Editing Asymmetric warfare (section)

==Definition and differences==
The popularity of the term dates from Andrew J. R. Mack's 1975 article "Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars" in ''[[World Politics]]'', in which "asymmetric" referred simply to a significant disparity in power between opposing actors in a conflict. "Power," in this sense, is broadly understood to mean material power, such as a large army, sophisticated weapons, an advanced economy, and so on. Mack's analysis was largely ignored in its day, but the end of the [[Cold War]] sparked renewed interest among academics. By the late 1990s, new research building off Mack's works was beginning to mature; after 9/11, the [[U.S. military]] began once again to grapple with asymmetric warfare strategy.<ref>{{cite journal|first=James A.|last=Russell|year=2004|title=Asymmetrical Warfare: Today's Challenge to U.S. Military Power|journal=Naval War College Review|volume=57|issue=19|url=https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2085&context=nwc-review}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Breen |first1=Michael |last2=A. Geltzer |first2=Joshua |date=1 March 2011 |title=Asymmetric Strategies as Strategies of the Strong |url=https://press.armywarcollege.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2565&context=parameters |journal=[[Parameters (journal)|Parameters]] |volume=41 |issue=1 |pages=42}}</ref>

Since 2004, the discussion of asymmetric warfare has been complicated by the tendency of academic and military officials to use the term in different ways, as well as by its close association with [[guerrilla warfare]], [[insurgency]], [[terrorism]], [[counterinsurgency]], and [[counterterrorism]].

Academic authors tend to focus on explaining two puzzles in asymmetric conflict. First, if "power" determines victory, there must be reasons why weaker actors decide to fight more powerful actors. Key explanations include:
*Weaker actors may have secret weapons.<ref name="Paul1994">{{cite book |last= Paul|first=Thazha Varkey |date=1994 |title=Asymmetric conflicts: war initiation by weaker powers |url= http://www.cambridge.org/us/academic/subjects/politics-international-relations/international-relations-and-international-organisations/asymmetric-conflicts-war-initiation-weaker-powers|location=New York, NY |publisher= Cambridge University Press |isbn=9780521466219}}</ref>
*Weaker actors may have powerful allies.<ref name="Paul1994"/>
*Stronger actors are unable to make threats credible.<ref name="Allen2011">{{cite journal|title=From Melos to Baghdad: Explaining Resistance to Militarized Challenges from More Powerful States|last1=Allen|first1=Michael A.|last2=Fordham|first2=Benjamin O.|journal=International Studies Quarterly |volume=4 |issue=55 |pages=1025–1045|date=2011|doi=10.1111/j.1468-2478.2011.00680.x|doi-access=free}}</ref>
*The demands of a stronger actor are extreme.<ref name="Allen2011"/>
*The weaker actor must consider its regional rivals when responding to threats from powerful actors.<ref>{{cite journal|title=Deadly Triangles: The Implications of Regional Competition on Interactions in Asymmetric Dyads|last1=Allen|first1=Michael A.|last2=Bell|first2=Sam R.|last3=Clay|first3=K. Chad|journal=Foreign Policy Analysis|volume=14|issue=2|pages=169–190|date=2016|doi=10.1093/fpa/orw026}}</ref>

Second, if "power," as generally understood, leads to victory in war, then there must be an explanation for why the "weak" can defeat the "strong." Key explanations include:
*Strategic interaction.
*Willingness of the weak to suffer more or bear higher costs.
*External support of weak actors.
*Reluctance to escalating violence on the part of strong actors.
*Internal group dynamics.<ref>{{Cite journal|title=Anomalously Slow Attrition Times for Asymmetric Populations with Internal Group Dynamics|last=Zhao|journal=Physical Review Letters |volume=103 |issue=14|pages=148701 |date=2 October 2009|display-authors=etal|arxiv=0910.1622|bibcode=2009PhRvL.103n8701Z|doi=10.1103/PhysRevLett.103.148701|pmid=19905607|s2cid=2413984}}</ref>
*Inflated strong actor war aims.
*Evolution of asymmetric rivals' attitudes towards time.<ref>{{cite book |last= Resnick|first=Uri |date=2013 |title=Dynamics of Asymmetric Territorial Conflict: the evolution of patience |url= http://www.palgrave.com/uk/book/9781137303981|location=Basingstoke, UK |publisher= Palgrave-Macmillan|page=287 |isbn=978-1-137-30398-1}}</ref>

Asymmetric conflicts include interstate and [[civil war]]s, and over the past two hundred years, have generally been won by strong actors. Since 1950, however, weak actors have won the majority of asymmetric conflicts.<ref>{{cite web|last=Arreguín-Toft|first=Ivan|title=How the weak win wars: A theory of asymmetric conflict|url=https://web.stanford.edu/class/polisci211z/2.2/Arreguin-Toft%20IS%202001.pdf |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140823020311/http://web.stanford.edu/class/polisci211z/2.2/Arreguin-Toft%20IS%202001.pdf |archive-date=2014-08-23 |url-status=live|access-date=2012-09-17}}</ref> In asymmetric conflicts [[conflict escalation]] can be rational for one side.<ref>{{cite journal | url=https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2478.2005.00375.x | doi=10.1111/j.1468-2478.2005.00375.x | title=Fully Informed and on the Road to Ruin: The Perfect Failure of Asymmetric Deterrence | date=2005 | last1=Langlois | first1=Jean-Pierre P. | last2=Langlois | first2=Catherine C. | journal=International Studies Quarterly | volume=49 | issue=3 | pages=503–528 }}</ref>