarters, including a threat to resign his command.<ref name=Gailey1997p70>{{Harvnb|Gailey|1997|p=70}}</ref> Full-scale planning was underway by early spring 1941, primarily by Rear Admiral [[Ryūnosuke Kusaka]], with assistance from Commander [[Minoru Genda]] and Yamamoto's Deputy Chief of Staff, Captain Kameto Kuroshima.<ref>{{Harvnb|Lord|1957|pp=12–14}}</ref> The planners studied the [[Battle of Taranto|1940 British air attack on the Italian fleet]] at [[Taranto]] intensively.{{refn|"The Dorn report did not state with certainty that Kimmel and Short knew about Taranto. There is, however, no doubt that they did know, as did the Japanese. Lieutenant Commander Takeshi Naito, the assistant [[Military attaché|naval attaché]] to Berlin, flew to Taranto to investigate the attack first hand, and Naito subsequently had a lengthy conversation with Commander [[Mitsuo Fuchida]] about his observations. Fuchida led the Japanese attack on December 7, 1941."<ref>{{Harvnb|Borch|Martinez|2005|pp=53–54}}.</ref>|group=nb}}{{refn|"A [[torpedo bomber]] needed a long, level flight, and when released, its conventional torpedo would plunge nearly a hundred feet deep before swerving upward to strike a hull. Pearl Harbor deep averages 42 feet. But the Japanese borrowed an idea from the British carrier-based torpedo raid on the Italian naval base of Taranto. They fashioned auxiliary wooden tail fins to keep the torpedoes horizontal, so they would dive to only 35 feet, and they added a breakaway "nosecone" of soft wood to cushion the impact with the surface of the water."<ref>{{Harvnb|Gannon|1996|p=49}}</ref>|group=nb}}

Over the next several months, pilots were trained, equipment was adapted, and intelligence was collected. Despite these preparations, Emperor [[Hirohito]] did not approve the attack plan until November 5, after the third of four [[Gozen Kaigi|Imperial Conferences]] called to consider the matter.<ref>{{Harvnb|Wetzler|1998|p=39}}.</ref> At first, he hesitated to engage in war but eventually authorized the Pearl Harbor strike despite dissent from certain advisors.<ref name = "nuclearm">{{cite web | url=https://ahf.nuclearmuseum.org/ahf/profile/emperor-hirohito/#:~:text=The%20emperor%27s%20office%20signed%20off,his%20ability%20to%20do%20so | title=Emperor Hirohito - Nuclear Museum }}</ref> Final authorization was not given by the emperor until December 1, after a majority of Japanese leaders advised him the Hull note would "destroy the fruits of the China incident, endanger Manchukuo and undermine Japanese control of Korea".<ref>{{Harvnb|Bix|2000|p=417}}, citing the Sugiyama memo</ref> Before the attack, he became more involved in military matters, even joining the Conference of Military Councillors, which was considered unusual for him.<ref name="nuclearm"/> Additionally, he actively sought more information about the war plans.<ref name="nuclearm"/> According to an aide, he openly displayed happiness upon hearing about the success of the surprise attacks.<ref name="nuclearm"/> 

By late 1941, many observers believed that hostilities between the United States and Japan were imminent. A [[Gallup poll]] just before the attack on Pearl Harbor found that 52% of Americans expected war with Japan, 27% did not, and 21% had no opinion.<ref name="cipo19411208">{{cite news |url=https://news.google.com/newspapers?id=RPcuAAAAIBAJ&pg=5721%2C1471377 |title=Gallup Poll Found 52 p.c. of Americans Expected War |work=Ottawa Citizen |date=December 8, 1941 |access-date=November 28, 2011 |author=The Canadian Institute of Public Opinion |page=1 |url-status=live |archive-date=August 12, 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210812143117/https://news.google.com/newspapers?id=RPcuAAAAIBAJ&pg=5721%2C1471377}}</ref> While American Pacific bases and facilities had been placed on alert on many occasions, officials doubted Pearl Harbor would be the first target; instead, they expected the Philippines to be attacked first. This presumption was due to the threat that the air bases throughout the country and the naval base at Manila posed to sea lanes, as well as to the shipment of supplies to Japan from territory to the south.{{refn|Noted by [[Arthur MacArthur Jr.|Arthur MacArthur]] in the 1890s.{{sfn|Manchester|1978|p={{page needed|date=December 2021}}}}|group=nb}} They also incorrectly believed that Japan was not capable of mounting more than one major naval operation at a time.{{sfn|Evans|Peattie|1997}}{{page needed|date=December 2021}}

===Objectives===
[[File:PearlHarborCarrierChart.jpg|thumb|The route followed by the Japanese fleet to Pearl Harbor and back]]
[[File:A6M2 on carrier Akagi 1941.jpeg|thumb|An Imperial Japanese Navy [[Mitsubishi A6M Zero]] fighter on the aircraft carrier ''[[Japanese aircraft carrier Akagi|Akagi]]'']]
The Japanese attack had several major aims. First, it intended to destroy important American fleet units, thereby preventing the Pacific Fleet from interfering with the Japanese conquest of the Dutch East Indies and Malaya and enabling Japan to conquer Southeast Asia without interference. The leaders of the [[Imperial Japanese Navy]] (IJN) subscribed to [[Alfred Thayer Mahan]]'s "[[decisive battle]]" doctrine, especially that of destroying the maximum number of battleships. Second, it was hoped to buy time for Japan to consolidate its position and increase its naval strength before shipbuilding authorized by the 1940 [[Two-Ocean Navy Act|Vinson-Walsh Act]] erased any chance of victory.<ref name=Willmott14>{{Harvnb|Willmott|1983|p=14}}.</ref><ref>{{Harvnb|Fukudome|1955|p=150}}</ref> Third, to deliver a blow to America's ability to mobilize its forces in the Pacific, battleships were chosen as the main targets, since they were the prestige ships of navies at the time.<ref name=Willmott14/> Finally, it was hoped that the attack would undermine American morale to such an extent that the American government would drop its demands contrary to Japanese interests and seek a peace compromise.{{sfn|Prange|Goldstein|Dillon|1981}}{{page needed|date=December 2021}}{{sfn|Zimm|2011}}{{page needed|date=December 2021}}

Striking the Pacific Fleet at anchor in Pearl Harbor had two distinct disadvantages: the targeted ships would be in very shallow water, so it would be relatively easy to salvage and possibly repair them, and most of the crews would survive the attack since many would be on [[shore leave]] or would be rescued from the harbor. A further important disadvantage was the absence of all three of the Pacific Fleet's aircraft carriers ({{USS|Enterprise|CV-6|2}}, {{USS|Lexington|CV-2|2}}, and {{USS|Saratoga|CV-3|2}}). Despite these concerns, Yamamoto decided to press ahead.{{sfn|Evans|Peattie|1997}}{{page needed|date=December 2021}}{{sfn|Willmott|1983}}{{page needed|date=December 2021}}{{sfn|Blair|1975}}{{page needed|date=October 2015}}

Japanese confidence in their ability to win a short war meant that other targets in the harbor, especially the navy yard, oil tank farms and submarine base, were left unscathed<!--not exactly ignored: commanders debated another attack to get them, but it was seen as being too risky-->, since by their thinking the war would be over before the influence of these facilities would be felt.{{sfn|Willmott|1983}}{{page needed|date=December 2021}}